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**CATHOLICISM AND THE SECOND
FRENCH REPUBLIC**

1848-1852

BY

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


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TO

MY MOTHER AND FATHER

IN GRATITUDE AND AFFECTION



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PREFACE

THIS study in nineteenth-century French history had its origin in a seminar conducted by Professor Charles D. Hazen on the Second French Republic, which the author attended during the year 1918-1919 at Columbia University. It is an attempt to show the political influence which the Catholics wielded during the years 1848-1852, their interest in the social questions that were then agitating France, their cooperation with the moderates for the establishment of a stable republic, their fear of the "social peril" and reaction against it, and finally the attempt of Louis Napoleon to capture their support for the furtherance of his ambitions.

I desire to express my thanks to Professor J. Holland Rose of Cambridge University, who greatly facilitated my research work in England; to the Librarian at Cambridge, who graciously accorded me the use of the University Library; to *M. le Directeur des Archives Nationales* for permission to consult several documents in the French Archives; and to the officials of the British Museum and the Public Record Office, London, and of the *Bibliothèque Nationale*, Paris, for their helpfulness. More especially I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to Professor Carlton J. H. Hayes of Columbia University and to Professor William W. Rockwell of Union Theological Seminary, New York City, for reading my manuscript, for revising part of the proofs and for their criticism and suggestions. I am under obligation to Professor F. J. Foakes Jackson and to Mr. Walter M. Horton of Union Theological Seminary for reading the proofs.

PORT WILLIAMS, NOVA SCOTIA, CANADA,
AUGUST, 1923.

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INTRODUCTION

I. CHURCH AND STATE

THE Old Regime in France was characterized by an intimate union between the state and the Church, between the throne and the altar. In the interests of absolute monarchy, it was thought necessary to keep the Church as much as possible under the control of the state; and for this purpose emphasis was laid upon the "liberties of the Gallican Church", which gave it more or less independence of the See of Rome. These liberties were probably the outcome of concessions that the Papacy, from time to time, had made to the Church in France. In 1682, during the quarrel of Louis XIV with the Papacy, an attempt was made definitely to formulate them. The result was the four Gallican Articles of 1682. Article I, the most important in this connection, declared:

Saint Peter and his successors have received jurisdiction from God, only over spiritual matters, those which pertain to salvation, and not over temporal and civil affairs. In consequence kings are, by God's decree, subject to no ecclesiastical power in temporal matters. They cannot be deposed, either directly or indirectly, by the Head of the Church; nor can their subjects be released from submission, obedience and the oath of allegiance, which are due them.

Moreover this doctrine was declared necessary for the public tranquility, and as advantageous for the Church as for the state. The Papacy, however, never approved of these articles, and in 1693 Louis XIV informed Innocent XII that the royal decrees, which made acceptance of these

articles obligatory, would not be enforced. Nevertheless, the articles of 1682 remained the expression of Gallicanism which the majority of the French clergy professed. They were defended in the seminaries and in the schools, and guarded against attack by the vigilance of the French Parlements, which never lost an opportunity to suppress any work that seemed hostile to them.¹ From the papal point of view the so-called Gallican liberties were nothing but a badge of servitude imposed upon the French bishops by absolute monarchy.² From the point of view of the monarchy, they were another prop to absolutism.

But there was another phase of the alliance of throne and altar. The clergy constituted the first order of the state.³ Catholicism was maintained as the sole religion of France. The secular arm was employed to execute the injunctions of the Church, to enforce the observance of Sunday and of the innumerable feast days, and to repress heresy. Anything that appeared to threaten the unity of religion was as ruthlessly suppressed by the government as any attempt to challenge the royal power and prerogative.⁴

Because of its association with the monarchy, because of the privileges which it possessed under the old regime, and because of the anti-Christian spirit of much of the revolutionary philosophy, the Church suffered greatly at the hands of the Revolution. The clergy were deprived of their revenues by the state expropriation of ecclesiastical property, and the relations of the Church with the state were regulated by the Civil Constitution of the Clergy.

¹ Catholic Encyclopedia, art. Gallicanism.

² De Maistre, J., *De l'église gallicane dans son rapport avec le souverain pontife* (Lyon, 1838), p. 341.

³ Champion, E., *La séparation de l'église et de l'état en 1794* (Paris, 1903), p. 4.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

Many, therefore, preferred exile or deposition rather than accept the new order of things. The suspicion that the *non-jurors*, those who refused to take the oath of the Civil Constitution, were intriguing against the Revolution was soon directed against the clergy indiscriminately; and *jurors* [the Constitutional priests] and *non-jurors* alike were denounced as accomplices of kings and *émigrés*. Patriotism therefore in many cases, especially when the armies of the Republic were hard pressed by the armies of royalty, manifested itself in warfare against the Church. The worship of Reason and the *Patrie*, the cults of the Supreme Being and Theophilanthropy, and finally the separation of Church and State, were aspects of this warfare. When republicans did not deliberately attempt to destroy Catholicism, they hoped that, under the light of reason and with the waning of superstition, it would gradually disappear.

Nevertheless the Revolution failed to destroy the Church. The act of separation was regarded as a victory for Catholicism and as a recognition of the failure of the Republic to annihilate it. Although favorable to the state, inasmuch as it produced a free and secular state with control of education, separation was not unfavorable to the Church. The Church, it is true, was split up into various factions, who quarreled amongst themselves and prevented it from presenting a united front to the Republic. But notwithstanding there was, at the close of the Directory in 1799, "an extraordinary development of religious life in France."¹

Napoleon refused to adhere to the religious policy, favorable as it was to the state, which he had inherited from the Directory. Hardly had he been seated in power

¹ Aulard, A., *The French Revolution* (New York, 1910), vol. iv, p. 202.

before he negotiated with the papacy a Concordat, which, says Aulard, "established, and even aggravated, the old confusion between Church and state." No pious motives, no desire to favor the Roman Catholic religion—for he was probably devoid of religious conviction—but personal ambition actuated the First Consul. His political astuteness told him that the Catholic Church, if properly reorganized, if sufficiently subordinated to the ruling authority, could be made a great bulwark to his power. Nominally the Concordat did not abolish the principle of the secular state, as Catholicism was not proclaimed a state religion, but only the religion "professed by the great majority of the people of France." Nominations to episcopal sees were to be made by the First Consul after which the Pope would confer canonical institution. The curés of the cantons were to be appointed by the bishop, but their choice might fall only on persons approved by the government. The chief towns of the cantons alone were to possess priests having the rank of curé. The spiritual needs of all smaller places were to be ministered to by vicars [*prêtres desservants*] who were subject to appointment and dismissal at the hands of the bishop. Both bishops and curés swore to maintain obedience and fidelity to the government; to hold no intercourse with, or support, any league, at home or abroad, which might be hostile to the public tranquility; and to inform the government of any movement inimical to the interests of the state. No papal bull, brief, mandate or decree might be received, printed or put into execution, no council or synod, national or diocesan, might be held, without receiving the authorization and permission of the government. In return the state undertook to assure the bishops and curés a "suitable stipend."¹

¹For the text of this Concordat see *Raccolta di concordati su materie ecclesiastiche tra la Santa Sede e le autorità civili*, edited by Mercati (Roma, 1919), pp. 561-565.

A system that made the Church but a "sacred *gendarmerie*" for the realization of political ambition, however much satisfaction it may have caused at the outset, could not long sustain enthusiasm. Subjection grew increasingly irksome to the clergy; and the Emperor's treatment of the Pope touched the Catholic conscience. The instrument which Napoleon had created to enable him to govern men's consciences through the Pope helped to compass his ruin. His fall was therefore hailed with relief and the Restoration welcomed as a deliverance.

If Napoleon sought to make the Church serve the state, the monarchs of the Restoration endeavored to make the state serve the Church. The government, said Odilon Barrot, "seemed to wish to reign for and by the Catholic Church." The ultra-Catholic party, composed largely of *émigrés*, immediately raised its head and clamorously made its desires known. It demanded the abolition of the Concordat, admission of the religious orders, the destruction of the University, full liberty for the clergy to open schools, removal of the divorce law from the Napoleonic code, restoration to the Church of the confiscated ecclesiastical property which the state still possessed, and compensation for what had been sold—in short a return as nearly as possible to prerevolutionary conditions. A new concordat was actually negotiated with the Pope "in order that," said the preamble, "religion might recover . . . its former prestige."¹ It proposed to revoke the Concordat of 1801 and restore the dioceses suppressed by Napoleon. His Most Christian Majesty was to cooperate with the Holy Father and to use every means in his power to remove the obstacles that hindered the welfare of the Church and prevented the execution of her laws. The Chamber of Deputies, however, seeing in the vague phrases of the new

¹ *Raccolta di concordati*, pp. 597-601.

concordat the yoke of the papacy, refused to sanction it, and Louis XVIII was obliged to inform Pius VII that the French government could not sustain it without shaking the throne. The most that could be obtained was an augmentation of the number of episcopal sees. Furthermore, divorce was removed from the civil code. The influx of religious congregations was encouraged, their right to receive legacies was recognized, and their control of schools winked at.

Louis XVIII, who "did not have for the Revolution and its principles the innate horror that Charles X had retained", possessed some political discernment, and perceived that it was impossible to return to the state of affairs that obtained in 1789. But even this little wisdom Charles X, "the idol and the hope of the reactionary party",¹ lacked. By devotion to the Church he thought to atone for the sins of his youth. He declared that he wished to heal the last wounds left by the Revolution, and announced his intention of renewing, by the ancient ceremony of coronation, the intimate alliance of the throne with religion. A law against sacrilege was passed, processions of the Holy Sacrament, for which inhabitants were ordered to drape their houses, were once more authorized, and France was treated to the spectacle of a king anointed in truly mediaeval fashion at Rheims and piously walking in religious procession through the streets of Paris.

The Catholic clergy [said Odilon Barrot] were impelled by a heedless religious zeal in the same direction as the government. Happy to be able to shake off those legal restrictions that confined them to the sanctuary, they emerged triumphant. Their processions, so long restricted to the churches, conspicuously manifested themselves in public. It seemed as though they had recovered possession of the France of a former day.

¹ Barrot, Odilon, *Mémoires*, vol. i, p. 65.

But this attempt to foist a clerical regime upon the France of the Revolution ill served the interests of religion and of the Church. It caused a resurrection of the Voltairian spirit; it flooded the country with cheap editions of the sceptical literature of the eighteenth century; it aroused "systematic hostility and sarcasm, not only against the ministers of religion, but against religion itself"; and caused the liberal party to become irreligious on political grounds, if for no other reason. "Impiety", said de Tocqueville, "was a form of opposition." The fatuity of Charles X and of the clerical party that controlled the government blinded them to the current of feeling that was growing against such an administration and sealing their doom. In July, 1830, Paris rose in revolution against a monarchy with which it identified the Church. "Catholicism", says a writer of clerical sympathy, "established as a state religion, was one of the aspects of this regime, and the most detested of all."¹

Not only did the Restoration so favor the Church that de Tocqueville could claim with a measure of truth that it ruined itself for the sake of the Church,² but it dragged the Church down in its own debacle. Following the Revolution of July, Catholicism met with a hostility second only to that experienced during the Revolution of 1789. Crosses were torn down by the same hands that destroyed the *fleur-de-lis*. The residence of the Archdishop of Paris and the Church of Saint-Germain l'Auxerrois were sacked as well as the Tuileries. Bishops were driven from their dioceses, and the Archbishop of Paris was obliged to conceal himself for several months. Catholic seminaries were closed. Priests were unable to appear on the street clad in clerical garb without being insulted and ill-treated; while

¹ Foisset, M., *Vie du R. P. Lacordaire*, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1873), vol. i, p. 23.

² Cf. *infra*, chap. i, p. 70.

religion was caricatured in the press and in the theatre. The presence of a young man in a Church, it was said, provoked as much surprise as the visit of a Christian traveler to an oriental mosque; and Casimir-Perier informed the priests that the moment had come when they would have only a small number of devotees.¹

In spite of the hostility of the Revolution of July towards the Church, the new government, if we except a few repressive measures at the outset, was disposed to treat it with tolerance. Personally Louis-Philippe was an eighteenth-century Voltairian who regarded ecclesiastical questions with contempt, and who disliked to entangle himself in religious matters. For political reasons he was desirous of remaining at peace with the clergy. The charter of 1830, while refusing to recognize Catholicism as a state religion, nevertheless acknowledged that it was the religion of the majority of the French people. Furthermore it assured an equal protection to all forms of worship and promised their ministers a stipend from the public treasury. The Concordat was therefore maintained.

The Revolution of 1830 imparted a lesson to the Catholics which they had failed to learn from that of 1789, namely, that their best interests lay apart from any dynastic alliance.

In the face of this hostility [said Melun referring to the situation after July 30, 1830] the idea came to some young and ardent Catholics to reconcile the times and the country with the Church. Accepting public life and discussion as the means, they undertook to win over the minds of men by ending the confusion between the throne and the altar, between that which passes and that which abides, to show that Catholicism by virtue of its universality did not identify itself with or repel

¹ Thureau-Dangin, P., *L'Église et l'état sous la monarchie de Juillet* (Paris, 1880), pp. 3-5.

any form of government, and that far from being hostile to the liberties so dear to France, it was their source, their auxiliary which assisted them to triumph.¹

The leader in this movement was the Abbé Lamennais. He informed the Catholics that they did wrong to seek the interests of Catholicism "in the dust of a shattered throne". In 1830 he collaborated in the foundation of the paper, *L'Avenir*, which soon became identified with his own opinions, one of the tenets of which was the separation of throne and altar. Why does the priest in many places remain alone in a deserted temple? asked Lamennais. Why are his instructions no longer heeded, his precepts sterile? Because the priest has become the "*gendarme* of royalty." Lamennais indeed went the full length of his doctrines and demanded absolute separation between the Church and the state, for which the *Avenir* received the condemnation of the papacy. "The morsel of bread that is thrown to the clergy", he declared, "is only the seal of their oppression." Although his disciples broke with him on this doctrine, the liberal Catholics continued to work for the disentanglement of Catholicism from its alliance with the old monarchy.

As to political opinions [wrote Ozanam in 1834] . . . I desire the annihilation of the political spirit for the benefit of the social spirit. Beyond a doubt I have for the old royalism all the respect that one owes a glorious invalid; but I should not lean upon it, because with its wooden leg it cannot march in step with the new generation.

"For us French," he declared in 1838, "a great thing has been achieved: the separation of two great words which seemed inseparable, the throne and the altar."² This sever-

¹ Melun, A. de, *Mémoires* (Paris, 1891), vol. i, pp. 146-147.

² *Lettres*, vol. i, p. 254.

ance of Catholicism from the dynastic associations of the past, from "all the bonds of the polity that had just fallen", was one factor in restoring the influence of Catholicism to French society and one of the antecedents of the popularity that greeted it during the Revolution of 1848. As early as 1835 de Tocqueville could write:

Irreligious publications have become extremely rare—I do not know of even a single one. Religion and the priests have entirely disappeared from caricature. It is very rare in public places to hear conversation that is hostile either to the clergy or to their doctrines. This does not mean that all those who keep silent have conceived a great love for religion; but it is evident that they no longer bear it any malice.¹

II. THE CATHOLIC REVIVAL

The Revolution of 1789 had been nourished on the deistic philosophy of the eighteenth century, which, during the Revolution had manifested itself in anti-Christian propaganda and demonstration. Nevertheless there was a germ within that philosophy that was making for the revival of Christianity in the nineteenth century. This was the teaching of Rousseau as embodied in the "Creed of a Savoyard Vicar". While itself a product of eighteenth-century deism, it was at the same time a reaction against that philosophy; while capable of a sceptical conclusion, it also tended towards a reawakening of faith. Philosophy, the Savoyard Vicar taught, leads nowhere, whereas religion leads to the love of one's neighbor. "There is no good which philosophy can bring about, which is not equally well secured by religion, while religion bestows much that philosophy cannot give." Religion was not a matter of the reason, but of the heart; not a thing to be gleaned from

¹ Cited from Thureau-Dangin, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

books, but from life. Rousseau exalted what appealed to the heart rather than to the intellect; to the emotions, rather than to the reason; and in this he was one of the precursors of the Romantic Movement. He exalted Christ, the central figure of Christianity, whereas the arrogance of the philosophers had depreciated Him.

I own . . . [confessed the Savoyard Vicar] that the holiness of the Gospel speaks to my heart. . . . Consider the books of the philosophers with all their outward show; how petty they are in comparison! Can a book at once so grand and so simple be the work of men? Is it possible that He Whose history is contained in this book is no more than man? Is the tone of this book the tone of the enthusiast or of the ambitious secretary? What gentleness and purity in His actions, what a touching grace in His teaching, how lofty are His sayings, how profoundly wise are His sermons, how ready, how discriminating, and how just are His answers! ¹

Because he conceived dogmas as symbols rather than truths in themselves, the Savoyard Vicar could accept Catholicism and perform its rites conscientiously.

I serve God in the simplicity of my heart [he said]; I only seek to know what affects my conduct. As to those dogmas which have no effect upon action or morality, dogmas about which so many men torment themselves, I give no heed to them. I regard all individual religions as so many wholesome institutions which prescribe a uniform method by which each country may do honor to God in public worship; institutions each of which may have its reason in the country, the government, the genius of a people, or in the local causes which make one preferable to another in a given time or place. I think them all good alike, when God is served in a fitting manner. True worship is of the heart. God rejects no homage, however offered, provided it is sincere. Called to the service of

¹ Rousseau, *Emile*, Everyman's Library, p. 271.

the Church in my own religion, I fulfil as scrupulously as I can all the duties prescribed to me, and my conscience would reproach me if I were knowingly wanting with regard to any point. . . . I used to say Mass with the levity that comes from long experience even of the most serious matters when they are too familiar to us; with my new principles I now celebrate it with more reverence; I dwell upon the majesty of the Supreme Being, his presence, the insufficiency of the human mind, which so little realizes what concerns its Creator. When I consider how I present before Him the prayers of all the people in a form laid down for me, I carry out the whole ritual exactly; I give heed to what I say, I am careful not to omit the least word, the least ceremony; when the moment of the consecration approaches, I collect my powers, that I may do all things as required by the Church and by the greatness of this sacrament; I strive to annihilate my own reason before the supreme mind; I say to myself, who art thou to measure infinite power? I reverently pronounce the sacramental words, and I give to their effect all the faith I can bestow. Whatever may be this mystery which passes understanding, I am not afraid that at the day of judgment I shall be punished for having profaned it in my heart.¹

. . . Return to your own country [counsels the Vicar] go back to the religion of your fathers, and follow it in sincerity of heart, and never forsake it: it is very simple and very holy; I think there is no other religion upon earth whose morality is purer, no other more satisfying to the reason.²

My son, keep your soul in such a state that you always desire that there should be a God and you will never doubt it. Moreover, whatever decision you come to, remember that the real duties of religion are independent of human institutions; that a righteous heart is the true temple of the Godhead; that in every land, in every sect, to love God above all things and to love our neighbor as ourself is the whole law; remember there

¹ Rousseau, *op. cit.*, pp. 272-273.

² *Ibid.*, p. 275.

is no religion which absolves us from our moral duties; that these alone are really essential, that the service of the heart is the first of these duties, and that without faith there is no such thing as true virtue.¹

Such teachings set in the midst of a revolutionary philosophy almost inevitably inaugurated a reaction towards Catholicism.

During the latter part of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century the creed of a Savoyard Vicar exercised a profound influence.² For all those who on the morrow of the Revolution found the rationalism of the eighteenth century unsatisfying, and they were many, it was a "new Orpheus" to dispel their discontent.³ Some of the followers of Jean-Jacques, content to maintain a respect for Jesus Christ without faith, doubtless did not pass beyond deism. But for many more his teachings became a step towards Catholicism. Rousseau was one of the forces working towards a religious restoration in France, which could not help but be advantageous to Catholicism.⁴ His influence in this direction, however, became all the greater because the Creed of a Savoyard Vicar inspired Chateaubriand's *Genius of Christianity*, a work of which the author could boast that it had imparted its "flavor" to "literature".⁵

During at least some twenty years [says a recent writer] almost all those whom the Savoyard Vicar had brought back to God reentered the Churches behind Chateaubriand. For

¹ Rousseau, *op. cit.*, pp. 275-276.

² Cf. Masson, P. M., *Rousseau et la restauration religieuse*, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1916), p. 272.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 357-358.

⁵ Preface to edition of 1828. The work first appeared in 1802.

this generation Rousseau remains perhaps one of the great spiritual forces; but in so far as this force is constructive, one is no longer able to distinguish its influence from that of Chateaubriand. Temporarily the *Profession de foi* is incorporated in the *Génie du christianisme*, and disappears in the latter's radiance.¹

For Chateaubriand as for Rousseau, Christian "doctrine does not have its seat in the head, but in the heart; it does not teach to argue, but to live well." ² Over against reason, "which has never dried a tear", he places the countless benefits which Christianity has conferred upon the human race. "Who would not be convinced by the beauty and the grandeur of Christianity?" he asks. "Who is not overwhelmed" by the "imposing array of its benefits" ³ The truth of Christianity is thus not demonstrated by proof or by argument so much as by the influence that it has exerted in creating "a grander humanity amongst men"; and a new interest was consequently awakened in the history of Christianity. "The Christian religion makes a dogma of moral equality, the only kind that one can preach without overturning the world"; "Christianity is chiefly admirable for having converted the physical man into the moral man"; "The counsels of the Gospel form the true philosophy, and its precepts the true citizen": these are some of the deductions that he made from his survey of history.⁴ The question with Chateaubriand is not so much, Is Christianity true? but, Is it beautiful? It is beneficial?

This way of looking at Christianity made its appeal to the age; it helped to undermine the scepticism of the eighteenth-century philosophy; it created an atmosphere that

¹ Masson, *op. cit.*, p. 350.

² Chateaubriand, F. A., *Le génie du christianisme* (Paris, 1863), p. 22.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 625.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 619-620.

was sympathetic with Christianity; and it was one of the factors in the revival of Catholicism.

What Chateaubriand did for the revival of Catholicism by building upon one phase of the thought of Rousseau, Count Joseph de Maistre effected by attacking eighteenth-century philosophy. Over against the natural religion of the deists, with their absentee God, de Maistre placed the traditional conception of an ever-ruling providence. Because he perceived in Bacon, whom he called the "father of all errors", the progenitor of eighteenth-century philosophy, he took pains to point out the flaws in his thought.¹ His penetrating insight enabled him to exhibit the fallacies of the *philosophe*, and helped him to discredit them. Voltaire was his particular *bête noir*. He could perceive no merit in a writer who did nothing but "blaspheme" or "insult". "The laugh that he arouses is not legitimate; it is a grimace." To de Maistre, even his appearance had something satanic about it.

That frightful mouth, stretching from ear to ear, and those lips compressed with a cruel malice, ready, like a spring, to open themselves for the purpose of hurling blasphemy or sarcasm. Do not speak to me of that man [said de Maistre], I cannot abide the thought of him. Oh! What evil has he done us! Like that insect, the scourge of the gardens, which directs its fangs only at the root of the most precious plants, Voltaire, with his venom, does not cease to sting the two roots of society, the women and the youth. He inoculates them with his poison, which is thus transmitted from one generation to another.²

But the "great crime of Voltaire" was the "abuse of talent and the deliberate prostitution of a genius created to

¹ *Examen de la philosophie de Bacon* (Lyon, 1836), vol. ii, pp. 25, 267.

² *Les soirées de Saint-Petersbourg, ou entretiens sur le gouvernement temporel de la providence*, 4th ed. (Lyon, 1842), vol. i, pp. 241-242.

praise God and Virtue.”¹ “He delivered over his imagination to the raptures of hell, which lent him all its power to drive him on to the bounds of iniquity.”²

By exposing the errors of the eighteenth century, which were often superficial, and by showing that Catholicism made its appeal to reason, de Maistre did much towards the revival of Catholicism in the nineteenth century.³

Another factor making for the revival of Catholicism was the birth of the Liberal Catholic Movement, the chief honor of which undoubtedly belonged to Lamennais. The Abbé Lamennais had first come into prominence through the publication in 1817 of his *Essay on Indifference in the Matter of Religion*. In that work he sought to show that the validity of Christianity rested upon its universality. Proof was based upon the “philosophy of the common reason”, which was akin to the “general will” of Rousseau, whose influence Lamennais had felt. Christianity was the true religion because it had been accepted by the infallible reason of the human race,⁴ which found its expression in the Catholic Church, and, in the last resort, in the Pope. But beneath this affirmation of Catholic dogma there was the scarcely veiled suggestion that the final court of appeal is in the people. This last phase of his teaching, however, did not come into prominence until after he had fallen out with the Papacy.

What the people wish [said Lamennais in one of his later works], God himself wishes; for what the people wish is justice . . . the accomplishment in humanity of this sublime

¹ *Les soirées*, p. 242.

² *Ibid.*, p. 243.

³ Cf. Ferraz, M., *Histoire de philosophie en France au xix^e siècle* (Paris, 1880), p. 2; Brandes, G., *Main Currents in Nineteenth Century Literature* (London, 1906), vol. iii, pp. 86-112.

⁴ Calippe, *L'Attitude sociale des Catholiques* (Paris, 1912), vol. i, p. 223.

saying of Christ, "that they may be one, O Father, as thou and I are one." The cause of the people is then a holy cause, the cause of God. It will therefore triumph.¹

"You tremble before liberalism", said Lamennais to the Catholics; "Catholicize it, and society will be reborn."²

To Catholicize liberalism was the aim of the group of Liberal Catholics whom Lamennais had gathered around him, the most notable of whom were Abbés Lacordaire and Gerbet, and Counts de Montalembert and de Coux. In order to propagate their ideas they founded the *Avenir* and the *Agence Générale pour la défense de la liberté religieuse*. Although Lamennais, shortly after the condemnation of the *Avenir*, broke with the Church, his disciples refused to follow him, and remained the core of the Liberal Catholic Movement.

Besides the political tenets of the *Avenir*, for which it was condemned by the Pope in 1832, the *Avenir* possessed a social program. The industrial revolution, which was just beginning to affect France, and the *laissez-faire* economic philosophy were creating a poverty and a social injustice that threatened even to surpass the evils of the old regime. Condemning the *laissez-faire* doctrine of Adam Smith and J. B. Say, the Social Catholics of the *Avenir* denounced those, who, in order to "concentrate wealth in the hands of the few", "trafficked in the sweat" of the poor and subordinated the "comfort of the proletariat to the splendor of the favorites of fortune", and demand social justice for the proletariat.³

¹ Calippe, *op. cit.*, p. 232.

² Leroy-Beaulieu, *Les Catholiques libéraux*, p. 82.

³ Lecanuet, *Montalembert*, vol. i, p. 180; *Avenir*, June 30, 1831; cf. Moon, P. T., *The Labor Problem and the Social Catholic Movement in France* (New York, 1921), chap. i.

The question of the poor [affirmed the editors of the *Avenir*], which is not only a question of political economy, but a question of life and death for society, because it is a question of life and death for five-sixths of the human race, is more than ever one of those that calls for a prompt solution in Europe.¹

They lamented that the introduction of machinery into industry, instead of mitigating the condition of the working classes, had imposed on them longer hours of toil, and was creating a race of physical, mental and moral degenerates. They deplored the fact that the destruction of the organizations and corporations of the Middle Ages had left nothing but "the individual and the state", "that is to say, anarchy and despotism."² They arraigned a state and government that enacted "brutal laws", which, under penalty of imprisonment, forbade citizens "to associate, to act in concert and to resist *en masse* the exactions of capitalists."³ Liberty of association was therefore one of the demands that the Social Catholics made of the government. They called upon the Church to strive to usher in a reign of social justice on the earth.

The lectures of Lacordaire, whom Monseigneur Quelen, the Archbishop of Paris, in 1835 called to the pulpit of Notre Dame, were another factor in the popularization of Liberal Catholicism. The cathedral which had once heard the praise of divine-right monarchy, which had sheltered the throne of the goddess of Reason, which had witnessed the coronation of a Napoleon, now rang with the voice of a champion of the rights of the people. Not that Lacordaire was silent on the doctrines of Catholicism, or made light of the rights of the Church. With apologetic for Catholicism couched in terms that appealed to the age, he so

¹ Lecanuet, *op. cit.*, pp. 176-177.

² *Ibid.*, p. 181.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 182.

effectively mingled a demand for popular rights that the ancient edifice was thronged. His lectures even became a theme for discussion in the salons of Paris. To his admirers, who looked for the conversion of the "large and motley" audience that flocked to hear him, his eloquence ranked with that of Bossuet. To his adversaries, "who saw the Revolution peeping out under each of his phrases", he was preaching the "demolition of society" and "presenting the holy water in a *bonnet rouge*". "But always the majority, composed of the younger people, were, like the public, in favor of the great preacher."¹ One quotation will suffice to show the trend of his thought.

Voluntary association [declared Lacordaire], where each may enter and depart freely, is, under conditions determined by experience, the sole efficacious remedy for the three woes of humanity, poverty, servitude and depravity. The Church since the day of Pentecost has proclaimed that aloud. It established amongst its first disciples the voluntary community of goods and of life; it smote with death that hypocrisy which so soon attempted to corrupt its laws; and since, in the course of the ages, it has never ceased to incite the faithful towards association in all its forms, for all purposes. Its unvarying maxim has been to unite in order to sanctify and protect, as the maxim of the world is to divide in order to rule.²

Amongst the men who were attracted by the Liberal Catholic Movement was the Vicomte Armand de Melun, who beheld in it the "surest and most legitimate way of making the influence of Christianity reenter modern society."³ While he found "their rehabilitation of the Middle Ages" "exaggerated", and did not accept "all their ultramontane enthusiasm", that did not prevent him from

¹ Melun, *Mémoires*, vol. i, p. 156.

² Lectures at Notre Dame; from Calippe, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 9.

³ Melun, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

identifying himself with the movement. If he did not become more closely associated with its intellectual leaders, it was because he felt that his mission was the more obscure one of a social worker.¹ "By visiting the poor, by relieving the sick, by instructing and caring for children" he believed that he could "remove the obstacles that separated the lower classes from God." Monseigneur Affre, who succeeded Monseigneur Quelen as Archbishop of Paris, urged him to enter the priesthood, but believing that, in the work of reconciliation of the people with the Church, a layman had an important rôle to fulfill, he refused. Laymen could lend aid and gain a hearing in places where admittance would be refused to a priest.

But Melun's work of reconstruction soon became more comprehensive than that of a social worker. He perceived the necessity of combining the "study of theory" with the "practice of charity"; for hitherto that study had been left too much to the philosophers and economists, in the belief that the practice of charity sufficed to relieve the poor. Accordingly in 1844 he was instrumental in founding the periodical *Annales de la Charité* and a few years later [1847] the *Société d'Économie Charitable*. The rise of industrialism with the attendant spread of socialistic teachings² created the necessity of a careful study of the social and economic questions of the time from the point of view of Catholicism.

It belongs to Catholicism [said Melun], to the men of good will whom it inspires, to apply their intelligence to the study of those questions, to the solution of those problems, to the investigation of all those means, which are calculated to diminish suffering, to facilitate labor, and to remove the dis-

¹ Melun, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

² Cf. *infra*, chap. ii.

trust and the misunderstandings which separate men and arm them against each other. Such was the purpose in the foundation of the *Société d'Économie Charitable*.

The Society debated such questions as the "extinction of pauperism", "the penitentiary system", "the work of children in factories" and "cooperative societies", and discussed social questions with the presiding officers, the leaders and the orators of popular societies. "All the Catholic youth and intelligence took part in its works, and left it only to defend its doctrines in the Chamber or in the press MM. Montalembert, Falloux, Riancy, Cochon often cooperated there."¹ Such was the work of Melun in what he called "the reconciliation of the country and of the century with Catholicism."²

The socialism of the day, most notably the doctrines of Saint-Simon, also influenced the Social Catholic movement.

"The golden age is not behind us, but in front of us," wrote the Comte de Saint-Simon in 1814. "It is the perfection of the social order. Our fathers have not seen it; our children will arrive there one day, and it is for us to clear the way for them." The most important phase of his teaching was his doctrine of progress, which, however, he himself did not construct into a definite system of social progress. That was left to his disciples. But he taught that, as the goal of progress is social happiness, the first need was the amelioration of the condition of the working classes, who formed the vast majority in society.³ Another phase of his ideas was that he gave an important place to religion in the progressive development of mankind. Although he had been schooled in eighteenth-century thought,

¹ Melun, *op. cit.*, p. 232.

² *Ibid.*, p. 233; cf. Moon, *op. cit.*

³ Bury, J. B., *The Idea of Progress* (London, 1920), p. 282.

he had also felt the religious reaction against the irreligious philosophy of that age. Not deism, or even Christianity, was to be the religion of the future, but a *Nouveau Christianisme*—the title of a work which he left unpublished and which promised to “expand the ethic, the dogma, the worship of religion.”¹

One of the disciples of Saint-Simon who had been attracted by his teachings was P. J. B. Buchez, a convinced republican whose political faith rested on the principles of the French Revolution.² In 1821 Buchez had been one of the founders of the *Charbonnerie française* in imitation of the Italian Carbonari. On the appearance of the *Nouveau Christianisme* in 1825 Buchez attached himself to the school of Saint-Simon. “Society as a whole”, said Saint-Simon in that essay, “ought to work towards the amelioration of the moral and physical life of the poorest class. Society should organize itself in the manner most calculated to attain this end.”³ It was a doctrine that appealed to Buchez. But on the development of pantheistic tendencies in the school of Saint-Simon, with which he disagreed, he abandoned it. Then without being less an apostle of the Revolution he drifted back towards Catholicism.⁴ But he carried with him the Saint-Simonian idea of progress by the amelioration of the condition of the working classes. This combination of Saint-Simonianism with Catholicism is shown by the publication in 1839 of his *Essai d'un traité complet de philosophie au point de vue du Catholicisme et du progrès*. History Buchez visualized from the point of

¹ Weill, G., *L'École Saint-Simonienne* (Paris, 1894), p. 2.

² Castella, G., *Buchez, 1796-1865* (Paris, 1911), p. 8.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 9; *New Christianity*, Eng. translation (London, 1834), p. 26.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12. Buchez, however, did not openly profess Catholicism until just before his death in 1865.

view of a progress in which Christianity played an important rôle. It was from Christianity that the idea of the unity of humanity and the unity of history developed.¹ He saw in the Church the "defender of all the poor", the friend of those who suffer", which has feared neither persecution nor the violence of the temporal power in its endeavor to withstand the oppressor.² The mission which the Church has fulfilled in the past it still has to perform in the future. What it was in the first centuries it should be still.

Priests [he said], you are the pillar of light that ought to guide us in the unknown way of the future. You bear the holy ark before which the flood of evil passions should subside. Priests, do not renounce your task; do not leave France to bear the burden and the responsibility alone! Do not curse the attempts that we have made, nor those which we shall be able to make. Do not attach yourselves to that which is temporary, but to that which is eternal. It is because you have remained static, because you have ceased to show us the way, that we have sought it ourselves and have gone astray. It is because you have allied yourselves with that which perishes that the people, who perish not, have momentarily forsaken you. March on, and the world will follow you!³

In harmony with these ideas Buchez sought to effect a reconciliation between Catholicism and the Revolution. The purpose of the Revolution, he believed and taught, was identical with that of the Church; and he would have wished "that the Revolution should declare itself Christian and that it should desire nothing more than that which Christianity enjoined."⁴ He reproached the clergy for re-

¹ Castella, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

² Calippe, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 173.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. i, p. 173. The reference is to the old monarchy.

⁴ Castella, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-14.

fusing to perceive that the interests of the Gospel and of the Revolution were one, and he sought to remove the mutual objections of each against the other. "By the voice of Buchez", Castella has said, "many old prejudices against the Church were destroyed."¹ And conversely he helped to surmount the obstacles that the Church had perceived in the Revolution. According to one of his disciples he was for a long time "the doorkeeper of the Church."² Consequently it was of immense significance for the position that the Church was to occupy in 1848 that, in a period when the republican movement was growing, the affinity between the Gospel and the Republic should be emphasized.

Another liberal Catholic of this period who had felt the influence of Saint-Simon, although in reacting against his doctrines rather than in becoming his disciple, was Frédéric Ozanam. Various tendencies had been felt by Ozanam: the traditionalism of Bonald and de Maistre; the Romanticism of Chateaubriand, whence his interest in the past and the attempt "to show religion glorified by history"; and the socialism of Abbé Gerbet and Charles de Caux. Combined with these was the Saint-Simonian conception of social progress. With this background Ozanam was to become one of the leading exponents of Social Catholicism during the reign of Louis-Philippe, and the Second Republic. While a law student at the Sorbonne he founded the *Société de Saint Vincent de Paul*, which was a lay association for social work, and which almost immediately developed 100 branches. It grew out of the need that Ozanam and other fervent Catholic students felt, surrounded as they were by fellow students who were Saint-Simonians, Fourierists and deists, of "fortifying" their faith. In its discussions the "boisterous sphere" of poli-

¹ Castella, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-14.

² *Ibid.*; cf. Lavissee, *Histoire contemporaine*, vol. v, p. 106.

tics alone was forbidden. "The arena was open and opinions of all sorts, even Saint-Simonian, were admitted to the tribune."¹ But in its wider aim the purpose of the society was to "conserve and propagate the spirit of fraternity",² and to make Christianity interpose itself within the breach that was gradually splitting French society into two hostile camps, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.³ In 1839-1840 while practising law at Lyons he gave a course on Commercial Law, in which he condemned the *laissez-faire* doctrine and branded the exploitation of the laborer by the capitalist as "slavery", advocated associations of laborers and government intervention in "extraordinary circumstances", and demanded a sufficient wage for the laborer. In 1840 he was appointed professor of literature at the Sorbonne. In all his work "the apologist reappeared in the man of letters, in the savant, in the historian";⁴ but it was the apologist who sought to show that Catholicism was making for the material and social progress of mankind.

Such were some of the tendencies that were making for the revival of Catholicism under the Monarchy of July, and preparing for it the popularity that it was to meet after February 24, 1848.

But one other factor must be taken into consideration if we would understand the position of the Church both during the July Monarchy and the Second Republic, and that is the struggle for educational liberty.

III. THE STRUGGLE FOR LIBERTY OF INSTRUCTION

Under the Old Regime education was in the hands of the Church and the religious orders. To instruct the young

¹ Ozanam, *Lettres*, vol. i, p. 67.

² *Id.*, *Mélanges*, vol. ii, p. 47.

³ *Lettres*, vol. i, pp. 211-212.

⁴ Calippe, *Ozanam* (Paris, 1913), p. 126.

constituted part of the duties of the clergy. From the primary school to the Sorbonne education was controlled by the Church. This did not mean, however, that the state was disinterested in education; for the state could not permit anything to be taught that would be prejudicial to the divine-right monarchy. If the state permitted the Church a monopoly of education, it was in order that it might instruct the people to be obedient and submissive subjects of His Majesty. Instruction in religious faith implied instruction in monarchical faith.¹ Thus we find the General Assembly of the Clergy of France affirming in 1770 that "religion instructs the people to bear the yoke with docility and to accept without resistance the chains of despotism." To be an obedient Catholic under the old regime was to be a submissive subject.²

Towards the latter part of the eighteenth century, however, the ecclesiastical monopoly of education began to arouse the criticism and the condemnation of the *philosophes*. Rolland complained that the young men in the colleges knew the names of all the consuls of ancient Rome and were often ignorant of those of the kings of France; they were familiar with the great deeds of Themistocles and Alcibiades, but not with those of Du Guesclin and Sully.³ Some criticized the existing education from the utilitarian point of view, maintaining after Rolland "that the kingdom is never more flourishing than when the reason is generally cultivated"; others denounced it from the point of view of the Rights of Man, reasoning with Diderot that "instruction gives dignity to man, so that the slave speedily feels that he was not born for servitude."⁴

¹ Seignobos, *et al.*, *La lutte scolaire* (Paris, 1912), p. vii.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

The Revolution, therefore, destroyed an educational system which it felt inconsistent with its principles. A clergy that was so closely allied with the monarchy could not be trusted to teach republican faith. Many attacked the Church, if for no other reason than to injure the absolute monarchy. "Many maltreated the Majesty of God only to abase the majesty of kings. They overturned the altars to shake the throne."¹ Consequently it was necessary to construct a new education for a new regime. In order to further its own ends, the state should control public instruction; for it was recognized that this was a means of consolidating its power, as the system of the Old Regime had been of supporting the divine right monarchy. Public instruction was at once a means of developing and conserving democratic virtue.² Moreover, as Condorcet declared: "Public instruction is a duty of society towards its citizens."³

But the Revolution, although educational theories were not lacking, failed to construct a new system of national education based on new principles. Many schemes were proposed, but all proved to be abortive. At the close of the Directory the Church was in a fair way to regain its monopoly of education.⁴ So badly discredited was the official instruction that many of the bourgeoisie and even some of the officials sent their children to schools maintained by the Catholic clergy. It was reserved for Napoleon to reconstruct the educational life of France. This he did by unifying education under what was known as the Imperial University, which was not a local university, but "the sum

¹ *La lutte scolaire*, p. vii.

² *Ibid.*, p. xii.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

total of all the public teaching bodies of the French Empire arranged and drilled in one vast instructional array.”¹

At the head of the University was a Grand Master assisted by a council which consisted of ten councillors who were appointed for life, and twenty for one year. Subordinated to the Grand Master were twenty-seven Academies scattered over France. Each Academy was presided over by a rector who was elected for five years. Relations between the Grand Master and the Academies were maintained by means of general inspectors. The University Council itself was made up of inspectors, rectors of the Academies, professors of the various faculties and principals of the Lycées. It prepared the regulations for the governing of the University, and was both active and powerful.² The entire educational life of France from the elementary school to the Sorbonne was thus comprised within the one system. “No school”, said the decree of March 17, 1808, “no educational establishment whatsoever may be formed apart from the Imperial University, and without the authorization of its head. No one may open a school or teach publicly without being a member of the Imperial University and a graduate of one of its faculties.”³ The Lycées and the secondary schools of the communes, the Colleges, were administered directly by the University. Private instruction, it is true, might still continue, but only under the strict tutelage of the University. Once authorized, private schools were obliged to submit to inspection, pay dues to the University and send their candidates for the baccalauréate to the classes in rhetoric and philosophy given by the

¹ Rose, J. H., *Napoleon I* (New York, 1916), vol. i, p. 273.

² Weill, G., *Histoire de l'enseignement secondaire en France* (1802-1920), (Paris, 1921), p. 25.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

University.¹ All diplomas were granted, and all degrees conferred, by the University.

In appearance the University possessed a monopoly of education; but under the Empire the monopoly was much less rigid than it seemed. The Church was not slow to erect *petits séminaires* which not only trained pupils intended for the priesthood, but which soon became, by reason of their lower fees, veritable Colleges in rivalry with the Lycées of the University. In many cases the Jesuits, who, after the dissolution of their order, had remained in France as "Fathers of the Faith," were installed as instructors. Not seldom did the ecclesiastical instruction prove itself so vigorous that it prevented the development of the Lycées. Moreover the officers of the University, often in sympathy with the Church, connived at the non-enforcement of the Imperial edict. After two years' existence of the University, investigation showed that almost everywhere ecclesiastical rivalry was strong; the schools controlled by the priests were flourishing, while the Lycées decayed; and the academic councils were frequently filled with former priests.² Indeed so unsatisfactory, from the Imperial point of view, did the system prove, that, on November 15, 1811, Napoleon issued a decree which was calculated to increase the monopoly of the state. Henceforth there should be only one ecclesiastical establishment in a department, which was to be situated in a town where there was a Lycée or College; it could not receive pupils over nine years of age if the school of the University could provide them with lodging; and it was obliged to send its pupils to classes in the state institution.³ But this new decree proved ineffec-

¹ Weill, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

² *La lutte scolaire*, p. 28.

³ Weill, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

tive in strengthening the monopoly of the University. The clergy attempted to open schools in the *Grands Séminaires* under the pretext that all their students were intended for the priesthood. The new edict was flagrantly disregarded, even officials conniving at its non-enforcement. There was a partiality for clerical instruction, especially amongst the old nobility—all of which tended to favor the ecclesiastical schools at the expense of those of the University.¹

If lay instruction was unable to flourish in the face of ecclesiastical opposition during the Empire, when there was some pretense at enforcement of the University monopoly, still less could it do so under the Restoration when ecclesiastical instruction was openly favored. Louis XVIII had been on the throne hardly six months before he issued an ordinance permitting bishops and archbishops to open secondary ecclesiastical schools in each department, and to appoint their instructors, an edict that practically rescinded the Imperial edict of November 15, 1811. Such schools might be placed in the country regardless of the existence there of a Lycée or College. Their pupils were exempted from attendance at classes of the Lycée and from payment of fees to the University; and after completing their studies in the ecclesiastical school, they might present themselves before the University for examination and obtain its degree, which would be conferred gratuitously.² Thus ecclesiastical schools were established throughout France under control of priests and even of Jesuits, and more or less independent of the jurisdiction of the University. During the early part of the Restoration, indeed, some semblance of lay control of the University was maintained; but in 1822 a bishop, Monseigneur Frayssinous, became Grand Master, and for six years the University remained under the domina-

¹ *La lutte scolaire*, pp. 30 et seq.

² Debidour, *op. cit.*, p. 695, document xiv.

tion of the Church. This resulted in a general dismissal of lay headmasters as well as of some lay instructors, and the substitution of secular clergy or members of congregations.¹ In 1828, however, with the fall of the Villèle ministry, which had appointed Frayssinous, and the rise of the Martignac ministry, there came a change of policy. On June 16, 1828, appeared the two famous ordinances that sought to protect the University against the clergy. The first decreed that no one should remain at the head of, or give instruction in, a school which belonged to the University, or in one of the secondary ecclesiastical establishments, unless he affirmed in writing that he did not belong to any unauthorized religious congregation. With one blow the Jesuits were thus excluded. The second ordinance limited the number of pupils admitted to ecclesiastical schools to 20,000, compelled all students in such institutions who were over fourteen years of age to wear the ecclesiastical habit, and forbade the attendance of day pupils.² The bishops immediately prepared to resist; but they were silenced by the intervention of Rome.³

But during the Restoration a new tendency, which was destined to be predominant during the monarchy of July, was introduced into the struggle between the Church and the state. This was the demand for liberty of instruction, *liberté d'enseignement*. In the early part of the Restoration, the liberals, following out their principles to their logical conclusion, opposed monopoly in education. In 1817 Benjamin Constant, "invoking Adam Smith and Condorcet, refused the government all right of coercion." "In education as in everything else", he said, "let the government watch over and preserve, but let it remain neutral

¹ Weill, *op. cit.*, pp. 56 *et seq.*

² Debidour, *L'Église et l'état*, pp. 699 *et seq.*

³ Weill, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

...”¹ Another liberal, Renouard, a member of three educational societies which were founded in 1828, declared: “Unity of instruction is the chimera of every despotism, whether political, scientific or religious.”² Irritated by the ordinances of 1828, the Liberal Catholic party, which was then in its infancy, took up, amidst the ironical congratulations of their adversaries, the same cry. A deputy of the right was able to say that he congratulated himself on being in accord with Benjamin Constant against the monopoly. “Like him, I ask only liberty for all, for the one as well as for the other. Like him I think that the truth is strong enough to require only the neutrality of the government.”³ But it was Lamennais who, in the early stages of the Liberal Catholic Movement, was to become the leading exponent of this doctrine. It had seemed a terrible scandal to Lamennais that the Church should “figure in the budget [of the state] in the same fashion as the fine arts, the theatres, etc.”, and therefore he had argued for separation of the two powers. Her spiritual empire, he contended, could best be maintained by liberty. For a similar reason he believed that the interests of the Church in education could be safeguarded by a similar remedy. Catholic liberals as well as liberals of purely political tenets could thus meet on a common platform. Both alike claimed that they were heirs of the liberties decreed by the Revolution of 1789.

The liberty of instruction which liberals and the Liberal Catholic party were both demanding at the close of the Restoration was promised by the Charter of 1830. It declared that, with the least possible delay, a law would be promulgated that should embody liberty of instruction, and

¹ Weill, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Id.*, *Le Catholicisme libéral*, pp. 12 et seq.

that all laws to the contrary were henceforth abrogated.¹ Not only did the *Avenir* immediately clamor for the fulfilment of this promise, but a group of Liberal Catholics, Montalembert, Lacordaire and Charles de Coux put it to the test by opening a school. But the school was promptly closed by the police and its teachers arraigned for trial. Montalembert, who, through the death of his father, had just become a peer of the realm, vindicated his cause before the Chamber of Peers, and demanded that the promise of the Charter be carried out. "All my life I shall congratulate myself", he declared, "with having been able to consecrate these first utterances of my voice in demanding for my country the single liberty that can fortify and regenerate it."² A nominal fine was imposed on the schoolmasters, but the incident was in reality a defeat for the government. Although the condemnation of the *Avenir*, which came shortly afterwards, was a repulse for the Liberal Catholic party, the beginnings of the movement were not without some fruit. In 1833 Guizot was instrumental in the passing of a law that fulfilled, as far as primary instruction was concerned, the promise of the Charter. One part of the monopoly was thus suppressed. In 1836 Guizot proposed a similar project for secondary instruction, but the fear that the Jesuits awakened in the minds of the bourgeoisie prevented it from passing the Chamber of Deputies. Then in 1841 Villemain, the minister of public instruction, brought forward a new law. It assured liberty of instruction; but in subjecting the *petits séminaires* to the inspection of the University, it brought down the condemnation of the higher clergy, and Villemain, unwilling to engage in a struggle with the episcopate, withdrew it.³

¹ Mourret, F., *Le mouvement Catholique en France de 1830 à 1850* (Paris, 1917), p. 195.

² Lecanuët, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 250.

³ Lavissee, *op. cit.*, vol. v, pp. 334-335.

The episcopate, especially after the condemnation of the *Avenir*, had been slow to join in the educational conflict with the July Monarchy. Only after 1841, following the lead of Monseigneur Parisis, the bishop of Langres, did they take part in the struggle. Thenceforth, until the preparation of the Falloux law in 1850, he was to be an able collaborator with Montalembert. The entry of the latter into the Chamber of Peers where he vindicated the rights of the Church, was a strange sight for that body still tainted with eighteenth-century scepticism. "The entrance into the court of the Luxembourg of a knight wearing mediaeval armor and having a cross on his breast would not have appeared more strange to them and less reasonable."² But his youthful ardor and conviction soon won him a respectful hearing. Then the support of the episcopate after 1841 gave the former followers of Lamennais new confidence. They resuscitated the *Univers*, which, under the direction of Louis Veuillot and Charles de Caux, gave them a powerful organ in the press. In order to strengthen the Catholic movement still more the *Parti Catholique*, with Montalembert as its acknowledged leader, was created. "The *Parti Catholique*", said Louis Veuillot, "was born of the necessity of obtaining liberty of instruction."² They promised to give the government no repose until the Church was granted this right which she demanded. They organized the *Parti Catholique* throughout the departments, and prepared to play a political rôle in the elections of 1846. Montalembert urged Catholics to put liberty and religion above every other interest.³

The violence of the extremists in the *Parti Catholique*, of whom Louis Veuillot was the most notable, in their at-

¹ Thureau-Dangin, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

² *Le parti Catholique* (Paris, 1856), p. 14.

³ Lecanuet, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 292 *et seq.*

tack against the monopoly of the University¹ drew from the bourgeoisie a counter attack, of which the Jesuits were made the butt.² This new phase of the struggle caused serious embarrassment to the *Parti Catholique*, and led to a partial suppression of the Jesuits in France. But by 1845 the hostility thus awakened had somewhat subsided. Salvandy, who had succeeded Villemain as minister of public instruction, seemed disposed to conciliate the Catholics, and in 1846 he proposed a new educational law. This project, however, inasmuch as it still maintained the inspection of the ecclesiastical establishments and proposed to prescribe the books that they should use in their instruction, was as unpalatable to the Catholics as its predecessors.

The hostility that the question of the Jesuits had aroused against the Catholics was offset by the advent of Pius IX, who was elected to the pontifical throne in June, 1846. The prospect of a liberal Pope tended to make the Church more popular at home. Both liberals and conservatives vied with each other in acclaiming the election of a liberal Pope. Guizot spoke of "Pius IX accomplishing the reconciliation of the Catholic Church with modern society"; Lamartine called his election "a great good fortune for humanity"; Odilon Barrot compared the work of Pius IX to the "holy endeavors of the great popes of the middle ages"; and Thiers declared: "a holy pontiff, who joins to the piety of a priest the wisdom of an enlightened prince, has formed this very noble project of conjuring the revolutions by according the people the satisfaction of their just needs. It is an admirable work."³

¹ Lavissee, *op. cit.*, vol. v, pp. 330 *et seq.*

² Thureau-Dangin, *op. cit.*, p. 253.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 474.

But besides the favor that the liberalism of Pius IX cast upon the Catholics in France, another factor was inclining the bourgeoisie towards their cause. This was the socialistic propaganda, which between 1840 and 1848, was on the increase. The alarm that it began to arouse within the bourgeoisie tended to drive them into the arms of the Church. Nevertheless the fear of having the Jesuits dominate secondary education outweighed the more recent peril, and prevented the government of the July Monarchy from giving satisfaction to the Catholics. It was to take the Revolution of 1848 and its socialistic menace to counterbalance the older fear.

The very fact, however, that the Catholics formed part of the opposition towards an unpopular government, instead of its allies as in 1830, helped to make them sympathetic with the Republic and the Republic favorable towards them. Catholics, if not actually allied with the Republicans, were at one with them in opposition to the regime of Louis-Philippe and their demand for liberty.

The breaking down of the alliance between throne and altar, the Romantic and Liberal Catholic movements, and the struggle for liberty of instruction are the three factors that explain the situation in which the Catholics found themselves at the beginning of the Second Republic.

CHAPTER I

THE CATHOLICS AND THE REVOLUTION OF FEBRUARY

THE relations of the Church with the state under the government of Louis-Philippe had been such that his fall caused little or no regret on the part of the Catholics. For the same reason they found little, if any, difficulty in giving their adhesion to the Republic proclaimed on the 24th of February. The day following the Revolution the *Univers* wrote: "The dynasty of July has fallen. . . . New men are about to appear on the scene. God performs his work by all sorts of agents. He accomplishes his designs by ways of which the world remains unconscious."¹ Several days later it came out even more strongly.²

Who dreams to-day of defending the monarchy in France? France believed itself still monarchical, and it was already republican. It was astonished yesterday; but to-day it is not even surprised. Having recovered from the first moment of confusion, it is applying itself wisely, courageously, invincibly, to provide itself with institutions which it has for a long time definitively accepted. The monarchy succumbs under the weight of its faults. No one has wrought its ruin as much as itself. Immoral with Louis XIV, scandalous with Louis XV, despotic under Napoleon, unintelligent up till 1830, crafty, to say nothing more, until 1848, it has beheld decrease the number and strength of those who believe it still necessary. To-day it has no longer any partisans.

¹ *Univers*, February 25, 1848.

² *Ibid.*, Feb. 27.

The prospectus of the *Ère Nouvelle*, which appeared during the month of March, was equally emphatic. Referring to the fact that three monarchies had fallen in less than half a century, it remarked:

France is asking herself if kings are not condemned by heaven, since they fall so easily; and she wishes . . . to live and to remain under another form of public administration. Why should we prevent it? Has the Gospel, has the Church, ever condemned any form of government whatsoever? Do Christian institutions flourish better under the autocratic scepter of the Czar than under the democratic sky of the United States? What divine reason is there why we should oppose the establishment of a Republic in France? Assuredly none. . . . There is therefore no duty, religious or divine, to oppose the will of France, if at this moment she prefers the republican to the monarchical form. That is a matter of opinion, not of faith.

It was not enough, however, merely to allow the Republic to exist. Let us follow, urged the editors of the *Ère Nouvelle*, with the most sincere good will each step that France takes. Let us become the most devoted of her children.¹

Not less hearty was the adhesion that the clergy made to the new regime. On the 8th of March Monseigneur Affre, the Archbishop of Paris, accompanied by several of his colleagues, waited on the provisional government and assured it the support of himself and his clergy.

It gives me pleasure to tell you [he affirmed] that you may be certain of the loyal cooperation of all the clergy of Paris. This is not a protestation, of the truth of which I have any doubts. I have beheld the ecclesiastics in all parts of my

¹ Bazin, *Vie de Maret*, vol. i, p. 230, where it is given *in extenso*. This prospectus is also found in volume i of the *Ère nouvelle* in the *Bibliothèque Nationale*.

diocese manifest the most ardent desire to contribute towards the public order as far as their duties permit.¹

The government, wrote the Archbishop of Sens on the 29th of February, 1848, "wishes to associate the consecration of the religious sentiment with the great achievement of liberty regained, to invoke the divine benediction upon the work of the people. . . . Our support is assured to it."² But not only did the clergy accept the Republic as an accomplished fact; many went further still and welcomed it as a Christian institution, as the true consequence of the teachings of the Gospel. "The principles whose triumph should usher in a new era", declared the Archbishop of Bourges, "are those which the Church has always proclaimed, and to which it has once more just given utterance before the whole world, through the mouth of its august chief, the immortal Pius IX."³ "From the religious point of view", said the bishop of Gap, "the institutions which are given us to-day are not new: they were proclaimed on Golgotha."⁴ "Our flag", wrote the bishop of Châlons, "now bears for a device: Liberty, Equality, Fraternity; it is the whole Gospel in its simplest expression; we wish nothing more. The Republic . . . can count on us, and it will have no better friends."⁵

A republic [announced Monseigneur Parisis, the bishop of Langres] can be very inoffensive; for a long time people have been accustomed to speak of the "republic of letters," to signify literature. A republic can even be very holy; and people have always singled out the Christian republic rather

¹ Bazin, *op. cit.*, p. 195.

² *Univers*, March 9, 1848.

³ *Ibid.*, March 9; Mandate of March 6.

⁴ *Ibid.*, March 19, 1848.

⁵ *Ibid.*, March 14; cf. Bazin, *op. cit.*, p. 199.

than the monarchy, to signify the Church. But what is more inoffensive in itself than literature, and what more holy than the Church of God? The proclamation of the Republic cannot therefore, in any manner, even for the most sensitive consciences, be an obstacle which will prevent them from adhering immediately and stoutly to the provisional government. . . . Nothing . . . is more exclusively Christian than these three words inscribed on the national flag: Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. Far from repudiating these sublime words Christianity claims them as its work, as its creation.¹

The lower clergy likewise accepted the Republic with enthusiasm. "Unprecedented events have just been accomplished in a wholly providential manner", wrote a priest to the *Démocratie Pacifique*. "It is the dawn of a new day that has just burst upon the world."² "Forty thousand curés proclaimed from the pulpit the benefits of the republican regime."³ Religious and charitable societies marched in procession through the streets of Paris to pay their respects to the new government, some of them being mistaken for socialistic demonstrations for so doing.⁴ Prominent Catholic laymen also, such as Melun, Falloux and Montalembert, legitimist at heart, determined to support the new Republic.⁵

Nevertheless the Republic was accepted by the Catholics and granted its support only on certain conditions. The Church can live as comfortably under the regime of a republic as under that of a monarchy, declared the bishop of Beauvais on the 1st of March, "provided that it be granted

¹ *Univers*, March 14, 1848.

² *Démocratie Pacifique*, March 8, 1848.

³ Dreyfus, Ferdinand, *L'École en 1848* (Paris, 1908), p. 8.

⁴ Melun, Vicomte A. de, *Mémoires* (Paris, 1891), vol. ii, p. 25.

⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. i, p. 252; Falloux, *Les républicains et les monarchistes depuis la révolution de février*, *Revue des deux mondes*, February, 1851.

what it demands, before and above all else, the liberty to work towards the salvation of souls and towards the happiness of all".¹ During the entire reign of Louis-Philippe the Church had been contending for certain liberties, the most notable of which was the liberty to give instruction. When therefore ecclesiastics and laymen who had the cause of the Church at heart, hailed the Republic as a new era of liberty, they had in mind this right most eagerly sought. For some doubtless this was the chief reason for desiring the Republic. For instance, the bishop of Nancy, while speaking of liberty in general, took care to specify "liberty of conscience, liberty of association, liberty of education."² "We wish liberty for ourselves and for all," declared Monseigneur Sibour, bishop of Digne, ". . . liberty of assembly and of association, liberty of worship, liberty of conscience, and liberty of education which is inseparable from all the others."³ Even those who were convinced republicans singled out this liberty. The editors of the *Ère Nouvelle* in their prospectus specified liberty of instruction as one for which they would struggle.

We ask for ourselves and for everybody the liberties which have hitherto been refused us, and which Protestant America has refused no one since the day of its glorious enfranchisement. We ask liberty of education, liberty of instruction, liberty of association, without which all the others are impotent to form men and citizens.⁴

"The Church," affirmed the *Univers*, "asks only one thing of human governments: liberty." "Let the French Republic put the Church in possession of this liberty, which

¹ *Univers*, March 14, 1848.

² Bazin, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 200.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 196.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 231.

everywhere monarchs refuse it, or seek to take from it, and there will be no better or more sincere republicans than the French Catholics.”¹ Moreover, one reason why so many of the clergy offered themselves for election was that they might the more readily gain this coveted right; and they gave their support most readily to those who were willing to champion it. The Catholics looked upon the Republic as their opportunity, and they determined to make the most of it. Thus the Abbé Bautain specified in his electoral circular that he would work for liberty of instruction in all its degrees.² Monseigneur Sibour, the bishop of Digne, likewise placed liberty of education and of instruction amongst the qualifications that electors should search for in their candidates.³ And the Electoral Committee for Religious Liberty exhorted the faithful to accord their votes only to those who would guarantee all the liberties of the Christian and of the citizen, amongst which it also specified “liberty of education and instruction.”⁴

Then another condition which the Catholics made to their acceptance of the Republic was that it should be orderly and stable.

What is it that the Church has liked in the Monarchy? [asked the *Univers*; and replied immediately]: a principle of order. What is it that it has feared in the republic before the encouraging example which the United States gave to the world? The lamentable recollection of an anarchy which was for it the negation of all liberty.⁵

Any such thing as a Civil Constitution of the Clergy or Separation of the Church and the State would at once throw

¹ *Univers*, February 27, 1848.

² *Ibid.*, April 2, 1848.

³ *Ibid.*, March 24, 1848.

⁴ *Ibid.*, March 9, 1848. Cf. *Élection populaire*, *passim*.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Feb. 27, 1848.

the Church into the ranks of the reaction. From the political point of view, said the Abbé Etang, the interest of the Republic itself calls for the maintenance of the budget of the Church.

When it is desired to make a new institution acceptable to a people, there are certain precautions that should be taken; and the French Republic is in precisely this situation. Behold these trees, symbols of liberty, which have just been planted in the midst of our public squares! . . . Their roots have not yet penetrated the soil; they have as yet produced neither leaves, flowers, nor fruits. They have not put forth branches, and do not therefore afford any shade. Such is our young Republic. It has not taken root yet in the monarchical soil. It has reassured no interest, foreshadowed no prosperity. If it wishes to live, it is necessary for it to obtain favor in public opinion, and unfortunately it has been discredited before its birth. Its predecessor has served it ill. It is still recalled that the First Republic began its attack against the city by assaults on the sanctuary, which it despoiled before it overthrew it. Will it be good policy to adopt the same tactics and to create the impression that one aspires after the same end? Catholicism is unquestionably the religion of the majority of the French. Will it be policy to injure the religious sentiments of almost the entire nation? And it is quite certain that they will be wounded if the Catholics are denied their priests and their worship. Thus numerous enemies of the Republic will be created.¹ There can be only two parties in France [declared the bishop of Mans], that of good order and that of anarchy. The Christian religion, principle of true liberty, is essentially opposed to all that which is vicious, unjust and disorderly. Let the new government, which has been instituted in such an astonishing manner, guarantee all interests, as it has promised, and it will have universal sympathy and will become very strong. This is my most sincere wish.²

¹ L'Etang, M. de, *Du budget du culte Catholique* (Paris, 1848), p. 33.

² Bazin, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 194, February 29, 1848.

Such was the attitude of the Catholics towards the Republic. How then was the Church regarded by the government and by the people?

The provisional government seems for the most part to have been well disposed towards the Church. Responding to the deputation of clergy consisting of the Archbishop of Paris and several of his vicars, Dupont [de l'Eure], the President of the provisional government, said on behalf of his colleagues:

The provisional government receives with keenest satisfaction your adherence to the government of the French Republic. Liberty and religion are two sisters, both of which are equally interested in living together on good terms. We count on your cooperation and on that of the clergy, as you may count on the benevolent attitude of the provisional government.¹

One of the first official acts of the new government had been to publish in the *Moniteur* a decree by which it assured the Church that it would guarantee the free exercise of all its religious activities. At the same time it requested the Church to offer prayers for the new Republic.² Then on the 11th of March Carnot, the Minister of Public Instruction and Worship, issued a circular in which, after felicitating the clergy on their unreserved and hearty support of the new institutions which the people had founded, he called on the Church to have "faith in the Republic", and once more promised the Church the support of the government.

This will not be that vacillating and uncertain protection that princes have often proffered religion in the hope of associating

¹ Bazin, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 195.

² *Moniteur*, March 1, 1848: "... the provisional government invites M. the Archbishop of Paris and all the bishops of the Republic to substitute for the old formula of prayer the words: '*Domine, salvam fac Rempublicam.*'"

it with the evil designs of their politics [he declared]; the clergy will find a more solid and more durable protection in the conformity of its feelings with those of the people.¹

Some have seen in the fact that the elections to the Constituent Assembly were set first for Sunday, the 9th of April, and finally for Sunday, the 23rd of April, which was Easter, an attempt of one faction of the government to place difficulties in the way of the clergy and the faithful taking part in the elections. It has been stated that, acting on the advice of George Sand, Ledru-Rollin chose Easter Sunday because he feared that the activity of the clergy would be directed against his revolutionary propaganda.² On the other hand the date of Easter Sunday caused some scruples amongst a few members of the government, who feared to offend the clergy and the religiously inclined of the population.³ Lamartine, however, supported this arrangement, arguing that it was a coincidence that augured well both for the Republic and for religion.⁴ The probability is that this diversity of opinion was due to the radical division that existed within the provisional government itself, the moderates being inclined to look for the support of the Church, while the radicals, represented by Ledru-Rollin, would distrust that same influence as being opposed to the kind of republic which they desired. The moderates, beholding in the clergy a source of strength by no means to be disregarded, urged them to make full use of their rights as citizens, and thus aid in the establishment of a stable government. "It would be wrong for the priests to renounce their character of public officials", declared the *National*.⁵

¹ *Moniteur*, March 15th, 1848.

² Veuillot, *Louis Veuillot*, vol. ii, p. 229.

³ Stern, *Revolution de 1848*, vol. ii, p. 202.

⁴ So Daniel Stern.

⁵ *Univers*, April 12, 1848.

The people as a whole were no less well disposed towards the Church and the clergy than the majority in the government. A curious incident which occurred during the sack of the Tuileries illustrates this fact. A student of the polytechnic school, fearing that the chapel of the palace would be desecrated by the mob, "ran in all haste" thither through rooms crowded with men intent on casting out of the windows the spoils of royalty, and rescued the sacred vessels and the crucifix, which he, along with several others who had joined him, started to carry to the neighboring Church of Saint Roch.

In the midst of the respectful people who surrounded them, an enemy of the freedom of worship uttered a cry of hatred against the divine friend of the poor and of the laborers. Then the student from the polytechnic school, who carried the crucifix, raised it in the air, crying, "You wish to be free! Well! do not forget that you can only be free through the Christ"—"Yes! yes!" replied a great number of voices: "He is the master of all." And their heads were uncovered to cries of "*Vive le Christ!*" The crowd immediately joined these heroes who knew so well how to defend their country and their God. The crucifix and the sacred vessels were then carried in procession to the church of Saint Roch, where they were received by the curé. On giving him these precious articles they craved his blessing. "We love God," they exclaimed: "we bring you his image, which could not remain in the dwelling of a perjurer. *Vive la liberté! Vive la religion! Vive Pie IX.*"¹

It was this incident that Lacordaire cited from the pulpit of Notre Dame to illustrate the attitude of the people towards the Church, and awakened thereby the applause of his hearers.²

The popularity of the clergy with the people is also illu-

¹ *La république et la religion* (Paris, 1848), pp. 3-4

² Foisset, *Vie de Lacordaire*, vol. ii, p. 178.

strated by another fact. After the proclamation of the Republic the order of the day was the planting of trees of liberty, an "occasion more of glasses of wine than of prayers," said Melun.¹ Nevertheless the people believed that their trees would not grow if the clergy did not come to bless them.² "One is surprised", said Ozanam, "to meet the Cross and priests forming processions on the squares. One did not expect that the Revolution of February would reestablish processions."³ A friend of Ozanam's, one Abbé Cherruel, had, by the 12th of April, blessed thirteen such trees.⁴ The planting of a tree of liberty is described in *La république et la religion*. A great crowd having gathered in the Champ de Mars for the purpose of planting one of these trees of liberty, the leaders sent a deputation to the curé of the parish of St. Peter to request him to come "to invoke the blessing of heaven upon the work of the people."

Having arrived on the Champ de Mars he is received by cries a thousand times repeated of "*Vive la religion Catholique! Vivent les ministres du Christ!*" An improvised pulpit is erected. The priest clad in his ecclesiastical garb then addresses the multitude religiously attentive: "Brethren, why have you requested me to come into your midst to bless this tree of liberty? Ah! because, as a result of the Christian training which you have received, you have not beheld in me an ordinary man. You know that, in spite of my unworthi-

¹ Melun, *Mémoires*, vol. i, p. 253.

² Ozanam, *Lettres*, vol. ii, p. 206. Letter of March 31, 1848.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 211. Letter of April 12, 1848. He speaks of the people of Paris as seeking every occasion to give evidence of their respect for religion, their sympathy for the clergy. "My friend the Abbé Cherruel . . . is still greatly moved by the proofs of faith which he has found in this crowd, in which since 1815 the priest has been accustomed to see only enemies of God and of the Church."

ness, I am, as priest, the representative of God among men. It seems to me therefore that at this hour I behold the heavens open above our heads, and, from the height of his eternal throne, God planting by means of my hands, God blessing through my mouth, this tree of liberty."

This was hailed with acclamations: "*Vive le cure! Vive la religion!*"

"Brethren" [continued the priest], "that which God has planted, men cannot cut down. That which God has blessed, men ought never to profane." Then he bestowed his benediction upon the people. . . . In the meantime rain was falling in torrents. Suddenly a magnificent rainbow displayed its colors against the clouds. The priest addressing the people for the second time said: "This rain is the celestial dew that comes to fertilize your tree of liberty and make it grow. Brethren, let us all swear that never a single drop of human blood will come to stain and dishonor the roots of this hallowed tree."¹

It is certain that during the revolutionary days acts of hostility against the Church or the clergy were extremely rare.² One attack again a monastery at Lyons seems to have been sporadic.³ It was much more common for the people to protect the Church and the clergy. The Abbé Lacordaire appeared in the Constituent Assembly clad in the garb of a Dominican friar and was greeted with cheers by the people.⁴ A Catholic proletarian republican urged the people of Paris to go to the clergy with their griefs,

¹ *La république et la religion*, pp. 18-19.

² *Le comité des cultes en 1848*, art. from *La révolution de 1848*, 1905, p. 186.

³ Cf. *Univers*, March and April, *passim*.

⁴ Foisset, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 186. "We see every day churches respected, and priests honored." *Ère nouvelle*, April 15, 1848.

assuring them that they would there find an attentive ear.¹ Some of the clergy participated in the activities of the clubs, three of which were presided over by priests.² The alliance thus seemed to be cemented between the Church and the people.

It was perhaps inevitable that the Revolution of 1848 with its reminiscences of 1789 should raise the question of the legal relations existing between the Church and the state. Moreover the *Avenir*, the journal published by Lamennais and Lacordaire in the early part of the July Monarchy, had called for the separation of the two powers. Lamartine also as late as 1845 had advocated the "free Church in the free state" as a means of solving the educational problem.³ Whether the precedents of Lamennais and Lamartine bore much weight or not,⁴ the fact remains that very shortly after the proclamation of the Republic the question began to be raised. The *Univers* of the 11th of March announced that "already in the papers and in the clubs the question of the relation of the Church with the state, with all that it involved, was being discussed."

If the Church wishes to retain its civil establishment [announced the *Démocratie Pacifique*], the Republic will ask it to go back to its original constitution and to democratize itself. If the Church intends to keep its present constitution, its aristocratic constitution, the relic of the epochs of its decadence, the Republic will abandon it in its independence and in its isolation.

¹ *Un prolétaire catholique républicain* (Paris, 1848).

² *La république et la religion*, p. 12.

³ Whitehouse, *Lamartine*, vol. ii, chap. 37, esp. p. 140.

⁴ Guérin (L. F.), *De la séparation des deux puissances*, quotes the opinions of Lamennais and argues for separation of Church and State; Gilon, H., *Voix d'un Catholique*, claims to be a follower of Lamennais, and quotes his opinion as well as that of Lamartine on the suppression of the ecclesiastical budget; Les Coeurs, L., *L'État et le budget des cultes*, quoted Lamartine in arguing for separation.

But even in this case the Republic will respect the liberty of the Church, because henceforth the French nation wishes liberty of association, liberty, sincere, absolute. For our part we offer the clergy our brotherly counsels. The *Univers* demands that the clergy be consulted regarding its relations with the state. Nothing is more just. But the *Univers* seems to designate the bishops as the only legitimate representatives of the clergy. In the eyes of the Republic, however, the bishops are much more the representatives of the old royalty, which has chosen them, than the real representatives of the clergy. Let the clergy show themselves to the Republic in their universality; let provincial assemblies, let a national council restore the Church its liberty, with the Christian principle of universal election, and then the princes of the clergy will have a right to homage and sympathy. As long as the bishop shall not be elected by the priests, as long as the appointment of Caesar shall leave on the episcopal mitre its badge of servitude, there will be sufferance in the Church, mistrust in the people. We desire the union of the people and the Church; and we indicate the means of attaining it: the democratization of the clergy.¹

The question of separation of the two powers was discussed in some of the clubs, in one of which the consensus of opinion seems to have been in favor of such a step.² One speaker argued that it was unjust for a citizen to be obliged to support a religion which he did not desire. Let the priests, the pastors, the rabbis, be as the doctors, supported by the people who desire them. Religion would not perish because of such separation; and he referred to the United States and to the fact that churches were maintained in France during the Revolution and before Napoleon

¹ *Démocratie pacifique*, March 9, 1848.

² *Qui doit payer les prêtres? Réponse d'un club à la question* (Paris, 1848). The question was also discussed at the *club de l'école de la médecine* when Lacordaire was present. *Univers*, April 6, 1848.

negotiated the Concordat with the Papacy.¹ The financial reason was also urged. The suppression of the ecclesiastical budget would free the state from a great drain on its resources. Let this money be expended for educational purposes so that all might profit by its expenditure.² Another speaker urged the necessity of maintaining the budget of the Church in order to keep the clergy under the rein of the state. "For if to-day they are the devotees of the Republic, yesterday they were the servants of Louis-Philippe." Undoubtedly Pius IX was a truly liberal pope, but his predecessor had been "a real Jesuit" and an "enemy of liberty", and his successor might be worse still. It was impossible therefore for the Republic to have confidence in a body of clergy whose head was at Rome rather than in France. But if the Republic continued to pay them, it would have them under its control.³ Still another speaker made use of the same argument to reject the budget of worship. "The clergy, Pope, archbishops, bishops are more subtle than we are," he argued; "they discuss their plans in secret. If there ever was a powerful aristocracy, they are that." If we are going to continue to pay the clergy, we shall have to look out for the safety of the Republic; for we are thus giving the Church the more weapons to use against it.⁴ What will happen if you discontinue state payment of the clergy?

The lower clergy, the simple priests, those whom you know and love, will daily acquire more strength against those who lord it over them. It will come to pass that, as in the primitive Church, these humble priests will regain the right to choose

¹ *Qui doit payer les prêtres?* p. 3.

² *Ibid.*, p. 5.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

their bishops and archbishops, who are to-day a general staff wholly at the service of the Pope, who, do not forget, resides at Rome and who is not, and never will be, French. . . . from the moment that payment [of the clergy] becomes purely voluntary, then all will change, and you will have a clergy truly French, which will stick to France. Rome will no longer give the watchword, and she will daily lose some of that ascendancy which has caused so many ills and commotions in our country, which is to-day, and rightly, a cause of fear and mistrust for many citizens. What would you say, my friends, if the generals and colonels chosen by the Republic could not command our armies and our regiments without the sanction of the King of Prussia, and if they looked upon him as their real commander, obeying him and looking to him for promotion? Would you be foolish enough to pay them as long as they remained under his orders? Certainly you would not! The clergy which you have been paying since 1802 [the experiment is long enough, I hope] is it not more and more ultramontane every day? that is to say, more devoted to the Pope, and consequently less to the nation? Far then from preventing it, it is the salary that has done that. Therefore let the Republic no longer pay for religion; but let him who wishes it pay for it. And many will do it, be assured of that: I who speak to you first of all, for I wish it for myself and my children. In this way the priests will become independent. They will appoint the bishops and archbishops; they will choose the most worthy, and then, but only then, will they form one clergy obeying nothing but its own conscience and the French interests. They will be able to retain their good relations with the Pope, but they will no longer be subject to him nor receive his orders in all things, because the people will hold the purse, and it will be necessary to take them into consideration.¹

That these republicans desired to put their ideas into practise with regard to the Church and its constitution is

¹ *Qui doit payer les prêtres?* pp. 5-6.

shown by the multitudes of petitions that were showered upon the Committee on Worship appointed by the Constituent Assembly.¹ The general tenor of the more radical of these petitions seems to have been to break the power of the higher clergy and to make the lower more independent, or, as the *Démocratie Pacifique* put it, to compel the Church "to democratize itself". There thus seems to have been a strong desire on the part of many republicans to lay hands on the Church as well as on every other institution, and make it conform to what they regarded as republican principles.²

But the Church was too strong to suffer any drastic measures to be taken. One reason why the clergy took such a great interest in the elections to the Constituent Assembly was that its weight might be thrown against the separation of the ecclesiastical and the secular powers. It was part of the electoral platform of some of the candidates that state payment of the clergy, which was looked upon as a just reimbursement for the confiscation of the property of the Church by the Revolution, should be continued.³ One of the first deliberations of the Committee on Worship, which had been appointed early in May, 1848, by the Constituent Assembly, dealt with the petition of Citizen Boissier, who asked for the suppression of the ecclesiastical budget.⁴ All the members of the committee were in accord to reject the conclusions of the petition. Even Arnaud [de l'Ariège], who desired the greatest possible degree of separation between the Church and state, seems to have submitted to the

¹ *Archives Nationales (versement de la Chambre des Députés)* 276, dossier 4, comité des cultes, *passim*.

² Cf. Bonnetat (Abbé J.), *Inamovibilité des desservants* (Paris, 1848), p. 61.

³ *Univers*, April 19, 1848.

⁴ *Archives nationales, op. cit.*, session of May 29, 1848.

will of the majority.¹ Thus the committee began its work, to the great satisfaction of the *Univers*, by decreeing that the Republic should support the Church. The clergy themselves were, for the most part, hostile to separation. *Lacordaire*, who in 1831, when he was under the influence of *Lamennais*, had argued for separation now contributed articles to the *Ère Nouvelle* in which he contradicted the position he had maintained in the *Avenir*.² *Lamennais* seems to have adhered to his old position, but he was no longer within the Church;³ and even with him, if we can believe *Odilon Barrot*, it was merely theoretical. The latter relates in his memoirs⁴ that one day the members of the committee appointed to prepare the constitution for the Republic found themselves face to face with the question of absolute separation of Church and state.

We had a clean slate before us [he declared]; it would have been very easy to inscribe in our Constitution that famous formula of *M. de Cavour*, "a free Church in a free state." None of us, not even *M. de Lamennais*, the only priest who sat on our committee, and who certainly was second to none in liberalism and in political daring, proposed this separation. The truth is that it is much easier to formulate the independence of the two powers in theory than to realize it, especially when it is a question of placing a society constituted as ours, where all is divided, individualized, and pulverized, over against the powerful organization of the Catholic clergy.

In other words, the Republic "did not dare" take such a step. Accordingly in the constitution which was sub-

¹ *Univers*, June 3, 1848.

² *Ère nouvelle*, July and August, *passim*.

³ *Opinion du Citoyen Lamennais contre le salaire des cultes par l'état* (Paris, 1848), (B. N. Lb54, 90).

⁴ *Mémoires*, vol. iv, p. 12.

mitted for the approval of the Assembly by the Commission, article VII promised not only freedom of worship but also the maintenance of the budget of the clergy. "Each may freely profess his religion and receive from the state an equal protection for the exercise of his worship. The ministers of the cults recognized by law alone have a right to a salary from the state."¹

The Constituent Assembly was little more inclined than the Constitutional Commission had been to reject the state support of the Church.² Article VII of the proposed constitution was discussed in the Assembly on the 18th of September, when several amendments to the proposed article were introduced.³ Pierre Leroux was the first to oppose the article as it had been drafted by the Committee. While maintaining that he was not a partisan of an absolute distinction between the spiritual and the temporal, he nevertheless felt that the trend of the times was towards a separation between religion and politics. He would therefore have the legislators be "consistent" with themselves and reduce article VII to a simple expression of religious liberty: "Each may freely profess his religion".⁴ Another speaker, Citizen Lavallée, proposed the following amendment: "No one can be forced to contribute towards the expenses of any cult. The Republic will subsidize none." And he supported his amendment with the contention that the then existing relations between Church and state tended to weaken religion. If Judaism and Christianity figured to the same extent in the budget of cults, if the state thus placed on the same level two religions of

¹ *Moniteur*, September 19, 1848.

² Cf. Haureau (M. B.), *La liberté et l'égalité des cultes* (Paris, 1848), p. 37: "It has hardly been discussed; striking proof of our wisdom!"

³ *Moniteur*, September 19, 1848.

⁴ *Ibid.*

which the one was the negation of the other, would this not lead to incredulity? But in spite of all the arguments that could be mustered, amongst which the financial one did not fail to appear, the amendments were one by one rejected, and article VII was accepted by the Constituent Assembly as it had been drafted by the Commission.¹ The Republic thus declared in its Constitution its determination to continue the state support of the Church.

The attempt to "democratize" the Church,² to bring its constitution more into conformity with what were regarded as republican principles, had its exponents within the Committee on Worship as well as in the Assembly and in the clubs. One of its members desired some change in the Church in order to "safeguard the rights of the state against the pretensions and the encroachments of the clergy."³ Monseigneur Parisis, the bishop of Langres, replied that the Concordat was a convention agreed upon by two powers, the state and the Papacy, and that therefore the state could not alter it. Citizen Pradié suggested that the concurrence of the two powers would be necessary in order to make any alterations in the existing relations.

One of the projects thus brought forward for the "democratization" of the Church dealt with the mode of appointment of bishops. The majority of the Committee seemed to favor their nomination by means of election, but they differed as to the mode. Some, such as Citizen Isambert, believed that it would be dangerous to leave the election in the hands of a single class, and he therefore favored the participation of the faithful.⁴ Others, such as Arnaud [de l'Ariège] and the three bishops who sat on the Com-

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Archives Nationales, op. cit.*, session, November 9, 1848.

³ *Ibid.*, session of June 5, 1848.

⁴ *Ibid.*, session of June 22, 1848.

mittee, contended that election should be in the power of the clergy alone. "This doctrine", said Monseigneur Fayet referring to Isambert's proposal to introduce a lay element, "may be suitable for the Jansenists and the Protestants, but it is not Catholic doctrine. In admitting the principle proposed by M. Isambert for the constitution of the Church, we shall arrive at the Civil Constitution of the Clergy".¹ The lay element, he contended, would be sufficiently represented by the chief of the executive who would always have the right of presentation.² The committee eventually decided³ that the election of bishops should be in the hands of an electoral body composed solely of ecclesiastics. It was a triumph for canon law.⁴ The article of the Concordat that conferred on the First Consul the right to fill vacant sees appeared to the committee no longer con-

¹ *Archives Nationales*, session of June 23, 1848.

² *Ibid.*, session of August 3, 1848.

³ *Ibid.*, session of February 18, 1848.

⁴ The method of appointing bishops has varied from time to time in the history of the Catholic Church. Until the sixth century, they were elected by both the clergy and the people, subject to the approval of the neighboring bishop. In the early Middle Ages in the West, the kings of Gaul claimed the right to interfere in the election of bishops, and they often nominated them directly. The Second Lateran Council (1139) empowered the chapter of the Cathedral Church to choose the bishop. The Pope also maintained the right to make appointments to vacant sees; but by the Concordat of 1516 he permitted the king of France, with certain reservations, to nominate the French bishops. (The Concordat of 1516 is given in *Raccolta di concordati*, ed. Mercati, pp. 233-251). This agreement lasted down to the French Revolution. The Concordat of 1801, which Napoleon negotiated with the Papacy, decreed that the First Consul should nominate the bishops and the Pope should confer canonical institution. This method was in vogue at the beginning of the Second Republic in 1848. (Cf. *Catholic Encyclopedia*, arts., Bishop, Investiture, Concordat). The whole trend of the development was thus away from popular election such as the radicals wished to introduce into the Church. (Cf. *Codex juris canonici*, ed. Gasparri (New York, 1918), Can. 329 and note 4.)

sistent with the demands of the republican state, under which the mode of election had much greater vogue than under the monarchy.¹ It was therefore proposed to request the government to open negotiations with the Holy See for the purpose of making a new Concordat.²

Another proposed change in the administration of the Church was that the vicars in charge of country parishes should have permanent appointments. Unlike the curés of the cantons, the appointment of rural vicars was not submitted to the government for ratification. They therefore held their parishes subject to the pleasure of the bishop.³ This situation had created much dissatisfaction, as the rural vicars thought that they should be irremovable as well as the curés; and some of them petitioned the Committee on Worship to this effect.⁴ There was also the feeling that this condition of affairs gave the Church too great political power over the rural populations. The vicars, by reason of the fact that they were dependent upon the bishops, could be made instruments to thwart the plans of the government. If they were made irremovable, could they not act more freely and independently? So argued Citizen Cenac, a member of the Committee on Worship.⁵

But the "irremovability of vicars" met with hostility outside the Committee on Worship as well as within. "To desire irremovability," declared the Abbé Bonnetat, "is to introduce into the Church . . . that spirit of independ-

¹ *Archives Nationales*, *op. cit.*, session of February 18, 1849. It was decided that the electoral body should nominate three candidates, from amongst which the head of the state should appoint the bishop. *Cf.* sessions of June 22, 23, 1848.

² *Ibid.*, Pradié, *La question religieuse* (Paris, 1848), p. 183.

³ *Archives Nationales*, report of Pradié on petitions.

⁴ *Ibid.*, August 24, 1848.

⁵ Pradié, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

ence and of constitutionalism which is shaking modern society to its very foundations.”¹ Within the Committee Arnaud [de l’Ariège] expressed the feeling of its members when he declared that the whole question revolved around the competence of the civil authority in such a matter. The wrong that the authors of the Civil Constitution of the Clergy committed was that they sought to regulate the relations between the Church and the state without consulting the Church. “The proposition which is before us commits the same wrong: it introduces an incompetent authority. It is a question of the discipline of the Church, in which the civil power does not have the right to meddle.”² The majority, following the lead of Monseigneur Fayet, the bishop of Orleans, decided, as in the question of the election of bishops, to petition the government to discuss the matter with the Holy See.³ In the opinion of Citizen Isambert this was merely an indefinite adjournment of the question,⁴ which indeed it was. The Constituent Assembly apparently did not possess sufficient interest in the matter to discuss the reports of the Committee of Worship.⁵ And Pius IX after November 16, 1848, was “disenchanted with democracy”. The times were therefore inopportune for any revision of the Concordat and the whole question was simply dropped.⁶

It is impossible, therefore, to see in the political relationships between the Catholics and the Revolution any reason why they should not have maintained after February the attitude which they had then adopted, or

¹ Bonnetat, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

² *Archives Nationales*, *op. cit.*, session of January 22, 1849.

³ *Ibid.*, session of August 24, 1848.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Cf. *Moniteur*, February 27, 1849 and March 24, 1849.

⁶ Pradiè, *op. cit.*, p. 183.

why the ecclesiastical leaders should become less enthusiastic republicans. The Constituent Assembly was favorable toward the Church.¹ The Committee on Worship was largely dominated by the three bishops, of Orleans, Langres and Digne.² The Constitution of the Republic guaranteed liberty of instruction for which the Catholics had long been clamoring.³ As the Vicomte de Melun testified: "Everybody else has the right to complain of the Republic except religion."⁴ "This revolution", said de Tocqueville, "which appeared destined to continue and perhaps surpass the work of 1793, has restored not only to religion, but to the clergy, an influence a thousand times greater than the Restoration, which actually ruined itself for their sake, was able to do."⁵

¹ The adoption of article vii of the Constitution indicates this.

² This is the impression that one gets from reading the report which is in the *Archives Nationales*. The bishops swayed the committee in every instance.

³ Cf. *infra*, chap. vii.

⁴ Baunard, *Vie de Melun* (Paris, 1880), p. 202.

⁵ Senior, *Correspondence and conversations of A. de Tocqueville with N. W. Senior* (London, 1872), vol. i, pp. 54 *et seq.*

CHAPTER II

THE CATHOLICS AND THE SOCIAL CRISIS OF 1848

The causes of the social, as well as those of the political revolution of 1848, have their roots in the Revolution of 1789. Amongst the institutions of the Old Regime which that great upheaval ruthlessly overturned was the economic constitution of France. By the law of 2-17 of March, 1791, the National Constituent Assembly swept away the Gilds, the Corporations, etc., which ever since the Middle Ages had regulated the economic life of the country.¹ It was a great reform and one of momentous significance; for it gave a mighty impulse to the economic development of the nineteenth century. But it also had its deplorable consequences. Inspired by the doctrine of the Physiocrats, which became known as *laissez-faire, laissez-passer*, this law freed the workman as well as the master from all restrictions and left the way open for the individualistic regime. The immediate consequence was, on the one hand, to ruin many of the masters, who had therefore to discharge their journeymen, often becoming workmen themselves;² and on the other, to lower wages and vastly increase the amount of unemployment. The industrial crisis thus created was aggravated by the movement towards the towns of that part of the rural population which was thrown out of work by the ruin and dispersion of the nobility and clergy.³ In order to protect themselves the journeymen of

¹ Quentin-Bauchart, P., *La crise social de 1848* (Paris, 1920), p. 1.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 2 and 4.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

Paris began to form associations which they developed to an unprecedented state of perfection. From April, 1791, on, all the professions saw the formation of associations having rigid rules of admission, and regulations which fixed wages and forbade employment under conditions other than those which they prescribed.¹

But such associations were intolerable to the National Constituent Assembly; for it beheld in them at once a form of reaction towards the old regime with all its restrictions, and a menace to the recently-won omnipotence of the state. Moreover, the middle classes, greatly favored by the substitution of competition for monopoly and restriction, became alarmed at the apparition of a fourth estate, which they beheld increasing in power and influence by means of organizations and associations which were extending themselves from profession to profession, and from Paris to the other cities of France.² For this reason, the Constituent Assembly voted, on June 14, 1791, without discussion, the Chapelier law—so-called from the name of its formulator. "There are no longer any corporations within the state", said Chapelier proudly in his report, "there is no longer any interest but that of each particular individual and the general interest." This law prohibited, whenever they should meet together, "citizens of the same rank or profession, contractors, merchants, workmen and journeymen of any craft whatsoever, from electing a president, a secretary, trustees, from taking minutes, from deliberating on, or passing resolutions, and from formulating rules regarding their pretended common interests."³ All resolutions and agreements tending to fix the price of labor were declared "unconstitutional and derogatory to

¹ Quentin-Bauchart, *op. cit.*, pp. 4-5.

² *Ibid.*, p. 5.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

liberty and to the Declaration of the Rights of Man." Besides, the authors of such resolutions were threatened with a fine of five hundred livres and with the forfeiture of the rights of citizenship for a year. And finally it was decreed that "all tumultuous assemblies for the purpose of protesting against the free exercise of industry and commerce" should be considered as "acts of sedition."¹

Such in short was the policy of the First Republic towards working-men's associations, a policy which was continued and reinforced by the Consulate and the Empire. Extracts from several articles of the Penal Code make this abundantly clear.

No association of more than twenty persons may be formed except with the consent of the government and under conditions which it may please the public authority to indicate.²

¹*Ibid.* "For him (Chapelier) and his contemporaries, republican heirs of a conception of absolute monarchy, the omnipotence of the state, the sole link binding free citizens, appeared the political and social ideal. Not only were the corporations broken up, but every institution that tended to interpose itself between this supreme authority and individuals would be persecuted and destroyed without mercy. Thus Chapelier mistrusted as well the formation of bureaus for the relief of the sick and the unemployed, considering them 'specious designs'. 'These specific distributions of relief . . . demand the frequent association of individuals of the same profession, the election of trustees and other officers, the formulation of rules and the exclusion of those who do not submit to them. It is thus that privileges . . . are reborn.'" This did not mean that the unfortunate were to be abandoned. "It is the duty of the nation," said Chapelier, "it is the duty of public officials in its name, to furnish work to those who have need of it for their existence and relief to the helpless." The Constitution of 1793 affirmed: "Society owes subsistence to its unfortunate citizens, either in procuring work for them, or in assuring means of existence to those who are no longer capable of work." It was this duty of the state that formed the basis of the socialism of the forties. Thus the Revolution laid the foundation of the social ills of the nineteenth century, but it also suggested a remedy for them.

² Article 291.

Any coalition on the part of workmen . . . to prohibit work in a factory, to prevent them from starting work before, or remaining at work after, certain hours, and in general tending to suspend, prevent, or increase the wages of labor, if there has been any attempt at, or beginning of execution, will be punished with imprisonment, the minimum of which shall be one month, the maximum, three. The leaders or promoters will be punished with imprisonment varying from one to three years.¹

Yet this legislation, unfavorable as it was to the welfare of the working man, failed, for several reasons, to effect him immediately. Under the Empire the scale of wages was maintained relatively high by the scarcity of labor [which was caused by the conscription of the best youths of the country for the wars of Napoleon] as well as by the continued demand for products of home manufacture created by the Continental Blockade.² Moreover, this reign of industrial prosperity continued under the Restoration, and, with the exception of one crisis in 1818, lasted until 1826. The labor problem, therefore, during these years remained in the background; and the demand for associations and protection of workmen seemed to have died out.³

But even during this period the way was prepared for that strife which was to disturb the latter years of the Restoration as well as the entire period of the July Monarchy. For it was during these years [i. e. the Restoration] that machinery began to be introduced and big industry created thereby. It was during this period, too, that the *laissez-faire* doctrine was popularized by Jean-Baptiste Say, so that it became the accepted economic dogma of the middle class. Thus the stage was set for the industrial prosperity of the bourgeoisie, with all the attendant evils of

¹ Article 115. Cited from Quentin-Bauchart, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

² *Ibid.*, p. 11.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

the individualistic regime, on the one hand, and on the other hand, for the birth of socialism with its hostility equally bitter and uncompromising towards the bourgeoisie and their political economy.¹

It was during the reign of Louis Philippe, therefore, that the labor problem became acute, and the sway of competition made its evils felt to the fullest extent. The free play of competition, the lack of associations of any sort between laborers [which were indeed forbidden by law], the absence of any responsibility on the part of the employer towards his employees, but rather his interest to exploit them as much as possible,² maintained the scale of wages so low, that the laborer had nothing between him and starvation but wages, which oftentimes scarcely sufficed for his daily needs. Consequently an overproduction of goods, which resulted in the shutting down of factories,³ threw multitudes out of employment and left them with no means

¹ Jean-Baptiste Say published his *Traité d'économie politique* in 1803-1804. It met with immediate success; but a second edition was interdicted by Napoleon. Consequently a new edition did not appear until 1814, when it practically became the Bible of the bourgeoisie. "Based on the primordial idea of the existence of natural, inevitable laws, of which unrestricted competition alone assures the free play at the same time that it draws from it the maximum of advantages; seeing in the individual interest the sole motive, and in the struggle of interests between them the sole source of progress, it unmercifully proscribed everything that threatened to place a restriction on this incessant and beneficent conflict; consequently it refused the state all intervention in the economic domain, as it condemned every organization capable of injuring the free play of supply and demand. In resumé, it erected in theory the state of affairs created by the suppression of the corporations and the interdiction of new associations." Quentin-Bauchart, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

² The bourgeoisie both in theory and in practice opposed the intervention of the state in economic affairs.

³ Overproduction was often due to the fact that goods were manufactured without any regard as to the amount the markets could stand, or to the quantity competitors were turning out.

of subsistence. It was this that caused the insurrection at Lyons in 1831 and again in 1834, when the starving workmen inscribed on their banners: "To live by working, or die fighting."

In sharpest contrast with the condition of the working man, for whom a livelihood was so insecure, there was the increasing prosperity and riches of the bourgeoisie, the capitalist class.

By a cruel mockery [wrote the Vicomte de Melun in 1848—and this description applies to the preceding years as well—] poverty is the most prevalent and the most hideous in the very localities where labor has wrought the greatest marvels and accumulated the greatest wealth. The manufacturing cities, the great centers of industry, contain caves that lack light, air and space, but not inhabitants. In these hovels, burrows rather than human habitations, vegetate, suffer and die, human beings with countenances emaciated and wan, with mutilated limbs, with bent backs . . . who, in order to obtain a morsel of bread, are for long hours without repose at the mercy of a pitiless machine.¹

It was this contrast between the two prominent classes in society, the bourgeoisie with their increasing wealth and power, and the proletariat with their helpless poverty and deplorable squalor, that caused the formulation of the various socialistic systems that came into prominence in 1840 or thereabouts. Men such as Louis Blanc, Cabet and Proudhon began to ask if something were not radically wrong with a society that permitted such contrasts to exist, particularly in France with its cherished dogma of the equality of all men; and therefore they wrought out systems which were calculated to build society upon a more equitable basis. What matters the "right to equality", asked Louis Blanc, "if man lacks the power to obtain it?" And he added:

¹ Melun, Vicomte Armand de, *De l'intervention de la société pour prévenir et soulager la misère* (Paris, 1849), p. 8.

Right, considered in an abstract manner, is the mirage, which, since 1789, has deluded the people. Right is the metaphysical and defunct protection which has replaced for the people the actual protection that is due them. The Right pompously and fruitlessly proclaimed in the charters has served only to conceal the injustice of the inauguration of the individualistic regime and the barbarity of the abandonment of the poor. It is because liberty has been defined by the word *Right*, that one has come to call free, men who are slaves of hunger, slaves of cold, slaves of ignorance, slaves of chance. Say it then once for all: liberty consists, not only in the right accorded, but in the power given to man to exercise it, to develop his faculties under the reign of justice and the protection of the law.¹

But how was the condition of the proletariat to be improved? The answer was, by the state. It was necessary to apply "all the power of the state", which was "assuredly not too much for such a task."²

The state, however, was under the control of the bourgeoisie who were strongly entrenched in the government, and who were opposed to all state intervention. The power of the bourgeoisie, therefore, must be broken by political revolution. But political revolution once achieved was to be only a stepping stone to a social revolution. "Without political reform", said Louis Blanc, "no social reform is possible; for if the second is the end, the first is the means."³ In the last resort a great transformation of the whole face of society was the only hope of the proletariat. "A social revolution ought to be attempted", said the same writer, "because the existing social order is too filled with iniquity, with poverty, with baseness to exist long;" and "because there is no one, whatever may be his position,

¹ Blanc, Louis, *Organisation du travail* (Paris, 1848), p. 19.

² *Ibid.*, edition of 1840, p. 96.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 96.

his rank, his fortune, who may not have an interest in the inauguration of a new social order.”¹ “1789 began the domination of the bourgeoisie, 1830 continued it”;² the next revolution, therefore, should be for the advantage of the people.

Before the country was ripe for revolution, however, the people must be prepared for it; and this could be accomplished only by a general diffusion of the leading principles of socialism. Consequently the years between 1840 and 1848 were characterized by a vigorous propaganda for the spread of the teachings of the socialists, and for the awakening of the working classes to a sense of their opportunity as well as of their needs. Newspapers, brochures, pamphlets, literature, histories of the Revolution, all lent themselves, in greater or less degree, consciously or unconsciously, to the dissemination of socialistic ideas.³ More-

¹ Blanc, Louis, *op. cit.*, ed. 1840, pp. 129-130.

² *Ibid.*, p. 79.

³ Amongst newspapers should be mentioned *le Courier français* which entitled a series of articles, “concerning organization of labor”; the *National*, in which Marrast wrote in 1844: “If the political organization towards which we aspire does not have the effect of ameliorating the condition of the poorer classes, we shall cease to concern ourselves with politics.” But the *National* was too closely wedded to the orthodox economy, and therefore the more advanced of the Republican party founded the *Journal du Peuple* and the *Reforme*. In these papers Flocon popularized the idea and the formula of *Droit au travail*, Pecqueur and Louis Blanc, those of *l’organisation du travail*. In 1845 the *Reforme* wrote: “All men are brothers. Where equality does not exist, liberty is only a lie.”

Amongst brochures should be mentioned, Louis Blanc’s *Organisation du travail*, 1840; Cabet, *Voyage en Icarie*, 1840; *Vrai Christianisme suivant Jesus-Christ*, 1846; Pierre Leroux, *De l’humanité*; Lamennais, *l’Esquisse d’une philosophie*, 1840; Proudhon, *Qu’est-ce que la propriété?* 1840.

In literature the novels of George Sand propagated similar doctrines, notably, *Le compagnon du tour de France*, 2 vols., 1840; *Le meunier d’Angibault*, 3 vols., 1845; *Le péché de M. Antoine*, 2 vols., 1847.

Noteworthy amongst the histories that lent themselves to the propa-

over, and what is perhaps of equal significance, socialism presented itself to the people under the guise of religion, often posing as the true interpretation of Christianity. It thus not only made its appeal to the material needs of humanity, but also sought to root itself in one of the most deeply seated instincts of the human race.¹ "In demanding the right to live by labor", said Louis Blanc, "one does much more than contend for the rights of millions of individuals made wretched by oppression or by chance: . . . one salutes the Creator in his work."² "What is socialism", he asked elsewhere; and answered, "It is the Gospel in action."³ Cabet was even more emphatic in his association of socialism with Christianity. He wrote a book entitled *True Christianity according to Jesus Christ*, in which he sought to show that the Gospel proclaimed by Jesus was nothing but communism.

Yes, Jesus Christ is a Communist!!! [he exclaimed]. We add moreover, that according to Jesus, the Apostles and the Fathers of the Church, Christianity is unable to exist without communism, and no one can say he is a Christian if he is not a communist. And conversely, communism is nothing else than true Christianity.⁴

ganda of socialistic ideas are: Cabet, *Histoire populaire de la Révolution française*, in which the articles of Marat, and the discourses of Robespierre were most prominent; Lamartine, *Histoire des Girondins*, 1847; Louis Blanc, *Histoire de la Révolution* and *Histoire de dix ans* 1841-1844.

¹ The *Univers* speaks of Cabet, Louis Blanc, *et al.*, as men who disguise criminal ambitions under some words borrowed from the Gospel, *Univers*, August 17, 1848.

² Louis Blanc, *op. cit.*, ed. 1848, p. 4.

³ Quentin-Bauchart, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

⁴ Cabet, *Vrai christianisme suivant Jesus-Christ* (Paris, 1847), pp. 620 *et seq.* The socialists were right in associating Christianity with their endeavor to alleviate the sufferings of the working classes; but they were wrong in identifying it with the ephemeral systems which they sought to establish.

That this propaganda was effective the events that followed the 24th of February, 1848, are sufficient evidence. The testimony of Proudhon in the Assembly was to the same effect.

Socialism [he said] has made the Revolution of February; your parliamentary quarrels have not disturbed the masses. Socialism has figured in all the acts of the Revolution: March 17, April 16, May 15. Socialism sat at the Luxembourg, while politics were being discussed at the Hotel-de-ville. The National workshops were a caricature of socialism; but as they have not been its work, they have not dishonored it. Socialism has served as the banner of the last insurrection; those who prepared it, and those who exploited it, had need to enlist the laborer in this great cause.¹

Louis Veuillot, the editor of the *Univers*, testified that it was the most industrious and upright as well as the better educated class of the proletariat who had become the adherents of Cabet and his doctrines.²

In short the mind of the working class on the eve of February seems quite generally to have been prepared for, and expectant of, a revolution that should cut deeper into society than a mere overturning of the political power.

What do you wish? [asked a friend of Montalembert of a carriage builder whom he had assisted in establishing himself]. We wish to enjoy all the benefits that you enjoy [was the reply]. We wish that there should be no people better clothed, better housed, or more comfortable, than others. . . . Look, do you see those "swell" ladies who pass by? They have beautiful cloaks, fine coats and dresses; our wives have none of them. . . . Ah well! that insults us, that is unjust; it is necessary that there be an end to it.³

¹ *Univers*, August 2, 1848.

² *Ibid.*, August 17, 1848.

³ Lecanuet, *Montalembert*, vol. ii, pp. 402-403. "Whoever took the

Moreover the socialists were quite convinced that their systems were the only hope of the new society. Cabet stated in a letter to the provisional government that he was prepared to suffer martyrdom to sustain before the opposition of all men that Icarian Communism was the doctrine most capable of ushering in the happiness of the people and of all humanity.¹ And Louis Blanc, who had taken the Oath of Hannibal against the then constitution of society, was not less certain that his scheme for the organization of labor was the sole means of salvaging society. Well might the Abbé Maret exclaim: "Under the name of democracy, what strange pretensions assert themselves and claim likewise the honors of triumph! There is no system whatsoever, eclectic, rationalistic, socialistic, which does not believe that its opportunity has arrived, and which does not prepare for action, to fashion France according to its image."²

trouble to enter the factories, to glance over the books that were read there, to take account of the enormous and very significant number of brochures, of pamphlets, of almanachs, that the people bought and devoured, writings filled exclusively with social theories on the rights of the working man, with complaints over his condition, with bitter accusations against the rich and the capitalists, could easily perceive that the danger was not in these intestine quarrels of the middle class over political reforms more or less extended, which it sought and which then absorbed all the attention of the government, but in those false ideas of absolute equality, in those envious feelings which brewed and fermented amongst the working classes. Both government and opposition have been deceived therein, and have committed the mistake of seeing society only in this restricted sphere where the political life was agitated. Thus the catastrophe of 1848 has been at once a surprise and a revelation." "Let us add that the republicans themselves did not suspect the condition of the minds of the people. If they had known it, they would have been much more unpardonable still for having knowingly destroyed the dam that confined this torrent of anti-social passions." Barrot, *Mémoires*, vol. ii, pp. 5-6.

¹ April 17, 1848.

² *Ère nouvelle*, April 19, 1848.

Now what was the attitude of Catholicism towards some change in the constitution of society that would improve the condition of the working classes? Not only were there many within the Church who had for some years been actively engaged in social work, but there was a widespread recognition of the crisis and the feeling that the Church as well as the Republic must do something to alleviate the sufferings of the proletariat.

Behind the political there is a social revolution [wrote Ozanam]; behind the question of the Republic, which interests only the literate, and them little, there are the questions that interest the people, for which they are armed, the questions of organization of labor, of repose, of wages. It is a mistake to suppose that these problems can be avoided. If any one thinks that the people can be satisfied by giving them primary assemblies, legislative councils, new magistrates, consuls, a president, he is greatly deceived.¹

Feugueray, in the *Revue Nationale*, emphasized the same idea. Political reform occupied only a secondary place. "What indeed would be the use of political reform if it were not the instrument of social reform?"² Scarcely less emphatic was Louis Veuillot.

The various regimes that have preceded the Republic [he said] have concerned themselves with the proletariat only to restrict their rights for the sake of the industrial bourgeoisie. Great reforms should be instituted to break these fetters. . . . The laborer has conquered his political and industrial independence. He has a right to institutions which shall guarantee it and make it effective for all.³

¹ Ozanam, *Lettres*, vol. ii, p. 196.

² *Revue nationale*, April, 1848. "The Revolution of 1848 ought to do for the masses what that of '89 has done for the bourgeoisie; otherwise it will be still a deception." *Revue nationale*, April 13, 1848.

³ *Univers*, April 6, 1848.

Even as late as August, 1848, after the June days had dispelled so many illusions, he wrote: "It is a truth as clear as sunlight . . . society ought to find some other means for providing for the support of the indigent classes, to which their labor does not furnish sufficient resources."¹ The attitude of Montalembert was similar.

The working classes [he said] have in our day conquered the first place in the preoccupations of all political minds, of all good citizens. Like all the influential they have their courtiers and flatterers, who think only of making use of their power in catering to their passions. As for me, I wish only to serve, not to flatter them. I shall study with respect their needs and their rights. I am ready to make all the sacrifices necessary to assist the one and maintain the other.²

The Vicomte de Melun, who perhaps more than the most of his day had the welfare of the proletariat at heart, was likewise alive to the opportunity that the new Republic presented for social amelioration, and perceived that it must concern itself with solving the social problem. In his opening address before the *Société d'Économie Charitable* on the 5th of March, 1848, he said: "The dream of some has become the reveille of all, and the questions that one hardly perceived on the distant horizon . . . have come to confront us, and clamor to-day for immediate attention and a positive solution."³ In his memoirs, written towards the close of the century, he referred to the situation in 1848, and made much of the opportunity that the Revolution presented for social reconstruction.

From the point of view of the study and of the solution of

¹ His attitude, however, could, at the same time, be quite different. Cf. *infra*, chap. iii.

² *Ère nouvelle*, May 24, 1848.

³ *Annales de la charité*, 1848, p. 65.

social questions, which we had prosecuted during the reign of Louis-Philippe, and which had obtained only with great difficulty, and at the last moment, the attention of the government of July, the Revolution of 1848 appeared, at the first sight, a real progress. Men were at last going to concern themselves with what appeared to us as the principal and dominant aim of politics, namely, with the amelioration of the condition of the people become sovereign; with the best means, if not of causing it to disappear, at least of diminishing suffering and want. The way was opened for all the investigations of science and of charity; a hearing was given to every idea and to every system; accordingly Christianity was to have the opportunity to give its advice, to present its solution. And already amongst the republicans of the *Veille*, a society was formed consisting of men of science and of ability, who took the Gospel for their flag and Catholicism for their political and social doctrine.¹

Nor were the clergy behind publicists, philanthropists and men of science within the Church in the recognition of the need of the time. The bishop of Digne in his mandate of the 15th of March, 1848, stated that the "amelioration of the condition of the working classes according to the spirit of love found in the Gospel" was one of the principles to which every candidate should subscribe if he wished the support of the clergy.² Defending himself against the accusation that he would not condescend to attend a meeting of the local workingmen's committee, he replied that no consideration could keep him away: "My place is everywhere where my brothers and children are. Do they not know that we are the descendants of the laborers who civilized the world, the successors of the Apostles, poor boatmen, fishermen, tentmakers, and cobblers? . . ." ³ "Democracy", wrote the Abbé de Salinis, "that is to say, the

¹ Melun, Armand de, *Mémoires* (Paris, 1891), vol. i, pp. 260 *et seq.*

² *Univers*, March 24, 1848.

³ *Ibid.*, April 17.

emancipation of the oppressed classes, their progressive initiation into political and civil life, is the movement implanted in the world by the Gospel.”¹ And one reason why so many of the clergy offered themselves as candidates at the elections of April, 1848, was because they felt that the Church should lend its voice and its aid towards the solution of the great problems that confronted the young Republic, not the least of which was the question of doing justice to the proletariat.²

But it was more particularly within the circle of a small group of Liberal Catholics, laymen as well as clerics, that the first step was to be taken towards the reconstruction of a new social order. This was the foundation of the paper, the *Ère Nouvelle*, the very title of which revealed the expectations of the founders. The most distinguished amongst them were: Lacordaire, celebrated for his *Conferences* at Notre-Dame and well known for his liberalism as well as for his interest in the working classes; the Abbé Maret, a theologian of distinction, who also professed a keen interest in social work; Frédéric Ozanam, historian, apologist, professor of literature at the Sorbonne, who combined with an exemplary Christian character a profound desire to relieve the suffering of the masses, and finally, Charles de Coux, an economist, who owed his conversion to Catholicism to the social implications which he saw in its doctrines. With a staff possessing such tendencies it

¹ Abbé de Salinis to the Archbishop of Bordeaux, April 5, 1848. Cited from Foisset, *Vie de Lacordaire*, vol. ii, p. 474.

² *Ibid.* The widespread sympathy that was felt by many of the clergy, more especially the lower clergy, with the *Ère nouvelle* and its doctrines, reveals that there was a considerable party within the Church of this way of thinking. Cf. Bazin, *op. cit.*, vol. i, chap. xxiii; and the *Ère nouvelle*, February 19 and 20, 1849. One of these testimonials stated that the only way of safety for France was in “the alliance of Christianity and Democracy.” Its author was a professor in a seminary.

is not difficult to understand the direction that their paper would take.

According to the Abbé Maret the existing *Parti Catholique* had not shown itself sufficiently considerate of the condition of the working classes.¹ The *Univers*, the great representative of this party, did not, therefore, suffice. "We wish to found a new paper", wrote Ozanam, "for a time quite new."² "The Gospel has disregarded nothing, forgotten nothing that touches man", wrote the editors in their prospectus.³

We behold with sorrow the moral and bodily afflictions of so many of our brothers, who here below bear the heaviest part of common toil, a part made more burdensome by the very development of industry and civilization. We do not believe these evils without remedy; and if patience is enjoined for everybody, charity combined with science can accomplish something to stay the scourge, if not to destroy it entirely. . . . We expect, we ought to expect, that the Republic will use its power towards the alleviation of the woes of the greatest number of its children.

Repeatedly the *Ère Nouvelle* emphasized the same need and duty of the Republic.⁴ After the elections had taken place, and the new Assembly had met, it urged the representatives of France to devote themselves to the solution of this problem, which was uppermost in the minds of the people. "Without doubt", it wrote, "it is necessary for us to have a constitution, but the obtaining of the

¹ Bazin, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 225.

² *Lettres*, vol. ii, p. 208, Letter of April 12. The first number of this paper appeared on April 15, 1848.

³ This prospectus is found in vol. i of the *Ère nouvelle* in the *Bibliothèque Nationale*. It is also printed in Bazin, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 228-232.

⁴ Cf. *Ère nouvelle*, May 8, 18, 19, 1848.

daily bread is a more pressing need still, and the National Assembly should not deceive itself on that score.”¹ It suggested that if the fruits of labor had been more equitably divided in the past, and if means of livelihood had been assured to the laborers, the July Monarchy might still have been standing. Let the Republic therefore heed this warning. If it should prove itself as powerless as that Monarchy to resolve this problem and to satisfy the legitimate needs of the people, it would discover that it had been only the “preface to a frightful anarchy.”² The most important task that confronted the National Assembly was so to “modify the economic constitution of France” that it would preserve all the advantages which the past had presented, guard against new and greater dangers, and at the same time correct all the injustices and abuses that now clamored for redress. The *Ère Nouvelle* recognized that this was no light task; it was not astonished that these problems “caused to grow pale the men who knew no other care than their own repose, the tardy followers of Malthus and Bentham.” But it pledged its support in the attempt of the Republic to give a “striking satisfaction to the feel-

¹*Ère nouvelle*, May 16, 1848. “Men of the old middle classes, see that your representatives do not lose sight for one instant of the purpose of the democratic republic, and that they earnestly seek institutions of fraternity.” *Revue Nationale*, May 4, 1848. The *Revue Nationale* was the organ of Buchez, who had entered political life under the Restoration through Carbonarism. For a time he belonged to the school of Saint-Simon. But by 1837 he had forsaken Saint-Simonianism for Catholicism. He did much to popularize the idea of the alliance of the Revolution with Christianity. His creed may be summed up in the phrase, “Social realization of Christianity.” For a time he was President of the Constituent Assembly. Cf. *Revue Nationale*, April 20, 1848, Castella, G., *Buchez* (Paris, 1911), Calippe, C., *L'attitude sociale des catholiques français au dix-neuvième siècle* (Paris, 1911), vol. i.

²*Ère nouvelle*, May 16, 1848.

ing of fraternity, that Christian form of patriotism, without which Equality and Liberty would speedily disappear from the soil of France." Moreover the editors promised to study the questions that were uppermost in men's minds, to examine the various systems that had been proposed by the socialists, to the end that they might help to usher in the new era.

This group of Social Catholics went further still. They proposed to found, under the patronage of the *Ère Nouvelle*, a school of Social Catholicism.

One of the greatest faults of the Catholics of our time [they affirmed] is the indifference which they show towards the economic and social works that are now agitating and inflaming the most vehement and most numerous class of society. One great fact, however, should open their eyes for the future. For half a century political passions have detached more branches from the sacred trunk than ever any heresy has done; to-day another order of tendencies is developing in the public mind. . . . We behold with some uneasiness infidel writers noisily take possession of the social scepter, while religious writers do not seem to perceive the capital importance of these questions in our time, or else they march in this direction only with a timid step. The result is that this science, perfectly Christian in its design, has been founded by infidelity. This is not a reason why we should abandon it to our enemies, who forge out of it a powerful weapon with which to slander the Catholic idea, to represent it as hostile to the happiness of the suffering classes, and thus to kindle hatred as blind as deplorable. It is therefore urgent that we ourselves should also form a social school since the wind of the century blows towards socialism. All the goodness, the truth, the justice that there is in the economic and socialistic productions will be gathered in the one center, and there all works of this kind will be analyzed and judged carefully and impartially; there will be assembled all the minds who feel attracted by these studies,

and, by shielding themselves against errors, by having recourse to the examination of the Church, there will be built up an imposing body of doctrine; and thus the pseudo-socialists will be deprived of the influence that they exert over numerous classes and the generous youth. That alone can be counted on to bring them back into the fold of religion, where the true unity, the Christian fraternity, will be found. We adjure then the Catholic economists, the members of the charitable societies, to collaborate in forming a committee where Christian economics and Christian socialism shall be able to compete with the heterodox sects, and to snatch away from them the dangerous power that they have built up by their active propaganda.¹

The group of Catholics that centered in the *Revue Nationale* likewise claimed to be a "school of Christian socialism".

We seek the social realization of Christianity [affirmed Feuguera],² that is why and how we are socialists. . . . Without doubt we are not socialistic according to the fashion of M. Cabet, M. Louis Blanc, M. de Considérant. We do not wish to suppress property, which is an essential condition of human liberty; we do not wish a monopoly of every industry placed within the hands of the government; we do not entangle the wholesome idea of association with the chimeras of Fourierism. But we are not the less socialists, and we claim this title with some pride; for socialism at bottom, in its disposition, or rather in the sentiment from which it emanates, is nothing less than charity applied to the economic and civil order.³

¹ Bazin, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 294-295.

² Feuguera was a disciple of Buchez and collaborated with him in the editorship of the *Revue Nationale*. After the withdrawal of this paper in July, 1848, he became one of the editors of the *Ère nouvelle*. Cf. *Ère nouvelle*, April 5, 1848.

³ *Revue nationale*, April 20, 1848.

Finally the *Ère Nouvelle* proposed to afford a Catholic, a Christian solution to the social problem. Therefore they occupied more or less the position of mediators. While contending for the welfare and happiness of the laboring class, so numerous in society, they frankly avowed that they did not think that this involved "the ruin of the other classes."¹

What had we done if the 24th of February, 1848, had not found us Christian? We confess frankly, we should have seen before us only two issues: the spoliation and the extermination of the bourgeoisie, or else the reestablishment of the people in that slavery from which Christianity has drawn them. We should have been either fanatical democrats or impious conservatives. *But we were Christian.* . . . What had the Christians to do? Evidently comport themselves as mediators between the two parties. Trustees of the doctrine that has reconciled all things in heaven and in earth . . . they should remain above both camps. Sympathizing with their afflictions, correcting their errors, they should respect the victory of the people and not take advantage of the dangers of the bourgeoisie. Hostile to the one or the other, they would have abdicated their influence.²

But it was not merely the need of reconciling two classes that were hostile to each other, which constituted the social problem: it was also a question of reconciling Catholicism with democracy. "We are of our time", affirmed the editors proudly; "we accept it with its general instincts, its liberal tendencies, its democratic institutions."³ The great need of the hour was conciliation, "conciliation of religion with liberty, conciliation of Catholicism with democracy,

¹ *Ère nouvelle*, May 16, 1848.

² *Ibid.*, September 1, 1848.

³ *Ibid.*, July 22, 1848.

conciliation of faith with science.”¹ Without the application of Christian principles as embodied in Catholicism at its best, this little group of Social Catholics found no hope for society, or solution for the labor problems confronting the Republic.

Turning now to the question of solving these problems, what did Catholicism propose by way of constructing the new society?

First of all, the Liberal Catholics found the solution in the principle of association, which, they claimed, was nothing more than a logical development of the third word in the republican motto, Fraternity. The idea of association was in the air.

To-day [wrote Melun], association is, in the thought of workmen, the great remedy for all their ills and for all their helplessness. They wish to have in common, work, wages and relief, hoping to put themselves in the place of the middlemen, who separate them from the consumer, and thus add to their wages the profit which proprietor and middleman claim.

As a principle, association was opposed to the principle that had dominated the regime of the bourgeoisie, namely, competition. It was the idea of association that the socialists, in one form or another, had adopted in their opposition to the then economic constitution of society. It was this same principle that the liberal Catholics had adopted, finding in it a fundamental Christian doctrine.² “Society

¹ *Ibid.*, Oct. 27, 1848; Bazin, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 280. Wrote Maret: “In the eyes of a true statesman, nothing should appear more important to-day than the conciliation of Catholicism with democracy. Christian democracy! there is the future. There will be no stability, order or dignity without it.” *Ibid.*, vol. i, p. 260.

² But if the Social Catholics accepted and advocated the adoption of the principle of association, they rejected the extreme form of it, communism. “. . . If we desire association in labor, we spurn with

is not, as the individualists think it," said Melun, ". . . a machine without feeling, which leaves each to chance. It is first and above all else a great association for defense, for insurance and for mutual protection, formed by God himself." For this reason, while recognizing the advantages that had accrued from the destructive work of 1791,¹ the Social Catholics unsparingly flayed the selfishness that the individualistic regime had engendered.

The Constituent Assembly [to quote Melun again] in abolishing the Gilds, the Corporations and the feudal rights, has broken down the last obstacles that prevented men from obtaining work and acquiring property. . . . It has prepared a road, which would enable men of industry, of energy and of perseverance, to march on towards happiness and riches. Since 1789 humanity has proceeded rapidly in this direction.

But 1789 did not finish its task; 1848 must complete the work of the first Revolution.³ Even the *Univers*, which can by no means be accused of a *rapprochement* towards socialism, found in the principle of association a key to the great problems of the hour. Let the various bodies within the state, it urged, "form associations and themselves determine the quality, the quantity and the price of their products."⁴ Then the laborer would have a voice in regulating production, the price of commodities and the

all our strength association in consumption, that is to say, life in common. . . . To-day the common life would be a cause of immediate dissolution of every kind of association. This reason would suffice to make us reject it, even if, which it is not, it were consistent with the conservation of the family and the conditions of justice and of liberty which we have laid down." Art. *Du communisme*, by A. Ott in *Revue nationale*, February, 1848. Ott was a disciple of Buchez.

¹ *Ère nouvelle*, February 18, 1849.

² Melun, *Intervention de la société*, p. 22.

³ *Univers*, June 1, 1848.

⁴ *Revue nationale*, April 13, 1848.

scale of wages. "In social as in political economy", wrote Montalembert to the electors of Doubs, "I have a profound faith in the principle of association, the only one which has not yet been tried in modern France, the only one, perhaps, which shall be able to conciliate all interests. . . ." ¹ The *Ère Nouvelle* likewise found in the principle of association a means of avoiding the errors of the past as well as of escaping the dangers of the future.

Association! That is what ought to be the powerful lever of modern society. . . . Do not forget it: there is our strength; there are all our resources. If democracy is not destined to be the most monstrous of despotisms that ever existed, it will be to this principle of association that we shall owe it. ²

And the *Revue Nationale* declared: "Association is the true formula of social Christianity, in which, by one of those general presentiments that do not deceive, every one searches at once the remedy of present ills and the revelation of the future." ³

But the Social Catholics developed the idea of association, so that it meant an association of laborer and capitalist for the control of industry, the oversight of production and the sharing of profits, ⁴ or else that the laborers themselves should become the capitalists. "The end to attain", said the *Revue Nationale*, "is that the implements of labor may be possessed by associations of workmen, instead of, as to-day by individuals alone." ⁵

Association between workmen, or between proprietors and workmen [said Melun] is one of the most legitimate rights,

¹ *Ère nouvelle*, May 24, 1848.

² *Ibid.*, February 4 and 5, 1849.

³ May 4, 1848.

⁴ *Ère nouvelle*, February 11, 1849.

⁵ *Revue nationale*, July, 1848.

sometimes the most successful, of the liberty of labor; and no system appears better calculated to bring to an end war between labor and capital, than to associate them, to cause the laborer to enter into the ranks of the manufacturer, to change his wages, in short, into a sharing of the profits. Already several great industries have admitted their workmen to a participation in the profits; and it is a duty of the state to remove from the laws all obstacles that may obstruct the right of association.¹

But did Social Catholicism advocate the liberty of association without any restrictions whatsoever? Did no one perceive in it a source of unrest, even violence? At least one perceived such danger, and he worked out a solution for the difficulty. This was Montigny, counsel to the court of appeal at Paris.

Ought we to admit as a right [he asked] the existence of associations with the pressure, often blind and unjust, that they exercise on industry, with the disorders that are their natural outcome even in face of the rigors of the law? If you give laborers the right of association, no doubt they will abuse it by making exaggerated demands, which, as a very consequence of this inadmissible exaggeration, will transform themselves into acts of violence. For associations lead to unemployment; and unemployment for the laborer is soon hunger and always distress.

And unemployment and distress soon transform themselves into use of force. "We cannot therefore allow associations to exist apart from the control of a mediating power," he declared, ". . . without embroiling the public authority and the government with the populace, without creating political dangers in the midst of which the very

¹ Melun, *op. cit.*, pp. 44 *et seq.* The reference is to arts. 414, 415 and 416 of the Penal Code which prohibited associations.

existence of society is called in question." On the other hand to refuse laborers the right to combine would mean that whenever there was a surplus of labor, wages would be reduced, so that the laborer could not provide against a time of crisis—in short it would put the laborer at the mercy of the grasping industrial exploiter. After the Revolution of February, when the right of association was everywhere recognized, such a thing was unthinkable. How then could the dilemma be avoided? Montigny found the solution in representative councils consisting of an equal number of members elected from capital and labor, to discuss and settle general questions of wages, length of the working day and relations between employer and employee. "The authority of these councils would not be imperative, but purely moral, for liberty of industry and labor is opposed to all constraint." Nevertheless those represented in the council could not combine against its decision. Moreover, in order to avoid "vexatious irritation" in which the purpose of the institution would be compromised, Montigny advocated having a kind of "civil jury" composed of disinterested citizens to assist the councils in forming equitable judgments. Thus he hoped "to regulate the relations between proprietor and labor without doing injury to liberty which was at once the first principle of politics and the most productive element in commercial prosperity." At the same time he wished "to reestablish between the different classes the bonds that egotism had relaxed too much. In our time the part of governing consists in reconciling those opposed to each other, uniting what has been disunited, recomposing society." ¹

¹ This article was contributed to the *Annales de la charité* for 1848, pp. 244-245. It was entitled, *The necessity of creating representative councils for industry*. It was approved by the *Ère nouvelle*, q. v., February 18, 1849.

The Social Catholics went further still and demanded state legislation in order to solve the social problem.

Guizot had published in 1848 a book entitled, *Concerning Democracy in France*, in which he remarked:

If French society were seriously and effectively Christian, what a spectacle it would afford to-day in the midst of the difficult problems that confront it! . . . Let modern society not fear religion and let it not bitterly call in question its natural influence. That would be to give way to a puerile terror and to adopt a sad error. You are in the midst of a vast and inflammable multitude. You are complaining that you lack the means to act on it, to enlighten it, to direct it, to restrain it, to calm it. . . . You have everywhere in the midst of this multitude men whose mission, whose constant occupation, is precisely to direct it in its beliefs, to comfort it in its afflictions, to inspire it with a sense of duty, to reveal hope to it; who exercise over it that moral influence which you do not find elsewhere. And will you not thankfully accept the influence of these men! ¹

That is well [commented the *Ère Nouvelle*]. But it is not enough. Let the priest make Christians of individuals; but you statesmen, on your part make the law more and more Christian. . . . Instead then of restricting ourselves to the exhortation: "Be Christian and practice the Gospel," we . . . say to those who hold the reins of power: "Accomplish in the social order that which the priest does in the moral order; put your institutions in accord with the principles of the Gospel, as he does the conduct of individuals. . . . Attack at the same time ignorance and poverty by putting instruction before all; protect childhood from the excess of a premature labor; assure old age and disability of a secure refuge; give to laborers the

¹The bourgeoisie who, before February 24, 1848, were unaware of the extent to which socialistic ideas had permeated the masses, became alarmed at the peril that threatened them and sought to use the influence of the Church to allay it. Cf. *infra*, chap. vii. *Ère nouvelle*, art. "Condition of social peace," March 30, 1849.

hope of repose in their last days. Concern yourselves without respite with these vital questions, with these problems the adjournment of which jeopardizes so many lives, and causes so much suffering, so many resentments, so many hatreds. Work to that end, and you will behold all feelings becoming assuaged; you will see, as a reward of your efforts, social peace appearing. . . . As long as these great interests do not pre-occupy our legislators, as long as the essential questions are relegated to the last rank in order to give place to questions of secondary import, so long will peace be sought in vain.”¹

The social problem was, therefore, one that demanded state action. The Vicomte de Melun doubtless expressed the feelings of his party when he wrote:

They have made a singular creation out of society. It presents itself to the greatest number in the form of a tax-collector who ruins, of a policeman who arrests, of a judge who condemns, of a hangman who imprisons or executes, and they fear to show it as a mother who protects.²

But it was precisely under this last aspect that some, in supporting the project of the *droit au travail*,³ wished to present the state. The phrase *droit au travail*, as well as the idea that lay beneath it, originated with Louis Blanc; and it had become a cherished project of many, if not all, those who, commonly called socialists, looked and worked for the amelioration of the working classes. Some even saw in it the application of the very principles for which the Republic stood. “It has been said,” affirmed Ledru-Rollin, “that the *droit au travail* is socialism: I reply, No! the *droit au travail* is the Republic applied.”⁴ It there-

¹ *Ère nouvelle*, March 30, 1849.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 19.

³ Right to Employment.

⁴ Session of September 12, 1848, *Moniteur* of September 13.

fore found its way into the Declaration of Rights, which, in imitation of 1789, constituted the preface to the Constitution of 1848. "Society is under obligation", it maintained, "by the general and productive means that are at its disposal, as well as by those which will ultimately be organized, to furnish labor to all able-bodied men who are unable to find it elsewhere." The project was warmly debated in the Constituent Assembly in September, 1848; and on the part of the Social Catholics was supported in the press by the *Ère Nouvelle*, and in the Assembly itself by a young liberal, but ardent Catholic, Frederic Arnaud [commonly known as Arnaud de l'Ariège, from the constituency which he represented]. Some had objected to the very idea of having a "philosophical preamble" to the Constitution. But not so the *Ère Nouvelle*. "What! Cannot France inscribe in the frontispiece of its constitution a part at least of its Christian and reasonable tradition! Cannot the legislators write at the head of its laws that which is in the reason and conscience of France!"¹

The *Ère Nouvelle*, as did Louis Blanc and his followers, found in the *droit au travail* a remedy against one of the greatest evils of the years preceding the Republic of 1848, namely, unemployment.

The *droit au travail* [it declared] has been born out of the suffering of the people. It is a cry of distress uttered by the masses of workmen who are immersed in poverty. Because of this it should arouse the deepest compassion within every man who possesses a Christian heart. This suffering and poverty are due, in a great measure, to those economic theories that have as their purpose and result the development of wealth for the profit of the few, in reducing the laborer to the condition of being merely an instrument of production. On the one hand the forced reduction of wages, and on the other the

¹ *Ère nouvelle*, September 11, 1848.

inevitable crises of industry and commerce, which suspend all labor and suppress even the most meagre wages, have created this profound woe of our civilization, this destructive plague called pauperism.¹

For the "disinherited of the human family" the *droit au travail* was a consolation, nay more, a hope. Should they, therefore, be deprived of it? "We affirm the contrary. There is in this sentiment . . . the idea of eternal justice; there is in it a philosophical and moral truth, the right to existence by means conforming to the nature of man." Arnaud de l'Ariège maintained much the same thesis before the Constituent Assembly. "When society contains numerous victims of egotism, of bad faith, of ill-will, or, at least of neglect and indifference, ought the state to fold its arms?" he asked.²

The *Ère Nouvelle* recognized, however, the danger of having such a formula as the *droit au travail* inscribed in the Constitution of the Republic. It would, therefore, limit its application.³ The state could not furnish labor to the unemployed beyond its resources.⁴ Moreover such a constitutional right should not be made an excuse for "idleness, disorder or lack of foresight" on the part of citizens. Nor should the state in its endeavor to fulfil this obligation become a competitor with private industry so as to hamper it.⁵ Notwithstanding, here was a fundamental right of

¹ *Ère nouvelle*, September 18, 1848.

² *Moniteur*, September 14, 1848, Session of Sept. 13.

³ Cf. Bazin, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 282. "We have rejected as a deplorable error the *droit au travail* in the sense that the socialists give it. We have demanded for man the right to existence by employment or by assistance. And the application of this right has been confined within limits that will guarantee the interests of all."

⁴ *Ère nouvelle*, September 18, 1848.

⁵ *Ib'.*

man that could not be denied without bringing dire consequences. "When God brings man into existence and while he maintains him in it, he gives him at the same time the right to all that is strictly necessary to the maintenance of this life, to his intellectual, moral and physical development."¹ Let the National Assembly, therefore, be assured that the debate of a day cannot decide such a question; for it is one that "survives its judges, and which providence holds open for centuries, if necessary, for the education of man."² "When one sees the state", said Arnaud de l'Ariège, "except itself from interference to relieve the poor who faint for want of food, do not say that the state protects liberty: say that it protects egotism."³

The most thoroughgoing project of state legislation which the Social Catholics proposed in 1848 for the solution of the social problem, was that of the Vicomte de Melun.⁴ There is at the root of almost all human ills, he said, "weakness, ignorance, improvidence or vice."

Against all these causes [he continued], society is able to perform the triple mission of prevention, relief and cure. To weakness it will offer assistance; to ignorance, instruction; to improvidence, prudence; to vice, education, punishment and rehabilitation. But it will intervene only when personal resources or family support are lacking, or when the aid demanded can come from no other source.⁵

¹ *Ère nouvelle*, September 18, 1848.

² *Ibid.*, October 18, 1848.

³ *Moniteur*, September 14, 1848, Session of September 13.

⁴ *De l'intervention de la société pour prévenir et soulager la misère* (Paris, 1848). "It is Armand de Melun who best represents the Social Catholic movement of 1848." Dreyfus, Ferdinand, *L'assistance sous la seconde république* (Paris, 1907), p. 96.

⁵ Melun, *ob. cit.*, p. 31.

The state was to surround the individual from birth—and even before by means of maternity institutions—to old age and death, with a series of laws which should ensure him the maximum amount of happiness and welfare.

Realizing the importance of childhood, its protection and training, Melun advocated the institution of maternity hospitals, day nurseries for the care of infants whose mothers worked outside the home, orphanages, agricultural colonies and technical schools. All children who worked in factories should be given strict supervision lest they should be permanently injured in health or morals by their surroundings. For them he would combine instruction with work, or divide the time between the two.¹ Great emphasis was placed upon education, which he called “the most powerful means of influencing childhood and youth; for”, he declared, “it trains the will, and instructs it to make good use of its energies, its intelligence and resources.”² Education should therefore be compulsory, and where necessary, free.³ Protection should also be provided for young workmen in factories and mills to prevent industrial work from degrading them to the level of mere machines.⁴

The adult, having been reared in school and furnished with a trade through apprenticeship, may seem, when he has attained his prime, to have no further need of protection. But life is difficult and a fall is speedy for him who is so close to poverty. He cannot afford, even for a moment, to relax his foresight and caution. He lacks the leisure to procure for himself all the treasures of health, knowledge and preservation. It is in the interest of society to create for him such institutions as shall enable him to save, to preserve his strength

¹ Melun, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-33.

² *Ibid.*, p. 35.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

⁴ *Ibid.*

and his morality and to prevent his bodily labor from stifling his intelligence.¹

The law, therefore, should as far as possible safeguard the workingman. Savings-banks should be instituted to encourage thrift; free lectures and libraries founded to fortify him against the ills due to ignorance; lotteries and gambling dens prohibited and cabarets and places of amusement in order to protect his morals strictly regulated.² Melun recognized also the necessity of having proper habitations for working-men. "The housing of workmen calls for a great reform", he asserted. Too often their dwellings were mere hovels, which, damp and foul, lacking light and air, bred pestilence and disease, and brought on premature old age. If the law regulated the nature of houses that were to be built in certain localities, if it decreed the demolition of houses for the beautifying of streets and the safeguarding of life, why should it not legislate concerning those that threatened their occupants, by their insalubrious surroundings, with a slow death?³

The law should likewise protect the working-man by means of factory regulations. It should prohibit child employment, or else impose conditions for his instruction and recreation.⁴ It should protect the adult against unsanitary conditions in his place of work, against dangerous machinery and against excess of labor.

But society should not only seek to prevent, it should seek also to heal and relieve. For illness, disability and old age there should be provided hospitals, free medical aid, convalescent homes, insane asylums, institutions for the

¹ Melun, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 46-47.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

deaf and dumb and blind.¹ Where punishment was necessary to combat crime, it should be meted out with the intention to restore rather than to avenge. For "the law ought not to imitate those whom it attacks: it is free from anger and consequently from revenge. Justice strikes to rehabilitate and punishes in order to improve, and expiation, in order to be effective, has need of taking charity with it into the prison."²

The great question of the time was unemployment. How should the laborer be protected against that? While objecting to the introduction of the *droit au travail* in the constitution, Melun nevertheless realized that it was essential for society to go to the rescue of the "innocent victims of liberty", those who were "weighed down beneath the march of progress."³ The government, he suggested, could prevent much of the decrease in wages due to competition of labor, by regulating the establishment of industries, prohibiting their introduction into localities where they would be liable to cause those evils.⁴ The state might also forestall excess of labor in the towns by encouragement given to agriculture, which would thus make the rural population less eager to flock to the towns.⁵ Moreover, if an attempt were made to point out to the inhabitants of the country the dangers and illusions of the city life, at the same time emphasizing the advantages of the country, the movement towards the cities might be somewhat checked. Against great industrial crises society should also seek to protect the working-man. The govern-

¹ Melun, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

² *Ibid.*, p. 48.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

ment, by means of public works, which would be of great utility to the country as well as of service to the laborer, should endeavor to relieve such a crisis. If necessary, it might concentrate into one year a piece of work which ordinarily would be spread over several years, and thus it would relieve unemployment.¹

Pauperism ought to be and can be successfully combatted [concluded Melun] . . . by enlightened and persevering efforts, by a sustained application of the public intelligence and good will, by a series of measures, of laws, of institutions, beginning with birth, supervising the education of the child, providing for the treatment of the afflicted, caring for the needs of the disabled and the aged, aiding and assisting labor, encouraging thrift, sheltering the destitute, restoring the penitent, protecting the workingman against greed and fraud, preparing for him better lodgings, clothing and food, and affording to the willing and provident the means of raising themselves by successive and easy stages to enfranchisement, from ignorance to knowledge, from bad to good, from charity to wage-earning, from proletarian to *propriétaire*.²

But Melun was not content with a mere theoretical relief of the poverty and suffering of the lower classes. He was a man of action as well as a man of ideas. Owing to the influence of his friend Falloux, who was convinced that his ideas and work would be beneficial to the country, he was elected to the Legislative Assembly on the 13th of May, 1849.³ There he was instrumental in effecting the

¹ Melun, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

² *Ibid.*, p. 64.

³ Melun, de, *Mémoires*, vol. ii, pp. 36 *et seq.* "I feel myself already in the grip of the electoral fever," he wrote in February, 1849. "If I should consider only my own ambition and my pleasure, I should be tempted to seek a more convenient road somewhere else. But I say to myself every day that there is here a great work to be done, the crown-

creation of the *grande commission d'assistance publique*, which instituted the relief laws of the Second Republic. The heart of this commission consisted of a small group of "men, young, energetic, inspired by the Christian spirit", the leaders of which were Melun and his brother.¹

ing of all my work, the introduction of charity into politics, the reconciliation of the rich and the poor, of him who possesses with him who suffers; and it is only from the height of the tribune and by legislation that the treaty of peace can be made acceptable. . . . "

¹ Melun, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

CHAPTER III

THE REACTION AGAINST SOCIALISM

THE Revolution of the 24th of February, 1848, was preceded by a vigorous propaganda on the part of the socialists, who, furthermore, regarded the political upheaval as an opportunity to apply their schemes for the regeneration of society. It was inevitable that many, especially the more conservative classes, should perceive a peril in this tendency towards a social revolution; it was inevitable, too, that as soon as they realized the magnitude of the danger, the reaction would begin. With some it began almost immediately; with others, after the Insurrection of June, which sealed the fate of the moderate Republic. Beginning as a reaction against socialism it ended in a reaction against Republicanism.

One of the first to perceive the menace that threatened society after the 24th of February was Louis Veuillot, the editor of the *Univers*. As early as the 2nd of March, he wrote:

All the extreme doctrines which, under the Old Regime, fermented in silence within a few disordered brains, and which were unable to achieve publicity, either because the government hindered, or because they did not rally a sufficient number of adherents to furnish means of propaganda—all these doctrines burst into prominence. Every day sects are hatched that clamor for the possible and the impossible, without even taking into consideration the invariable character of human nature. We have sages who would destroy everything and refashion it on a new model. . . . They would create for man

a social ideal quite different from that which we have known since Adam. . . . ¹

Ozanam, in a letter of the 6th of March, declared the peril greater than that of any revolution of the past; ² and Abbé Maret signalized the strange pretensions that clothed themselves in the guise of democracy as the greatest danger that menaced the Republic. ³ It soon became apparent that the words "republic" and "democracy" had quite different meanings according as they were used by moderate republicans or by socialists. "To-day everybody is republican", affirmed the *Univers*, "but not after the same fashion. Some dream, under the name republic, of the realization of utopias destructive of property and of the family, and subversive of all social order." ⁴ But to the moderates, who constituted the majority in the provisional government, the republic signified liberty for all, stability and order. The Second Republic was to be the arena of a constant struggle between these two diverse ideals. The great aim of the provisional government, as well as that of the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies, was to consolidate the moderate republic: to establish a stable and orderly government which should be respected at home and not feared abroad. On the other hand the demonstrations of the 25th and 26th of February, the 17th of March, the 16th of April and the 15th of May, as well as the June Insurrections of 1848 and 1849, were calculated to force the majority to usher in the socialistic republic, which was to have as a basis the Organization of Labor. ⁵ In this contest the weight of the

¹ Cf. Joly, Henri, *Le socialisme chrétien* (Paris, 1892), pp. 223-224.

² *Lettres*, vol. ii, p. 196.

³ *Ère nouvelle*, April 19, 1848.

⁴ *Univers*, March 19, 1848.

⁵ Quentin-Bauchart, *La crise social de 1848* (Paris, 1920), chs. vii, x, xii.

Catholics was to be thrown on the side of order and stability.

After the formation of the provisional government the elections were the great preoccupation of all parties. It was the sovereign people, exercising their sovereignty through universal suffrage, who were to decide what the constitution of the Republic was to be. Everything, therefore, depended upon this Constituent Assembly. The moderates looked for it to establish the moderate republic; and the socialists hoped that they could obtain a sufficiently strong representation to enable them to carry out their schemes.¹ All parties worked to have the majority favorable to themselves and to the ideas for which they stood. No sooner had the date for the elections been set than Ledru-Rollin, the Minister of the Interior under the provisional government, sent his emissaries throughout the country to organize the people for the elections.

At the head of each *arrondissement* [he wrote to them], place men who are sympathetic and resolute. Do not bother about giving them instructions, but kindle their zeal. By the elections which are to take place, they hold in their hands the destiny of France. Let them give us a National Assembly capable of comprehending and achieving the work of the people. In a word, all men of the *Veille*, and not of the *Lendemain*.²

This distinction between republicans of the *Veille* and those of the *Lendemain* was sufficient to arouse alarm.³ But the tone of the second circular was much more threatening:

¹ This is the significance of the manifestation of March 17, the purpose of which was to have the elections delayed so that socialistic propaganda would have a better opportunity to do its work. Quentin-Bauchart, *op. cit.*, chap. x.

² *Le moniteur universel*. The contrast is between those who were republicans before February 24th, 1848, and those who became republicans after that day of revolution.

³ Cf. *Univers*, 9 March, 1848.

"You demand what your powers are: they are unlimited. Agent of the revolutionary government, you are to be revolutionary also."¹ All the moderates, and more especially the propertied classes, persuaded themselves that the Minister of the Interior, having made himself master of the administration of the country, had decided to remove, if necessary by violence, all opposition from an assembly, which, composed solely of fanatical republicans, would compass their ruin in establishing a socialistic regime.² To many the instructions of the Minister of the Interior savored too much of 1793, the remembrance of which, said the *Univers*, all citizens, and members of the provisional government above all, ought to hasten to destroy.³ And it added: "No one refuses his adhesion to the republican government. Who would wish to support that which they call the revolutionary government?" To Frédéric Ozanam it was a "question of saving or ruining France."⁴ It is no longer a question between the monarchy and the republic, declared the *Univers*. The true issue lies elsewhere. "The true question is now between the pagan republic, a republic, Lacedaemonian, oppressive and tyrannical, and the Christian republic, modern, tolerant and liberal."⁵ "The socialist schools suppress liberty: may the elections be a reaction against this retrograde spirit."⁶

Realizing, therefore, that the future of France depended upon the composition of the National Assembly,⁷ clergy as

¹ *Le moniteur universel*. Cf. Quentin-Bauchart, *op. cit.*, p. 259.

² Quentin-Bauchart, *op. cit.*, p. 259.

³ *Univers*, March 9, 1848.

⁴ *Lettres*, vol. ii, p. 212.

⁵ *Univers*, March 9, 1848.

⁶ *Ibid.*, March 7, 1848.

⁷ Cabane, Henri, *Histoire du clergé de France pendant la révolution de 1848* (Paris, 1908), p. 103.

well as laymen, great ecclesiastics as well as publicists, strove for the moderate republic, the republic of stability and order. The attitude of the Catholics as a whole was well expressed by the *Univers*: "Who will found institutions and customs truly democratic, if the Church does not assist towards that end?"¹ Threats such as that which lurked in the circulars of Ledru-Rollin to his commissioners only made them the more determined. ". . . institutions founded on the Catholic soil of France", declared the Abbé Etang, "of which Catholicism did not furnish the chief elements, would be sterile and ephemeral."² The leaders in the Church were keenly alive to the situation which confronted the country. "France has adopted the republican regime," wrote the bishop of Montauban, "and nothing is able to make it depart from this resolution. But the constitution of this regime is a problem which permits of different solutions. It is a question of discovering the best and cleaving to it."³ "To be present as a simple spectator at a movement which will determine the condition of the country", said the bishop of Agen, "will that not be to betray one of its most sacred obligations, when it has need of the assistance of all its children?"⁴

A great act is being prepared [wrote the bishop of Digne on the 15th of March]. The nation in a few days is going to elect its representatives and charge them to draw up a constitution which will decide its destinies. . . . From the midst of the National Assembly, therefore, will come the safety of the *Patrie*, its civil and religious liberty, its prosperity, its peace, or else new tempests and frightful calamities.⁵

¹ *Univers*, March 15, 1848.

² Etang, Abbé, *Catholicisme et la république* (Paris, 1848), p. 41.

³ *Univers*, April 9, 1848.

⁴ March 15: Bazin, *Vie de l'Abbé Maret* (Paris, 1891), vol. i, p. 205.

⁵ *Univers*, March 24, 1848.

"In the present situation in France", declared the Abbé Etang, "and precisely because of it, Catholicism is the only force that offers to the government guarantees of existence and durability."¹

The Constituent Assembly will be what the electors make it [declared the editor of the *Univers*]. If honest folk, if Christians, giving in to counsels of fear, allow themselves to be dominated by audacious minorities, the Assembly will be bad, and then we may look for the worst; but if they act as free men, if they know how to do their duty, the Assembly will be good, and then we may hope for the best. Let the clergy, let the Catholics, meditate on this. They have in their hands infinite means of influence. If they wish to make use of them, they will be able to save France.²

The first need of the Catholics, if they were to take a serious part in the elections for the new assembly, was organization. But such organization they already had at hand; and this fact doubtless gave the Church an advantage which was not possessed by the socialists. Under the leadership of Montalembert, the Parti Catholique had formed what was known as the Electoral Committee for Religious Liberty to assist in the campaign for liberty of education in the elections of 1846. All that was necessary, therefore, in 1848 was to revive and enlarge this organization. As early as the 28th of February, Montalembert had convoked the central committee in Paris, which immediately began to despatch

¹ Etang, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

² *Univers*, March 12, 1848. The uncertainty which reigned in the country is described by a letter of Charles de Bourmont to Mgr. Parisis. "The circulars of M. Ledru-Rollin have struck them with terror and paralyzed conscientious activity. They have only one thought, that of abstention, in order not to compromise themselves, or of appearing at the electoral assemblies only to choose the men proposed by the government, or rather by the clubs." Guillemant, *Vie de Mgr. Parisis* (Paris, 1916-1917), vol. ii, p. 272.

appeals and instructions to the various committees in the departments.¹ For their work was vastly greater in 1848 with universal suffrage in vogue, than it had been in 1846 under a very restricted suffrage. On this account it was necessary to extend the organization to meet the new demands. The central committee, in its instructions of the 8th of March, insisted on the need of organizing, in the chief towns of each department, a central committee that should assume the responsibility of preparing a list of candidates whom the Catholics ought to support. Then there should be established in each *arrondissement* and in each *canton* "energetic and resolute correspondents", on whom would devolve the duty of canvassing the communes, obtaining opinions on the various candidates, sustaining those whom they deemed proper, and eventually supervising the elections which were to take place in the chief town of each *canton*. In case the members of the committees should be uncertain as to the tendencies of any of the candidates, they should propose a program which those candidates would be bound by "honor and conscience" to adopt should they be elected. These rural committees, however, were not to work in isolation. They were to act in concert with moderates representing other shades of opinion; and if they had on their lists the names of men who fulfilled the necessary qualifications, they were not to hesitate to give them their support, a wise precaution which would prevent splitting the moderate vote.² In proposing this common action with other committees, the religious committee contrasted its liberalism with that of Ledru-Rollin and his emissaries. "Would Paris have made the Revolution of February", asked the *Univers*, "and would the departments have accepted it, to undergo the despotism

¹ Lecanuet, *Montalembert*, vol. ii, p. 386.

² *Univers*, March 9, 1848.

of Ledru-Rollin and his agents? We do not believe it." "France has not shaken off the yoke of corruption to accept that of terror."¹ Such a method as that of the Minister of the Interior, they believed, was in flagrant violation of the very first principle for which the Republic stood. "Let there be no ostracism, no exclusion, no recriminations, no reactions, but also no reservations in favor of any past whatsoever." "Let us search our candidates amongst honest folk and the liberal minds of all classes, of all professions, of all opinions and of all religions." No one was worthy to represent France who did not respect the conscience of another.² "Above all things", stated the *Ère Nouvelle*, "the elector ought to be free; he should receive or submit to no influence other than that of truth."³

Nevertheless the electoral committees were far from being lax. The Catholics were doubtless as intolerant towards those whom they suspected of communistic socialism as the commissaries of Ledru-Rollin were towards those whom they found insufficiently republican in sympathy. In their circular of the 15th of March, the electoral committee emphatically stated that the most important function of the local committees was "discussion of candidatures." The *Univers* advised the same procedure. "Let the electors prepare themselves for the elections by a thoroughgoing inquiry into the doctrines of the candidates. Absolute ideas are dangerous; for they do not correspond in any way to the necessities of political life and of affairs."⁴ Their predilection was for "eminent Catholics" who had proved themselves trustworthy, and whose "presence in the

¹ *Univers*, March 30, 1848.

² *Circulaire du comité électoral de la liberté religieuse*, March 15, Bazin, *op. cit.*, pp. 217-218.

³ *Ère nouvelle*, April 17, 1848.

⁴ *Univers*, March 9, 1848.

National Assembly would be a strong guarantee for all men of order and of liberty.”¹ “The clergy and men of faith”, said the *Ère Nouvelle*, “will naturally support the men most capable of understanding and applying the new symbol of France.”² Where candidates were lacking whom the electoral committee approved, outsiders might be brought in.³

All the work, however, was not left to the local committees. The central committee, which had the direction of the campaign under its charge, established a bureau in Paris, to which all information that would prove of use was sent.⁴ But it also published a brochure entitled the *Élection Populaire*, of which five numbers appeared during the month of April. Copies were sent in bales to the various committees in the country who scattered them broadcast.⁵ The purpose of this leaflet was two-fold, to clarify opinion and to stimulate indifferent electors to take an interest in the campaign. One of its most noteworthy features was the strong appeal which it made to rural electors.⁶ The leaders of the electoral campaign realized that

¹ *Univers*, March 7, 1848; cf. Stern, Daniel, *Révolution de 1848* (Paris, 1862), 2nd ed., vol. ii, p. 194.

² *Ère nouvelle*, April 17, 1848.

³ Melun, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 3.

⁴ At the office of the publishing house, Lecoffre and Co., 29 Rue du Vieux-Colombier; Ozanam, *Lettres*, vol. ii, p. 204.

⁵ Lecanuet, *Montalembert*, vol. ii, p. 387.

⁶ Cf. *Univers*, March 12: “The Catholics, the clergy, are numerous and strong in the country: it will be their fault if religious men are absent from the National Assembly. Let them work, therefore, to make it worthy of themselves and of France”; also Etang, *op. cit.*, pp. 53-54: “It is on the entire surface of France, far from these great centers where passions surge, that Catholicism wields its sway with greatest sovereignty.” “. . . when the tempest raises itself within the queen of cities and carries away thrones and institutions, they (the in-

their strength lay in the country districts among an agricultural population, which had a majority over the industrial.¹ Realizing this fact, the editor of the *Univers* protested against the decree of the provisional government which fixed the polling booths in the chief towns of the canton rather than in the commune.² For this arrangement gave the advantage to the towns over the rural districts.³ The *Élection Populaire* took care to point out the disastrous effect which the organization of labor and communism would have upon the agricultural proprietor. Undoubtedly the laborer in the city was unhappy; but so was the farmer, and no one was concerned about him. Moreover, and this is what the editors emphasized, the burden of "all that one proposed to do for the laborer would fall on the farmer." "Under the socialistic regime," they declared, "it is the budget of the state that provides for the former; but the budget of the state is made up by taxation, and the taxes are paid largely by the inhabitants of the country." If the socialists obtained control of the country, it was argued, taxation would be greatly increased.⁴ It is true that the editors of the *Élection Populaire* did not fail to show the disadvantage for the workman of all schemes for the organ-

habitants of the country) are still calm, they behold the seething floods break at their feet like an angry wave of the sea. They wait and they hope, because they have faith in Him who stills the tempest. But this faith which gives them their strength, will give you strength also, if you know how to employ it. The electoral urn is placed in the center of France; and France is going to gather around this urn. Our Catholic provinces, enveloped in their belief, will advance, divided between the feelings of the duty of the citizen and the feeling of the man and of the Christian."

¹ Quentin-Bauchart, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

² *Univers*, March 7, 1848.

³ *Ibid.*, March 12, 1848.

⁴ *Élection populaire*, April 17, 1848.

ization of labor; but their arguments were more particularly adapted for the small rural proprietor. Furthermore, they sought to show that all socialism was communism, which was more thoroughgoing in its alterations of society, and consequently inspired the greater fear.¹ "Do you wish to know, electors, what communism is?" Civilization has brought the right of "territorial property"; and Christianity has established the "unity and the indissolubility of marriage." But

to-day communism pretends to change all that; it wishes us to return to the childhood of society. . . . It desires no longer individual property; no longer the family; no longer the liberty of the individual. . . . Do not forget, electors, that the communists propose to put in practice their mad theories; that they proclaim themselves the avengers of the poor, and that such men know only a single object of toleration, that which works to their profit.²

If therefore the electors wished to preserve religion, liberty, family and property, let them avoid those who "professed admiration and regret for '93", who "hoisted the red flag", who "eulogized Robespierre and Marat";³ let them neglect nothing to send to the National Assembly men whose morality was known, whose good sense had been shown, and whose courage was inflexible, "champions resolved to die, if necessary, for the defense of these eternal bases of all society."⁴ If they did not wish an increasing burden of taxation, let the "inhabitants of the country go to the elections and elect men less occupied with organizing labor in

¹ "Of all socialistic doctrines, it is communism that to-day spreads the greatest terror." *Revue nationale*, February, 1848.

² *Élection populaire*, April 18, 1848.

³ *Ibid.*, April 7.

⁴ *Ibid.*, April 18.

the cities",¹ men who, "freed from vain theories and anti-social chimeras, would desire only the good of all, and would not seek to establish the delusive happiness of some on the very real unhappiness of others".² When it is considered that the Revolution of 1789 had vastly increased the number of small holdings,³ and that it had removed a great burden of taxation from the peasantry,⁴ it will be readily seen that these arguments of the *Élection Populaire* could not have been without effect. The Church, therefore, wished to call in the country to redress the balance of the towns.

But the Catholics went further and made participation in the elections a religious duty. "Electors", declared the *Élection Populaire*, "you belong to your country, to humanity and to the Church, which is the great universal family. Woe betide you if . . . you desert the political arena! The safety of France is in your hands. God will demand a strict account of the mission which has been confided to you."⁵ The bishop of Quimper advised his clergy to instruct their parishioners that they were under an obligation to attend the elections.⁶ Another ecclesiastic wrote that not only could a Catholic absent himself from the Mass, but he ought to do so, if he found it impossible to perform the duties of both citizen and Catholic.⁷ "A good vote

¹ *Élection populaire*, April 7.

² *Ibid.*, April 15.

³ It is estimated that in 1840 there were over 4,000,000 agricultural property holders, of whom at least 3,500,000 were small proprietors. Quentin-Bauchart, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

⁵ *Élection populaire*, April 12.

⁶ *Univers*, March 23.

⁷ Cabane, *op. cit.*, p. 116, citation from *Univers* of March 16.

on that day will be the best prayer," declared a priest writing to the *Univers*.¹

In this work of preparing the country for the elections a very active part was taken by the clergy. Shortly after the Revolution of the 24th of February, Montalembert, seeing the importance of having the cooperation of the higher clergy, addressed a confidential letter to all the bishops urging them to do their duty lest the fate of 1789 befall the Church.

X Let them cooperate [he urged], without fear and without strife . . . , on the one side with the curés of the canton, on the other with the friends of religious liberty in their dioceses . . . with the view to discover and to designate the men most worthy, from the social and Catholic point of view, of the suffrage of honest men.²

Some of the clergy indeed had scruples about participating in a political struggle. But to the majority France in her difficulty had need of the cooperation of all the wisdom and of all the devotion of all parties, clergy as well as laymen.³ "Who can blame us?" demanded the Archbishop of Paris. "We do not vote for any of the parties which hitherto have divided our assemblies, but for a single party, in which all the others ought to be lost to-day: this party is that of order and of liberty".⁴ It was the social crisis that drew the Catholics into politics, rather than the desire to support any one political tenet. In some cases the lower clergy called upon the bishops, many of whom were holding back, to assume the leadership lest the clergy be divided and

¹ The elections were set for Easter Sunday, April 23; cf. chap. I, p. 55. *Univers*, March 12, 1848.

² Lecanuet, *Montalembert*, vol. iii, p. 389.

³ Lacordaire, *Ère nouvelle*, April 22, 1848.

⁴ Lecanuet, *op. cit.*, p. 389.

thus lose the effect of their influence.¹ Carnot, the Minister of Education and Worship, likewise issued an appeal for the cooperation of the clergy. Reminding them that they were French citizens, and that as such they possessed the right to participate in all political affairs, he urged them to take their places in the electoral assemblies and in the National Assembly to defend there the one great interest of all, "that of the *patrie*, closely related to that of religion."² There was a widespread response to these appeals.³ Many of the clergy offered themselves as candidates for the Constituent Assembly, the most distinguished amongst them being Abbés Lacordaire and Bautain, and the bishops of Langres, Quimper and Orleans. As candidates they either avowed their devotion to republican principles, or if not to republicanism, at least to "Christian and National" liberties, as Lacordaire. But just as strongly they affirmed that they stood for what they believed to be the fundamental bases of society, the family, private property and personal liberty. The Abbé Bautain, after pledging his electors to maintain liberty of person and of association, ended by stating that he would contend no less resolutely for "liberty of persons and of property, without which," he declared,

¹ Guillemant, *Charles Louis Parisis* (Paris, 1916-1917), vol. ii, p. 272.

² *Univers*, March 11, 1848. Carnot, although belonging to the school of Saint-Simon, was not in sympathy with the socialism of the Second Republic. Carnot, *Le ministre de l'instruction publique et des cultes* (Paris), 1848, p. 31.

³ "My clergy," wrote bishop Guibert, "are throwing themselves headlong into the work of the elections. They have seriously proposed to me to establish a committee with each curé of the canton which will correspond with the vicars who will bring their parishioners to vote in the chief town." Paguelle de Follenay, *Vie de Cardinal Guibert*, vol. ii, p. 106. The influence of this bishop is shown by his statement that he had the election of nine deputies under his control, and he was not a man to exaggerate; cf. Weill, *Catholicisme libéral en France* (Paris, 1909), p. 93.

"there is neither security nor dignity in the social state."¹ Another clerical candidate, M. Caron, curé of Nesle, while finding himself in perfect harmony with the program of the new republic, did not hesitate to affirm that he did not dream of an "equality of social position." "That is an absurd and criminal chimera", he said; "that is the theory of robbery, the ruin of society and the family in pillage and blood."² One curé [of the Cathedral of Beauvais], who had apparently gone farther than most in his zeal for the republic, was accused of being a communist; but he repudiated such an appellation: "I a communist!" he exclaimed, ". . . I shall demand until death the maintenance of the family and of property; and what is communism, if it is not the destruction of the one as well as of the other?"³

When the election day arrived the activity of the clergy was not less evident. The bishops had given instructions that the services of the day should be arranged so as not to interfere with the casting of the ballot.

Everywhere in the country [said Daniel Stern], they celebrate Easter Mass at the dawn of day. As soon as the service is over, the curé joining the mayor, the justice of the peace, the commandant of the National Guard and the school-teacher, they assemble the electors, form them in column and conduct them in procession, with banner unfurled and band playing, singing patriotic songs, to the chief towns of the canton.⁴

All this took place with very few disturbances.⁵ The result exceeded the expectations of even the most sanguine.

¹ *Univers*, April 8, 1848.

² *Ibid.*, April 17, 1848.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Stern, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 203; cf. Guillemant, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 274.

⁵ Stern, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 203.

Thus, said the bishop of Langres, "the rural populations have caused all to see that . . . simplicity of manners united with religious conviction suffices to give a high and serious idea of civic obligations."¹ Nothing is more significant, stated the *Univers*, than this eagerness of the rural communes to rise up as one man in order to put the "red list" at the foot of the polls.²

That the influence of the clergy in the elections was by no means negligible their opponents bear witness.

Not far from the chateau is the vicarage [said the *Réforme*, the journal of Proudhon]; there also is exerted an influence more dangerous still than that of the former. For the priest rules in some manner over the thought of the peasant as the noble over his field. And let no one say that the French clergy have received the republic with love and gratitude: one does not break so quickly with the past.³

And after the elections had taken place the *National*, disappointed in not finding the Assembly more republican, stated:

The reports that are coming to us from many of the departments prove that the influence of the clergy has been exerted in a manner hostile to the republic. . . . Certain bishops have used without scruple these dangerous arms which the provisional government has placed in their hands. There are, we know it, some dioceses where the curés of the towns and countryside have received very imperious and singularly detailed proscriptions.⁴ I hear it said everywhere [stated the *Christ Republicain*], that the priests have intrigued in the elections in the departments; that they have forced their parish-

¹ Guillemant, *op. cit.*, p. 274.

² *Univers*, April 30, 1848.

³ *La réforme*, April 2, 1848; *Univers*, April 5.

⁴ *Univers*, May 4, 1848.

ioners to vote for the curé or the bishop, on pain of refusing them absolution. And that after giving them ballots which they had marked, they conducted them to the polls to see if they really cast the same ones.¹

Nevertheless it would be difficult to estimate precisely the influence which the Church exerted in the elections of the 23rd of April, 1848. Statistics probably do not exist which would permit of more than a general statement. The much-quoted assertion of Debidour to the effect that "the elections, from whence set out, the 23rd of April, 1848, the Constituent Assembly, were largely the work of the Church", is probably extreme.² We know that many of the clergy who stood for election, as well as some of their candidates, were defeated.³ On the other hand we have the statement of Bishop Guibert that, in his diocese, "of the eight names which the religious committees had presented, seven, in spite of the plots, the intrigues and the infamous violence exercised by the commissioners and their agents, were successful."⁴ Daniel Stern also states that those whom the Church excluded were not elected, or were elected with great difficulty.⁵ We shall therefore doubtless be safe in asserting that the Church was one of the forces, and that by no means the least, which, in the elections to the Constituent Assembly, worked for the moderate republic in opposition to socialism. There was no attempt on the part of the Catholics to form a clerical party. Nor

¹ *Le Christ républicain*, June 8, 1848.

² Debidour, A., *L'Église et l'état en France de 1789 à 1870* (Paris, 1911), 2nd ed., p. 485.

³ Out of forty-two members of the clergy who were candidates, only fourteen were elected. Cabane, *op. cit.*, pp. 224-227. Among Catholic laymen, both Ozanam and Melun were defeated.

⁴ Paguette de Follenay, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 108.

⁵ Stern, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 194.

was there, at least before the 15th of May, 1848, any disloyalty to the Republic.

The party representing the moderate republic having thus been established in power, the Catholics, like the moderates of all other shades of opinion, looked for stability and peace. "The whole of France", affirmed the *Univers*, "aspires only after order and civil peace." But the truth could not be concealed, it declared. If there were any attempt to appeal from the result of the elections to the mob on the street, then there would be a reaction. "France in her passion for order would sacrifice liberty to obtain it."¹ These words were prophetic, but ominous for the future of the Republic. The attempt on the National Assembly of the 15th of May was the beginning of the disillusionment. "This violation of the law by the might of the populace", said Melun, "made all my confidence wane, and that day I despaired of the Republic."² Lacordaire, who was in the Assembly when it was invaded by the mob, had only one thought: "The Republic is lost."³ Three days later he resigned his seat in the Assembly. The *Ère Nouvelle* affirmed that the 15th of May caused the birth of the party of reaction.⁴ It is certain that after this date the reaction against socialism grew apace. It revealed itself in the criticism of the organization of labor, the progressive tax, the state purchase of the railways, and in the suppression of the National Workshops, in all of which was perceived the attempt of socialism to dominate society.

As early as the beginning of April the *Univers* had begun its attacks on the schemes of Louis Blanc, which were being

¹ *Univers*, April 30, 1848.

² *Mémoires*, vol. i, p. 258. "The effect which this attempt had on me was profound; my confidence disappeared, or at least wavered; the June days were bound to destroy it. *Ibid.*, p. 258.

³ Foisset, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 189.

⁴ *Ère nouvelle*, May 19, 1848.

discussed in the commission of the Luxembourg, of which he was chairman.¹ It beheld in the organization of labor only a wild chimera totally opposed to the best interests of the workingmen. Such a system would make them slaves of the state, it affirmed; it would take away all their influence without giving them higher wages.² In its tendency to make the state the sole proprietor and capitalist, the *Univers* beheld an attack on private property. The *Revue Nationale*, the journal of Buchez and Bastide, the "organ of Christian Democracy", while contending strongly for a change in the economic system of France which would favor the workingman, likewise opposed the scheme of Louis Blanc. It found it philosophically unsound, and what was a greater defect, impracticable. As did the *Univers*, it perceived in the organization of labor the "general monopoly by the state", "the tutelage of the whole of society put in the hands of the executive power", the result of which would be calamitous for the laborer. It would condemn him to life imprisonment in the National Workshops; it would take away from him his free will and rob him of all creative ability and responsibility—"in a word, the most complete intellectual and moral degradation which one has ever seen."³ "Strictly speaking", said the *Ère Nouvelle*, "one can improvise chaos, but one will never be able to improvise a social system."⁴

The progressive tax and the state purchase of the railways were likewise attacked. "The progressive tax," said the *Univers*, "leads to communism by the rapid absorption of all private fortunes by the state."⁵ But not only

¹ This commission had been a sop thrown to Louis Blanc.

² *Univers*, April 6, 1848.

³ *Revue nationale*, April 6, 1848.

⁴ *Ère nouvelle*, May 31, 1848.

⁵ *Univers*, April 19.

does it affect the rich at whom it aims, declared the *Ère Nouvelle*, but in the last resort "it falls with all its weight on the laboring classes. It is for that reason that we reject it."¹ Another project met with like hostility on the part of the Catholics. This was the absorption of the railways by the state, by means of which it was proposed to reestablish public credit, and at the same time give employment to the army of "demagogues" who were causing the Republic so much concern. Berryer, Ravignan and the Abbé Cazales urged Montalembert to "denounce this danger". He did so with alacrity in a lengthy speech in the Assembly on the 22nd of June, in which, said de Tocqueville, he excelled himself;² for he perceived in the proposed scheme another attempt of socialism to foist itself upon society. "I find in this project", he said, "an attack on the right of private property, which is the base of all society."³

More important still, however, because of its immediate consequences, was the suppression of the National Workshops, which had been instituted at the beginning of March to serve a double purpose, to provide work for the unemployed in Paris, and to discredit, in the eyes of the public, the proposals of Louis Blanc.⁴ Under the direction of Émile Thomas, to whom their construction and supervision had been intrusted, they became a mere "caricature" of the National Workshops as Louis Blanc had envisaged them.⁵ Contrary to his project, which made provision for skill and ability of workmen, the employees, skilled and unskilled alike, were engaged in work which often had no other object in view than to keep them out of idleness.

¹ *Ère nouvelle*, April 28.

² Lecanuet, *op. cit.*, p. 404; de Tocqueville, *Souvenirs*, p. 210.

³ *Moniteur*, June 23, 1848.

⁴ Tchernoff, *Louis Blanc*, pp. 75-76.

⁵ Cf. statement of Proudhon, *supra*, p. 80.

Thus constituted, it soon became apparent that the National Workshops were merely a temporary expedient to meet the unemployment crisis that accompanied the proclamation of the Republic and was aggravated by it. Such was the opinion of the *Univers*. "Everybody understands that we could not allow 100,000 of our fellow citizens to die of hunger. Direct charity would have had evil consequences: it was a thousand times better for the state to pay these workmen wages for work which kept them in orderly habits."¹ "Considered in themselves", said the *Ère Nouvelle*, "the National Workshops were, when they were established [March 8], one of the necessities before which no government could recoil."² But that purpose had been fulfilled, and it was time for them to be dissolved and to give place to more permanent forms of organization. "If anyone imagines that material forces thus accumulated are going to bring the sudden realization of any utopia whatsoever, he is much mistaken."³ To the *Univers*, if the National Workshops have disproved the theories of the socialists, they will have justified themselves. "A hundred millions expended to illustrate a great social truth, and to snatch our fellow-citizens from fatal illusions would be well spent".⁴ Not only, however, did the leading Catholic papers of both liberal and conservative tendencies call for the suppression of the National Workshops, but a prominent Catholic and legitimist, the Comte de Falloux, played an active role in the act of suppression. As reporter for the Assembly's commission of inquiry Falloux denounced them as hot-beds of sedition and of immorality as well as a

¹ *Univers*, June 1.

² *Ère nouvelle*, May 31.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Univers*, April 1, 1848.

burden to the state, and called for their transformation.¹ Not, however, until the 21st of June was it definitely decided to abolish them.² That act was the signal for the Insurrection of June.

This insurrection, which Falloux has described as causing the loss of more generals than the most celebrated battles of the Empire, and which wrought the death of Monseigneur Affre, the greatly revered Archbishop of Paris, marked the crystallization of the reaction against socialism on the part of the Catholics, a reaction which was furthered by the events that were transpiring at Rome.³

This reaction against socialism after the June Days caused the Catholics to adopt two different attitudes. On the one hand, the more liberal, the Social Catholics, while taking care to distinguish themselves from the socialists and their theories, perceived, nevertheless, the necessity of radical reforms in the social order. On the other hand, the more conservative began to denounce, not only socialists but also the more liberal Catholics, whom they accused of compacting with socialism. It is within this latter group that one perceives the beginning of the reaction against republicanism.⁴

¹ "The man who exercised in these evil days the decisive influence, he who . . . contributed the most to bring the minds, in the commission at first, then in the Assembly, to this way of thinking . . . was incontestably M. de Falloux. He was at this time the chief, the most eloquent, the only courageous mouthpiece of the reaction. His name remains connected with the disastrous measure of violent dissolution which threw the National Workshops into insurrection." Stern, *op. cit.*, p. 359. This is supported by Melun, who was an intimate friend of Falloux. "It was owing to the energy of Falloux that the National Workshops were closed." *Mémoires*, vol. i, p. 258. In justice to Falloux, however, it should be said that he was heartily in favor of Melun's projects. *Ibid.*, vol. ii, p. 24.

² De la Gorce, *Histoire de la seconde république française*, 8th ed. (Paris, 1919), vol. i, pp. 326-327.

³ Cf. Mourret, *op. cit.*, pp. 249 *et seq.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 250.

The Social Catholics were lovers of order and stability no less than the conservatives; but they perceived that that end could be achieved only through progress. "Order is as impossible without progress as progress is without order", declared the *Revue Nationale*.¹ There should therefore be no cessation of the work of social amelioration.

The frightful struggle of which Paris has just been the scene [said the same journal] is a great lesson for the whole of France. . . . It demonstrates that it is urgent that the social question receive a solution, . . . a prompt and energetic remedy. . . . Far from believing, then, that the victory gained over the insurrection has repelled the social question, we think, on the contrary, that it has placed it in a truer light.²

Nevertheless they were far from accepting the socialist solution of the difficulty.

Everyone knows [said the *Ère Nouvelle*] that the sufferings of the people have given birth in some diseased minds to theories subversive of property, of the family, of liberty: theories which would bring a general misery and a universal slavery, which would make the state into a frightful machine, capable of destroying the human species. . . . However, communism in itself and as a future social ideal does not inspire in us the least fear; it is in too flagrant contradiction with all the laws, all the instincts, all the needs of our nature. But it is capable of agitating the streets and of imbrueing them with blood: it is able momentarily to compromise the most sacred interests. There is then a great danger against which it is necessary to guard.³

The Social Catholics perceived that the way to avoid this danger was to undermine the position of the socialists by

¹ *Revue nationale*, June 28, 1848.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ère nouvelle*, September 18, 1848.

adopting a saner and more practicable socialism than the latter.

Let us make socialists out of ourselves since it is the hobby of the century; let us inaugurate a real and peaceable socialism which does not impose itself by means of musket-shots. . . . It is incontestable . . . that socialism, left in the hands of these dangerous apostles, is a terrible arm suspended over the head of society . . . let us unfold in our turn the marvelous prospects of a Christian society, and we shall have the consolation of restoring to ourselves so many young men of good faith lost in the pandemonium of false socialism.¹

Furthermore, not to have some solution for the pressing problem of the time to oppose to socialism would mean that Catholicism would have to abdicate its influence. "When the most shallow utopian has his plan of social reorganization to offer to a people which suffers and seeks, Catholicism would have only a secondary role to fill, if it alone were doomed to sterility."²

But the best expression of this constructive side of Social Catholicism, in its opposition to socialism, was found in the program of Melun, which has already been discussed.³ Melun found socialism impracticable; for it would have to be inaugurated by an universal robbery, which would be a singular beginning for a reign of fraternity and justice. The socialistic regime, as its apostles proposed it, would impose sacrifices on the whole of France for the advantage of a few great industrial centers. Its Spartan legislation and its rigid regulation of the details of the lives of individuals would spell the destruction of liberty, which would be flagrantly inconsistent with democracy. In such a

¹ Bazin, *Maret*, vol. i, p. 295.

² Pierre Pradié in *Ère nouvelle*, October 19, 1848.

³ *Supra*, chap. ii.

system, he declared, "individual peculiarities are confused, personality is effaced, and the man disappears in the social pantheism." "To describe such ideas," said Melun, "is sufficient to refute them." But furthermore, socialism has forfeited the right to attack the present constitution of society whatever its evils may be; for it has given France more wounds—the reference is to the June Days—than it has received from all the systems which socialism has attacked.¹ The end that socialism sought for society by means of "utopian doctrines of *phalanstery*",² the Social Catholics wished to achieve through "Christianity and the Gospel".³

On the other hand the Insurrection of June caused the more conservative amongst the Catholics to adopt a hostile attitude towards any attempt at amelioration of the condition of the working-classes that bore any resemblance to the proposals of the socialists.⁴ This phase of the reaction against socialism began to manifest itself in the *Univers* almost immediately after the June days. What was the cause of unrest that had ended in the barricades of Paris?

¹ Melun, *De l'intervention de la société pour prévenir et soulager la misère* (Paris, 1849), chap. ii.

² The reference is to Fourier's *phalanstère*, or communistic reorganization of society.

³ Melun, *Mémoires*, vol. i, p. 261.

⁴ "The workmen, during the Days of June, had raised the banner of socialism, which too often the conservatives confused with the very legitimate and practical aspirations of charity; the reaction rapidly increased and went beyond its purpose; works of charity were almost always suspected of complicity with the dreams of the phalanstery of Louis Blanc and of Cabet." Melun, *Mémoires*, vol. ii, p. 25. "In short they were so hostile against all that which, near or far, recalled the doctrines and the interests in the name of which had just been declared a very savage war that, as General Cavaignac said to me one day, 'one was likely to be denounced as a socialist, if one were seen giving five centimes to a beggar.'" *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26.

The Social Catholics, like the socialists, perceived it, as we have seen, in the condition of the working-classes, which they therefore sought to improve. But not so the *Univers*. They search for the solution of the problem where no solution exists, it asserted. "The question has been resolved by the Church which has never bothered with political economy."¹ "The malady is in the soul", it affirmed; "it is necessary to apply the remedy there."² What then was the message of the *Univers* to the working classes? "To live meagrely by means of a precarious employment, that is nothing: it is thus that the greater part of humanity has lived, and always will live. God has made this law without which society would be impossible. Man must therefore submit to it."³ Montalembert and Louis Veuillot were in accord in this respect. The *Univers* of the 19th of September, in denouncing the theories that promised men a paradise on earth, quoted with approval a statement of the former, that "work is a punishment." Under the reign of socialism men were taught that the chief end of life was "to enjoy and to despise"; but if society were to escape the perils that threatened it with destruction, it would be necessary to return to the "religious doctrine", which was resumed by two other words, by means of which society had long lived, "forbear and respect."⁴ But the *Univers* reached the climax of its reactionary doctrine when, in its issue of the 12th of February, 1849, it stated: "Society has need of slaves. It can exist only at such a cost. It is necessary that there be some men who work much and live little.

¹ *Univers*, September 9, 1848; cf. Joly, *op. cit.*, p. 227; Calippe, *L'Attitude sociale*, vol. iii, p. 33.

² *Univers*, July 3, 1848.

³ *Ibid.*, July 7.

⁴ Montalembert, speaking in the Constitution Assembly, September 18, 1848. *Moniteur*, September 19; cf. Joly, *op. cit.*, p. 228.

They play the role in society which the various members of the human body do in the life of the individual, obeying the brain which is idle in appearance."¹ Let the working-man therefore be content with his lot.

This reaction against anything that savored of socialism found concrete expression in the warfare that began in the latter part of 1848 against the *Ère Nouvelle* and its doctrines, a warfare which ended only with the withdrawal of the original editors on the 5th of April, 1849, when it fell into reac-

¹This doctrinal reaction against socialism seems to have been quite widespread. "Christianity does not preach an erroneous doctrine of man when it says to him that suffering here below is a necessity of his condition, an indispensable element of the trial which he has to experience. No! it does not seek to deceive him, or to demean him when it offers resignation as the basis of virtue, and a relief for the ills of which he complains." Bishop of Bayeux: Mandate for Lent, *Ami de la religion*, February 27, 1849. The *Ami de la religion* quoted with approval the words of Thiers from his book *Sur la propriété*: "... religion says to you: suffer, suffer with humility, with patience, with hope, in looking up to God who awaits you and will recompense you." Oct. 19, 1848. "Be resigned to a laborious poverty," counseled Montalembert, "and you will receive eternal reward and compensation. That is what it (the Church) for a thousand years has said to the poor; and they have believed it until the day when their faith has been snatched from their hearts, immediately after which the horror of the social state has entered." *Moniteur*, September 19, 1848. "The present world is one which religion alone is able to heal. Allow it to handle the rich; it will cure them of egotism; it will develop in their hearts feelings of compassion and of generosity. Allow it to deal with the poor: it will cure them of license, of idleness, of debauchery; it will inspire in them the love of work, of order, of economy, Christian resignation, respect for property, loyalty, gratitude." Abbé J. Laffetay, Canon of Bayeux, *L'université Catholique*, September, 1848. The *Ami de la religion* finds the following causes for socialism: (1) Deism or the negation of all revealed religion; (2) Materialism, or the negation of the immortality of the soul and of the punishments and rewards of an other life; (3) Pantheism, or the negation of God such as the world has always believed in and worshipped; (4) rationalistic ethics, or the ethics of the state; (5) the cause embracing all the others: state education, or the monopoly of the University. October, 1848.

tionary hands.¹ The campaign was begun by a series of letters which Montalembert published in the *Ami de la Religion* shortly after that periodical passed under the direction and editorship of the Abbé Dupanloup. In the first letter [October 19, 1848] after affirming that Society had no worse enemy today than socialism, he went on to say:

if the socialistic contagion should even encroach upon the children of the Church, if a portion of our Catholic youth had the misfortune to open its mind or its heart to these fallacious doctrines, truly then the evil would seem irreparable . . . and there would remain nothing more to do than to weep over the ruins of a society condemned to die within the embrace of an incurable anarchy.²

The second letter appeared on the 23rd of October, and although it did not mention the *Ère Nouvelle* by name, it was evident to all that he was referring to that paper and its doctrines.

Why is it that such aberrations [he complained, referring to socialist tenets] have met amongst us, certainly not accomplices, but sometimes dupes, and more often still involuntary instruments? Why should men, of whom several are endeared to Catholics by their virtues, their character, their talents and their eloquence, have believed that, in order the better to serve the interests of the democracy to which they are devoted, they could lend an indirect cooperation with some of these errors.³

On the 30th of November, Montalembert wrote a third letter, addressed to A. M. Bonnetty, the editor of the *Université Catholique*, requesting him to publish his two previous letters in that periodical. In this letter he took oc-

¹ Bazin, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 355.

² *Ami de la religion*, October 19, 1848.

³ *Ibid.*, October 23, 1848.

casion to say that all that had transpired since he wrote the letter in question—the reference is to the events at Rome—had but confirmed him in his conviction and in his resolution to combat the errors which he had mentioned.

In the replies which have been addressed to me by the *Démocratie Pacifique* and the *Ère Nouvelle* [he continued] no one will have found anything of a nature to allay my fears or to modify my apprehensions. In France the socialists do not hold a banquet without drinking a blasphemous toast to Christ, as the first author of their doctrines; and they boast of having accomplices amongst the clergy! In Italy we have had demonstrated to us the practical application of this theory of the flatterers of the people, which substitutes for the alliance of throne with altar the confusion of Christianity with democracy. They cry in the streets *Vive Jésus-Christ, démocrate* and with the aid of the democratic dagger which slew Rossi¹ they demolish the sacred principate, which for a thousand years has been the bulwark of the liberty and of the dignity of the Church.

These sad doctrines which have just burst amongst us, he concluded, threatened with destruction both Catholic truth and the whole social order. The *Correspondant* likewise felt that some had affirmed a little too prematurely the alliance of Christianity with democracy. But as it was not quite as ready as the other journals to deny democracy any relation with Christianity, it affirmed that the idea of democracy united itself intimately with Christianity in the sense that no democracy was possible without the bridle of the Christian law.²

The battle against the *Ère Nouvelle* and its doctrines was taken up by the *Univers* and by some of the clergy as well as by the *Ami de la Religion*. On the 17th of January,

¹ Cf. *infra*, chap. iv.

² *Correspondant*, October 28, 1848.

1849, a grand vicar of Poitiers wrote to a subscriber of the paper in question: "It appears that you receive . . . a very bad journal: I urge you, in your own interests and in those of the Church, to cease all perusal of this sheet. You have no need to create penalties for yourself for the future. There are always enough in this life.." ¹ The bishop of Montauban, hearing that several of the professors of the Seminary of Montauban were subscribers to the periodical in question, wrote to the Superior expressing his disapproval and the hope that they would abandon it. Not content, however, with forbidding his clergy to read the *Ère Nouvelle*, he wrote a letter condemning its doctrines. "I insist on regarding as false", he affirmed, "as extremely dangerous, as founded almost always on equivocations and on ideas badly determined, the majority of the applications which the *Ère Nouvelle* makes of Christian principles to the social democratic state." ² But the most virulent attack came from the *Ami de la Religion*.³

There is in the Parisian press [it stated] a paper which for several months has been astonishing and profoundly grieving the Church. This paper has won a deplorable renown by the temerity of its doctrines and the errors of political conduct into which it has allowed itself to be dragged. It is the *Ère Nouvelle*.

Not only did the *Ami de la Religion* deplore the pernicious doctrines of the *Ère Nouvelle*, but it expressed itself as being deeply pained when it beheld it

sympathizing in the name of Catholicism with the revolutionaries of the whole world, almost always shutting its eyes to the

¹ Bazin, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 317.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 317-318.

³ *Ami de la religion*, March 31, 1849.

shameful excess of demagogism, perceiving in the frightful commotions which threatened to throw Europe back into barbarism only the pardonable incidents and the inevitable conditions of progress and of modern transformations; having only bitter words for the governments forced to oppose armed resistance to the brutal violence of the revolution and of the assassin.

The *Ami de la Religion* was at a loss to know what to say concerning "this strange illusion" which made men see in the "most detestable dreams of socialism the holy spirit of Gospel charity." It accused the *Ère Nouvelle* of sympathizing with the revolution in Rome. "The murder of Rossi, the siege of the Quirinal, the expulsion of the holy and august Pius IX, that shameful and sacrilegious parody played by some actors and infamous spoliators who call themselves the Roman Republic": all that the *Ère Nouvelle* would have us accept as a work of emancipation!

But the reaction against socialism went further still and condemned the very idea of state relief, or the attempt of society as a whole to prevent or assuage poverty. In his letter of the 23rd of October, 1848, to the *Ami de la Religion*, Montalembert had complained that the Social Catholics had affirmed "that private charity was a humiliation for the recipient, and that they prepared the way for the organization of relief by the hand of the state."¹ The *Univers* took up the same complaint in a series of articles which reviewed Melun's book on the Intervention of Society.

We do not pretend to refute all the false principles, all the impracticable proposals of our publicist [it stated] . . . But we believe that he begins with a radically false principle and that he leads to a result completely opposed to the Catholic spirit. . . . We are persuaded that his system contains the most

¹ Bazin, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 275.

direct and the most obvious attack that, for a long time, has been directed against the rights of the Church, which rights are the salvation of society. That was a sad phrase "education ought to be laic." M. de Melun would readily modify this grievous aphorism in saying: "charity ought to be laic." . . . We remain convinced that charity, even more than instruction, ought to be unrestricted, and that, in order to be effective, it should be religious. We affirm that the Church alone is able to teach devotion and resignation, and that the religious orders are chiefly designed to instill these teachings into the heart of society, to give to the poor as to the rich this double example of which they have so much need, and the practise of which is alone able to maintain society. We regard as dangerous and as revolutionary every proposal that tends to obstruct and restrain the action of the Church, already so restricted, and to withdraw from its domain so many souls whose safety has been intrusted to it. . . . We spurn, therefore, the theories and the systems of de Melun, because this direction, which he proposes to put into the hands of the state, tends inevitably to substitute the action of the state for that of the Church. We are persuaded that public assistance would not be long in assuming the appearance and the proportions of the University. . . . ¹

Melun's proposals also seemed to be conceding too much to socialism. "Such concessions, made to contemporary theories", said the *Univers* referring to his program, "appear dangerous to us." "The new project of intervention [Melun's] to prevent and relieve poverty allies itself" with

¹ Léon Aubineau, *Univers*, June 16 and 25, 1849. The *Univers*, said Melun, "discharged against my poor little pages, which I had conscientiously written in the hope that they would do a little good, three long articles which accused me: (1) of wishing completely to sacrifice private to legal charity; (2) of excluding from the latter the action of religious congregations; (3) of wishing to gain by these flatteries to the men and ideas of the day, a general supervision over, and even a ministry of public assistance." *Mémoires*, vol. i, pp. 265-266.

all the absurd hatreds of socialism. The *Univers* therefore rejected the idea of public assistance, which seemed likely only to increase rather than to allay the existing evil; and it published with complete approval an article from the *Union Franc-Comtoise*, entitled *Les Socialistes sans le Savoir*.¹ Proudhon, said the author of this article, "with that free and vigorous logic which leaves nothing in the shadow," has made this declaration regarding public assistance: "With this right to assistance I will overturn society."

He was a hundred times right; but I perceive some of his accomplices amongst his adversaries. . . . Beware of the unconscious socialists. All those who, for any purpose and actuated by any motive whatsoever, wish to magnify the intervention of society in the relations of men with each other, and who strive to supplant and, above all, to absorb individual efforts and merits by state action, are falling down a very slippery declivity into communism. To substitute the community for the individual and to slay liberty: the whole of socialism is there; it is at once the idea and the actuality. That those who perceive it and wish it, should work to lead the nation to such an end, is natural; but it would be deplorable if the present defenders of society should become their dupes and their accomplices. The socialism which acknowledges itself to be such and which marches with flag unfurled, has been conquered so far. But I am not sure but what the unconscious socialists are the chief danger of the moment.

The project of Melun to solve the social question by means of public assistance met with opposition in the Legislative Assembly as well as in the press. Once elected to that Assembly Melun made it a point to have created a commission which would prepare laws embodying his ideas on state relief. The Assembly voted the commission

¹ *Univers*, July 31, 1849.

without much difficulty; but the nomination of its members met with opposition from an unexpected source. What was Melun's astonishment and dismay when he saw Ber-ryer, whom he described as the "best and most amiable of colleagues", get up to combat the whole scheme.¹ He argued that the time was inopportune to deal with social questions; it would therefore be better to postpone all such discussion for a more stable regime when they would be likely to bring France calm and peace.² Indeed the Assembly and the commission as well contained a party, which, in face of the peril of socialism and the alarm which it had caused, wished to forestall all legislative action dealing with public assistance.³ This party was headed by Thiers. "Striding like a giant" over all the propositions for public relief, which since the proclamation of the Republic had been suggested either in the press or the Assembly, "he sabred them all with the vigor of his irony", and invited the commission to follow him in his merciless proscription of all the aberrations of the day.⁴ Relief was, according to this party, to be left in the hands of private individuals, and above all confided to the Church. Amongst the following of Thiers was Monseigneur Parisis, the bishop of Langres, who sought to make the Church "Mistress of Charity" as it had been under the old regime.⁵ It seemed to him a deplorable error that Melun should seek to put the "mayor above the curé in Christian charity." Social legislation appeared to him to be a restriction placed upon liberty. Melun "confounds society with the government",

¹ *Mémoires*, vol. ii, p. 47.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 49-50.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

⁵ Dreyfus, F., *L'Assistance sous la seconde république* (Paris, 1907), p. 133.

he declared. His "program is conceived and directed as if the Church did not exist", he complained. "The system of the author is that the state may have the initiative and the chief control of all charitable work, and that all other agents come to its aid. . . ." ¹ In spite of this opposition, however, the Social Catholics succeeded in having some useful measures enacted.² Nevertheless the work of the commission was not finished to the satisfaction of Melun. It was his desire to bring it to a conclusion by a general report on its accomplishments, which should be an expression of the principles necessary for the resolution of the labor problems of the time.³ Thiers, after some debate, was entrusted with the task of making the report; and he employed all the resources of argument and eloquence in combating every idea of relief save private charity. The ideas of Melun were thought to be too great a concession to socialism, and consequently were unacceptable to the Assembly. He was treated as a socialist by the majority with whom he voted; as a naive philanthropist by the great politicians; and as an enemy of private and religious charity by the bishops and the Catholics.⁴

But the reaction against socialism also led to an alliance of the *Parti Catholique* with the Club of the *Rue de Poitiers*, which had become the center of the political reaction. Founded in the early part of May, 1848, after the meeting of the Constituent Assembly, by the deputies who were without parliamentary experience and who had belonged to no previous assembly, the Club of the *Rue de*

¹ These are annotations which Mgr. Parisi made on a copy of Melun's *Intervention de la société*, which is now in the *Archives Nationales*, dossier 169, no. 3.

² Dreyfus, *op. cit.*

³ *Mémoires*, vol. ii, p. 56.

⁴ Melun to Falloux, December 4, 1849, *Correspondant*, 1882, p. 661.

Poitiers had at first excluded the old parliamentarians of previous regimes.¹ The June Days, however, changed the nature of this club. "Frightened by its isolation and its responsibility", it came under the leadership of Molé, Berryer, Montalembert, and above all, of Thiers, who henceforth, if we can believe his own statement, was its virtual ruler as it was his chief means of influencing the Assembly.² "All ranks, all shades of opinion, here mingled with the sole desire to defend civilization" against socialism. Thus transformed, the Club of the *Rue de Poitiers* assumed the leadership in the reaction and threw its weight into the scale in favor of the candidature of Louis Napoleon.³ In the early part of 1849 when the question was raised of elections for a Legislative Assembly the *Comité Electoral de la Liberté Religieuse* combined its forces with those of the Club of the *Rue de Poitiers*. This fact was announced in a circular published by Montalembert in the *Univers* on the 22nd of March, 1849.

When last year . . . we aroused your zeal and your solicitude regarding the elections to the Constituent Assembly, it was still possible to be deceived on the true condition of affairs, and to believe that the question was only one of regulating a political revolution and of constituting a new government.

¹Falloux, *Les républicains et les monarchistes depuis la révolution de février*, *Revue des deux mondes*, February, 1851.

²*Ibid.*; cf. also Senior, *Conversations with Thiers*, p. 30: "My principal instrument for influencing the Assembly was the Club of the *Rue de Poitiers*. It consisted of 300 of the most eminent deputies, and from its discipline, its compactness, and the personal character of its members, controlled the inexperienced and disunited remainder. The *Constitutionnel* was its organ, and the greater part, and by far the best part, of the public press was at its disposition. It exercised a preponderating influence over almost all the great towns, and great influence even in the rural districts."

³*Cf. infra*, chap. v.

To-day, unless one is smitten with an incurable blindness, it is necessary to realize that it is no longer a question of making this or that form of government prevail. Yes, it is necessary to know and to say it: It is society as a whole, society as it has been constituted for six thousand years, that these audacious innovators wish to overthrow in order to remake it according to their pleasure. It is not the last vestiges of royalty and of aristocracy which they wish to obliterate: it is religion, the family and property which they deny and which they proscribe. It is no longer France alone that is shaken: it is the whole of Europe that is a prey to the conflagration. Pius IX, the most generous of pontiffs and of men, to-day recompensed by the blackest ingratitude, is an exile from the Eternal City and despoiled of his temporal authority by a revolution which assassination has worthily inaugurated! These crimes find a large party in France to applaud them. This party hides neither its inclinations nor its strength.

Thanks to this party, destruction has become amongst us a sort of religion: it has not only its soldiers and its scribes, but its prophets, its apostles and what it calls its martyrs. What ought above all to fill our Catholic hearts with sadness and horror, these monstrous doctrines seek to establish, one does not know what sacrilegious solidarity with the dogmas of Christianity basely profaned, and with the Gospel odiously travestied.

The party of spoliation and demagogic dictatorship some time ago learned how to sink its personal rivalries and to renounce or adjourn its interior dissensions under the flag of socialism. Will the party of order and of liberty be less adaptable, less generous, less master of itself? Will the men of spirit and of sense who compose it not also, on their part, know how to sacrifice their discords, their preferences, their recriminations, however legitimate, in order to march together under the banner of society?

Dominated by these ideas the electoral committee for religious liberty has decided, for the purpose of enlarging its

sphere of action hitherto isolated and independent, to set the example of union and of conciliation which it recommends. It has resolved to combine its action with that of the electoral committee of the *Rue de Poitiers*, which, on its part, is obliged to unite every shade of moderate opinion. Several of our members have entered into this general committee and have signed its general program. You will behold their names there beside those of men whom we have for a long time combated. This *rapprochement* will make you understand both the extent of the danger that menaces us and the spirit of union which urges us on the course which we do not hesitate to unfold before you.

Having made this union with the Club of the *Rue de Poitiers*, the electoral committee for religious liberty proceeded to proscribe certain classes of candidates as ineligible to receive the votes of Catholics, and to recommend others whom it had formerly opposed. Thus, even those Catholics who "all their lives" had "professed the doctrines of religious liberty" were to be ostracized if they inclined towards revolutionary or socialistic ideas. On the other hand, men who were formerly opposed to the liberty of instruction, having conceded that right to gain the support of the Church in the social crisis, the electoral committee recommended its followers to support.¹ Moderate Republicans were likewise placed on the black list, because their tenets associated them more or less with the revolutionary party. Accordingly the electoral committee refused to support Cavaignac, Dufaure, Marie and Ferdinand de Lasteyrie, because their names appeared in the list of candidates supported by the *National* along with those of Flocon and Ledru-Rollin, who were looked upon as revolutionaries.²

¹ Cf. *infra*, chap. vii.

² *Univers*, May 9, 1849.

Thus not only had the reaction against socialism defeated the program of the Social Catholics and driven them into silence,¹ but it had also allied the Catholics with the political reaction. Monseigneur Darboy writing in the *Correspondant* declared:

the Church and the Revolution have nothing in common, neither point of departure, means, nor end. . . . The Church, a society based on tradition, a model of stability, does not recognize with the revolutionaries that kind of sovereignty of the streets which is only the installation of anarchy and the confiscation by braggarts, trimmers and sometimes by villains, of the fortune and honor of peoples.²

The doctrines of the clergy on property and their influence on public morality have established their "close solidarity with what is called the reaction."³ Montalembert declared that there could be no compromise between the Church and socialism;⁴ and socialism accepted the statement, and responded by announcing that it was impossible for the Catholic faith as established by the Church to become enlightened;⁵ and that Catholicism was its enemy.⁶

¹ This is the significance of the campaign against the *Ère Nouvelle*, the outcome of which was its suspension.

² *Correspondant*, November 25, 1850.

³ Weill, *op. cit.*, p. 101, note.

⁴ In legis. assembly, Jan. 17, 1850, *Moniteur*, Jan. 18.

⁵ Deschanel, Emile, *Catholicisme et socialisme* (Paris, 1850).

⁶ Joly, *op. cit.*, p. 218.

CHAPTER IV

THE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY OF GENERAL CAVAIGNAC AND THE FIRST INTERVENTION AT ROME

THE history of the relations between the Church and the state in France during the Second Republic is so closely connected with that of Pius IX that it is impossible to understand the one without taking into consideration the other.

The Papal election which took place on the 16th of June, 1846, after a reign filled with abuses that were becoming intolerable, brought to the pontifical throne Cardinal Mastai Ferretti, bishop of Imola, a man who was little known, but who belonged to an old Italian family "long famous down to their cats", so the proverb ran, "for nationalist sentiment."¹ Kind-hearted, impulsive, benevolent and a moderate liberal, the bishop of Imola had disapproved of the policy of repression adopted by the Gregorian regime, and sympathized with the aspirations of the Italians.² Little thinking that he would be elected to fill the vacant See, he set out for the Conclave with three books, Gioberti's *Primato*, Balbo's *Speranza d'Italia* and D'Azeglio's *Degli ultima Casa di Romagna*, with the intention of humbly offering them to the new Pope, a gift which was suggestive of the attitude

¹ King, Bolton, *History of Italian Unity*, 2nd ed. (London, 1912), vol. i, p. 171; Mourret, Fernand, *Le mouvement Catholique en France de 1830 à 1850* (Paris, 1917), p. 234.

² Pasolini, *Memoirs* (London, 1885).

which he expected that pontiff to adopt.¹ Pius IX, however, was almost totally unfitted both by nature and by education to face the situation that now confronted the Papacy. Devoid of genius, irresolute, capable of being easily led, yet at the same time of inflexible obstinacy,² his natural deficiencies might have been somewhat offset by a broad education. "But, unfortunately, bad health and the fatigues of mission work had interrupted for Cardinal Mastai the regular course of study which might have made him a practical man, and he had never found either time or opportunity to obtain correct knowledge of public affairs."³ Lacking therefore that breadth of judgment and firmness of character which are so necessary in the political reformer, Pius IX possessed few qualities save a spotless life, an almost infinite amount of good will, and an optimism as yet unclouded by disappointment, to steer the Papacy through one of the most troublous periods of its history.⁴

That Pius IX was in favor of many moderate reforms in the government of the Papal States there can be no doubt. His first official act was to proclaim an amnesty, July 16, 1846, granting pardon to all political prisoners and exiles. The effect of this act was electric. The new Pope immediately became the beloved ruler of a people capable of great

¹ Johnston, R. M., *The Roman theocracy and the republic* (London, 1901), p. 33.

² King, *op. cit.*, p. 171.

³ Pasolini, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

⁴ "... one was soon forced to recognize that one had been deceived with regard to the Pope, and that Pius IX did not possess the strength necessary in a leader of the democratic reform in Italy. Perhaps no other man in his place would have had more than he; perhaps it is just to recognize that what we find blameworthy in his conduct was the fatal result of the position that he occupied, both as head of religion and as guardian of the monarchical power." Bastide, *La république française en Italie en 1848* (Brussels, 1858), p. 193.

emotion and enthusiasm. Nor was his popularity confined to his own subjects; for he became the most talked of man in Europe. Further proof of his desire for reform lies in the fact that he purposed to carry out, to some extent at least, the reforms suggested in the memorandum of the powers to the Papal States in 1831, and to this end he expressed the wish to have the assistance of some Englishman of rank and experience. Lord Minto was accordingly sent to Rome in November, 1847.¹

But in the execution of his reforms Pius IX was hampered by two things: by the tendency to allow all reforms to be clamored for by the people before they were proposed by the government, and by opposition amongst his advisors. D'Azeglio, writing on the 6th of July, 1847, remarked that the greatest danger for Pius IX would be to "drift in uncertainty and indecision."² Lord Minto, in the early part of 1848, expressed to Palmerston the opinion that Pius IX was "not made to drive the state coach."³ The Pope seemed inclined to bask in the sunshine of the popularity created by his first act of clemency rather than proceed to execute the further liberal reforms of which his subjects had become expectant. As a consequence of this indecisive policy the populace soon learned to believe that they could wring almost any concession from him simply by clamoring for it long and loudly enough. But besides his own inability to proceed in his reforms with resolution and firmness, Pius IX was hindered by opposition on the part of the adherents of the Gregorian regime who had been retained in office.⁴ If the Pope did not order in a very de-

¹ Ashley, *Lord Palmerston* (London, 1879), p. 42.

² *Correspondance politique*, p. 12.

³ Ashley, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

⁴ "He (Pius IX) was very ready to proceed to new reforms, but these should have been enacted spontaneously, without appearing to be forced

cided manner a reform measure to be carried out, it was sure to be delayed by all sorts of excuses.¹

The rock on which Pius IX met with shipwreck, however, was his failure to reconcile the aspirations of Italian nationalism with the temporal sovereignty of the Papacy. The clamor of the populace might impel him to go a certain length, even beyond his own inclinations; but it was inevitable that there should be a limit beyond which his own innate obstinacy and his theory of the rights of the Papacy, buttressed by the intrigues of the retrograde party, would prevent him from going. Thus he conceded the admission of a certain number of laymen into his ministry; he granted a constitution;² he even gave his blessing to the papal volunteers as they departed from Rome for the defense of the States of the Church against the encroachments of Austria. But he would never consent to become a mere figurehead in the state; and his feeling that he was the spiritual father of Austrians as well as of Italians forbade him declaring war against Austria as the Nationalists wished. By the Allocution which he pronounced in the Consistory on the 29th of April, 1848, Pius IX, in view of the very nature of the Papal sovereignty, refused to sanction the cooperation of his state in the nationalist rising against Austria.³ From this time on, the extreme Nation-

from him by clamor." Pasolini, *Memoirs*, pp. 44-45. "The court of Rome was in all its traditions adverse to the reforming policy of Pius IX, who found himself thwarted continually." *Ibid.*, p. 36.

¹ Pasolini, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

² March 14, 1848.

³ "The dark and heavy question in my eyes is that of war! Why have we stumbled? Because when we wished for war, and had promoted it with all our strength, the Pope deemed fit, as a conscientious duty, solemnly to protest against it. In consequence of this act we drew back, and all Italy knows it." Pasolini, *op. cit.*, p. 29, Minghetti to Pasolini.

"This date, the 29th of April, . . . marks the end of the popular favor which Pius IX has enjoyed since his accession. . . ." Gaillard,

alists began to feel that Pius IX was opposed to their interests.¹ The forces of disorder grew much more powerful in the Papal States; and the Pope found it increasingly difficult to form a ministry under the new constitution. As early as the 24th of February, 1848, Palmerston had written to Lord Minto: "As to the poor Pope, I live in daily dread of hearing of some misadventure having befallen him. Events have gone too fast for such a slow sailor as he is. I only hope he will not be swamped by the swell in the wake of those who have outstripped him. . . ." ²

At the same time the Pope began to feel resentment at the ingratitude of his subjects for his good intentions and for his reforms. "How ungrateful people are!" he exclaimed to Pasolini, "When I have given them an amnesty and so many reforms." And Pasolini added: "He could not get over his astonishment and grief at finding none of the gratitude he had been led to expect, and which he had so clearly merited." ³ Thus thinking himself surrounded by distrustful and ungrateful men "he began to distrust everybody and everything." ⁴ He felt the reins of power

L'Expédition à Rome en 1849 (Paris, 1861), p. 58. "Here and throughout Romagna heavy accusations are thrown out against him (the Pope). I firmly believe in the purity of his intentions, although, alas! his indecision has done dreadful harm to Italy. There was a moment when Pius IX had before him the most beautiful of all good works to accomplish. He might have restored religion, regulated liberty, and pacified Europe; but that moment has gone by, never to return, and the Pope's temporal power is once more considered pernicious in Machiavelli's sense." Minghetti to Pasolini. No date. Pasolini, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

² Ashley, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

³ Pasolini, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 81. "One soon saw Pius IX, alarmed by the movement which he believed he had instigated, draw back and throw himself into the arms of those who urged upon him the sacred duty of preserving intact that monarchical crown with its twofold absolutism, of which he had been made trustee." Bastide, *op. cit.*, p. 194; *cf.* Pasolini, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

and the control of the state slipping out of his hands under the violence of the populace; and in August he addressed a request to General Cavaignac, the acting President of the French Republic for a force of three or four thousand troops to assist in maintaining order in the Papal States.¹ General Cavaignac refused the request, however, alleging that such intervention would be inconsistent with the mediation which France had proposed for the settlement of the affairs of Italy.² Consequently the Pope had to rely on his own resources. Accordingly on the 14th of September, acting on the advice of his counsellors, amongst whom was Pasolini, he called upon Pellegrino de Rossi to form a ministry. Rossi was a moderate liberal who had been sent to Rome by the government of Louis-Philippe on a diplomatic mission.³ With the proclamation of the Republic on the 24th of February, 1848, to which he had refused his adhesion, Rossi's mission had come to an end, but he had remained in Rome as a private citizen. The task that confronted the new minister was not an easy one, but he undertook it resolutely. He attempted to make of the constitutional papal government what it had hitherto failed to be, a stable government. With this aim in view, he set himself to repress the forces of disorder within the state. But opportunity was not given him to accomplish his task. Regarding him as an absolutist and as a reactionary,⁴ the revolutionaries, who had become more and more hostile to Pius IX, conspired against him, and on the 15th of November, 1848, as he started to ascend the stairs

¹ Bastide, *op. cit.*, p. 208.

² *Ibid.*, cf. Gaillard, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

³ Johnston, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

⁴ Cf. *Annuaire historique*, 1848, p. 573; Niccolini, *Pius IX* (Edinburgh, 1851), pp. 78-79.

for the opening of the Chamber of Deputies, had him struck down by the blow of a skilled assassin.

The news of the fate of Rossi fell like a thunderbolt on the Quirinal. In his bewilderment Pius IX scarcely knew which way to turn or whom to consult.¹ On the 16th of November the leaders of the populace organized a demonstration to compel the Pope to accept their democratic program, consisting of the convocation of a constituent assembly, declaration of war against Austria and a ministry composed of popular leaders.² Pius IX at first refused, helplessly protesting that it was against his conscience. But after a show of force and a collision with the Swiss guards during which a prelate, Monsignor Palma, was killed, the Pope yielded.³ That night Rome was illuminated in celebration of the event. "The sovereign has given us the Republic", cried the mob.⁴

The situation in which Pius IX found himself after the 16th of November was an intolerable one; and on the twenty-second he determined to make his escape from Rome. Accordingly on the 24th of November, disguised as a simple priest, Pius IX fled from the Eternal City. Accompanied by the Countess Spaur, the wife of the Bavarian Ambassador, he drove to Gaeta in the Kingdom of Naples and took up his residence there. So carefully was the secret of the Pope's intentions guarded that the Duke d'Harcourt, the French Plenipotentiary, drove to Civita-Vecchia with the papal baggage, fondly believing that Pius IX was intending to accept his invitation and take refuge in France.⁵

¹ Johnston, *op. cit.*, p. 195; Farini, *The Roman State*, vol. ii, p. 409.

² *Annuaire historique*, 1848, pp. 582 et seq.

³ Johnston, *op. cit.*, pp. 197-198. *Annuaire historique*, p. 584.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Senior, *Conversations with de Tocqueville*, vol. i, p. 238; cf. Johnston, *op. cit.*, pp. 203 et seq.

The intelligence of the plight of the Pope was received in France with a consternation corresponding to the enthusiasm with which his liberalism had previously been hailed.

Few of the faithful—not even those of Italy—had received with more acclaim the advent of a liberal Pope than the Catholics of France. On the 17th of February, 1847, Frédéric Ozanam had written from Rome to his brother: "You will see that it will be the bishop of Rome who shall once more reconcile the world with the Papacy." "To-day", wrote Monseigneur Sibour, bishop of Digne, "all has become clear: heaven has spoken. The miraculous election of Pius IX has placed on the Eternal Throne the Moses of the new age, the minister of divine activity."¹ "Glory to the immortal pontiff, who, from the height of that august throne where he is seated, has been able to read the divine decree in the heavens and has given the signal without hesitation." Not only, however, were the French Catholics enthusiastic over the reforms of Pius IX, but they also found in his example the sanction for their own liberalism.² A liberal pope was, to them, the signal for all the world to be liberal with him. It was perhaps inevitable that the French Catholics should read into the mind and acts of Pius IX much that was in their own minds, and

¹ Letter to Father Ventura in *La France religieuse*, Oct., 1848, p. 68.

² Bazin, *op. cit.*, chap. xiv. Some idea of the extent of this enthusiasm for Pius IX may be gained from the following: "The return of fraternity amongst men is due first of all to the French people, then to Pope Pius IX who has cleansed in the regenerative waters of liberty the old stains of the Papal power." *L'Alpha de la république ou le petit catéchisme des grands enfants* (Paris, 1848). On March 25, 1848 the editors of the *Ère Nouvelle* sent an address to Pius IX, in which they saluted him as the source of their inspiration: "The immortal work of conciliation of liberty with religion, Very Holy Father, which is the glory of the pontificate of your Holiness, has been their inspiration. They have dared, they have wished, to follow in the footsteps of their father and head pastor." Bazin, *op. cit.*, pp. 351-352.

in so doing not only outstrip him in liberalism, but also make him appear more liberal than he really was. Thus we find Ozanam concluding an article on the Papacy by using the phrase so suggestive of radicalism: "Let us pass to the barbarians and follow Pius IX".¹ It is therefore comprehensible that the situation in which the Pope was placed after the 15th of November, as soon as the news of it was received in France, should cause great concern. "Our mind is plunged in sadness", wrote the Archbishop of Paris. "The Church suffers in its head". "The vicar of Jesus Christ begins his passion: he is drinking the bitter cup of ingratitude." "The sufferings of the Sovereign Pontiff", wailed the *Correspondant*, "pierce the depths of our hearts". "In striking the head of the Church", said the *Ami de la Religion*, "in striking the vicar of Jesus Christ, the most august and sacred thing on earth, they have pierced with the same blow, the deepest, the most tender . . . spot in our heart."² Pius IX to-day, said the *Ère Nouvelle*, "is a thousand times dearer and more venerable in the eyes of the Christian world than on the very day when a grateful people surrounded him with those homages and those cries of triumph which were so soon forgotten."³

Such being the attitude of the French Catholics, they called upon the government to intervene in Italy on behalf of the Pope. "Republican and democratic France", said

¹ *Le Correspondant*, Feb. 10, 1848: This phrase was so ambiguous that Ozanam had to explain it in a letter of February 22, 1848. "When I said, let us pass to the Barbarians, I did not mean to go over to the radicals, to those radicals who are giving everyone concern and of whom everyone is afraid." "In saying, let us pass to the barbarians I demand that we act like him (Pius IX), that we concern ourselves with the people who have too many needs and not enough rights, who demand with justice a greater share in political affairs and guarantees of work against poverty. . . ." *Lettres*, vol. ii, p. 190 *et seq.*

² *Ami de la religion*, November 28, 1848.

³ *Ère nouvelle*, Nov. 26.

the *Ère Nouvelle*, "will do for Pius IX what in other times the most glorious heads of the monarchy have done for the Papacy."¹ "Happy France, eldest daughter of the Church", exclaimed the *Ami de la Religion*, "if God give her a part in this glorious work"—the restoration of Pius IX.²

The first intelligence that the French government received of the events which had transpired at Rome came indirectly, on Saturday, the 25th of November, through the Spanish legation, the despatch from the Duke d'Harcourt, the French Ambassador, arriving only on the morning of the twenty-sixth.³ But on the twenty-fifth General Cavaignac, the acting head of the government, was deeply absorbed in refuting the virulent attacks of his enemies in a session of the Assembly that lasted into the night. Nevertheless at the close of the session he approached Corcelle, who was an ardent Catholic and a member of the Assembly, whom General Cavaignac had proposed to send to Rome in September, informing him that the time had come for him to set out for Italy.⁴ Thus the decision was made to send assistance to the Pope before any despatch had been received from the official representative of France at Rome. The following morning, the same on which the despatch from d'Harcourt arrived, an order was sent to Toulon and Marseilles to embark 3,500 troops which had been kept there for some time owing to the intention once entertained of sending them to the relief of Venice.⁵ These troops were to sail for Civita-Vecchia as soon as Corcelle, the envoy

¹ *Ère nouvelle*, Nov. 28, 1848.

² *Ami de la religion*, Nov. 28, 1848.

³ Corcelle, Francois T. de, *Souvenir de 1848* (Paris, 1857), p. 8.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Gorce, de la, *Histoire de la seconde république française*, vol. i, p. 478. Normanby to Palmerston, Nov. 27, 1848.

extraordinary, should arrive at Marseilles. On the evening of the 27th of November, Corcelle received his instructions and departed from Paris.

Upon his landing at Civita-Vecchia Corcelle was to announce to the Pope that he had arrived in consequence of the appeal made to the French government for protection.¹ The instructions which he carried consisted of two parts, one intended to be communicated to the Assembly, and the other secret. The latter, providing for the event of his being unable to agree with d'Harcourt, empowered him to command the troops and conclude what negotiations he deemed advisable. That part of his instructions which were intended for the public stated that the purpose of his mission was "to intervene in the name of the French Republic to restore personal liberty to his Holiness if he had been deprived of it." Moreover he was to assure the Pope of a welcome worthy of him on French soil if he should choose to accept it. But, and this was the most important part of the instructions,

You are not authorized to intervene in any of the political questions which are at issue in Rome. It belongs to the National Assembly alone to determine the part it would have the Republic take in reestablishing order in the States of the Church. For the moment . . . you have to assure the liberty of the Pope and respect for his person.

The troops placed at his disposal were under no consideration to be disembarked unless such a step were absolutely necessary to insure the success of his limited mission.² These instructions were communicated to the Assembly on the 28th of November; but the general discussion of the

¹ Normanby to Palmerston, Nov. 27, 1848.

² *Moniteur*, Nov. 29, 1848, session of Tues., Nov. 28th. Normanby to Palmerston, Nov. 27, 1848.

intervention was postponed until the thirtieth, in order to give time for the arrival of further despatches from d'Harcourt at Rome. The Assembly had not been consulted regarding the expedition, affirmed General Cavaignac, owing to the fact that the urgency of the situation did not permit, and because the executive did not believe that it was exceeding its constitutional rights in taking such a step.

The discussion of the 30th of November was begun by the "Left" who attacked the project of the executive. Ledru-Rollin beheld in the expedition an attack on the liberties of the Roman people who had risen in revolt against a temporal prince. He maintained that it was a violation of article VII of the preamble of the Constitution, which stated that Republican France respected the liberties of other peoples. Edgar Quinet, while approving the moral protection extended to the head of Catholicism, stated that the issue at Rome was between the temporal power of the Papacy and Italian nationality, which events had shown to be incompatible. It was necessary therefore to choose between these two things: either to renounce the hopes of Italian nationality, or else destroy forever the temporal power of the Holy See. And he boldly affirmed that to place any obstacle in the way of the attainment of Italian nationality was to strike a blow at the Revolution of February.

The action of the government was defended by Montalembert who contended that it was not an Italian, a French or even a European question that was at stake, but a Catholic one.

It is not a question of an ordinary sovereignty [he affirmed]; it is not a question of an ordinary state; it is a question concerning him who is the spiritual sovereign of two hundred millions of people, and of a state that is the center of this sovereignty: it is a question of liberty of the Catholic idea itself.

The French Republic should be proud to initiate itself in foreign affairs by supporting the Catholic idea. But above all Montalembert supported the intervention because it was calculated to ensure the liberty of the Pope.

The religious liberty of the Catholics in France [he contended] is conditioned upon the liberty of the Pope; for if the Pope, the supreme judge, the ultimate tribunal, the living organ at once of the law and of the faith of Catholics, is not free, we cease to be free. We have therefore the right to demand of the government which represents us and which we have constituted, that it guarantee us both our personal liberty in the matter of religion and the liberty of him who is for us the living religion.

At the conclusion of the debate the Assembly approved the action of the executive by an overwhelming majority, 480-63.¹

What then was the main motive that led the executive to undertake this mission on behalf of the Pope? Were they merely prompted by their devotion to the head of Catholicism? There is no reason to doubt such devotion on the part of the executive, and that the religious element entered to some extent into the project of intervention.² "The Republic," wrote General Cavaignac to Pius IX on the 3rd of December, "will behold with pride your Holiness giving to the world the spectacle of that consecration wholly religious which your presence in its midst augurs, and which it [the Republic] will accept with the dignity and the religious respect which are becoming to this great

¹ *Moniteur*, December 1, 1848.

² Corcelle, *op. cit.*, p. 7. M. Bastide said it was their duty to make some demonstration in support of the Pope; this had always been a part which France had claimed for herself . . . Normanby to Palmerston, Nov. 28, 1848.

and generous nation.”¹ Nevertheless it seems difficult to believe that this was the sole motive. The mission was conceived before any word had been received from the French representative at Rome; and when those despatches did arrive, they contained no request from the Pope for intervention.² The excuse which was offered to Lord Normanby was that the Pope in immediate danger had asked for assistance. But such a request had been made two months before, and was for an intervention of a different kind.³ Moreover, not only had aid been refused when the Pope asked for it;⁴ but General Cavaignac opposed the Expedition to Rome in 1849.⁵ Why then such haste to despatch a force in aid of the Pope in November, 1848, before the circumstances at Rome were fully known? The answer is found in the political situation that then existed in France.

The elections which were to give the Republic its first President, who, under the new Constitution, was to be elected by direct universal suffrage, were to take place on the 10th of December. Leaving out of account the candidates who were too badly discredited to be elected, Lamartine, Ledru-Rollin, Raspail, the two strongest candidates were Louis Napoleon Bonaparte and General Cavaignac. An admirable soldier, perfectly upright in character, but a man of no very extensive views and little knowledge of affairs outside military life, General Cavaignac “combined a passion for order with that of liberty.”⁶ Belonging to a family known for its republicanism under the First Re-

¹ *Moniteur*.

² Cf. speech of Jules Favre on Nov. 30. *Moniteur*, Dec. 1.

³ Normanby to Palmerston, Nov. 30, 1848.

⁴ In August.

⁵ Corcelle, *op. cit.*

⁶ Weill, *Le Parti républicain de 1814 à 1870* (Paris, 1900), p. 305; Corcelle, *op. cit.*, p. 3; Senior, *Correspondence and conversations of Alexis de Tocqueville with N. W. Senior*, vol. i, p. 195.

public, he possessed a "fanatical devotion"¹ to Republican principles, and was regarded as the only hope for the Republic in 1848.² Realizing that the country was not republican in sentiment he hoped by becoming president to make it so and thus consolidate the Republic.³ But one of the factors that had to be taken into consideration was the Church; and it was becoming increasingly evident in the autumn of 1848 that the republicanism of many of its leaders, so loudly proclaimed in February, was on the wane. Was the situation in Rome, then, not an opportunity to rally the Catholics, who had shown themselves to be so influential, to the support of the cause that General Cavaignac had undertaken to sustain? Apart from the attacks of their enemies, who did not fail to make use of this argument, the evidence is strong that this did enter into the consideration of the executive.⁴ Lord Normanby in a confidential des-

¹ Normanby to Palmerston, Dec. 12, 1848.

² Senior, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 195; cf. Senior, *Conversations with Thiers and other eminent men*, vol. i, pp. 32 *et seq.*; de la Gorce, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 477-478; Mourret, *op. cit.*, p. 356.

³ When Lord Normanby on one occasion urged upon General Cavaignac the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, which the country felt had accomplished its purpose, "the General's only answer was that new elections for some time to come would destroy the Republic. I said, 'Then you do not think the country Republican?' 'Certainly not,' was his answer, 'and never was!' 'And you expect to make it so?' 'It is with that object alone that I seek the presidency.'" N. to P., Nov. 27.

⁴ Normanby, *A year of revolution*, vol. ii, pp. 332 *et seq.*; cf. Gaillard, *Expédition de Rome en 1849*, pp. 89 *et seq.* "General Cavaignac always told me . . . that he wished to maintain the Pope as a constitutional sovereign and had not the least desire to see a Republic established at Rome. This tone taken by this purely republican administration immediately preceding the Presidential Election showed their opinion that there existed in France in favor of the pope a public opinion which it was politic to conciliate. The objections, which I felt it to be my duty to urge against this Expedition, were, amongst others, that the means were obviously inapplicable to its professed object." Normanby to Palmerston, June 12, 1849.

patch to Lord Palmerston reported: "a general impression is abroad

that the precipitation which has marked the proceedings of the French government with regard to the Expedition to Civita-Vecchia is mainly attributable to electioneering purposes. Some of the heads of the clergy are said to have boasted that they could dispose of a million votes according as this step was or was not taken.

"Even those with whom the measure originated", affirmed Lord Normanby, "admit confidentially such to be the principal object they have in view."¹ Corcelle, it is true, scouted the idea that the intervention was undertaken for a selfish political motive; but he gave his case away by somewhat naively remarking: "I should not have blamed him [General Cavaignac] for thinking a little of the public approval of a good deed." The *Correspondant*, which supported General Cavaignac, although somewhat lukewarmly, argued that it mattered little if such a good deed had been prompted by selfish motives: "One begins in egotism and ends in virtue."²

The project of intervention, however, hastily undertaken and badly executed, was as unfortunate for the cause of General Cavaignac as it was futile for the rescue of the Pope. The orders for the embarkation of the troops, which had been despatched on the 26th of November, had reached Toulon and Marseilles only on the twenty-ninth, the day before the arrival of Corcelle. Consequently his sailing was delayed. In the meantime a despatch reached Marseilles announcing that the Pope had fled from Rome and had reached Gaeta in safety. Bastide, the Minister of

¹ Corcelle, *op. cit.*, pp. 5 *et seq.*

² *Correspondant*, Dec. 9, 1848.

Foreign Affairs, also received this news on the 1st of December, and at once despatched a message to Corcelle, informing him that it indicated a new line of conduct for him. The latter therefore sailed on the 2nd of December for Gaeta leaving the troops still in port.¹ Lord Normanby, who from the very first had opposed the sending of troops, arguing that an infantry force was unsuited to the purpose for which it was intended, and inadequate for the protection of the Pope should it disembark, now urged the immediate cancellation of the expedition.² Bastide appeared to agree with him and went to consult General Cavaignac. But the latter was loth to cancel the expedition. At a public gathering on the evening of the 4th of December, he announced that Corcelle had sailed and that the troops were to follow the next day.³ "I exclaimed with natural surprise", said Normanby, "'And the troops to follow?'" 'Certainly', replied General Cavaignac, 'as we do not yet know positively where the Pope is.' On Lord Normanby's objecting that the Minister for Foreign Affairs had given him a distinct assurance of a contrary character, the general said: "But I never told you they should not go." At an interview which Normanby had with him the following morning, General Cavaignac, who in the meantime had received word of the Pope's continued stay at Gaeta, attempted to explain his words away. The expedition was then cancelled.⁴

¹ Normanby to Palmerston, Dec. 1; *Ami de la Religion*, Dec. 7.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, Dec. 7, 1848.

⁴ Before the intelligence had been received that the Pope intended to remain at Gaeta, the wildest and most conflicting reports spread concerning the intentions of his Holiness. According to some the Pope had sailed for France; and the Minister of Worship and Education actually went to Marseilles to give him a fitting welcome on his landing. According to others the government was preparing the Palace at Fontainebleau to place at his disposal.

The action of the government in undertaking an intervention on behalf of the Pope produced a considerable sensation in religious "circles as well as some enthusiasm for the government, which was increased by the momentary falling off from Louis Napoleon as a consequence of the association of his cousin, the Prince of Canino, with the party in Rome which had assassinated Rossi".¹ "France speaks, the Pope will be free," declared the *Ère Nouvelle*. "And since the Republic puts its sword at the service of the Church the alliance of Catholicism and democracy is consummated. We do not believe that, since the French Revolution, a more solemn moment has dawned in the world."² The *Alliance*, the religious journal of Nantes, commenting on the zeal shown by the government on behalf of the Pope, said: "If we had still to pronounce on the question of President, the decision which General Cavaignac has just made, would suffice to determine our action."³ Even the *Univers* almost inclined towards his cause as a consequence.

This morning [it affirmed], in spite of what we find satisfying in the electoral manifesto of Louis Bonaparte, we had, we confess, almost decided to recommend the candidature of M. Cavaignac to the Catholics. It is no longer in France that the liberty of the Church is at stake, but at Rome. And what has been announced to us of the disposition of the President of the Council in face of the situation that confronts the Vicar of Jesus Christ seems to justify and demand our most ardent support.⁴

¹ Normanby to Palmerston, Dec. 10, 1848. Normanby, *A Year of revolution*, vol. ii, pp. 355-356.

² Nov. 28.

³ Quoted from the *Ère nouvelle*, Dec. 3, 1848.

⁴ *Univers*, November 29, 1848.

“ Good opinions do not suffice ”, it declared, “ actions which conform with them are necessary.”¹

But the events that followed tended to neutralize the effect that was first produced by the project of intervention at Rome.

When the real object of all these ministerial measures, which was avowed in private, became known to the public, they lost their effect; and when it was further ascertained that the Pope never had any present intention of coming to France, the government found they had excited the most dangerous feeling on the eve of an election, disappointment founded on deceit.²

Furthermore, dissatisfaction was expressed that the government did not seek to do more than merely to safeguard the personal liberty of the Pope.

All Catholics congratulate the government for the attitude that it has just taken towards the Pope Pius IX [declared the *Patrie*]; but it is necessary to recognize that the spiritual authority of the Holy See is unable to be separated from its temporal authority. To protect the one without safeguarding the other would be to misunderstand the nature and the extent of the duty towards the Papacy.³

Even the journals that supported General Cavaignac could ill conceal their disappointment that his measures had not been more far-reaching; while those who tended to oppose him were loud in their denunciation. “ It is without doubt worthy of France,” said the *Ère Nouvelle*, “ to offer the hospitality of a great people to the exiled pontiff; it is more worthy of her to guarantee him his rights and an authority

¹ December 2, 1848.

² Normanby to Palmerston, Dec. 10, 1848.

³ Quoted from *Ère nouvelle*, November 30, 1848.

necessary to the world"—by which authority it meant his temporal sovereignty.¹

In the question of Rome [remarked the *Correspondant*], the government has understood how to preserve its dignity abroad; but its intentions at bottom are far from being reassuring. . . . They will surround the Pope with the greatest honors, but they are compelled to fraternize with the Roman Republic which without doubt is already proclaimed. The position is a false one and the intention equivocal.²

The attitude taken by the government [said the *Voix de la Vérité*], imposes some restrictions on the congratulations of the Catholics in this grave affair. To separate the spiritual authority of the Holy See from its temporal in the protection accorded by France, is to fail to comprehend the nature and the extent of the duties that the eldest son of the Church is called upon to perform towards the Papacy.³

The *Univers*, on the other hand made no attempt to hide its dissatisfaction with the action of General Cavaignac. "The conduct of the government in the affairs of Rome revolts us", it declared.⁴ "As to the mission of de Corcelle, it is a fantasy." It accused the executive of attempting to conceal, under an appearance of chivalry, moral complicity with the revolutionaries at Rome. Even if the mission of Corcelle, as it is outlined in his instructions, succeeds, what will you have done? it asked the government.

You will have assisted that violent minority in consummating the revolution which it has attempted; you will have dethroned the Pope under pretext of saving him; you will have snatched away from Rome the only flag around which honest folk,

¹ *Ère nouvelle*, November 30, 1848.

² *Correspondant*, December 2.

³ Quoted from the *Univers* of December 1, 1848.

⁴ *Univers*, December 7, 1848.

who, there as everywhere, form the majority, would have been able to rally themselves; you will have given over the city and the States of the Church—perhaps half of the Peninsula—to an anarchy without counterpoise and without remedy.¹

“The government of the Republic”, it complained, “will do nothing to merit the approval of the Catholics, inasmuch as the impulse that has overturned the throne of Pius IX came from France in February.”² The *National* openly declared that the government could not guarantee the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff; but it also asserted that if Austria interfered in Italy, France would have to step in to make a demonstration in favor of Italian democracy. “We demand of the Catholic papers which sustain the candidate of the *National* [General Cavaignac] with so much warmth, what they think of this avowal?”³ Scarcely less severe was the judgment of the *Ami de la Religion*. It complained that the government had refused to act when first informed of the peril in which the Pope was placed. Then, when the liberty and the very life of the Sovereign Pontiff were at stake, it did nothing beyond extend an invitation to take refuge in France and send to Toulon and Marseilles orders that were not seriously executed. In short it concluded: “Nothing is done for the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff, nothing for the Holy See, nothing for the Pope.”⁴

But the Catholics were dissatisfied with General Cavaignac for other reasons than for his attitude towards Rome. Early in the presidential campaign the Catholic leaders determined, before giving General Cavaignac their support,

¹ *Univers*, November 30, 1848.

² *Ibid.*, December 7, 1848.

³ *Ibid.*, December 6, 1848; cf. *Ami de la religion*, December 7, 1848.

⁴ *Ami de la religion*, December 7, 1848.

to sound him on his attitude towards the educational question, which was always dominant. In particular they wished the withdrawal of the project that Carnot had brought forward on the 30th of June, which for several reasons was offensive to them.¹ According to Lecanuet, Montalembert sent Corcelle to broach the subject to Cavaignac. "The Catholics have a great many votes at their disposal", he began. "Before contracting to vote for you, they call your attention to the fact that the Carnot project on primary instruction wounds their religious conscience. They request that this project be withdrawn. This is their first condition." But General Cavaignac refused in a none too diplomatic manner. The "Right" had compelled him to sacrifice the ministry of Carnot; and now he declined to make this other sacrifice. "I am unable to abandon his bill", he replied, "since I approve the principle that inspired it. All I am willing to promise is to postpone the discussion, study the project, and admit such modifications as it may please the Assembly to introduce".²

Many of the Catholics also disliked and feared the following of General Cavaignac that grouped itself around the *National*, which after the Revolution of February had called upon the Catholic Church to democratize itself. "Cavaignac!" exclaimed one election manifesto, "He represents the past with all his anti-religious cortège of 1793." "He is the agent of the *National*, that old enemy of religion and the clergy, that implacable foe of Catholicism."³ "M. Cavaignac is ardently supported by the *National*", affirmed the *Univers*. "It is a misfortune for him."⁴

¹ Cf. *infra*, chap. vii.

² Lecanuet, *Montalembert*, vol. ii, p. 416; *Univers*, July 28, 1876; cf. *Univers*, December 7, 1848 and Dec. 2.

³ *Recueil biographique du clergé sous la république: au clergé et à leurs abonnés* (Paris, November 29, 1848).

⁴ *Univers*, December 2, 1848.

General Cavaignac has certain political friendships [declared the *Ami de la Religion*], which are of such a nature as to compromise him irreparably. It is quite time for him to break with them and renounce them forever. And he should not only separate himself from the *Réforme* and the Mountain, but he should also spurn all solidarity with the exclusive and irreligious party that the *National* represents.¹

Nevertheless there was one group within the Church, of which the *Ère Nouvelle* was the chief organ, that warmly championed the cause of General Cavaignac.

We believe [it affirmed] that the organization of the democratic government under the republican form is necessary for France. We find in the advent of the Republic the meaning of the past sixty years; we perceive in the struggle enlisted against it a conflict with the ideas and with the facts to which, according to us, the future belongs. . . . We support M. Cavaignac . . . because he is the man whom the situation demands; because in the Days of June the general saved such a Republic as France desires; because he, more than any other candidate, represents the republican opinion in its moderation and strength.²

Furthermore the *Ère Nouvelle* supported General Cavaignac because it believed in the reconciliation of Catholicism with democracy. "Democrats and Catholics", it maintained; "we shall vote for M. Cavaignac".³

Some of the higher clergy also supported the moderate Republic in the person of General Cavaignac, the most notable and energetic amongst them being Monseigneur Fayet, bishop of Orleans, who was also a member of the Constituent Assembly. If we can believe the *Vrai Catholique*,

¹ *Ami de la religion*, December 7, 1848.

² *Ère nouvelle*, December 4, 1848.

³ *Ibid.*

he used some pressure to compel the clergy of his diocese to follow his example.¹ But he also went further and published a letter in which he stated that, after careful consideration, the unanimous opinion of the bishops and of the other ecclesiastics in the National Assembly was that, in view of the situation in which the Church of France found itself, the "choice of General Cavaignac for the Presidency of the Republic offered to religion better guarantees and to the country greater calm and stability than any other candidate. We believe also," he continued, "that the clergy ought to cooperate at the elections and make use of all its legitimate influence there."²

Not all the clergy, however, thought as the bishop of Orleans. His letter was replied to by Monseigneur Parisis, bishop of Langres, and by Abbé Le Blanc, both of whom were likewise members of the Assembly.

I believe it my duty [wrote the former], in my own name and in that of those of my colleagues with whom I have been able to confer, to declare that a mandate of this nature has not and cannot have been entrusted to anyone. Ecclesiastics are able to act in such circumstances only as plain citizens.

The Abbé Le Blanc called the attention of the bishop of Orleans to the fact that, in his presence, he [the Abbé Le Blanc] had expressed a different opinion.³ Indeed many seem to have maintained an attitude of cautious reserve, refusing to pronounce for the one or for the other candidate, counseling the clergy to study the situation for themselves, and then vote as their consciences directed.

Do not heed imprudent insinuations, and exclude the party

¹ *Le vrai catholique*, February, 1849.

² *Ami de la religion*, November 18, 1848.

³ *Ibid.*

spirit [Cardinal Bonald, bishop of Lyon, counseled his clergy]. Take into consideration nothing but religion and France. . . . Whose is the hand clever enough and powerful enough to remedy their ills, who is the man self-sacrificing enough to renounce his interests for the interests of his country, his ambitions for his country's weal? Who is the candidate who possesses a liberalism broad enough to respect the liberty of the father of the family in the education of his children, the liberty of him who ministers at the altar in the performance of his duties, and the liberties of the citizen in the exercise of his legitimate rights? Let no one know your secret. Do not urge others to adopt your choice; for that would make you immediately a party man, whereas in the midst of political agitations, you should remain always the man of God.¹

Thus there was no unanimity amongst the Catholics in the question of the choice of a president for the Republic. Some supported General Cavaignac because they believed in the principles for which he stood, while others were inclined to mistrust those very same principles. Some remained neutral, while others openly championed the cause of Louis Napoleon. For some the election of Louis Napoleon doubtless meant a Republic of stability and order, while for others it portended its destruction.

Is this then a declaration of war that France makes against the Republic, in the name of order? [asked the *Ami de la Religion* when the result of the presidential election had become known]. Yes and no! [it answered] according to the manner in which it shall please the Republic to conduct itself. If order and the Republic are able to live together, France will not make war on the Republic. But if experience proves that their reconciliation is impossible, France will not hesitate in her choice. . . . Let the name of Napoleon Bonaparte not

¹ *Ami de la religion*, December 5, 1848.

frighten you beyond measure. The people in acclaiming him give you the choice between Consul and Emperor; the Consul, if you are worthy of liberty; the Emperor, if your ambitions and your follies have doomed you to servitude. . . . France has raised itself *en masse* against socialism on the one hand, and on the other, against the coterie of conspirators and rhetoricians who, for ten months, have exploited it, humbled it, and ruined it.¹

¹ *Ami de la religion*, December 19, 1848.

CHAPTER V

THE CATHOLICS AND THE ELECTION OF LOUIS NAPOLEON

LOUIS NAPOLEON was the son of Hortense Beauharnais and Napoleon's brother Louis, whom the Emperor, when he was providing thrones for all the members of his family, had created king of Holland. The youth of the young prince, which coincided with the Restoration,¹ was spent mostly in Switzerland and Italy, where his studies were supervised by his mother. But although his education was more or less superficial, he had been carefully schooled in all the precepts and principles of the Napoleonic cult. The gospel on which he had been trained to stake his faith was Bonapartism. Lord Malmesbury, who met him at his mother's house in Rome in 1829, found him already convinced that he was destined to rule over France.² This conviction became the firmer, when, in 1832, the Duke of Reichstadt, the son of Napoleon I, died at Vienna; and he immediately began to regard himself as the heir of the Emperor and the inheritor of the Empire.³ Accordingly in 1836 at Strasbourg and again in 1840 at Boulogne he

¹ He was born in 1808.

² Fisher, H. A. L., *Bonapartism* (Oxford, 1914), p. 131.

³ The adopted son of Napoleon, Eugène de Beauharnais, had died in 1824. Lucien Bonaparte had been excluded from the imperial succession because he had displeased his brother, and Joseph and Louis had both renounced it. A decree of 28 Floreal, year XII, had declared: In default of an heir of Napoleon, either natural, legitimate, or adopted, the imperial dignity should devolve on Joseph. Should he lack male heirs, the succession should fall on Louis and his heirs, natural or legitimate. In 1831, Prince Louis' elder brother died while taking part in an insurrection in the Romagna. Cf. Thirria, H., *Napoléon III avant l'Empire* (2nd ed., Paris, 1895), vol. i, p. 9.

attempted to rally the army to his cause. Declaring that the "noble spirit of the Emperor" spoke through him, he appealed to the French soldiers to assist him in entering into his inheritance. But both attempts were ignominious failures, and instead of obtaining him a throne, brought down on him the ridicule of Europe. Arraigned for conspiracy after the Boulogne fiasco, he took advantage of the occasion to deliver an address, the first time he had ever had the opportunity, he declared, of making his voice heard in France and of speaking freely to Frenchmen. "I represent before you, he said, "a principle, a cause, a defeat: the principle is the sovereignty of the people; the cause that of the Empire; the defeat, Waterloo." ¹ In 1846 he escaped from the fortress of Ham to which, after the Boulogne affair, he had been committed for life imprisonment, and made his way to London where he resided until after the overthrow of Louis-Philippe and the proclamation of the Republic.

But during his years of imprisonment and exile Louis Napoleon had not been idle: he had been perpetuating the Napoleonic legend, which Napoleon himself had created at St. Helena. "The Napoleonic idea", he was declaring, "is not an idea of war, but a social, industrial, commercial idea, an idea of humanity. If to some men it seems ever surrounded by struggles, the reason simply is, that it was, indeed, too long enveloped in the smoke of cannon and the dust of battle." ² But this was not the will of the Emperor. If he had invoked the power of the sword, it was "to found and not to destroy." His projects for France and Europe were projects of peace and prosperity,

¹ Thirria, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 192.

² *The political and historical works of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte* (London, 1852), vol. i, p. 349. *The ideas of Napoleon*. This was written in 1839.

which the hostility of the European powers had prevented him from accomplishing.¹ "Now the clouds have dispersed, and men discern through the effulgent glory of arms, a civil glory, greater and more enduring".² Louis Napoleon found the cause of all the ills that afflicted the Restoration and the July Monarchy in the fact that Napoleon had not been allowed to accomplish his beneficent designs. It therefore followed that the hope of France was to be found only in the continuation of the work so abruptly terminated at Waterloo; in reuniting the two popular causes, that of Napoleon and that of the Republic. "With the name of Napoleon people will no longer fear the return of the terror; with the name of the Republic, they will no longer fear the return of absolute power."³ Was the proclamation of the Republic in 1848, then, not the opportunity of the heir of Napoleon? A less astute man than Louis Napoleon would have perceived it.

Louis Napoleon Bonaparte was "essentially a copyist."⁴ Lacking the genius of the man who had shaken Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century, he nevertheless felt that he must do his work. By inheritance, therefore, as well as by training, he was a plotter; but being a dreamer rather than a man of action, he was constantly making false moves and compromising both his followers and himself. Extremely clever and fertile in conceiving plans, he was hesitant and dilatory in executing them.⁵ His greatest

¹ *Op. cit.*, vol. i; *Ideas of Napoleon*, chap. v.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Oeuvres*, vol. i, pp. 376 *et seq.*; *Rêveries Politiques*.

⁴ The phrase is de Tocqueville's. Senior, N. W., *Correspondence and conversations of A. de Tocqueville with N. W. Senior*, vol. ii, p. 16.

⁵ Senior, *Conversations with M. Thiers, M. Guizot* (London, 1878), vol. i, p. 35; Thiers: "The President acts as a child takes medicine—after having poured it out and looked at it, and carried it to his lips, and set it down again half a dozen times—at last, however, he gulps it down." *Ibid.*, p. 45.

moral defect was "his ignorance of the difference between right and wrong."¹ Nevertheless Louis Napoleon was not utterly deficient in virtues. He possessed an abundance of kindness and sympathy.² He was more or less keenly alive to the social evils of the day and sought their remedy.³ Although he was firmly convinced that he was destined to rule France, and was not over-scrupulous in the methods which he employed to achieve his destiny, yet, after his own aggrandizement, he sincerely wished the welfare of the people and the prosperity of France.

Such was the man who offered himself for election to the presidency of the Republic. But the revolution of February had found him unprepared.⁴ Not only was he an exile, but on the morrow of the proclamation of the provisional government he possessed only a handful of followers in France, and his name figured so little in the public mind that his candidature for the Constituent Assembly on the 4th of June escaped the notice of the press until after he had been elected.⁵ How then was he so to attract the attention of the country that he could triumph over his opponents in the presidential campaign? By every means in his power.⁶ No falsehood was left untold, no promise unmade, no person unflattered, and no force neglected that might contribute towards that much desired end.⁷ He even made advances towards the socialists;⁸ and

¹ Senior, *de Tocqueville*, vol. ii, p. 205.

² *Ibid.*

³ Cf. his *Extinction du pauperisme*, which appeared in 1844.

⁴ Ferrère, *Révélation sur la propagande Napoléonenne faite en 1848 et 1849* (Turin, 1863), *passim*.

⁵ Thirria, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 278.

⁶ Melun, *Mémoires*, vol. ii, p. 27.

⁷ Ferrère, *op. cit.*

⁸ Daniel Stern, *Révolution de 1848* (Paris, 1862), 2nd ed., vol. ii, p. 543.

there can be little doubt that had the radicals triumphed in 1848 instead of the conservatives, Louis Napoleon would have been found posing as a socialist rather than as a reactionary. It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that, in his candidacy for the presidency, he should seek to capture the support of the Catholics who had shown themselves to be so influential.

Some weeks before the date set for the presidential election one of the agents of Louis Napoleon, Boulay de la Meurthe, made advances towards Montalembert, the leader of the *Parti Catholique*, and urged him to interview the prince, saying that he would be charmed with him. Montalembert, after some hesitation, finally decided to do so, inasmuch as General Cavaignac had been too independent and had refused to give the guarantees which the *Parti Catholique* desired.¹ Accordingly, on the 30th of October he had his first interview with Louis Napoleon. "His manners and his conversation pleased me much", said Montalembert, "and I do not understand from what source his reputation for incapacity has been derived."² He informed the prince that before the Catholics pledged him their support they wished to know what guarantees he was willing to make for their principles. Louis Napoleon apparently resented the bluntness of the Catholic orator somewhat; for he made haste to reply that were the Catholics to offer him three million votes, they would receive from him no engagements that were contrary to his conscience and his convictions.³ Nevertheless he authorized Montalembert to state the difficulties which the Catholics found in his candidature and the things that they expected. This he did with alacrity.

¹ Lecanuët, *Montalembert* (Paris, 1919), vol. ii, pp. 416 *et seq.*

² *Ibid.*, p. 417, cited from journal of Montalembert.

³ Cf. Ollivier, *l'Empire libéral*, vol. ii, p. 111.

"You are accused," said Montalembert, "of having formerly conspired against the Pope, and of being affiliated with several socialistic and revolutionary sects. It is said, moreover, that the principle of nationalities is one of your favorite doctrines, and that for this reason the Italian patriots have founded the greatest hopes on you."

The prince again seemed somewhat annoyed at this recollection of the past; and Montalembert, perceiving that he had committed an indiscretion, was about to apologize, when the former seized him by the hand and exclaimed:

"I understand your scruples, M. de Montalembert; you wish to give your support only to a candidate whose past life will be a guarantee for the future. You have requested me to reply without restraint: I should be ungrateful not to do so I have indeed taken part in insurrections against the Holy See, and I have had the misfortune to lose my brother thereby. But that is one of the deeds that I regret most. I shall repair it, if God spares my life. That is the candid truth. As to being affiliated with any Italian sect whatsoever, I assure you that there is no truth in it. I am too fond of liberty, especially personal liberty, to have done that. Like you, in your admirable speech on the *Sunderbund*, I believe that radicalism, and more particularly Carbonarism is the direct opposite of liberty."¹

But it was not merely disavowal of the past that Montalembert desired: it was above all pledges for the future which he sought. On two points in particular he wished to know the mind of the prince-candidate: his attitude towards liberty of instruction, and towards freedom of religious associations, both of which the *Parti Catholique* had long sought.

¹ *Correspondance de Montalembert avec l'abbé Texier* (Paris, 1899), pp. 250-252. This account is taken from a letter of Abbé Texier to Monseigneur Buissas, bishop of Limoges, dated Nov. 14, 1848. The former had received it in a letter from Montalembert dated November 11, 1848.

As to liberty of instruction, answered the Prince, I desire as much of it as liberty has a right to demand. "I wish it complete, free, without reserve, as in the United States, in Belgium and in England. . . ." As to the other point, "I acknowledge to you", he said, "that I do not like the convents." He did not ignore, he continued, the great services that they had rendered, and the great things that they had done. But he added: "I believe that their day is passed and that to-day they are repellent to the ideas of the age."

Montalembert contended that religious associations should be permitted wherever liberty existed.

"Without doubt" [responded the prince] "and I regard that right as incontestable. Do not think me an enemy of prayer: I am a Catholic, not perhaps as good a one as you, but still I am one, and I revere all the traditions."

"Ah! Well!" [said Montalembert finally] "you should remember this conversation, and if you desire the votes of the Catholics, give them on these two points guarantees that will satisfy them."

"It is very grave" [replied Louis Napoleon]: "I need longer to reflect over it."

"We shall wait" [retorted Montalembert].¹

The answer to Montalembert was contained in the election manifesto that Louis Napoleon issued on the 27th of November, 1848.² After affirming that, whatever the result of the elections might be, his support would be assured

¹ *Univers*, July 28, 1876. This part of the conversation was recounted to Louis Veuillot, who wrote it down. In 1876, on going through some old papers, he ran across it and published it in the *Univers*.

² Thirria, *Napoléon iii avant l'empire*, vol. i, p. 462. Thiers told Senior that Louis Napoleon begged him to look at his manifesto. "I told him," said Thiers, "that it was detestable, full of socialism, and bad French, and sent him back to write a new one." Senior, *Conversations with Thiers*, vol. i, p. 35.

to the government that should effectively protect "religion, the family, property, the eternal bases of all society", he added: "To protect religion and the family is to guarantee freedom of worship and liberty of instruction."¹

Louis Napoleon, in his eagerness to capture the support of everyone who possessed a "voice or a pen", proposed that the editor-in-chief of the *Univers* should have an interview with him. But Louis Veuillot curtly refused, replying that Montalembert was the leader of the *Parti Catholique*, that he was familiar with its aims and wishes, and that no one else had any more authority to speak in its name than he.²

But besides endeavoring to capture the support of Montalembert and the *Parti Catholique* which he represented, Louis Napoleon also made a bid for that of the Social Catholics through the Vicomte de Melun. Melun relates³ that one morning he received a visit from an old College friend, Henri de Ruolz, who announced that he had come to make a somewhat astonishing proposal to him.

You know [he explained] that Prince Louis Napoleon is here canvassing for his election to the presidency. He knows what you have done for the relief of the poor and for the welfare of the people, and he desires to see you and consult you regarding means to assure the triumph of your ideas, which are also his.

¹"Louis Napoleon," said Melun, "in order to gain the vote of the Catholics had made it (liberty of instruction) one article of his presidential program and of his election circulars." *Mémoires*, vol. ii, p. 60. A propos of this question it is interesting to compare a statement that Louis Napoleon made on the 13th of December, 1843, when he had nothing to gain from the Church: "Unfortunately the clergy in France are in general opposed to democratic interests; to permit them to establish schools free from control would be to allow them to teach the people hatred of the Revolution and of liberty."

²Louis Veuillot, *Le Parti Catholique*, p. 41.

³*Mémoires*, vol. ii, pp. 27 et seq.

Melun was in no sense a Bonapartist and he knew Louis Napoleon only through the fiascos of Strasbourg and Boulogne.

I strongly suspected [he said] that he desired to see me only because he believed that I had a certain influence over the people and other classes of society as a consequence of the schools, societies and patronages which I had founded. I had no desire to make myself in this way an accomplice of his intrigues, and to give the appearance, by frequenting his lobby, that I was preparing an office for myself, or going to salute the rising sun. I refused then quite plainly, but politely, alleging that the Prince and I could employ our time more profitably than in fruitless conversations.

Two days afterwards, however, the friend of Melun returned with new entreaties and a fresh argument. Insinuating that he would probably be elected, Louis Napoleon declared that if Melun were in touch with him, once he was seated in the presidential chair, he would not fail to favor the development of his works of charity and the application of his ideas.

This consideration [says Melun] determined my action. I stipulated, however, three conditions to our meeting: that I should not be obliged to go to his residence; that the interview should take place without intermediary or witness; finally that my visit should in no wise pledge my vote, and that afterwards, as before, I should be free to choose my candidate for the presidency.

The answer was returned that Melun's conditions were accepted; and the hour of the rendezvous was set for the following day.

Louis Napoleon greeted me with thanks for responding to his request, said Melun, and added

That he had desired to see me because, having the same pas-

sion as I for the happiness of the people and likely to be called to a position which would permit him to fulfil his good intentions, he considered it very important to be in touch with men who had devoted their lives to this great mission. He was aware that there existed amongst religious men certain prejudices, certain fears, against the ideas and the doctrines which would control his government, and he was happy to find here an opportunity to make known to that part of society which he esteemed most, what he would do if he were elected President of the Republic. "Will you, then I pray you", added he with the most amiable air, "ask me all the questions which interest you on this subject, and I will gladly reply in all confidence and in all sincerity."

"Since this is so", replied I, "allow me, Prince, to propound three questions, the importance of which you will certainly grasp, and which will go straight to the point which you assign to our conversation, the one religious, another political, the third social."

"The religious question concerns the great interest which, as you know, to-day engages the attention of all Catholics, the liberty of instruction."

"On this point", Louis Napoleon hastened to say, "we shall be quickly agreed: I think, as do the Catholics, that it is a right belonging to the heads of families, to select the men to whom they confide the education of their children; and it is the duty of the government to make it easy for them to choose teachers who share their beliefs and their doctrines, rather than to combat their principles of religion, of morality and even of politics, in the minds of their sons. Liberty of instruction alone is capable of securing them such teachers and professors. Accordingly, while maintaining the University, that great foundation of my uncle, the monopoly of which was justifiable at the time when it was created, if I attain power, I shall hasten to have prepared a law which will guarantee to the country liberty of instruction.

[Melun bowed his assent and continued his interrogation].
 "I shall now ask you what your line of politics will be, on

which party you will base your government, what will be, in a word, the color of your ministry?

"I am neither an extreme reactionary, nor an adherent of the old regime", replied Louis Napoleon smiling, "and my government will not be that of a party, but it will be the representative of order and of all the principles on which rest the peace of society. I shall choose my ministers from the different shades of the great party of order, and yours¹ will not be forgotten, for I count on giving the portfolio of public instruction to one of your friends, Falloux. What is now your social question?

"It is very simple", said I. "You are aware, Prince, in what manner the duties of society, and above all of the state, have been represented lately towards the people, its work, and its ills. Some declare that the state, putting itself in the place of individuals, ought to correct all the inequalities, abolish all the woes, make itself the regulator of labor and of property, assign to each his place, his work and his wages, without any regard to the liberty or to the rights of individuals. Others, leaving to each the right and duty of getting on in the world, wish the government to be completely disinterested, and not to concern itself with affairs of this kind. In a word the former wish the state to do all, the latter to do nothing. To which will you listen?

"To neither of these", he replied. "I shall be equally remote from that socialism which suppresses liberty and from that egotism which leaves to each, whatever may be his strength and his resources, the responsibility for his life." Thereupon [added Melun] he unfolded before me a theory which greatly resembled that of the Catholics, counting especially on charity to combat poverty, but recognizing the duty of the state to support such works, and to do what individual good will was too weak to accomplish. I had read some of his books, products of his meditations in the prison of Ham, or inspirations arising from his confidence in his star; and

¹ The legitimist party.

I perceived clearly that his approach to power, or, if one wishes, the desire not to offend anyone, had made him wiser and more practical. In a word, in spite of my distrust, the legitimacy of which I was later to recognize, it was difficult for me on this occasion to discover any objection to his ideas or refutation for his arguments. . . .

Melun was on the point of taking his departure when a fourth question occurred to him.

"The situation in which France is placed", said I to him, "with its Republic in the midst of so many monarchies is very peculiar, and it would be easy to find a pretext for war with the hope, as under the First Republic, of attracting as allies the peoples eager, under its flag, to recover their independence or their autonomy. Will not the great and glorious souvenirs of your uncle and his popularity appear to you an invitation to follow his example? And will not your advent be the signal for war and conquest?"

"I am indebted to you", replied Louis Napoleon, "for giving me the opportunity to declare my whole mind on this point. Yes, my uncle has made great and glorious wars, and he has often been reproached with having made too many. It was difficult for him to do otherwise, and he was not always the one who provoked war. But to-day the circumstances are entirely different, and I declare to you that it would be a crime to drag France into a war. It is peace that she needs; and if I rule, I shall certainly give it to her."

The interview ended with the declaration on the part of Louis Napoleon of his gratitude, and with the expression of the hope, that, if he were elected President, Melun would support him in the endeavor to accomplish all the good that they both desired. The latter immediately wrote to his brother an account of the conversation, which he concluded by saying: "He gave me the best of receptions, he replied to all my questions in a most interesting manner, he pro-

mised me a place in his court, but nevertheless I will not vote for him."

I perceived [commented Melun] the cleverness of the candidate who believed that he could gain the votes of the Catholics and charitable workers, by talking to me in such a manner, while in the street, in the cabarets and elsewhere, his partizans were buying votes with other promises and at quite another price. Alas! France should have heard that day as I did: "The Empire is liberty, the Empire is order, the Empire is peace," and have realized that, the votes gained and the trick played, the Empire was an entirely different thing.

But Louis Napoleon sought to make events as well as promises rally the Catholics to his candidature. Thus he employed the action of the government in the question of intervention at Rome both to bring discredit upon General Cavaignac and to give prestige to himself. The *Univers* of the 2nd of December had criticized him severely for failing to cast his vote at the session of the Assembly on the 30th of November in support of the government's project on behalf of the Pope. Thus his habitual practise of keeping himself in the background, and abstaining from all action or speech that might compromise him in the eyes of the public, drew down upon him the criticism of the very party with which he had been trying to curry favor. The next day appeared a cleverly worded letter signed by Louis Napoleon, which more than repaired the damage done by his abstention.

Understanding [he affirmed] that there have been comments on my abstention from the vote relative to the expedition to Civita-Vecchia, I believe it my duty to declare that, while having decided to support every measure calculated to guarantee effectively the liberty and the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff, I have not been able to support by my vote a military de-

monstration that seemed to me both dangerous to the sacred interests which it was intended to protect, and of a nature to compromise the peace of Europe.¹

The *Univers* showed by its comment that it was not slow to grasp its intent.

The government [it declared], according to the language of M. Cavaignac and of M. Dufaure, has thought only of protecting the person of the Holy Father and of guaranteeing his individual liberty. In this letter, M. Louis Napoleon Bonaparte speaks of the liberty *and of the authority* of the Sovereign Pontiff. We hope that he has inserted this phrase designedly, and if such should be the case, that he will remember it.²

It was not merely his abstention from the vote of the 30th of November, however, that Louis Napoleon had to explain. As early as its issue of the 29th of November, the *Ère Nouvelle* had called attention to the fact that a Bonaparte, the Prince of Canino and cousin of the Presidential candidate, figured amongst the demagogues of Rome who had oppressed the Pope. The *Univers* in several of its issues pointed out the same fact, casting aspersions on the name of Bonaparte because of it.³ And the *Ami de la Religion* declared:

We are unable to keep silent. In the first rank of the enemies and persecutors of Pius IX, there is a man, the Prince of Canino, whose acts excite the just execration of the world, and whose name casts a deplorable reflection even on that of

¹ *Univers*, December 3, 1848. The biographer of Montalembert affirms that he (Montalembert) suggested to Louis Napoleon that he write this letter to the press. Lecanuet, *Montalembert*, vol. iii, p. 443.

² *Univers*, December 3, 1848.

³ Notably *Univers* of December 2 and 6, 1848. In its issue of Dec. 2 it wrote: "M. Bonaparte does not brag about his cousin Canino, but neither does he disown him."

Louis Napoleon. A categorical and solemn disavowal is necessary to reassure them.¹

Such hints again quite overcame the customary reserve of Louis Napoleon and he published in the following issue of the *Ami de la Religion* a letter addressed to the Apostolic Nuncio, by means of which he sought to put an end to all rumors which associated him with his Roman cousin.

For a long time [he declared] I have had no relations whatsoever with the eldest son of Lucien Bonaparte; and I deplore with all my heart that he has not felt that the maintenance of the temporal sovereignty of the venerable head of the Church was as intimately connected with the genius of Catholicism as with the liberty and the independence of Italy.²

These declarations in favor of Pius IX, combined with the report that Louis Napoleon had offered the portfolio of Worship and Education to the Comte de Falloux, had the effect of inclining the *Ami de la Religion* and the *Univers*, with the party which they represented, towards his cause.³ But they also determined the policy which he was to follow after his election. If he had not actually committed himself to undertake an expedition in favor of the Pope, and to prepare an educational law which would satisfy the Catholics, he had aroused expectations which he afterwards found it impossible to disregard.

All these bids on the part of Louis Napoleon for the support of the Catholics did not succeed in rallying them un-animously to the support of his candidature. However much the *Ami de la Religion* and the *Univers* might incline towards his cause, they did not forsake their position of pro-

¹ *Ami de la religion*, December 7, 1848.

² The Abbé Dupanloup confided to his biographer that he was instrumental in obtaining this letter from Louis Napoleon. Lagrange, *Vie de Mgr. Dupanloup*, vol. i, p. 468.

³ *Ami de la religion*, Dec. 7, 1848.

fessed neutrality.¹ On the other hand the *Ère Nouvelle* was openly hostile.² Not only did it oppose him on the ground that his flag was fatally a monarchical one,³ but also because it perceived in him "not peace but war, not prosperity but disorder, not tranquillity but the tempest." In a word the presidency of Louis Napoleon would be "only a precipitation towards the unknown".⁴ The *Ère Nouvelle* cautioned the clergy not to make themselves the accomplices of all shades of the reaction by falling under the illusions of Bonapartism.⁵ The attitude of the episcopate was similarly divided. Some of the bishops, as we have seen, declared for General Cavaignac, while others maintained a neutral attitude.⁶ Amongst the lower clergy, some of the

¹ *Univers*, Dec. 7, 1848.

² The *Événement* had asserted that the kind of president France needed was a thinker, who in solitude and through suffering had worked out his ideas. "But this candidate exists," it continued; "God has prepared him for France through suffering and exile. He is called Louis Napoleon Bonaparte." "Louis Napoleon a thinker!" exclaims the *Ère Nouvelle*; and it proceeds to define the only sense in which it can conceive of such a thing. "One day Louis Bonaparte was walking in the court of the castle of Ham, where he had been for three quarters of an hour. M. de Montholon, who had been waiting to speak to him, decided at last to interrupt him. But when hat in hand he stopped respectfully three steps from the prince, the latter turned and said to him: 'Keep still: do you not see that I am thinking.'"

³ *Ère Nouvelle*, Dec. 4, 1848.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Dec. 8.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ "No bishop has directed the Catholics of his diocese to vote for such or such a candidate. On the contrary, all the bishops have implicitly recognized, and several have expressly stated, that they had no injunction to give on this score, and that the priests and the faithful were free to vote according to their convictions and their conscience." *Ère Nouvelle*, Nov. 28, 1848. The *Ami de la religion*, referring to the presidential election, asserted that the Church "had no particular flag to hoist." The issue was not clear-cut for the Catholics, as it was in the elections of April 23, 1848, and May 13, 1849. *Ami de la religion*, April 19, 1849.

priests were enthusiastic for the cause of Louis Napoleon. Thus we find the *Recueil Biographique du Clergé sous la République* issuing [November 29] a manifesto to the clergy, in which it urged them to support the Prince, alleging that he bore a name synonymous with order and conciliation, and that he was the true friend of the clergy. Lacordaire, on the other hand, seeing in the presidency of Louis Napoleon only the peristyle of the Empire, supported General Cavaignac.¹ Prominent Catholic laymen were likewise divided, some, as Melun and Falloux, supporting Cavaignac, others as Montalembert and Louis Veillot, Louis Napoleon.

It is impossible, therefore, to find in any support which the Catholics may have given Louis Napoleon, the reason for his success. Besides, too many occupied a position of neutrality to give them the solidarity of a party. That Catholicism did not play any very important, much less a decisive, part in the presidential campaign is further shown by a consideration of the factors which were working towards the election of the Prince-President.²

Scarcely had the Republic been proclaimed before the Bonapartist intrigue began that was to end in the Second Empire. The chief agents of this intrigue were Aristide Ferrère and Persigny, who on the 12th of March, 1848, met and discussed plans for the restoration of the House of Bonaparte to power in France. From that date their insidious propaganda was carried on by a few trustworthy followers, who sought to make use of the discontent amongst the middle classes, which was due to financial depression, for the purpose of undermining the Republic and paving the way to power for Louis Napoleon. They sought to

¹ Foisset, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 196.

² For the contrary view, cf. Weill, *Le Catholicisme libéral* (Paris, 1909), p. 99; who does not, however, seem to take all the facts into consideration.

create partizans of the Prince in all classes of society; to awaken the dormant Bonapartist sentiment throughout the country districts as well as amongst the workmen; and to remove all prejudices against the name of Napoleon.¹ It is this propaganda that helps to explain the elections of Louis Napoleon to the National Constituent in June and again in September 1848, as well as to the presidency on the 10th of December. In order that Louis Napoleon might not compromise himself or their work, they kept him entirely in the background, speaking and making promises in his name.² Amongst the discontented of all classes, and especially amongst those whose business the political upheaval had either ruined or threatened, Ferrère sowed his seed. In contrast with the instability and the insecurity of the republican regime, the Bonapartist agents exalted the name of Napoleon as standing for the very things which the Republic lacked, stability, security, prosperity.³ Sometimes, indeed, they met with deaf ears,⁴ but more often they found ready listeners. Papers sprang into existence, such as the *Napoléon Républicain*, which depicted the Napoleonic principles as those of "pure democracy", which alone would be able to save France from anarchy on the one hand and from reaction on the other.⁵

Louis Napoleon's position is exceptional, and what is more, favorable [wrote Ferrère in his circular of the 17th of November, 1848]. A stranger to all parties he is able to conciliate them all, for he will not have to appease the hatred of some or satisfy the ambitions of others. He will not remain

¹ Ferrère, *op. cit.*, pp. 69-70.

² *Ibid.*, p. 71.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 195 *et seq.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

⁵ *Napoléon républicain*, 16 June, 1848; Odilon Barrot, *Mémoires*, vol. iii, pp. 18-19.

in the narrow circle of the coteries of Paris; for his intentions are to choose, from the general councils of the department and arrondissement, the men of ability and intelligence who are found there in great numbers, and to call to his side all who possess capacity irrespective of their past. . . . It is therefore in the general interest to select from the family of Napoleon, which the sovereignty of the people has raised to power, this principle of stability, which the Bourbons have not been able to give, and which the Republic does not offer. It is thus to the nephew of the Emperor that belongs the good fortune to conciliate the factions, extinguish civil discord, restore trade, and conduct France towards a future of glory and prosperity.¹

Another factor making for the success of Louis Napoleon on the 10th of December was the support given him by the Club of the *Rue de Poitiers*, which was virtually ruled over by Adolf Thiers. When it came to a question of which candidate this club should support, it was decided, after some discussion and little opposition, to adopt Louis Napoleon at its official candidate.² Deputations frequently came up from the different departments to consult Molé and Thiers, the leaders of the club, and to ask their advice as to which candidate to support. This was "uniformly given in favor of Louis Bonaparte."³ If we can believe de Tocqueville, "almost all the leading members of the Constituent Assembly" voted for him.

Many were enthusiastic in his cause. They gave to it the solidarity of a party. Two ideas governed them, and it is difficult to say which was the more absurd. One, that he was "nul"—that he had neither talent nor knowledge, and that therefore he could be easily led; the other, that if he were un-

¹ Ferrère, *op. cit.*, pp. 195-198.

² Senior, *Conversations with Thiers*, p. 32.

³ F. O. Normanby to Palmerston, Nov. 16, 1848. Normanby, *A Year of Revolution*, vol. ii, p. 298.

manageable, he could be easily got rid of, at least at the end of his term, perhaps before. They thought that he would be a tool, and a tool that they could break.¹

The decisive factor, however, in the election of Louis Napoleon was doubtless what the *Revue des deux mondes* termed the *aveugle prestige d'un souvenir*² taken in conjunction with the Bonapartist propaganda. Louis Napoleon had been discreetly kept in the background so that he was uncompromised and little known. The magic of the name that he bore was his strongest asset. Any support that the Church and the bourgeoisie gave him doubtless increased his majority; but they were not the important factors.³ "His candidature took like a train of gunpowder", said Melun.⁴

History affords no parallel [wrote Lord Normanby] to this spectacle of all the eminent men of all former political parties uniting in support of a man whom no one of them would have personally selected. They in fact follow, whilst they attempt to direct a popular impulse which they could not resist. The memory of the Emperor Napoleon is no doubt for something in this impulse, but the hatred of the Republic gives another signification to the name of Bonaparte, and the traditional recollection that it was by such means the last republic was destroyed, gives peculiar force to this mode of protestation.⁵

¹ Senior, *Conversations with de Tocqueville*, vol. i, p. 195.

² "Louis Napoleon," said de Tocqueville, "had the merit, or luck, to discover what few suspected, the latent Bonapartism of the Nation. The 10th of December showed that the memory of the Emperor, vague and indefinite, but therefore more imposing, still dwelt like an heroic legend in the imagination of the peasantry." Senior, *Conversations with de Tocqueville*, vol. ii, p. 11. *Revue des deux mondes*, vol. 24, 1848.

³ Odilon Barrot, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 26; cf. Ollivier, *l'Empire libéral*.

⁴ *Mémoires*, vol. ii, p. 34.

⁵ F. O. Normanby to Palmerston, December 12, 1848. *A Year of Revolution*, vol. ii, p. 361.

But if Louis Napoleon failed to rally Catholic support whole-heartedly to his candidature, he sought to capture its cooperation for his rule. It was one of the wings of the party of order on which he desired to base his power. This is shown by the fact that Falloux, who according to de Tocqueville "represented only the Church,"¹ was invited to assume the portfolio of Worship and Education. In the early part of December 1848, after it had become practically certain that Louis Napoleon would be elected President, Falloux was approached by Odilon Barrot on behalf of Louis Napoleon and urged to accept this position in the new ministry. But he positively refused.² At the Assembly Falloux went to Louis Napoleon and thanked him for the honor which he had done him in inviting him to accept such a post, but excused himself on the ground of his health. The Prince then pressed him to accept one, if he felt unable to assume the responsibility of both, portfolios. But Falloux replied that he was as incapable of filling one as he was of filling both. The conversation ended by Louis Napoleon expressing the hope that this was not his "last word." Then, lest his Catholic friends should endeavor to

¹De Tocqueville, *Souvenirs* (Paris, 1893), p. 309. "Falloux, who was legitimist by birth, education, by preference, and by reason of the society in which he moved, . . . belonged at heart only to the Church. He did not believe in the triumph of legitimacy which he served, and he sought, by means of our revolutions, only a road to restore the Catholic religion to power. If he remained in the ministry, it was to watch over her affairs, and, as he said to me from the outset with all candor, because of the advice of his confessor. I am convinced that, from the beginning, Falloux had foreseen the advantage that could be obtained from Louis Napoleon for the accomplishment of this design, and that early familiarizing himself with the idea of seeing the president become the heir of the Republic and the master of France, he had thought only of utilizing this inevitable event in the interest of the clergy. He had offered the support of his party without, however, giving himself," pp. 353-354.

²Falloux, *l'Évêque d'Orléans* (Paris, 1879), pp. 3 *et seq.*

persuade him to reverse his decision, Falloux left the Assembly purposing to absent himself from its sessions until the ministerial slate was made up. But he was reckoning without his friends.

The "first onslaught" that was directed against the decision of Falloux was made by Montalembert and Ravignan. For three hours the former employed his eloquence and the latter his entreaties in order to persuade him to accept the proffered post.¹ But Falloux was obdurate. He was suspicious of Louis Napoleon, and he feared to compromise the interests of religion by making such an alliance as his acceptance would entail.

It is not a monarchical scruple that holds me back [he affirmed], for the monarchy is not at issue at this present moment . . . it is only a question of religion, which is never separate from the public interest. If I should hope to serve it, I would not hesitate to sacrifice all my reluctance. But the Bonapartist traditions, the training of Prince Louis, his previous conduct in Italy, do they authorize this hope?²

He finally convinced his friends that his position was the logical one, and that it would be a great mistake for him to accept the ministry.³ He was not, however, to be left with this decision.

The next attack against Falloux's resolution was made by the Abbé Dupanloup, who through his journal, the *Ami de la Religion*, was playing an important rôle in the politics of the Church. He relates that after saying Mass on Tuesday morning, the 12th of December—the election had been on the 10th—he was beginning his thanksgiving when he was seized by so "irresistible an impulse" that he was

¹ Lecanuet, *Montalembert*, vol. iii, p. 421.

² Falloux, *op. cit.*

³ Lagrange, *Vie de monseigneur Dupanloup* (Paris, 1883), vol. i, p. 469.

unable to continue. It was flying in the face of Providence to allow Falloux to follow the bent of his own will. Dupanloup therefore set out immediately to change that will. "That was nine o'clock in the morning, and I persevered", he relates, "until eleven o'clock at night, returning only when he was minister."¹

Then began that somewhat amusing game of hide-and-seek between Dupanloup and Falloux. The latter, fearing that he would not be left in peace, swore his valet to secrecy and went to pass the day in the *Jardin des Plantes* and in the house of his friend Madame Swetchine. But the Abbé Dupanloup, eventually overcoming the valet's power of resistance, discovered the whereabouts of his friend and lost no time in beginning his attack.²

Your refusal [he began] has been laid before Prince Louis, who replied coldly, "I understand what this means. At M. de Falloux's age a man does not willingly refuse a ministry. His party will not allow him to accept. This is a declaration of war. I wished to lean upon the conservatives; since this support is withheld, I must seek one elsewhere. To-day the Legitimist party raises its head; to-morrow the Orleanists will do the same. I cannot remain thus in mid-air, and must ask the left for the assistance which is refused by the right. This evening I will see M. Jules Favre." So you see, my friend [said the Abbé Dupanloup] this is the situation created by your obstinacy. You will abandon Italy to its convulsions, leave the Pope helpless at the mercy of his worst enemies, and cover the most eminent members of the conservative party with confusion before her.³

This was too much for Falloux's powers of resistance, so

¹ Lagrange, *op. cit.*, p. 470.

² Falloux, *op. cit.*, pp. 13 *et seq.*

³ Falloux, *Memoirs of a royalist*, Eng. trans., pp. 328-329.

he promised to submit provided he could obtain the support and cooperation of Thiers.¹ The party therefore went immediately to the residence of the latter. When Thiers was told that Falloux had at last consented to accept the position in the ministry, he began to congratulate him. But the latter protested:

"Do not thank me yet", I said, "I am come to you because the priests send me." I purposely used this expression in order to place my interlocutor at once face to face with the difficulty. "I will accept office if you will promise me to prepare a bill for educational liberty and to support it. If not—no!" "I promise, I promise," effusively replied M. Thiers, "and you may rest assured that I feel no difficulty in giving you this pledge. You can rely on me, for my convictions are the same as your own. We have made a mistake on the religious question, both my liberal friends and myself, and we may as well admit it freely. I had better go at once and see Prince Louis, who is even now listening to detestable counsels; for perhaps in a few hours it will be too late to win him away from these sinister influences."²

It therefore seems evident that the Catholic leaders, notably Montalembert and the Abbé Dupanloup, in persuading Falloux to accept the proffered portfolio in the new ministry, hoped to accomplish two things, French intervention on behalf of the Pope and a law that would assure them the educational rights which they had so long demanded. Indeed Falloux stated in his memoirs that such was his conception of his task. "I desired nothing better", he declared, "than to justify myself in my own eyes by undertaking, without losing an hour, my double task of

¹ Senior's description of de Falloux: "A man of high talents and acquirements and virtues, who, much against his will, took office, because his confessor told him that it was his duty." *Correspondence with de Tocqueville*, vol. i, p. 107.

² Falloux, *op. cit.*, pp. 330-331.

assuring religious liberty in France and the Pope's safety in Italy."¹ Louis Napoleon's desire to have Falloux in his ministry was taken as a gage that he intended to perform at least his pledge regarding liberty of instruction.² As to the relief of the Pope several others in the ministry seem to have desired such a step, while only one was openly hostile.

M. Barrot entered frankly into the feeling of admiration for Pius IX, and freely expressed his respect for the Catholic creed. But with him it was natural instinct and good will, not religious convictions. Drouyn de Lhuys and M. Léon Faucher regarded the Pope as the keystone of the European edifice, and they desired to retain his throne like that of any other sovereign. M. Drouyn de Lhuys often said, "I prefer a good Pope to a bad one, but I prefer a bad Pope to none at all!" M. Faucher applauded this sentiment. By a good Pope they meant a sovereign pontiff such as Pius IX had shown himself from 1846 to 1848. By a bad Pope they meant the indignant, discouraged, ruler surrounded by absolutist influences which were endeavoring to gain empire over him.³

The President's attitude, however, seems not to have been so enthusiastic in the papal cause as his letter to the papal nuncio on the eve of his election would have us believe. He was torn between the conflicting desires to gain the support of the Catholics in France and his sympathy with the aspirations of Italian nationalism. On one occasion he seems to have been inclined to intervene in behalf of the Roman revolutionaries.⁴ But ultimately his desire to stand

¹ Falloux, *op. cit.*, p. 342.

² Melun, *Mémoires*, vol. ii, p. 60.

³ Falloux, *op. cit.*, p. 368.

⁴ Senior, *Conversations and correspondence with A. de Tocqueville*, vol. ii, p. 10; cf. Falloux, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 367.

well with the Catholics got the better of whatever sympathy he may have had with the revolutionary party, and although his action in the Roman question was probably not prompted by single-minded motives, nevertheless he was to receive the credit of fulfilling the will of the Catholics.¹

¹ Cf. *infra*, chap. viii.

CHAPTER VI

THE EXPEDITION TO ROME IN 1849

I. ROME AND EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY IN THE EARLY PART OF 1849

PIUS IX an exile at Gaeta introduced a new difficulty into an already complex Italian situation. The diplomatic body were requested to follow him to his new court, which at once became the center of European interest and intrigue. On the evening of the 25th of November the Bavarian minister at the Papal Court arrived in Naples with an autograph letter from the Pope, announcing his arrival at Gaeta.¹ Two days later the King of Naples, accompanied by the Royal Family, the Apostolic Nuncio and a large body of clergy sailed from Naples to visit the Pope.² The presence of the Bourbon monarch at the Papal Court did not foster the liberal tendencies of the Papacy.

At first it appeared possible to effect a reconciliation between the Pope and his subjects.³ But such a possibility seems to have been excluded from the counsels at Gaeta. A deputation, which was sent from the Romans, was refused admittance into the Neapolitan States at Terracina.⁴ Sir William Temple in a letter to Lord Palmerston stated that

¹ *British parliamentary papers: correspondence respecting the affairs of Rome*, vol. lviii, Napier to Palmerston, Naples, November 26, 1848.

² *Ibid.*, Abercromby to Palmerston, Turin, Dec. 1, 1848.

³ *Ibid.*, Cooper Key to Sir Wm. Parker, Rome, Jan. 3, 1849.

⁴ Farini, *The Roman State*, vol. iii, p. 41.

it was to be feared that the counsels of those who were adverse to the Pope's going to Rome except by means of armed intervention would prevent any active measures being taken towards a reconciliation between his Holiness and his subjects.¹ This was confirmed by the fact that Pius IX sent a letter to the young Emperor Francis Joseph, on the occasion of his accession, addressing him as his "*très cher fils*", and requesting his assistance against the rebellious subjects of the Papacy.² Nor was the Papal court more ready to accept a restoration at the hands of Piedmont. The King of Piedmont despatched Count Enrico Martini as ambassador to the Pope, but the latter at first refused to receive him, alleging that the formality of asking the acceptance of an ambassador had not been observed, and that the Government of Charles Albert was in communication with the "rebels" at Rome. Finally, however, the Pope consented to receive Count Martini as a private visitor. During the course of the interview that followed, when the conversation had turned upon the best mode of restoring the temporal authority of the Pope, the envoy of Piedmont referred to the schemes of the constitutionalists, and urged the necessity of an accommodation. He impressed upon the Pope, should the attempt at reconciliation fail, the advantage of calling in only Italian, and the certain mischief and peril of accepting foreign aid. The reply of Pius IX was to the effect that he had little or no confidence in the Italian governments. He was suspicious of the moderates, and looked for foreign intervention. The Church was not national, he maintained, but universal; and the Pontiff was more her head than he was the father of his own subjects. He intimated that an Austrian intervention was likely, and

¹ *British parliamentary papers, op. cit.*, Ponsonby to Palmerston, Vienna, December 24, 1848.

² Naples, January 5, 1849.

on Martini appearing a good deal moved and perturbed at this, he added: "What would you have? They have brought it upon themselves."¹ Martini offered the Pope a Piedmontese corps for the defense of the Romagna; but Cardinal Antonelli rejected such aid, alleging that "the Holy Father could not, under the idea of promoting the national cause of Italy, compromise the true interests of the Holy Church."²

At the same time the Bavarian ambassador, Count Spaur, and the court of Naples were working for an Austrian, or a combined Austrian and Neapolitan, restoration of the Pope. On the very day³ of Martini's interview with Pius IX Count Spaur informed Count von Liedekerke, the minister of Holland, that an Austrian ambassador would shortly reach Gaeta and that within a fortnight the "Roman nuisance" would be at an end.⁴ Spain also seemed disposed to intervene, and despatched a squadron to Italian waters, giving as an excuse that she desired to protect the personal safety of the Pope.⁵

When France got an inkling of the designs of Austria and Naples, the government immediately despatched Latour d'Auvergne to Gaeta, instructing him, in conjunction with the Duke d'Harcourt, the French Ambassador, to expostulate with the Papal court. They requested the Pope to be good enough to assure them that he had neither asked nor anticipated aid from Vienna earlier than from Paris. They pointed out that Austrian intervention, if it were intended, must be for the advantage of Austria, rather than for the

¹Farini, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, pp. 194-195.

²*Ibid.*, pp. 199 *et seq.*

³January 12, 1849.

⁴Farini, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, pp. 195-196.

⁵*British parliamentary papers, op. cit.*, Gioberti to Bertran de Lis, Turin, January 15, 1849.

advantage of the Holy See. Finally they asserted that if Austria stirred, France also would send a force to the Roman States and would garrison some point of importance.¹ Neither the Pope nor Cardinal Antonelli gave any distinct answer to the representations of the French delegation; but it seems probable that the remonstrance of France foiled, to some degree at least, the immediate schemes of Austria and Naples.²

While intrigues were going on at Gaeta for an Austrian and Neapolitan restoration of the Pope, a proposal came from another source. On the 21st of December, 1848, Spain communicated to Piedmont the suggestion that each of the Catholic powers should name a representative, and that such plenipotentiaries should meet at some convenient place in order to agree on ways and means to effect the restoration of Pius IX. To avoid delay the government of Spain proposed Madrid or some Spanish town on the shores of the Mediterranean as the seat of the conference. "As the matter in question is essentially Catholic," it was urged, "Spain cannot seem a place ill-suited for such conferences." In order not to awaken the susceptibilities of the Italians, Spain was careful to say that this conference should concern itself solely and exclusively with the question of securing the freedom and independence of the Pope, without dealing with questions of another character.³ This pro-

¹ Cf. *British parliamentary papers, op. cit.*, Normanby to Palmerston, January 15, 1849. "Some excitement has been prevalent in Paris during the last few days in consequence of the military and naval preparations making in the southern seaports. I had some conversation with M. Drouyn de Lhuys on the subject, who explained that these steps were only taken in order to be in a certain stage of readiness, in case Austria should leave the French Government no alternative than either a joint interference in the affairs of the Roman States, or the independent intervention of her army in the north of Italy."

² Farini, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 201.

³ *British parliamentary papers*, vol. lviii, M. Pidal to M. Bertran de Lis, Madrid, December 21, 1848.

posals of Spain was sent to the other courts; but it met with too much opposition to be carried into effect immediately. Drouyn de Lhuys, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, probably knowing the feeling of Piedmont, replied that he considered the independence of the Pope not only a Catholic question, but also a European one.¹

The strongest opposition to the project of Spain, however, came from Piedmont, who gave the foreign powers to understand that she would not tolerate their intervention in Italy on behalf of the Pope. Spain had contended that as the authority of the Pope was a matter of concern to all Catholic powers, they had the right to intervene to safeguard that authority. This contention Gioberti, now Prime Minister of Piedmont, flatly denied. If the position of Spain were valid, he argued, it would mean that the Roman States did not geographically belong to Italy. Admitting that as a spiritual lord the Pope was under the protection of all the powers, he maintained that as a temporal prince he could be placed under that same protection only in so far as might be consistent with Italian nationality and independence. This principle of Italian nationality and independence, continued Gioberti,

is not less sacred than the temporal rights of the Pope: it is necessary therefore to endeavor to reconcile the two. Now as it is repugnant to Italian nationality and independence, that foreign powers should interfere in the political affairs of the Peninsula by force of arms, it follows that the Pope as a temporal prince can only be placed under the protection of the Italian powers. These powers being eminently Catholic, and some of them having all the means requisite for maintaining the legitimate rights of the Pontiff, the strong protection which his rights demand is in this way reconciled with the principle of our nationality and of our independence. Such

¹ *British parliamentary papers*, vol. lviii, Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, January 8, 1849.

is the only manner in which the two principles at stake can be reconciled. If, for the protection appertaining to the Italian States, that of all Catholic states is substituted, our nationality is at an end, and Italy becomes to a certain extent subject to the whole world, and the Pontificate, which is the glory of our Peninsula, becomes a burden to it, and, so to speak, a badge of servitude.¹

By the end of January the negotiations for the restoration of Pius IX had thus reached a deadlock. France supporting the views of Piedmont² refused to unite with Austria for a combined Austrian and French intervention, or to allow Austria alone or Austria and Naples to intervene, as the Papal court wished. On the other hand the court of Gaeta refused to accept either the mediation or the armed intervention of Piedmont, who persisted in protesting against any foreign interference. Gioberti argued "that a pacific and kindly interposition must be more palatable to the Vicar of Christ than the violent and blood-stained paths of warfare, and that the aid of an Italian sovereign would be preferred by Pius IX to German succours."³ Should such intervention be proposed, he added, Piedmont would utter a formal protest "before Italy and all friendly powers." Moreover, nothing but reverence for the Holy See would withhold them from regarding intervention as a *casus belli*.⁴ The Pope, it is true, unbent sufficiently to recognize the official character of Count Martini. But if he at times showed himself inclined to mild counsels, he would afterwards unsay his words, or Cardinal Antonelli would wrest

¹ *British parliamentary papers*, vol. lviii, Gioberti to M. Bertran de Lis, Turin, January 15, 1849.

² Bianchi, *op. cit.*, vol. vi, p. 492, document xxxv; Barrot, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 147.

³ Farini, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 203.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 204.

“a doubtful or contrary sense out of them.”¹ The Neapolitan agents were continually fostering suspicion of the intentions of Piedmont at the court of Gaeta, insinuating that that power was offering her mediation with the secret intention of obtaining a great slice from the States of the Church.² The court of Gaeta continued to favor a Papal restoration by means of Austrian arms,³ and accordingly despatched an envoy, Monsignor Bedini, under an assumed name to France, in order to devise arrangements with the Catholic party there for foiling the opposition of the French government to their designs.⁴

On the 4th of February, the Austrian Ambassador, Count Maurice Esterhazy, arrived at Gaeta. He immediately had an interview with Cardinal Antonelli and an audience with the Pope. The upshot was that a consistory of Cardinals was called for the 7th of February, at which it was decided to request the armed assistance of Austria, France, Spain and Naples.⁵ The sentiment against Piedmont prevailed to such a degree that the latter power was struck off the list of Catholic nations to which an appeal for aid should be made.⁶ The proclamation of the Roman Republic on the 9th of February did but confirm the decision of the court of Gaeta. So that on the fourteenth Pius IX protested before the diplomatic body against that proclamation.⁷ And on the 18th of February Cardinal Antonelli addressed his note to the four above-mentioned Catholic powers.

¹ Farini, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 208.

² *Ibid.*

³ *British parliamentary papers*, vol. lviii, Abercromby to Palmerston, Turin, January 17, 1849.

⁴ Farini, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 207.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 209.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 210.

⁷ Gaillard, *op. cit.*, pp. 129-130; Farini, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 277.

. . . . Inasmuch as Austria, France, Spain and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies by their geographical position lie so that they can repair promptly to the dominions of the Holy See to reestablish the public order overthrown by a horde of sectaries: the Holy Father, accordingly trusting in the religious concern of these powers, daughters of the Church, asks with entire confidence their armed intervention, mainly to liberate the States of the Church from that band of wretches, which is exercising there, with every kind of enormity, the most atrocious despotism.¹

This appeal of Cardinal Antonelli to the Catholic powers had the effect of strengthening the determination of Austria, impelled by her own interests in Italy as well, to restore the Papal government by force of arms. But Austria was now loth to act in Italy without knowing what the attitude of France would be; for they feared what Louis Napoleon and the Republican party might do, a fear that was fostered by Lord Ponsonby, the English Ambassador at Vienna.² Accordingly, Schwartzemberg, the Austrian Chancellor, doubtless in order to sound the French cabinet, proposed that France should restore the Pope, declaring that the Austrians would content themselves with moving some troops into Bologna, which they would withdraw as soon as France should complete the work at Rome.³ But France at once rejected this proposal.⁴

The court of Gaeta meanwhile had become impatient at the delay, and had made a direct appeal to Austria for "immediate armed intervention." Schwartzemberg, in a note

¹ Farini, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, pp. 279-280.

² Hübner, Count J. A. von, *Une année de ma vie. 1848-1849* (Paris, 1891), pp. 561 *et seq.*; *British parliamentary papers*, vol. lviii, Ponsonby to Palmerston, February 15 and February 20, 1849.

³ *Ibid.*, Ponsonby to Palmerston, Vienna, March 13, 1849.

⁴ *F. O.* 27, vol. 842, Normanby to Palmerston, March 12, 1849.

to France, stated that this was a demand that Austria could not refuse; yet before acceding to it, he invited France to appear at Civita-Vecchia with any force she might please "whilst the Austrians moved upon Rome and restored the Pope, leaving his Holiness to give his subjects such a government as it might be his pleasure to grant."¹ M. Drouyn de Lhuys, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, informed M. Thom, the Austrian Ambassador, "that these were measures with which France not only could have no concern, but against which she entered her formal protest; and if they were nevertheless persisted in, she would consider herself at liberty to pursue that course which might appear most consistent with her national honor and interests."²

The French Cabinet supported this position of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The policy of France was to effect a reconciliation between the Provisional Roman government and the court of Gaeta; and to this end M. Mercier was unofficially sent to Rome with the intelligence that the Romans must not expect the slightest sympathy from the French government, and that their only means of avoiding an intervention from other powers was for them to come to terms with the Sovereign Pontiff.³ Failing such an arrangement, the Papal restoration should be effected by Italian arms alone.⁴ Both these solutions, however, were rendered impossible by the refusal of the court at Gaeta to accept any restoration other than that brought about by foreign intervention.

¹ *F. O.* 27, vol. 842; *cf.* Johnston, *op. cit.*, p. 256.

² *F. O.* 27, vol. 842. Lord Normanby to Lord Palmerston, Paris, March 12, 1849.

³ *Ibid.*, Lord Normanby to Lord Palmerston, Paris, March 11, 1849; Bianchi, *op. cit.*, p. 493. Document xxxvi: Schwartzemberg to Austrian Ambassador at Naples.

⁴ Farini, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, pp. 295-296.

Negotiation having failed to bring about any agreement, it was decided to act upon the suggestion of Spain and hold a conference on the affairs of Rome. Each of the four Catholic powers accordingly named a representative to meet with those of the other powers in a conference which, it was agreed, should open at Gaeta on the 30th of March. But in the meantime Piedmont suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of Austria at Novara on the 22nd of March. This event removed the possibility of the former power offering any serious resistance to armed intervention in the States of the Church. On this account the representatives of Austria and Naples, as well as Cardinal Antonelli, were much elated, and were prepared to press the more strongly for the immediate restoration of Pius IX. The conferences opened at Gaeta on the 30th of March under the presidency of Cardinal Antonelli. D'Harcourt and Rayneval represented France; Esterhazy, Austria; Martinez de la Rosa, Spain; and Ludolf, Naples.¹ The Duc d'Harcourt knowing, through the examination that the French agent Mercier had recently made, that nothing less than civil equality and political freedom would satisfy the inhabitants of the Roman States, proposed liberal arrangements and refused to consent to Austria restoring the clerical government without guarantees for the Roman people.² Antonelli, on the other hand, who had at first professed liberal views and disguised his distrust of France, now that his spirits had been raised by the Austrian success, demanded an immediate intervention and restoration that should be "fettered neither by promise from the court, nor by securities for the people."³ The other powers supported him in his views; but d'Harcourt alone opposed, declaring that he could not go on with

¹ Farini, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 350.

² *Ibid.*, p. 351.

³ *Ibid.*

the negotiations without further instructions from his government.¹ It was this situation that called forth the French Expedition.

II. THE QUESTION OF FRENCH INTERVENTION AT ROME

While negotiations were being carried on between the various European powers regarding the position of the Pope, the French Catholics were pressing their government to intervene and thus have the honor of a papal restoration. Not only was there great dissatisfaction expressed at the limited mission which General Cavaignac had undertaken, but the Catholic press continued to emphasize the rights of the Papacy and the duties of France as the "Eldest daughter" of the Church. During the months of December, 1848 and January, 1849 the Abbé Dupanloup was publishing a series of articles in the *Ami de la Religion* entitled *De la Souveraineté Temporelle du Pape*, in which he stressed the necessity of the papal sovereignty for preserving the independence of the Pope, for the liberty of the Church and for the safety of Europe.² Besides, both the *Univers* and the *Ami de la Religion* showed in their editorials an increasing impatience with the government for not taking more prompt action.

We are unable to conceal our astonishment [declared the latter periodical] at the slowness of the government in coming to a decision as to French policy in the affairs of Italy. To be sure, we understand the inherent difficulties of a new situation, which are still more aggravated by the hostile attitude and the ill-will of the assembly . . . but we fear that the executive does not sufficiently comprehend what the dignity of France calls for, what the glorious traditions of her devotion towards

¹ Farini, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 350.

² These articles were published in book form (Paris, 1849) by the committee for the defense of religious liberty and used for propaganda purposes. Lagrange, *Dupanloup*, vol. i, p. 462.

the Holy See and the unanimous wishes of thirty millions of Catholics demand.¹

The *Univers*, criticizing the *Ère Nouvelle* because it betrayed sympathy with the Roman democrats, declared:

The temporal sovereignty of the Pope is not a subject for controversy; it is not dependent on the caprice of the factions; it rests on ancient rights against which universal suffrage can do nothing that will have any weight in the face of justice. To summon a Constituent to discuss these rights, to determine whether the temporal power of the head of the Church shall be maintained or altered, is to suppose that these rights are questionable, that this power is subject to universal suffrage. That would be to call in question the inalienable sovereignty of this power, for a dependent power is no longer sovereign. And that is why the Pope is unable to recognize the Roman Constituent, even if he should be certain that the first act of this assembly would be the peaceful reestablishment of his authority.²

The *Ami de la Religion* heartily approved Antonelli's note to the powers of the 18th of February, requesting their intervention on behalf of the Pope, and gave this as an added reason for French action.³ At various times it returned to the same theme.

Nothing is more painful to us [it complained on the 13th of March] than to behold during the past months the so indecisive and feeble attitude of the government towards Pope Pius IX. In vain Catholic France has incessantly called the attention of the divers powers that have successively ruled it, to the fact that the honor of the country, the national traditions, the higher interest of order and of civilization in Europe demand a prompt and vigorous initiative.

¹ *Ami de la religion*, January 6, 1849.

² *Univers*, January 20, 1849.

³ *Ami de la religion*, March 8, 1849.

Then again in April when the Italian question was being debated in the Assembly:

We are obliged to return with as much insistence as grief to the inert and passive role which the Minister of Foreign Affairs imposes on our country in the question of Italy. It would appear that the conferences concerning Rome opened at Gaeta on the 30th of March between the plenipotentiaries of France, Austria, Spain and Naples. But in this congress of Catholic powers, France . . . has not adopted the language that one ought to expect from the eldest daughter of the Church. . . . Let us confess it without evasion, nothing has been more distressing for us, than to read in the correspondence in our opinion the best authenticated, how the delays and the evasions of France are arresting the action of the Catholic powers in Italy. It is then the Minister of Foreign Affairs who still annuls here the good will and the enlightened intelligence of the President of the Republic and of the majority of the members of the government, and who seems to forget this utterance made on the eve of the tenth of December amid the applause of France: "the temporal authority of the Holy See is necessary to the independence and liberty of Italy."¹

And the *Univèrs* of April tenth declared:

In the opinion of Catholic peoples, the temporal power of the Pope is necessary, from the point of view of expediency, if not of absolute necessity, to the independence of his spiritual power. The result is that the Catholic nations of Europe, even on the supposition that they unanimously admit the principle of the sovereignty of the people, have the right to demand that the Romans be allowed to apply this principle only in so far as it is compatible with the temporal authority of the head of the Church. For our part, we do not see what serious objection the doctors of democracy can find against these considerations.

¹ *Ami de la religion*, April 14, 1849.

Even the *Ère Nouvelle* affirmed that, although in normal times the temporal power of the Papacy might not be absolutely necessary to "the existence of the Pontificate and of the Church", in "the present state of the world" it was the condition of the spiritual independence of the Pontiff.¹

But besides insisting on the maintenance of the temporal power of the Papacy because of its ancient rights, and because it was regarded as necessary to guarantee the spiritual power as well as the liberty of the head of the Church, the French Catholics declared that it was a pledge for the social stability not only of France, but also of Europe. "From the point of view of civilization and of peace", said the *Ami de la Religion*, "the establishment in the center of the Mediterranean peninsula of a seat of social disorganization and of revolutionary propaganda was not a thing to be viewed with indifference."² "In the name of the social order" for which the success of the Roman revolutionaries was at once "an offense and a peril", it called upon the great powers to intervene.

When it is a question of reestablishing the social order on its foundations, what is the use of recognizing that religion is the soundest and the most solid of all, if one does not dare, in a situation where religion is exposed to the greatest of perils, defend it and preserve it openly? [asked the *Univers*]. The direct participation of France in the restoration of Pius IX to Rome would have been, on the part of its government, a guarantee of order and peace, the consequences of which would have had . . . a great effect both at home and abroad.³

The *Univers* saw no hope or safety for society in the "vulgar spirit of order" or the "materialistic spirit" of force which

¹ November 30, 1848.

² February 22, 1849.

³ *Univers*, April 18, 1849.

had conquered on the 24th of June.¹ It beheld in Pius IX the "corner-stone of the social edifice". Whatever the statesmen of Europe did for or against Pius IX, they did for or against the salvation of society.² Thus the Catholic press made use of the "peril of socialism" to urge the French government to intervene on behalf of Pius IX.

Within the government itself it was also urged that France take the decisive step and intervene in favor of the Pope. Falloux, the Minister of Worship and Public Instruction, was the warmest partizan of such a policy. The hope of restoring Pius IX to his temporal power had been, as we have seen, one of the motives that led him to take office.³ Moreover, Odilon Barrot, who was then at the head of the Ministry, relates that M. Falloux, incited by the impatience of his own party as well as by his own convictions, eagerly urged them "to pronounce for the immediate restoration of the power of the Pope at Rome." "He hardly allowed a session of the council to pass without raising the question of intervention."⁴ Falloux also seems to have urged the President to undertake the mission that the Catholics so keenly desired.⁵ And Louis Napoleon, according to Odilon Barrot, was no more insensible than General Cavaignac had been of the honor that would devolve from the restoration of the "loved and revered head of Catholicism". Besides, the President did not lack counsellors who, urging the advantage that would accrue to him in the future if he would play the role of "protector of the Catholic Faith," insinuated that it might well help him to realize his ambitions.⁶

¹ *Univers*, January 1, 1849.

² *Ibid.*, and April 27, 1849.

³ *Cf. supra*, p. 194.

⁴ Odilon Barrot, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 145.

⁵ Falloux, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 368-369.

⁶ Barrot, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, pp. 145 *et seq.*

But in spite of the pressure that was brought to bear on the government by the ardent champions of the rights of Pius IX, no immediate action was taken. The most that they could obtain was the refusal of the French Government to recognize the Roman Republic or to receive its agents.¹

Various motives were dictating this policy of non-intervention. The "Mountain"² was hostile to any movement that they suspected of being in favor of Pius IX, and Louis Napoleon had not altogether got over his desire to conciliate this part of the Assembly.³ Moreover England was exerting pressure to prevent France from adopting an aggressive foreign policy.⁴ Most important of all, however, was the influence of Sardinia. That state, as we have seen, was holding out for a purely Italian settlement of the Roman question. In order to convert the members of the French Cabinet and Assembly who were opposed to such a solution, Gioberti made a special visit to Paris, Falloux asserts at Louis Napoleon's own request.⁵ The latter, as early as the 28th of December, 1848, had so far adopted the ideas of Gioberti that he talked of placing the Pope when restored at the head of an Italian league or confederation arranged for the satisfaction of the claims of Italian

¹ Falloux, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 368-369.

² The extreme left of the assembly. So-called in imitation of their predecessors under the First Republic.

³ Senior, *Conversations with Thiers*, "As his (Louis Napoleon's) policy is purely selfish, he wishes to offend no party unless he can destroy it. He was trying at this time to conciliate the *Montagne*," pp. 54 *et seq.*

⁴ "Ever since the Revolution, my one object, which I have uniformly kept in view, has been to prevent the appearance of a French soldier beyond the French territory. I consider that upon that one point, in the present state of Europe, may turn the question of a general war." Normanby, *My year of the Revolution*, vol. ii, pp. 336-337.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 369 *et seq.*

Nationalism.¹ It was not difficult therefore for the Minister of Sardinia and the President of the French Republic to agree. The outcome seems to have been the consent of Louis Napoleon to allow Sardinia to act alone.²

But Gioberti was unable to convert the entire Cabinet to his way of thinking. Amongst the dissidents there always remained Falloux and the party that he represented. In spite of the efforts of the President to bring him to favor his views,³ Falloux persisted in demanding that France should act independently.

The endeavor to conceal France behind Piedmont [said he to the President] is like trying to hide a giant under a blade of grass. Everybody will see us, Austria first of all. France by openly declaring herself would stop Austria, but France hiding under cover of Piedmont would be defeated without an opportunity of defending herself and without obtaining the benefit either of the revolutionary propaganda or that of the conservative action.⁴

"Piedmont should second France in Italy, and not the French conceal themselves behind the Piedmontese."⁵

Events, however, were playing into the hands of those who favored a policy of intervention on behalf of the Pope.⁶

¹ Normanby to Palmerston, December 28, 1848.

² Falloux, *Antécédents et conséquences de la situation actuelle* (Paris, 1860), pp. 8-9; Gaillard, *op. cit.*, p. 195.

³ So Falloux, *Memoirs*, vol. i, p. 369.

⁴ Falloux, *Memoirs*, vol. i, pp. 369-370; *Antécédents*, pp. 8-9.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁶ While the Catholics were pressing the government to intervene at Rome on behalf of the Pope, the left wing of the Republican party was urging intervention on behalf of the Roman revolutionaries. Ledru-Rollin was the great exponent of this policy in the Assembly. As early as January he accused the government of conspiring with Austria and Naples to effect a Papal restoration, or if not conspiring, at least con-

The hope that the Roman question would be settled without foreign intervention, either through the Roman Republic dying of its own inherent weakness, as the government agents at Rome reported,¹ or through a restoration of the Pope by the arms of Sardinia, was destroyed by the defeat of the latter power by Austria in the battle of Novara on the 22nd of March.²

The Conference of Gaeta was likewise working against the settlement of the Roman question as the French desired, since the majority of the representatives, encouraged by the repulse of Piedmont, were pressing for an immediate armed intervention in the Roman States. Austria desired to restore Pius IX without imposing any conditions upon him; and in this Naples and Spain supported her.³ Only France stood out for some guarantees for the liberties of the

senting thereto. He disapproved of the policy of negotiation as heartily as did Falloux. "Negotiation is not possible," he declared. "It is action that is the need of the moment, action in favor of a people that has justly risen against its sovereign"; and he appealed to the manifesto of Lamartine which pledged France to intervene on behalf of oppressed nationalities. To protest against the legitimacy of the revolution at Rome, he affirmed, is to protest against that of the Revolution of February. "Yes, these revolutions are sisters. Only despots or aristocrats can proclaim it otherwise." On February 20th he declared that "the proclamation of the Republic at Rome should be a grand piece of good news for the friends of liberty." "From what right, in virtue of what principle," asked citizen Bac, "does the French Republic protest against the proclamation of the Roman Republic?" "From whence have you derived sufficient authority to condemn a people that rises up against its sovereign?" "To deny Rome the right to drive out its temporal prince," said Ledru-Rollin, "is to deny that France was right in driving out Louis-Philippe." Rome has the right to count on France, he declared. But what are you going to do? he asked. "Intervene? Intervene to stamp out liberty? You cannot do that without violating the French constitution. . . ."

¹ Barrot, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 147.

² *Ibid.*

³ Farini, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 398.

Roman people. Learning the views of his colleagues, the Duke d'Harcourt declared that his powers were not sufficient to enable him to involve France in an alliance for the unconditional restoration of the Pope.¹ The defeat of Piedmont combined with the temper of the proceedings at Gaeta drove France into action.²

Stirred by the news of Novara and fearing Austrian preponderance in Italy, the French Assembly passed a resolution declaring:

That if, in order the better to guarantee the integrity of Piedmontese territory and the better to safeguard the interests and honor of France, the executive power believes it ought to give to its negotiations the support of a partial and temporary occupation of Italy, it will find in the National Assembly the most complete support.³

The executive was not less stirred by the intelligence of the defeat of Novara than the Assembly. It fell like a thunderbolt upon the President.

I allowed the first disagreeable impression to pass over at the Elysée [said Falloux] and then I went and asked the President if we were to allow Austria, who was already preparing for her march forward, to absorb the Papal States and render Pius IX unpopular by placing him under the protection of a power so repugnant to Italy. "To-day you are right", he answered. "France can no longer remain a passive spectator, and in face of the triumphant Austrian flag, ours will be hailed in Italy with unanimous acclamations." From this time the President wished for and hastened on the departure of our troops, already concentrated on the coast of France by General Cavaignac.⁴

¹ Farini, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 398; Balleydier, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 70; Bianchi, *op. cit.*, document xxxvi.

² Barrot, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 191.

³ *Moniteur*, April 1, 1849: session of March 31.

⁴ *Memoirs of a Royalist*, vol. i, pp. 371-372.

Indeed Thiers has related that after the receipt of the news of Novara he had great difficulty in restraining the warlike propensities of Louis Napoleon who desired to send an army at once across the Alps to restrain Austrian aggrandizement.¹ So the probability is that the President desired to intervene in Italy more for the sake of opposing Austria than for the purpose of aiding the Pope.² The members of the Cabinet were likewise in favor of armed intervention in Italy.³ Thus, although "Catholic convictions were not the only decisive considerations, the Catholic interests and French interests were indissolubly linked."⁴

Accordingly, on the very day that the Cabinet decided to intervene in Italy, the 16th of April, Odilon Barrot, basing his demands on the resolution of the Assembly of the 31st of March, appeared before that body and asked for a credit of 1,200,000 francs for an expedition to the Mediterranean.⁵ Thiers urged him to say nothing about the Roman Republic: neither to irritate the Mountain by asserting an intention to overthrow it, nor to deceive the Assembly by pretending that they were going to Italy to support it. "Before the Assembly be vague", counselled he;⁶ and Odilon Barrot was vague.

The protection of our countrymen, the right to maintain our legitimate influence in Italy, the desire to contribute towards obtaining for the Roman populations a good government founded on liberal institutions: all make it our duty to use the authorization you have given us [declared the head of the

¹ Senior, *Conversations with Thiers*, vol. i, p. 48.

² Barrot, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 193.

³ *Ibid.*, Falloux, *op. cit.*, pp. 371-372.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Senior, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 55; Barrot, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, pp. 193-194.

⁶ Senior, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

Cabinet]. It will be impossible for us to enter more into detail without compromising the end that we have in view.¹

As the matter was urgent the Assembly appointed a committee to consider the matter. The committee consisted almost entirely of liberals or of republicans; but the ruling spirit was Adolf Thiers. After hearing the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Thiers controlled the committee and bluntly informed them of the intention of the government.

“We are not going to Civita-Vecchia to support the Roman Republic” [he declared]. “We are going there to restore the Pope.” This was a shell thrown into the committee. “To restore the Pope!” they cried. “Yes”, I said, “To restore the Pope, and I think I can give you sufficient reasons. Are you prepared to make common cause with those who murdered Rossi and stormed the Quirinal? Are you prepared to support a government which has been imposed on the Roman people by foreign ruffians, which lives by terror, by assassination and by plunder? Are you prepared for their sake to make war with Austria, backed by Russia, already in possession of all Italy, except Piedmont, and supported by the sympathy of the whole Catholic world? Are you prepared for their sake to destroy the independence of the central authority which gives to religion consistency and uniformity, and to let the Pope sink into a Neapolitan subject? If you are not prepared for all this, you are not prepared to support the Roman Republic.

“Another alternative is to remain quiet, and to see the Pope restored by the Austrians. They desire nothing better. The instant that we refuse to restore him their troops will cross the Apennines. They are waiting only for our decision. Are you willing to give up to Austria all that remains of Italy? This of course is not a subject of argument. What possible course then is there compatible with our interests and our

¹ Barrot, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 193; Senior, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 55.

dignity, except to take the initiative, and to restore the Pope ourselves?

"And this too is the conduct most beneficial to the Roman People. We shall relieve them from the foreign banditti that now oppress them in the name of liberty. This indeed the Austrians would do. But we shall do what the Austrians would not do, we shall induce the Pope to grant them liberal institutions. A nation called in by a deposed sovereign, who restores him, has a right to give advice and a right to demand that within certain restrictions it be followed. This right we shall exercise. Instead of the violent reaction of a Pope brought back by Austria, there will be only the *réaction modérée* of a Pope brought back by France."

My arguments succeeded. Grévy, a very advanced liberal, was, I think, the first who declared himself convinced; the rest followed, and Jules Favre, perhaps the most democratic member of the committee, drew up the report advising the Assembly to grant the credit.¹

Thus Jules Favre went before the Assembly, as Odilon Barrot had done, with the intent to conceal from it the real motive that actuated the government.² Fearing lest the Assembly should not vote the credits for the expedition if the real object were baldly stated, Jules Favre not only declared: "the government acts with perfect freedom, fettered by no engagements, consulting only its own interests, its own honor and the influence which it ought to exercise on every European question;" but he also added, what he knew was not the truth: "the government does not propose that France shall concur in overturning the Republican government now subsisting in Rome."³

¹ Senior, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 57.

² Cf. Seignobos, *La Revolution de 1848*, p. 296; Bourgeois et Clermont, *Rome et Napoléon III* (Paris, 1907), p. 17.

³ Senior, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 59-60; Odilon Barrot, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, pp. 195-196, where Odilon Barrot betrays the real intention of the gov-

Many of those who supported the government motion indeed affirmed that they had no intention of going to Italy to support the Roman Republic against Austria. The continued refusal of the government to recognize the Roman Republic showed as much. Moreover Odilon Barrot declared: "We do not wish to establish any solidarity between the existence of the Roman Republic and that of the French Republic."¹ General Lamoricière, a moderate republican, who had sat on the committee, was, perhaps, more explicit:

I believe that in proceeding to Italy [he declared] the French forces will go there, if not to save the Roman Republic, which cannot, I regret, be saved, at least to save liberty. . . . We have in the committee . . . questioned at length the head of the Cabinet and the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the Congress of Gaeta and on the consequences that had resulted from it for France. If we had believed that France was leagued, engaged with Austria, with Spain, with Naples to intervene in Italy, do you think that we should have come to you to propose the report that we have brought to the tribune? Never! But it is because there have resulted positive affirmations from men of probity, whom we ought to believe, whose word we do believe, that France will act independently.²

In view of such declarations it is difficult to see how the
ernment. "The Assembly last night, at twelve o'clock, adopted the principle of the government proposition on the subject of the expedition to Civita-Vecchia by a majority of 112: 395-283. The anarchy prevailing at Rome, the impatience of the Pope, the real wishes of the population, were all successively given as reasons for the appearance of a French force on the shores of the Roman territory; whilst great care was taken, as far as possible to veil the direct object of the expedition, the destruction of the republican form of government established at Rome." Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, April 17, 1849. *F. O.* 27, vol. 843.

¹ *Journal des débats*, April 16, 1849.

² *Ilid.*

Assembly could have been greatly deceived as to the real motive of the government. Indeed the extreme republicans in the Assembly suspected the intentions of the executive. "When one comes," said Emmanuel Arago, "to ask of us a French intervention in Italy, it is necessary that at the national tribune . . . the head of the Cabinet formally declare what the principles are that will guide this intervention." Before voting for the proposition he wanted a specific declaration that the government was not going to Italy "to make the flag of France float beside that of Austria in order to accomplish the work of Austria."¹

Ledru-Rollin was also suspicious of the intentions of the government.

Citizens, in the discourse which you have just heard, [said he referring to the speech of Odilon Barrot] a word has struck me. That word is the thought of the government: this fatal word, I have foreseen it for three months; to-day it has just been uttered: it is the restoration of the Pope. . . . I ask you to reply categorically to this: Is it a restoration of the Pope that you wish? Have the courage to say it; come out from the shade; tear away the veil. If it is a restoration of the Pope, it is necessary that the country know as much; for I am convinced that far from associating itself with you, the country as a whole will rise up at such an idea.²

What will the government do, if the Roman Republic refuses to receive the troops of the French Republic? [asked citizen Schoelcher, a member of the committee, who also belonged to the extreme left]. Will it reestablish the Pope on his temporal throne, in spite of the wish of the Roman people? Well, the government has replied "yes!"

No! that is inaccurate" [interrupted Jules Favre]. "You are completely mistaken."

"On this point" [said Germain Sarrut, another member of

¹ *Journal des débats*, session of April 16, 1849.

² *Ibid.*

the Committee] "the majority and the minority of the committee have never been agreed. The minority pretends that the ministry has replied, "Yes"; the majority affirms that the Ministry has evaded the point. . . .

"The Ministry has replied, 'No!' [declared Jules Favre], "The Ministry is present" [continued Schoelcher]; "let it extricate us from the difficulty. The minority of the committee has heard the things that I have just said. Now, the question is very simple; I have the honor to place the question before the ministry. . . . If the Roman Republic does not wish to receive the Pope, what will the French troops do? That is what I ask. Well, I believe that the French troops, wishing to restore the Pope to Rome, will meet with resistance, a great resistance at Rome."¹

The question and declaration of Citizen Schoelcher were met with protests and with ironical laughter on the part of the right wing of the Assembly and with silence on the part of the Ministry. The question was then put to vote and carried by 395 votes against 283.

It seems evident, therefore, that the French government expected their expedition to be welcomed not only at Civita-Vecchia, but also at Rome.² Emissaries from the latter place were continually flocking to Paris asserting that the Romans were waiting to receive the French with open arms "as paladins of the faith, and the advance guard of the Pope."³ Moreover, the commissioners, whom the French Government sent to Rome, obtained their information from the clergy, who led them to believe that French intervention

¹ *Journal des débats*, April 16, 1849.

² "It seemed easy to us," said Louis Napoleon, "to make the Romans, who were hard pressed on all sides, understand that their hope of safety lay in us alone; that if our presence meant the return of Pius IX, that sovereign, faithful to himself, would bring with him reconciliation and liberty." *Oeuvres* (Paris, 1854), vol. iii, p. 74.

³ Farini, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 13.

would meet with no opposition.¹ Colonel Le Blanc reported that the French would be received at Civita-Vecchia "without striking a blow."² The government believed that the Republic at Rome was based upon a small minority who kept the majority in subjection. To such a degree was this opinion broadcast that Odilon Barrot asserts—what is not quite accurate—that all parties in the Assembly believed that "at the mere report of our armed intervention the Roman populace would renounce their republic and throw themselves into our arms."³

It also seems evident that the French government expected the Court of Gaeta, if not to sanction all the administrative reforms that Pius IX had made before his flight from Rome, at least to make some very generous concessions which would insure him a welcome in the Eternal City as its temporal ruler.

The idea of the government, in deciding upon this measure [wrote Drouyn de Lhuys to d'Harcourt and Rayneval] has not been either to impose upon the Roman people a system of administration which their free will would have rejected, or to compel the Pope, when he shall be recalled to the exercise of his temporal power, to adopt such or such system of government. We have thought, we think more than ever, that by the force of circumstances, and in consequence of the natural disposition of men's minds, the system of administration which was founded at Rome by the Revolution of November is destined shortly to fall; that the Roman people, provided it is reassured against the danger of a reaction, will readily replace itself under the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff; and that Pius IX, on returning to his dominions, will carry back thither the generous, enlightened and liberal policy with which he has

¹ Farini, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 14.

² Gaillard, *op. cit.*, p. 433.

³ Barrot, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 199.

lately shown himself to be animated. To facilitate a reconciliation which should be carried out in such a spirit, to furnish the Pope and all those who, at Gaeta as well as at Rome, are disposed to contribute thereto with the support which they may require in order to surmount the obstacles raised in one sense or the other by exaggerated influences or by evil passions, such is the object which we have assigned to our expedition. Have the goodness, when announcing in concert with M. de Rayneval to Cardinal Antonelli the departure of the division commanded by General Oudinot, clearly to explain to him the object and the bearing of the resolution which we have now adopted. He will understand that in order to place himself in a position to profit by it, the Pope must hasten to publish a manifesto, which, by guaranteeing to the people liberal institutions in conformity with their wishes as well as with the necessities of the times, shall cause the overthrow of all resistance. This manifesto, appearing at the very moment when our troops show themselves on the coasts of the States of the Church, would be a signal for a reconciliation from which only a very small number of malcontents would be excluded. You cannot insist too strongly upon the utility of, or the necessity even which exists for, such a document.¹

Three motives seem to have actuated the French government in undertaking the expedition to Rome: "the maintenance of French influence in Italy, the restoration of the Pope, and the introduction or preservation in Rome of liberal institutions."² Of these three the desire to exert French influence in Italy to prevent Austrian aggrandizement at the expense of Italian liberties was doubtless the compelling motive.³ For it was not until the defeat of

¹ *British parliamentary papers*, vol. lviii. Drouyn de Lhuys to d'Harcourt and de Rayneval, Paris, April 18, 1849.

² Senior, *Correspondence and conversations of A. de Tocqueville with N. W. Senior*, vol. i, p. 231.

³ Senior, *Conversations with Thiers*, vol. i, pp. 60-62. "... after all it was not for the sake of the Roman people, it was not for the

Piedmont at Novara, when the power of Austria seemed to predominate, that France was stirred to action. The sympathy that was felt for Pius IX, the feeling that the temporal power was essential to safeguard the freedom of the Pope, the impatience of the clerical party in France, counted for much.¹ Certainly there was little sympathy felt for the leaders of the Roman Republic, except amongst the radicals. The government had obtained evidence of relations between the radicals of both countries, which did not tend to kindle sympathy with Mazzini and his followers who were now in control at Rome, more especially as the extremists in France were falling into greater and greater disrepute.² Even Louis Napoleon, who had at first been inclined to appease the radicals, was beginning to recover from his fear of offending them. He was doubtless aware that intervention on behalf of the Pope would gain him much credit with the Catholic party, which was a factor of no inconsiderable importance. Nevertheless, it is doubtful if either the desire to restore Pius IX or to obtain liberal institutions for the Roman people would have impelled France to intervene, if it had not been for forestalling Austria.

III. THE OVERTHROW OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC

The command of the expedition to the Roman States was entrusted to General Oudinot, Duke de Reggio, a man not without military distinction, and the son of a distinguished general of the Empire. The instructions that were given him by the Minister of Foreign Affairs were of such

sake of the Pope, it was not for the sake of Catholicism, that we went to Rome. It was for the sake of France. It was to plant the French flag on the Castle of St. Angelo; it was to maintain our right to have one half of Italy if Austria seized the other."

¹ Barrot, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, pp. 200-201.

² *Ibid.*, p. 192.

a nature that they would "mislead rather than guide him." While recommending him to march on Rome only if he appeared to be summoned by the wish of the Roman populace, they betrayed a great impatience to have done with the Roman Republic.¹ Reminding him of the fact that Rome was threatened with reaction from within and invasion from without, and of the consequent duty that France felt of upholding her own influence in Italy and of reestablishing a regular order of things in the Roman States, which should be based on the rights and the interests of the inhabitants, he empowered the general to receive any propositions from the existing authorities at Rome which would pave the way for such a result, warning him at the same time to guard against any act that might be interpreted as a recognition of the Roman Republic. Resistance at Civita-Vecchia he declared unlikely; but should it be offered, the commander was not to be balked by resistance offered in the name of a government that not one power in Europe had recognized. The first duty of the general on landing was to enter into communication with d'Harcourt and Rayneval, the French envoys at Gaeta. He was to proceed in concert with them, receive their advice and then take the measures that he deemed advisable. Officers were to be sent to Rome to explain to the existing government the nature of their mission; to inform them that the general was not there to uphold the present order of things; and to exhort them to concur in such arrangements as would save the country from further perils. All the details of the expedition were left to the "good sense" of the general, which was deemed sufficient to meet any contingency.² The instructions of the Minister of War were a little more explicit. They decreed that General Oudinot should remain at Civita-Vecchia until

¹ Barrot, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 200.

² Farini, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, pp. 411 *et seq.*

he should receive further orders from the government. But this clause of the instructions of the Minister of War was overruled by the instructions of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.¹

On the 24th of April an advance squadron of the French force, which was 12,000 strong, arrived in the harbor at Civita-Vecchia. Immediately a deputation landed with a letter from General Oudinot to the governor, which, stating the purpose of the expedition couched in vague terms, requested permission to disembark. The governor of the port asked fourteen hours in which to reply. But as M. Espivent, the aide-de-camp to General Oudinot, pressed for an immediate answer, the governor threatened to resist. This threat was made the stronger when he had read the proclamation of General Oudinot, which expressed the intention of France to restore the Papal government. At that M. Espivent "in the manner of a crafty diplomatist more than of a straightforward soldier" proceeded to allay their resentment. He affirmed in writing:

The government of the French Republic, animated by liberal views, declares itself bound to respect the wish of the majority of the population of the Roman States, and . . . it is only come in the character of a friend with no aim beyond that of maintaining its legitimate influence here. It is determined to impose no form of government on the populations of these states, which they do not themselves desire.²

Won over by these promises, the governor decided not to oppose the French disembarkation. He informed General Oudinot, however, that he would have to be governed by orders from Rome.³

¹ Barrot, *op. cit.*

² Farini, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, pp. 415 *et seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, p. 417.

Meanwhile news of the arrival of the French had reached Rome. The Assembly, stirred by the impending danger, held a special sitting at midnight on the 24th of April, decided to oppose the French expedition, and sent the minister Rusconi and the deputy Pescantini to Civita-Vecchia with a remonstrance addressed to General Oudinot. "The Roman Assembly . . .", it read, "protests, in the name of God and of the people, against the said unexpected invasion, declares its fixed resolution to resist, and throws upon France the responsibility for all the consequences."¹

When the orders to resist had arrived from Rome, however, the populace of Civita-Vecchia, "cajoled by Espivent," were crying out for peace;² and when they discovered that the governor had convened the military officers to carry out his orders from Rome, they became so tumultuous that it was decided not to oppose the French, provided General Oudinot would ratify the promises of his aide-de-camp. This he did. The French troops were therefore to hold the gates and the cantonments conjointly with the Italians, and the two tricolor flags were to float above the town. The French troops accordingly disembarked without opposition. "We are masters of Civita-Vecchia without striking a blow", General Oudinot informed his government. "The authorities have offered no resistance. The inhabitants and the National Guard have received us with cheers."³

One of the first acts of General Oudinot after his disembarkation had been, in accordance with his instructions, to despatch Colonel Le Blanc to Rome to collaborate with

¹ Farini, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 418.

² Mazzini to Marioni, Rome, April 28, 1849. *F. O.* 43, vol. 46. "The governor and the commandant of the fort had protested; but the population deceived by these proclamations, did not think it its duty to resist. A council of war unfortunately permitted the disembarkation."

³ Bourgeois et Clermont, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

the French Chargé d'Affairs there in announcing to the Roman Triumvirate the purpose of the expedition. Accordingly, on his arrival in Rome late in the evening of the 26th of April, Forbin-Janson accompanied by Colonel Le Blanc called on the Triumvirs to announce the intentions of the French government,¹ and to obtain a peaceful reception for the French forces. To this end the envoys urged the "liberal and national character of their intervention"; "the immense service that they were rendering the Roman state in forestalling the Neapolitan invasion, in preventing the influence of Austria from dominating there as in the past"; "the guarantees that they would certainly demand in favor of the constitutional regime"; even "the desire of France to allow the internal question to be resolved by the spontaneous expression of the wish of the population."² But they made it plain that it was the intention of France to put the Pope back on the throne. To Mazzini, therefore, who was the virtual ruler of Rome, all hopes of conciliation were disappointed. Nor was the Assembly less ready to resist than the Triumvirate. The proclamations of General Oudinot, which were read in the Assembly, produced a "universal cry of indignation and of war"; and it therefore enjoined the Triumvirate to take what measures it deemed necessary to "save the Republic at any cost, and to repel force by force."³

Nevertheless Forbin-Janson, in the very letter in which he announced the determination of Rome to resist the French expedition, assured General Oudinot that any resistance that Mazzini and his party could offer would be

¹ Gaillard, *op. cit.*, p. 434.

² *Ibid.*, p. 435.

³ Mazzini to Marioni and Borgatti, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Marioni, April 29, 1849. *F. O.* 43, vol. 46; Gaillard, *op. cit.*, p. 437; Farini, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 4; Bourgeois et Clermont, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

supported only by "three or four hundred foreigners and the desperadoes of the *cercle populaire*." The population, he informed him, would not second Mazzini in his "desperate efforts." He made light of attempts that were in progress to put Rome in a state of defense, describing them as "*Vellétés de résistance*," which would disappear as General Oudinot advanced.¹ Captain Fabar, whom General Oudinot had also sent to Rome, reported in the same strain. "I have seen the leaders of the people", he affirmed, "and notwithstanding their assertions, I am convinced that the French army would be received with gratitude in the Roman States, provided that it immediately makes a vigorous demonstration against that nest of Italian mob rule."² And d'Harcourt and Rayneval wrote from Gaeta: "Forward, General! You will not find, whatever people may say, any decided resistance at Rome; the majority of the citizens will come to meet you as soon as you show yourself."³

Accordingly on the 28th of April General Oudinot set out from Civita-Vecchia for Rome "without a breaching gun and with scarcely a biscuit, but full of vain anticipation of a glorious reception and a gratuitous banquet."⁴ Convinced by the reports of his agents that the moderate party only awaited his approach to shake off the yoke of a faction of demagogues,⁵ and impelled by his personal desire to restore the Pope,⁶ he marched to the gates of Rome. So careless had he been of all reconnaissance that, on the strength of an antiquated map of the city, he directed one part of his forces against a gate in the walls which had been closed for

¹ Gaillard, *op. cit.*, pp. 436-437.

² Farini, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 16.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *F. O.* 43, vol. 46. Lord Napier to Lord Palmerston, May 12, 1849.

⁵ Gaillard, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 162.

over twenty years.¹ So completely were the French under the illusion that they would be welcomed at Rome that some, it was said, mistook the first discharge of artillery for a customary signal of mid-day.² Lacking siege material and reserves, General Oudinot was unable to rally his forces and was obliged to retire leaving some 260 prisoners and 300 dead and wounded.³

The defeat of General Oudinot had the effect of strengthening the Triumvirate at Rome, fostering the hope that the Republic would ultimately triumph, and confirming the Romans in their determination to resist. It was hoped that England would support them; and to this end Marioni, a Republican envoy in London, besought Lord Palmerston to recognize and protect the Republic.⁴

We have gained [he wrote] a claim to the sympathies, the respect, I had almost said to the aid, of civilized nations, and consequently of England. The accusations of anarchy and faction disappear before the daylight of facts, which now speak too loud and too plain to leave to diplomacy even the shadow of a pretense. Will your excellency permit me to flatter myself that the government of Her Majesty the Queen will, as early as practicable, recognize our Republic, at least as a government *de facto*.⁵

¹ Barrot, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 206.

² Farini, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 19.

³ *F. O.* 43, vol. 46. Lord Napier to Lord Palmerston: "The defeat of the French was certainly caused by their confidence and credulity. The French government seems to have been fed with false assurances that their arrival was warmly desired, that the Republican party was a cowardly and hated minority, that on the first exhibition of the Catholic standards, the friends of moderate freedom, the friends of Pius would overturn the Triumvirate and open their gates with joy to their deliverers."

⁴ Farini, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 144.

⁵ *F. O.* 43, vol. 46. Marioni to Palmerston, May 8, 1849.

But Palmerston was by no means inclined to such a step. He was listening to Signor Calvi, a member for Bologna in the Roman Assembly, who informed him that in spite of "the settled determination of the people of the Roman States no longer to remain under the oppression of a priestly government", "the great majority of the people of those states" were "averse to the Republican form of government", and wished only for "those securities of person and property which a constitutional form of government was calculated to afford."¹ Indeed Palmerston accepted the French view that the Pope should be restored with the constitution that he had already granted;² and advised not only Calvi, but Rusconi, who had gone to London to support Marioni, to that effect.³ All the assistance therefore that he was prepared to give the Roman Republic was good advice.

Mazzini was inclined to hope also that the radicals in Paris would succeed in overturning their government, and thus convert the Roman Expedition into a bulwark for the Roman Republic, as Ledru-Rollin and his followers wished.⁴ An agent, Accursi, was despatched to France for the purpose of treating with the radicals who were striving to rise to power there.⁵ Church plate which was seized in the States of the Church was forwarded to Paris to aid Ledru-Rollin in accomplishing his designs.⁶ Moreover an attempt was made to subvert the French army by appealing to the republican sentiments of the soldiers. For this purpose they

¹ *F. O.* 27, vol. 844. Palmerston to Normanby, May 16, 1849.

² *Ibid.*

³ Farini, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 145.

⁴ *F. O.* 43, vol. 46. Napier to Normanby.

⁵ Farini, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 68.

⁶ *F. O.* 27, vol. 846. Mr. Woodmason to Lord Palmerston, Rome, July 4, 1849.

flattered and liberated the French prisoners. They were cordially entertained and carried to visit the ancient monuments and holy shrines. I saw [said Lord Napier] at St. Peter's these tipsy captives sobered by the solemnity of the place. The flags of the French and Roman Republics were held on the high altar behind the canopy of bronze. . . . All at once they fell to kissing and swore they would never fight each other more. Nor will they, for when the prisoners reached the camp General Oudinot sent them all down to Civita-Vecchia and shut them up.¹

A "monster gift of cigars", which were wrapped in republican handbills and sent to the French headquarters, was also doubtless intended to subvert the French army.²

But if the defeat of General Oudinot called forth rejoicing and awakened hopes at Rome, it caused consternation at Paris.

Before the official despatch of General Oudinot giving details of his action before Rome had reached the French government, various reports of his defeat had been received. Vague rumors were current, which often magnified the event and gave the opposition an excuse for attacking the executive. Accordingly in the session of the Assembly of the 7th of May interpellations were addressed to the government asking for explanations of its conduct of the Roman Expedition. Jules Favre began, in a speech of marked virulence, an attack on the executive, which, in view of the fact that he was reporter for the parliamentary commission that decided to restore the Pope, it is difficult to regard as anything but an attempt to discredit and overthrow the existing administration.³ You have made France "the *gen-*

¹ *F. O.* 43, vol. 46. Lord Napier to Lord Normanby.

² King, Bolton, *Life of Mazzini*, 2nd ed (London, 1912), p. 134.

³ Barrot, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 210; *F. O.* 27, vol. 844, Normanby to Palmerston, May 8, 1849.

darme of absolutism" was the accusation that he hurled against them.¹ The executive pleaded in extenuation that all the information available was contained in letters addressed to private individuals, which, without official reports, was insufficient to condemn the government; that the opposition met at Rome was due to the presence of foreigners there, rather than to the hostility of the Roman people themselves; that even the Assembly had not desired to recognize the Roman Republic. Nevertheless it was evident that the government was seriously embarrassed.² A committee was appointed by the Assembly, which, after hearing the instructions given to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, proposed the following resolution: "The National Assembly invites the government to take without delay the necessary measures that the Italian Expedition may no longer be diverted from the purpose that was assigned to it."³ The resolution was voted by the Assembly by 328 votes against 241. But inasmuch as it did not define definitely the object of the Expedition, which had been left vague at the outset, the government was still able to carry out its own conception of the Roman Expedition without taking too seriously the vote of the Assembly.

The news of the defeat of General Oudinot had quite a different effect upon Louis Napoleon. He told Lord Normanby that the probability was that "some over-zealous agents" had represented the chances of resistance at Rome as quite absurd and had urged him to lose no time in marching on the Eternal City. When asked if he were satisfied with the conduct of the troops, he replied, "Completely so."⁴ But he could not endure that the military honor of

¹ *Journal des débats*, session of May 7, 1849.

² Normanby to Palmerston, May 8.

³ *Journal des débats*, session of May 7. Farini, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 80.

⁴ *F. O.* 27, vol. 844, Normanby to Palmerston, May 7, 1849.

France should be stained; and he wrote a letter to General Oudinot that caused no little stir and added to the embarrassment of the government :

Our soldiers have been received as enemies [he complained] : our military honor is involved ; I shall not suffer it to be stained. Reinforcements shall not be lacking you. Say to your soldiers that I appreciate their bravery, that I share their sufferings, and that they can always count on my support and on my recognition.¹

General Oudinot's repulse therefore gave Louis Napoleon an opportunity to curry favor with the army.

To the Assembly, this letter seemed like a deliberate attempt on the part of the executive to ignore its resolution. Grévy inquired if it were private correspondence or an official act, and asked if the government intended to execute the decision of the Assembly taken on the 7th of May.

"Yes", interrupted Ledru-Rollin, "the letter is official, for it engages your policy in spite of you." "It is certain . . . that this letter is a public document which will reach our soldiers, which will influence their minds, and which will engage the government whatever you may do." "The check of the French arms on this occasion", he declared, "is not discreditable for them."²

Odilon Barrot answering for the government replied without any hesitation that the letter of the President was not an official act. He informed the Assembly that the executive, in order to carry out the will of the Assembly as expressed in the resolution of the 7th of May, had despatched an envoy to Rome, M. Ferdinand de Lesseps, a young diplomatist who, he affirmed, possessed their entire confidence, who had proved himself capable of hand-

¹ *Journal des débats*, session of May 9, 1849.

² *Ibid.*

ling difficult situations, and who had always served the cause of liberty and of humanity. Lesseps, he declared, had received formal instructions to use all the influence he could to make the French intervention result in serious and real guarantees of liberty for the Roman States.¹

Nevertheless, the attack upon the President and his ministers by the "Left" increased in violence. Ledru-Rollin declared that the President's letter nullified the decision of the Assembly.

As to the conduct of the Ministry [he continued] it confines itself to these explanations: "We have despatched an agent and we wish a judicious liberty; we wish to reestablish liberal institutions." Worthless equivocation! What it is necessary to say is, that, if the Republic is the wish of the nation, you will respect it.²

At the close of the Session of the 11th of May a proposition signed by fifty-nine members was submitted to the Assembly to accuse the President and his ministers with having violated Article V of the Constitution, which declared that the French Republic respected foreign nationalities and would never employ its force against the liberty of any people. The proposition, however, was defeated by 388 votes against 138.

Inded it seems probable that the "Left" of the Assembly was attempting to make use of General Oudinot's defeat to overturn the government and to establish the radicals in power. The country was on the eve of new elections;³ and the socialists were leaving no stone unturned to increase their representation in the new assembly, if not to control it. Lord Normanby writing Lord Palmerston reported

¹ *Journal des débats*, session of May 9.

² *Ibid.*

³ The elections were set for May 13, 1849.

that a "general uneasiness" existed "as to the imminence of renewed disturbances and conflicts in the streets of Paris".¹ The more timid had taken precautions to obtain passports for their families so that they might leave the country in case of a new insurrection.² All indications pointed to the likelihood of the radicals, egged on by Mazzini and his followers at Rome, taking advantage of the election crisis to seize the reins of power that were fast falling into the hands of Louis Napoleon and his supporters.

But if the radicals were expecting much from the elections, so also were the conservatives.

Alarmed at the progress socialism was making amongst the masses, the *Parti Catholique* and the Club of the *Rue de Poitiers* had combined their forces in order to stem the tide that menaced them.³ The outcome of the elections, therefore, could not but have a profound effect on the Roman Expedition, according as radicals or conservatives were returned to power.⁴

As there was little doubt that the majority about to be returned would not share the personal sympathies that dictated the last will of the expiring Assembly, the vote of May 7, the executive proposed to pay little attention to it.⁵ On this account the chief need of the government was to gain time, "to avoid as much as possible irritating debates, and by a mixture of firmness and of condescension, to remove every pretext for extreme and desperate measures on the part of the Assembly."⁶ To this end Ferdinand de

¹ Normanby to Palmerston, May 10, 1849.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Cf. supra*, chap. iii.

⁴ Bourgeois et Clermont, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

⁵ Normanby to Palmerston, May 8, 1849. This is the interpretation of Lord Normanby.

⁶ Barrot, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 216.

Lesseps was sent to Rome. His negotiations had little more significance than to allow the executive opportunity to tide over an internal political crisis and to send reinforcements to General Oudinot.¹

The instructions that Lesseps received, in order to veil the real intention of the government and at the same time give the appearance of fulfilling the will of an Assembly whose lease of life had almost expired, were necessarily vague. Drouyn de Lhuys recommended him to take two copies of the *Moniteur* of the 8th of May, one for General Oudinot and one for himself, containing the debate and resolution of the Assembly, as he judged that it was from that source that he should derive his instructions.² But the Minister of Foreign Affairs also gave him written instructions which interpreted the resolution of the Assembly.

The object which we propose to ourselves [ran these instructions] is that of saving the States of the Church from the anarchy by which they are afflicted, and of preventing a blind reaction from bringing present injury and future peril on the restoration of a regular government. Everything which prevents other powers, animated by less moderate sentiments, from prosecuting an intended intervention, will leave larger scope for our direct and peculiar influence, and tend, as a natural result, to the further carrying out of the object I have mentioned. You will, then, whilst using all diligence to attain this termination as quickly as possible, endeavor to steer clear of two difficulties which will lie in your path. It is necessary, in the first place, that you should abstain from everything which may justify the persons, who now hold the reins of government in the Roman States, in believing, or causing to be believed, that we consider theirs a regular government,

¹ D'Harcourt, *Les Quatres ministères de M. Drouyn de Lhuys* (Paris, 1882), pp. 27-29; Barrot, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, pp. 216-217.

² De Lesseps, *Ma Mission à Rome* (Paris, 1849), pp. 16-17.

which would give them a moral power that they do not at present possess. Secondly, in the arrangements which you may have to make with them you will avoid every stipulation, every expression, calculated to arouse the susceptibilities of the Holy See and of those now assembled at Gaeta, who are but too much inclined to think that we are disposed to hold very cheap the authority and the interests of the Roman Court. In the country to which you are going, and with the persons with whom you will have to deal, the manner is not less important than the matter. These are the only instructions I can give you at present. To render them more precise and particular, it would be necessary to have information which we do not yet possess as to what has taken place in the Roman States within the last few days. Your correct and enlightened judgment will guide you according to circumstances. You will also communicate with Messrs. d'Harcourt and Rayneval respecting everything of importance, or which does not require an immediate decision. It is unnecessary for me to recommend you to be on terms of intimacy and confidence with General Oudinot, this being absolutely essential to the success of the enterprise which both of you must have at heart.¹

To restore the Roman Expedition to a purpose which had at the outset been but vaguely defined; to cooperate with General Oudinot, who had been instructed by Louis Napoleon to retrieve the disgrace the retreat from Rome had involved; to do nothing that would offend the Papal court, which was determined not to come to terms with the Republicans at Rome; to perform the will of the Assembly and at the same time to restore the Pope to a city ruled by a government determined not to submit to his rule; to satisfy the conflicting desires of all parties, and to offend none—such was the impossible task that Lesseps undertook.

Arriving at the camp of General Oudinot on the 15th of May he informed the commander-in-chief of the mission

¹ Farini, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, pp. 81 *et seq.*; Lesseps, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-20.

that had been intrusted to him, and then proceeded immediately to Rome.¹ There, he reported to General Oudinot, what was contrary to the accepted view of conditions, that he beheld an entire city in arms, and that he found a population determined to resist. Putting aside all exaggerated estimates, he declared, one can count on at least twenty-five thousand serious combatants. If the French were to enter Rome by main force, he reported, they would have opposed to them, not only foreign adventurers, but the bourgeoisie, the shopkeepers, the youth—in short all classes who at Paris were defending order and society.² The result was that a cessation of hostilities was arranged between Rome and General Oudinot, which permitted the Roman Republic to send a force against a Neapolitan army which had entered the States of the Church, and gave the French commander opportunity to obtain reinforcements.³

Lesseps, who was himself a liberal, at once sought to arrange a convention with the Roman Triumvirate. Accordingly he drew up a series of three propositions, which, with the consent of General Oudinot, he submitted to the Triumvirate as the basis of negotiation. These propositions affirmed: the Roman States request the fraternal protection of the French Republic; the Roman populations have the right to pronounce freely on the form of their government; and Rome will receive as friends the French Army which shall perform the service of the city conjointly with the Romans.⁴ The Triumvirate replied on the 19th of May that they were unable to accept the propositions of Lesseps, inasmuch as they did not find in them sufficient guarantees for the liberties and for the independence of the Roman

¹ Lesseps, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 21-24.

³ Bourgeois et Clermont, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

⁴ Lesseps, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-29; Farini, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 104.

States. "The Assembly has observed", ran the reply, "the way in which the words 'Roman Republic' have been studiously avoided in your first article . . . it has thought that it has discerned there an unfavorable intention . . . Rome has no need of protection."¹ At the same time they intimated that they were preparing a set of counter propositions.²

But Mazzini and his fellow Triumvirs failed to keep their promise to send proposals. They sought to gain time, hoping that the elections in France would place the radicals in power there. Indeed the first reports from Paris, which stated that the majority consisted of "ardent Republicans", were published in a Roman paper, and seemed to lend support to such a hope.³ Moreover the Roman government sought to treat with General Oudinot over the head of Lesseps. Through the American Ambassador, Mr. Cass, they sent a series of propositions to the General. But the latter rejected them as they were entirely at variance with his own ideas, and amounted to a recognition of the Roman Republic.⁴

This incident [said Lesseps] made me suspect that the Roman executive power, seeing me determined to follow invariably the line that I had adopted from the first, sought to act without me on the mind of the commander-in-chief. On the other hand, I knew that a party, having little confidence in the intentions of France and disposed to reject every attempt at conciliation, sought to present me in the eyes of the Roman populace as a source of agitation. It was openly said in the clubs that I was a new Rossi.⁵

¹ d'Harcourt, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

² Lesseps, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

³ Bourgeois et Clermont, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

⁴ Lesseps, *op. cit.*, p. 33; Farini, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

⁵ Lesseps, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-34.

At the same time the leaders of the army, incited by d'Harcourt, who complained of the "slowness of the expedition" and of "the negotiations with the Republican leaders", were impatient to attack and enter Rome, if necessary, by force.¹

On the 21st of May, therefore, not having received the counter-proposals that Mazzini had promised, Lesseps and General Oudinot sent a protest to the Triumvirate, announcing the breaking-off of the negotiations.² But Mazzini, anxious to avoid a complete rupture, paid Lesseps and General Oudinot a visit, the outcome of which was that the latter was persuaded to be patient a while longer and the former to continue the negotiations. Lesseps knew that Mazzini had deceived him; but he hoped that the Roman populace, taking things in their own hands, would desert their leader and come to reasonable terms with the French.

On the 24th of May, fearing for his life, Lesseps left Rome and went to take up his abode at the army headquarters. As General Oudinot had repented of his consent to continue the negotiations, and as the army officers were clamoring for an immediate break with the Romans, a council of war was held. The discussion centered around the latest despatch from Paris to the Commander-in-chief, which instructed him to endeavor to enter Rome in accord with the inhabitants, or if compelled to attack, to do so only if certain of success.³ The majority, arguing that a mere attack, or a breach in the walls at most, would suffice to overthrow all opposition, called for an immediate offensive. But Lesseps maintained that they were wrong; that hostilities once resumed would result in much bloodshed and

¹ Bourgeois et Clermont, *op. cit.*, p. 120.

² Farini, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 112.

³ Bourgeois et Clermont, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

damage to buildings; that resistance would be prolonged; and that they would be compelled to undertake a real siege. General Mollière supported Lesseps so convincingly that it was decided to maintain the *status quo*.¹

In spite of this decision, however, dissatisfaction was rife over the method of negotiation. While the two parties in the Roman Assembly, those who favored an agreement with the French and those who opposed any such convention, argued and debated, the officers of the French army announced the approach of the season of fever, and gave that fact as a further reason for ending the negotiation. Furthermore Rayneval paid a visit to headquarters, and, in an interview which he had with Lesseps, complained that the latter was paralysing the action of the army and preventing them from once more covering the French name with glory.²

On the 29th of May the division of parties in the Roman Assembly, which led Lesseps to believe that an "honorable conciliation" would be accepted, and the desire to appease the army, actuated him in sending a new ultimatum to the Triumvirate.³ This ultimatum consisted of four articles, which declared that the Romans requested the protection of the French Republic; that France did not contest the right of the Romans to pronounce on their form of government; that the French army should take quarters which should be deemed suitable as much for the defense of the city as for the health of the troops; and that the French Republic guaranteed the territories occupied by its troops from foreign invasion.⁴

¹ Lesseps, *op. cit.*, pp. 40-41; Bourgeois et Clermont, *op. cit.*, pp. 135-136.

² Bourgeois et Clermont, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

³ Lesseps, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-44; Bourgeois et Clermont, *op. cit.*, p. 140; Gaillard, *op. cit.*, pp. 217-218; Farini, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, pp. 167-168.

⁴ Farini, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, pp. 167-168; Lesseps, *op. cit.*, pp. 45-46.

The Romans, however, were not satisfied with these articles; but after making several alterations, the chief of which was that the French troops should occupy positions outside the city, the Roman Assembly accepted them. But General Oudinot, who had meanwhile been making preparations to attack Rome, indignantly refused to sign this new convention, alleging that it was dishonoring to the French army.¹

The deadlock between the Commander-in-chief and the diplomat thus created on the 31st of May was relieved on the 1st of June by the orders that were received from Paris recalling Lesseps and instructing General Oudinot to attack Rome. "The provisional arrangement of the 31st of May", said Odilon Barrot, "compromised the honor of France and the dignity of our arms."²

The fault of Lesseps had been that he had attempted to execute the will of the Constituent Assembly³ which the executive did not intend that he should do.⁴ His arrangements with the Triumvirate, which would have compelled the French government to recognize and protect the Roman Republic,⁵ not only offended the military pride of France,

¹ Lesseps, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

² *Ibid.*, p. 78.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

⁴ d'Harcourt, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-30. "He who receives instructions during times of crisis ought to have acquired the habit of reading between the lines. In the case in question, a Minister of Foreign Affairs was plainly unable to say or be heard saying that the vote of the representatives could not be executed. The prudence of the agent was relied on to reconcile the national interest with the respect due an expiring Assembly. The instructions given possessed a very vague character; at bottom they meant: Examine the situation at Rome resulting from the last events; give us an account of them; confine yourself to partial arrangements; do not give uneasiness to the Holy See, or encouragement to the Triumvirs, and maintain a reserve which shall enable us to await the time, now very near, when the will of the majority in France shall be better known to us."

⁵ Gai'llard, *op. cit.*, p. 461.

but made no mention of the return of the Pope, without which no negotiation or convention could be acceptable to the executive.¹ In this respect even the first convention that Lesseps had proposed to the Roman Assembly, on the 19th of May, was unacceptable.² The executive, therefore, feeling that their agent had far exceeded his instructions, awaited only a favorable opportunity to recall him.³ While he had been negotiating at Rome the elections had taken place in France, which gave a majority of 500 conservatives out of a legislature of 750 members. The convocation of this Assembly on the 28th of May gave the government assurance of support; and consequently enabled it to send, on the 29th of May, the disavowal of its agent.⁴ The orders to attack Rome, however, were kept secret until the news of that event reached Paris and caused, at least ostensibly, the insurrection of the 13th of June.⁵

The capture of Rome on July 3, after a stout resistance and an inglorious siege of a month, brought the overthrow of the Roman Republic.

IV. THE RESTORATION OF PIUS IX

The purpose of France in intervening in the Roman States had been not only to restore the Pope, but to secure guarantees for the liberties of the Roman people, which, they felt, would be imperiled if Austria or Naples were allowed a free hand. It was the Pope as constitutional sovereign that they intended to put back on his throne. They hoped that Pius IX would issue a manifesto assuring his

¹ Normanby to Palmerston, May 29, 1849, *F. O.* 27, vol. 844; Barrot, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, pp. 289-290.

² Barrot, *op. cit.*, pp. 289-290.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Gaillard, *op. cit.*, p. 220.

⁵ de Tocqueville, *Souvenirs*.

subjects certain liberties, and that this manifesto, along with the appearance of a French force at Civita-Vecchia, would prove the means of conciliation. To this end Drouyn de Lhuys instructed the French plenipotentiaries at Gaeta to urge upon the Papal court the necessity for such a document. Accordingly on the 3rd of May d'Harcourt and Rayneval addressed a note to Cardinal Antonelli.

The intention of the government of the Republic [they wrote] is not to impose on the Roman populations a regime which their free will would have rejected, or to compel his Holiness, when he shall have been recalled to the exercise of the temporal power, to adopt this or that system of government. The government of the Republic does not doubt that the Roman people, provided they are reassured against the danger of a reaction, will replace themselves with alacrity under the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff, and that Pius IX, on reentering his state, will bring back there the generous, enlightened and liberal policy, with which he has formerly been animated. To facilitate this rapprochement, to contrive that the Holy Father, on reentering Rome, may find himself in a situation at once satisfactory for himself and his people, that he may thus guarantee Italy and Europe against new commotions, and disturb neither the political equilibrium nor the independence of the Italian States, such is the end towards which the efforts of France tend.

In accomplishing this design the French Republic counted much on the assistance of the Papal government. "It hoped that the government of his Holiness would consider it proper to publish without delay a manifesto, which, in guaranteeing the populations liberal institutions and such as conformed to their wishes as well as to the necessities of the times, would cause all resistance to fall."¹

But the French government had miscalculated the attitude

¹ Bianchi, *op. cit.*, vol. vi, pp. 495-497.

of the Papal court as they had that of the Roman populace.¹ At Gaeta, Pius IX fell more and more under the illiberal influence of Cardinal Antonelli, the Secretary of State, who persuaded the Pope that his attempt at reforms had been a mistake, that liberal institutions undermined the very foundation of the monarchy on which the temporal power rested, and that a policy of reform brought him nothing but ingratitude.² The Revolution at Rome and the murder of Rossi, which had also doubtless aroused serious reflections within his own mind, and made him question whether his policy had been a wise one, did but incline him the more to listen to the counsels of Cardinal Antonelli. Moreover, the influence of Austria, which was now greater at Gaeta than it had been at Rome before the 15th of November, 1848, was against a liberal policy. The Austrian Ambassador as well as the King of Naples and the Representative of Spain were encouraging Cardinal Antonelli to "dismiss all French and liberal tendencies."³ The fact that the other Catholic powers at Gaeta were in favor of an unconditional restoration doubtless strengthened the Papal court in its resistance to the demands of the French. "The Pope", wrote d'Harcourt to Drouyn de Lhuys, "not only does not wish to make any concessions, but he does not wish institutions to be expected in the future. His whole camarilla is Austrian to the marrow bone."⁴ Not until the 14th of May did Cardinal Antonelli reply to the note of d'Harcourt and Rayneval of the third, and then it was simply to state that the Holy Father had decided never to take any step that would in anywise compromise the

¹ Farini, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, pp. 98 *et seq.*

² About, E., *La Question romaine* (Brussels, 1859), pp. 134, 143-144; Falloux, *Memoirs*, vol. i, pp. 428 *et seq.*

³ Farini, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 99.

⁴ Bourgeois et Clermont, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

temporal power.¹ Early in May it was current in the States of the Church that the Pope had declared that he would return to Rome as absolute master or not at all.²

One of the first acts of General Oudinot after the capture of Rome had been to despatch Colonel Niel to Gaeta with the keys of the city to present them to the Pope, and to receive in return a personal letter from Pius IX, thanking him for the benefit he had conferred on Europe and on all civilized society.³ Then he proceeded to restore the Papal administration. The publication of papers was prohibited, assemblages were forbidden, the civic guard was disarmed, and all who were suspected of attachment to the Republic or aversion to the new government, Italians as well as foreigners, were banished.⁴ The ancient tribunals, both lay and ecclesiastical, were restored, and along with them the Inquisition, the judgments of which General Oudinot pledged himself to support.

The regular course of justice has been interrupted for many months [he declared in a circular]. It is in order to remedy such a state of things, no less prejudicial to the interests of the people of Rome, than to those of public morality, that the appointment of a Commissioner General of Grace and Justice has been made.⁵

But Pius IX, hoping to obtain larger guarantees for a restoration that should be without restrictions, delayed his return to Rome.⁶ On the 17th of July he issued a procla-

¹ Bourgeois et Clermont, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

² *F. O.* 43, vol. 46, Lord Napier to Lord Palmerston, May 12, 1849.

³ Farini, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, pp. 228-229.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 253.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 253-254.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 254-255.

mation to "his most beloved subjects", which expressed his thankfulness for the overthrow of the Roman Republic by means of "Catholic arms", which, stating his affection for his subjects and his longing to be in their midst, nevertheless placed his own independence above the liberties of his subjects, and which intimated the appointment of a Commission to carry on the affairs of state. Accordingly, three cardinals, Della Genga, Vannicelli, and Altieri were appointed to take over the civil administration of the States of the Church; and it was into their hands that, on the 31st of July, General Oudinot resigned his civil authority.¹

While General Oudinot was effecting a restoration of the temporal authority of the Pope, the French government continued to urge upon Pius IX the necessity of giving some guarantees to the Roman people. Immediately after the fall of Rome, Corcelle had been sent to Gaeta to announce that fact to the Pope, and to take advantage of it to obtain a pledge of some concessions. From the beginning of July until the end of October, 1849, the entire correspondence of de Tocqueville, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, with Corcelle was "to induce the Pope to grant liberal institutions to his people. I considered this", de Tocqueville told Senior, "as the most important of the three objects of the expedition: as an object effecting not only our own interests, but our honor; as an object without which the whole expedition was a lamentable failure."² Founding their demands on the fact that Pius IX had requested their aid, and the consequent right which they possessed to give him advice, the French government asked five things of the Papal government: a recognition of the principle of individual liberty and of the inviolabil-

¹ Farini, *op. cit.*, p. 259.

² Senior, *Conversations with de Tocqueville*, vol. i, p. 235.

ity of private property as laid down by the fundamental statute of the Pope of the 17th of March, 1848; a new organization of the Roman courts of justice which should give judicial guarantees to the citizens; a civil code like that in effect in Naples and Piedmont, which should regulate the conditions of persons and of property; elective municipal and national councils, which should be empowered to deliberate on matters of taxation; and the secularization of the public administration.¹

But Corcelle could get nothing but general promises from the Pope.²

Do you expect [said he to Corcelle] that I so soon forget the purely moral nature of my power as to bind myself in a certain manner, when I have not decided on questions of detail, and especially when I am called upon to pronounce in face of an army of thirty thousand men and of a power of the first rank, whose intentions are a mystery to no one? Ought I to be condemned to appear to yield to force? If I do something good, is it not necessary that my deeds may be spontaneous and may appear so? Do you not know my intentions? Are they not reassuring? Have I not taken the initiative in the reforms of which you speak?³

Nor could the French diplomats obtain any more definite promises. "Let the French restore the Papal government in reality, and then the Pope would do his part as became a Pope."⁴

The upshot of the pressure that the French brought to bear on the Papal court was the postponement of the Pope's

¹ Senior, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 235 *et seq.*; *Moniteur*, October 19, 1849. Session of October 18. These articles were embodied in a note which Corcelle and Rayneval sent to Cardinal Antonelli on August 19, 1849.

² Senior, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 236.

³ July 20, 1849, de la Gorce, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 219.

⁴ Farini, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 248.

return to Rome.¹ By means of passive resistance the advisors of Pius IX hoped to break the determination of France. One threat that France employed was to call a European Congress on the affairs of Rome, which would place the settlement in the hands of Protestant and schismatic as well as Catholic powers.² This alarmed the Papal court somewhat; but they probably perceived that it was a half-hearted threat, and that if carried out, would be nearly as disagreeable to France as to themselves.³ And the Pope in turn threatened to refuse to return to Rome and thus throw it on the hands of the French. Whenever Corcelle urged him to make definite reforms, he would answer: "That neither threats nor entreaties would lead him to violate a scruple, that he was as much Pope at Gaeta as at Rome, and that the French might do as they liked."⁴

Dissatisfaction was rife in Paris over this attitude of the Papal court and its proceedings. The French were irritated by the fact that the amnesty, which they had exacted "with great exertion", excepted all those who had sat in the Constituent Assembly.⁵ They complained of the servility of General Oudinot to the Cardinals and the readiness with which he had placed the administration in their hands.⁶ The temper of the government was manifested by a letter which, on the 4th of August, de Tocqueville addressed to the French commander-in-chief.

All the news that comes to me from Italy [he wrote] more

¹ Farini, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 255; Falloux, *Memoirs*, vol. i, p. 428; Barrot, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, pp. 404 *et seq.*

² Senior, *op. cit.*, p. 240; Barrot, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 407.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 240.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 237.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 236-237.

⁶ Barrot, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 409.

and more convinces me that, since the restoration of the Papal authority at Rome, you have not understood your rôle as the government of the Republic intended it. You seem to believe that from that time there is nothing more for you to do than to remain a passive spectator of the acts of the Pontifical government. It is not thus, I repeat it, that we understand the right of our army and its general.

We have been summoned by the Pope to come to his aid: we have reestablished him on his throne. The least result should be that, while our soldiers and our flag are still there, nothing should be done of a nature to imperil our security, to diminish our legitimate influence in Italy, or to compromise our honor.

I notice in the papers and in private letters that, with your concurrence, or at least under your eyes, institutions which have excited the reprobation of Europe have been set up, such as the Inquisition. We are informed that some men [such as Mamiani] who took no part in the last revolution, and who have not desired the Republic, have been persecuted and expelled from Rome.

Such acts ought not to be capable of being committed without your approval. You certainly have no orders to give to the Papal authorities, but when the moral interest of your army, or . . . the honor of your government seems to you to be compromised by the result of a measure, you have advice to give, and it is necessary to give it in such a fashion that it will cause reflection before it is passed over. We are counsellors with the sword at our side: let that not be forgotten.¹

Odilon Barrot and de Tocqueville did not fail to reproach Falloux for not employing the credit that his efforts and sollicitude had gained him at Gaeta to further the ends of the government.² "My situation became more delicate

¹ Gennarelli, Achille, *Il governo Pontificio e lo stato Romano* (Prato, 1860), p. lxviii.

² Falloux, *Memoirs*, vol. i, p. 436.

from day to day," wrote Falloux, "and my responsibility increased, placed as I was between men, all equally conscientious and all equally imperious, some thinking that I did too much, others that I did too little."¹ But Falloux was scarcely less irritated by the attitude of the Papal court than the other members of the Cabinet. He frequently saw the Apostolic Nuncio, the Papal representative in Paris, at the Nunciature, and continually repeated to him:

Take care, Monsignor, do not allow the least illusion to be entertained at Gaeta. They rely upon my presence in the ministry to avert all danger, and I really think I deserve the honor, but remember that should any crisis occur, I have no other weapon than my resignation, and that my resignation would probably be the signal for a change of system, upon which you would have little reason to congratulate yourself. I know quite well that you must negotiate with five or six great powers, who all hold very different views, but there is one power that you neglect too much, public opinion. In order to govern the world, you must first convert it; to diminish the number and obstinacy of claimants, it is necessary to send some at least away satisfied. For three centuries or more ancient Europe has witnessed monotonous and sad spectacles in matters of reform; everything is taken, and, alas! nothing is given. How well it would become the Church, and how worthy of her it would be, to inaugurate another method.³

But of the members of the executive Louis Napoleon perhaps suffered the greatest irritation at the attitude of the Papal court.

¹ Falloux, *Memoirs*, vol. i, p. 437.

² Barrot, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 412.

³ Falloux, *Memoirs*, vol. i. p. 437.

The President [wrote Falloux] always reserved in his attitude, always cautious in his language, particularly towards me, whom he wished to convince that his sympathy for Pius IX still continued, now showed some depression. It was easy to realize that an ardent struggle was going on in his heart between the earliest sentiments of his youth and the opposite engagements that his accession to the head of a Catholic nation imposed on him. "Ah, M. Molé, What a mess you have landed me in!" he said one day, and Molé repeated the remark to me.¹

Acting on the impulse of this feeling, offended that the dignity of France should be injured by the Roman court and his name calumniated, he wrote a confidential letter to Colonel Edgar Ney, which was a protest against the conduct of Rome and Gaeta. This letter was to be shown to General Rostolan, the officer chosen to supersede General Oudinot, who was recalled on the 4th of August, 1849.

The République of France [the letter ran] did not send an army to Rome to trample on Italian liberty, but, on the contrary, to regulate it, to preserve it from its own excesses, and to give it a solid basis, by restoring to his throne the prince who had put himself so boldly at the head of all useful reforms.

It grieves me to hear that the benevolent intentions of the Holy Father, and our endeavors, have been frustrated by hostile passions and influences. It is evidently desired to base the return of the Pope on proscription and tyranny. Now, you will say to General Rostolan from me, that he must not permit any act contrary to the nature of our intervention to be committed under the shadow of the tricolored flag.

It is thus I epitomize the temporal government of the Pope: a general armistice; the secularization of the administration; the Code of Napoleon; and a liberal government.

¹ Falloux, *Memoirs*, vol. i, pp. 435-436.

When I read the Manifesto of the three Cardinals, I considered it a personal affront that they did not even mention the name of France, or the sufferings of our brave soldiers. Any insult shown to our flag or our uniform goes straight to my heart; and I beg you to make it known that, though France does not sell her services, she at least requires that gratitude be shown for her sacrifices and self-abnegation. When our armies made the circuit of Europe they left everywhere, as traces of their passage, the destruction of feudal abuses, and the germs of liberty. It shall never be said that, in 1849, a French army acted in an opposite manner, and produced contrary results. Request the General to offer thanks in my name to the whole army for its noble conduct. I have learnt with regret that it is not treated, even physically, as it deserves. No means must be neglected by which to provide for the comforts of our troops.¹

The effect of this letter was profound, but quite different from what was intended. Falloux, to whom it had been shown before it was despatched, and to whom a promise was given that it would be withheld from the press, threatened to resign when it was published.²

"M. le President" [said he] "You have just given me my dismissal, and I must add that I should thank you for it, if I did not leave you full of anxiety for very serious interests.

"Leave me," he said with an air of great astonishment, "Why?"

"You have published what ought to have been kept secret.

"Do you think that the publication of my letter will entail a change of policy? I do not look upon it in that way. It is only a legitimate retaliation upon Cardinal Della Genga and his colleagues. But that change does not effect the Pope, and cannot in any way change the policy which I have been pleased to follow with you for the last year.

¹ Farini, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, pp. 281-282.

² Falloux, *Memoirs*, vol. i, p. 449.

"Such may be your intention, M. le President, since you do me the honor of telling me so; but it is no longer in your power to arrest the fatal impulse you have raised in France and Italy.¹

"I will tell you the strict truth, M. de Falloux, and you will see that you exaggerate the importance of the incident. I wished to keep my promise to you and let my letter do its work in silence, when an English despatch, intercepted by the police was placed before me. . . . This despatch represented me to the English cabinet as the plaything of the Austrians, and it overwhelmed me with stinging sarcasms, causing me an irritation to which I yielded without reflection. I sent orders to General Rostolan to make known the contents of my letter to the French army and to Rome. The General refused to obey this order, objecting that the letter was not countersigned by a minister, and that it would produce a dangerous ebullition in Italy. The Ministry still hesitated to support me against general Rostolan, when my letter appeared almost

¹Something of the effect of Louis Napoleon's letter may be gathered from the following letter of Cardinal Antonelli to the governors of the provinces of the States of the Church: "A letter which assumes to be written by the President of the French Republic to Lt.-Col. Ney in Rome has given increased audacity to the band of libertines, the sworn enemies of the Pontifical Government; and rumors are everywhere spread about, that it is intended to impose burdensome conditions on the Holy See. The anarchical party, in consequence of these expectations, displays an insulting attitude, as it believes and hopes to recover itself from the discomfiture it has undergone. But this letter has not any official character, being merely the product of private correspondence. I will also add, that even by the French authorities in Rome it is viewed with displeasure.

"The Holy Father is seriously occupying himself about giving to his subjects such reforms as he believes useful to their true and solid good; nor has any power imposed laws upon him in reference to this, he aiming to attain so important an end without betraying the duties of his own conscience.

"Profit by this intimation to contradict the falsehood promulgated to the prejudice of public order, and satisfy everyone that it is the interest of all the powers to sustain the liberty and independence of the Supreme Pontiff, for the peace of Europe. . . ." Arthur, Wm., *Italy in Transition* (London, 1860), pp. 392 *et seq.*, document I.

integrally in the *Moniteur Toscan*. Your colleagues then no longer saw any objection to its insertion in the *Moniteur*, and it appeared there. It was a thoroughly personal satisfaction to myself, the effect of which I had scarcely calculated; and I own this to you in all sincerity, it ought not to have and it will not have, you may be sure, any external influence over the whole tenor of our political conduct.

"This confidence certainly modifies my private opinion of the fact in itself [replied Falloux] but the public cannot be expected to know this, and I certainly cannot remain the responsible editor of a document of which my colleagues have accepted the responsibility without me.

"You are mistaken, M. de Falloux, the public must know the truth, I do not wish to conceal it in any way."

He at once seated himself at his writing table, wrote a few lines rapidly, and held the paper to me, saying. "Here, M. de Falloux, will that satisfy you?" It was a disavowal of the letter in the most categorical terms.¹

But Falloux to save the dignity of the President and of the other members of the cabinet refused to accept such a complete disavowal. He promised to be satisfied with the publication in the *Moniteur* of a statement denying that he had authorized the President's letter and affirming that the communication of the said letter was "purely official and excluded all idea of publication." "'You may feel easy about it'", said Louis Napoleon, "affectionately clasping both my hands."²

It is thus easy to see how far Louis Napoleon was willing to go to avoid losing the support of the Catholic Party, for which Falloux's presence in the ministry was felt to be a pledge.³

¹ Falloux, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 444-446.

² *Ibid.*, p. 447.

³ The question arises, was Louis Napoleon practising duplicity or humility for the sake of satisfying Falloux? The dissatisfaction that

After this interview with the President and the satisfaction that he gave him, Falloux endeavored to remove as much as possible the ill-effects of the letter to Colonel Ney,¹ especially by attempting to soothe the injured susceptibilities of the Papal Court.² The French ambassadors also did their utmost to conciliate the Court at Gaeta, alleging that the "Parisian government would not act as harshly as the President's letter implied."³

Notwithstanding the fact that the irritation at Gaeta was allayed somewhat,⁴ the effect of the letter, according to Falloux, was "disastrous".

Instead of going to Castle-Gondolfo, near Rome, as we had reason to hope that he would, Pius IX was anxious to place a still greater distance between himself and the French army. The king of Naples offered the Palace of Portici. Cardinal Antonelli, a few prelates of the Pontifical house, and some

he felt at the little regard that was paid to his letter, either by his ministry or by the Assembly, seems to lead to the former rather than to the latter conclusion. Moreover the whole character of Louis Napoleon points in the same direction. "This incident once over," said Falloux, "I asked myself—I ask myself still—which of the President's two assurances had been the true one. If, while promising me that he would keep the letter secret, he had already resolved to publish it, what advantage could he expect to gain from a duplicity of forty-eight hours, and how could he spontaneously prepare for himself the situation in which the inevitable return from Neris (whither Falloux had gone for his health and where he was staying when the President's letter appeared) would certainly place him? If, on the other hand, he had only yielded, in publishing his letter, to a passing feeling of ill-temper, how would this letter affect the program of his personal policy? In this hypothesis it would have to be admitted that duplicity cost him very little, and that he had not that strong repugnance towards it which honest men feel for this moral dishonesty." *Memoirs*, vol. i, pp. 449-450.

¹ Falloux, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 455.

² Farini, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, pp. 287-288.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 287.

members of the diplomatic corps vied with each other in repeating that the Pope would take refuge in America . . . sooner than allow there to be any doubt as to his independence.¹

Pius IX, by thus removing himself further from the States of the Church, gave the French to understand that he would not return to Rome until he had received full guarantee that his rule would be untrammelled by any restrictions that they might impose.²

Nevertheless on the 12th of September Pius IX issued his *Motu Proprio*, which outlined the institutions that he was prepared to establish in the States of the Church. It promised the creation of Provincial Councils, which should be appointed by the Pope to supervise matters of local interest in each province; a Council of State, a consultative body, which should give its opinion on all bills before they were submitted for the sanction of the sovereign; a Council of State for Finance, another consultative body, the members of which should be selected from lists submitted by the Provincial Councils, and the purpose of which was to examine expenditures, imposition of taxes, etc; judicial reforms which were undefined; and finally an amnesty with certain exceptions.

As a basis of government the *Motu Proprio* was much less liberal than the Fundamental Statute which Pius IX granted on the 14th of March, 1848; and it fell far short of the demands of the French government, either as expressed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, or by Louis Napoleon's letter to Edgar Ney. "The *Motu Proprio* is derisory; the amnesty is cruel", was the impression that it created.³

¹ Falloux, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 451.

² Farini, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 288.

³ Gaillard, *op. cit.*, p. 331.

The question that now arose was whether the Papal government should be compelled to make its institutions conform to the President's letter or whether the French government should profess itself satisfied with the *Motu Proprio*. The decision rested with the Legislative Assembly inasmuch as further credits for the Roman Expedition remained to be voted.

In the Assembly Arnaud [de l'Ariège], whom Falloux called a "sincere but inconsistent Catholic", raised the question as to whether the temporal power was necessary to enable the Papacy to fulfil its mission. Granted that the issue was a religious one, was it necessary to maintain that power to enable the Church to stand?

Do you think that the Church is unable to accomplish its mission, its destiny [he asked] without condemning a people to eternal servitude? . . . For my part, I who am a partizan at once of the principle of national sovereignty and of Catholicism, I am convinced that Catholicism has no need of the violation of any right whatsoever, I am convinced that whether in the past, in the present or in the future it has always, and shall always reconcile itself in its rights, in its interests and in its manifestations with all the rights of peoples. That is my conviction.

Moreover he believed that the time had come for the separation of the temporal and the spiritual, and that such separation would no longer cause any inconvenience to the Church.

The Papacy can remain independent without possessing this material seat [he declared]. It is able to do so, for . . . now, in the world, do you not see that the sentiment of right and of justice has replaced that of brute force? . . . not only is this union unnecessary, but it will henceforth be disastrous for the influence of the Church. . . . I believe the temporal sovereignty of the Pope is going to be reestablished in all its

absolutism, and that thus you will have been reduced to the sorry rôle of having been the accomplices of absolutism [was the accusation that he hurled against the government]. Thus without avail you have compromised all: democracy which you represent, religion which you wish to save, society which you pretend to consolidate.¹

Others brought a like accusation against the government.

"You make Italian Nationality impossible", said Edgar Quinet. "Machiavelli called the temporal power of the Pope the sword in the wound of Italy. By a heroic effort this people has cast the sword from its breast. When you plunge it in again, you prevent the wound from closing up."

But the majority thought otherwise.

I am convinced [said de Tocqueville] that . . . neither to-day . . . nor in the near future, is there any other means of making the Sovereign Pontiff independent, than to leave him a temporal power. With the opposite system you will always come to this, that, directly or indirectly, a foreign power will exercise on the will of the Holy Father a pressure of which France in particular, and the Catholic world in general, may have cause to lament. For my part, therefore, I have not hesitated to think, and I have not delayed one moment in saying, that one of the primary objects of our expedition in Italy ought to be to render the Pope his independence, which, according to me, can be restored to him only with the temporal power.

But de Tocqueville added:

I am convinced that if the Holy See does not bring considerable reforms into . . . the States of the Church, into their laws, into their judicial and administrative practice, if there

¹ *Journal des débats*, session of August 6, 1849.

are not liberal institutions consistent with the present conditions of peoples, I am convinced I say, that no matter what force may extend itself from the ends of Europe to sustain it, this power will soon be in grave peril.¹

When the Assembly was asked for further credits for the Roman Expedition, it appointed a parliamentary committee to investigate the matter, of which Thiers was reporter. Within this committee the question arose of Louis Napoleon's letter; but it was decided not to mention it.

To adopt it [Thiers told Senior] was impossible, to criticize it would have been indecent. So we decided not to allude to it, at least expressly; but a passage in which we declared that we could do no violence to the Holy Father, that we had restored him to full and complete liberty as to the use which he might make of it, answered it implicitly.²

France, said Thiers in his report to the Assembly, could not compel Pius IX to such and such a line of conduct; but it had the right to supplicate him to make concessions. Pius IX understood this perfectly, he declared, and a first important act of his free unhampered will is the *Motu Proprio*.

Your committee has examined carefully this act—not that it believes that France has the right to decide as to the merit of the institutions of foreign peoples [loud interruption from the extreme left]. But, by a very large majority, your committee declares that it sees in the *Motu Proprio* a very considerable preliminary advantage, which an unjust prejudice alone can fail to appreciate.

It is true, he acknowledged, that the bodies that it called for were consultative rather than deliberative, but in view

¹ *Journal des débats*, session of August 6, 1849.

² *Conversations with Thiers*, vol. i, p. 67.

of the fact that political agitations had been so extreme at Rome, this was rather an advantage than otherwise.

The important act which one calls the *Motu Proprio* [concluded Thiers] presupposes a body of laws which should reform the civil legislation, assure the equity of courts, bring about a just distribution of public functions amongst the different classes of citizens, procure, in a word, for the Romans the advantages of a government sagely liberal. These laws are announced, and the word of Pius IX suffices to remove all doubts. [Voice at Left: *belle garantie!*].¹

“Constitutional government is not in the *Motu Proprio*,” said Thuriot de la Rosière; “what is called political liberty properly speaking is not there.” But the Roman people could not expect such things, he argued. It was a sacrifice that they were asked to make for Catholicism as a whole, and he compared the situation of the Roman States within Catholicism with the District of Columbia in the United States. “The sovereignty of the Catholic peoples, in this case, suppresses the sovereignty of the Roman people.”²

To Victor Hugo the question at issue was the choice between the letter of the President and the *Motu Proprio* of the Pope.

If you sanction the letter, you condemn the *Motu Proprio*; if you accept the *Motu Proprio*, you disavow the letter. . . . The *Motu Proprio* and the amnesty . . . have aroused the indignation of the Roman people [he affirmed.] At the present time a profound agitation disturbs Rome, and tomorrow, if we should quit Rome, immediately the gate closed behind the last of our soldiers, do you know what would happen? A new revolution would burst forth.³

¹ *Journal des débats*, session of October 13, 1849.

² *Ibid.*, session of October 18.

³ *Ibid.*

"Gentlemen", said Montalembert, mounting the tribune amid a thunder of applause from the left that greeted the conclusion of Victor Hugo's speech, "Gentlemen, the discourse which you have just heard has already received, in the applause that it has called forth, the chastisement it deserved." Can France employ violence against the Holy Father, he asked?

Allow me to employ a homely figure of speech. When a man is condemned to struggle against a woman, if she is not the last of creatures, she can defy him with impunity. She says to him: "Strike, but you will dishonor yourself and you will not conquer me." Ah! well, the Church is not a woman. She is much more than a woman: she is a mother, the mother of Europe, the mother of modern society, the mother of modern humanity! It is in vain that one is an unnatural, a rebellious, an ungrateful son, for one always remains a son, and there comes a moment in this parricidal strife against the Church, when this struggle becomes unbearable to the human race and when the one who has begun it falls overwhelmed or annihilated, either through defeat or through the unanimous reprobation of humanity. [Applause] Imagine, Gentlemen Pius IX appealing to Europe, appealing to posterity, appealing to God against the violence and the constraint of France, France who has saved him, and who would thus add the most ridiculous of inconsistencies to a crime, which, since the dawn of history, has never brought any one happiness. [Great applause].¹

. . . . M. de Montalembert says to us [said Emmanuel Arago]: "to attack the Church is to attack helplessness, is to attack a woman, and when one attacks a woman, one dishonors oneself; but the Church is more than a woman, it is a mother!" And liberty, Sir. . . . I reply: liberty is our mother; we owe her homage. . . . Say to the Roman people:

¹ Session of October 18, 1849. "Montalembert," said de Tocqueville, "was splendid; nothing could be finer as a piece of oratory." Senior, *de Tocqueville*, vol. i, p. 68.

"In your sovereign liberty, choose, and we are here to assure the liberty of your choice; sovereign as we are, choose your government, recall the Pope if you wish, proclaim yourselves a Republic if that suits you; choose, we have delivered you from those who oppress you." If you do not do that, you deny every right, you will take away forever every illusion from those who were able to believe that you had not completely forgotten your liberal life.¹

It has been said [affirmed Odilon Barrot in his turn] there are two documents which are opposed to each other, the letter and the *Motu Proprio*: choose between them. The reply is very simple . . . we take the letter and the *Motu Proprio* at once: the letter as expression of the end that we wish to attain, the *Motu Proprio* as a concession already acquired. The *Motu Proprio* does not realize, who denies it? all that is contained in the letter, and it is for that reason that we are continuing to negotiate and to use our influence with the Holy Father to obtain it. . . . To those who pretend to find in the letter of the President of the Republic threats of violence, I am authorized to make a flat denial.²

After the interpretations that the Ministry has given of the letter of the President of the Republic [said Emile Barraut] it is evident that the ministry, that the executive power abandons the position of mediator, and passes with arms and baggage, and even with the letter of the President, into the camp of the right.³

The Assembly then voted the credits for the Roman Expedition by 469 votes against 180; which meant that it sanctioned the restoration of Pius IX on the basis of the *Motu Proprio*, and that the majority were willing, as Thiers said, to trust Pius IX.

¹ Session of October 18, 1849.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

But France having sent an army into the States of the Church to restore, was obliged to keep a force there ¹ to maintain the temporal power, until she was compelled to withdraw by the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war in 1870, when the last remnant of the temporal power was overthrown by the troops of Victor Emmanuel in the name of a united Italy.)
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¹ With the exception of a few months in 1866. Cf. *infra*, p. 343.

CHAPTER VII

THE FALLOUX LAW

ONE of the problems that confronted the Republic, in which the Catholics were vitally interested, was the question of education. The University, which Napoleon had created to control instruction, had always been offensive to Catholics, more especially when the state had enforced its monopoly. It had placed restrictions on the opening of private schools, and had supervised their conduct. It demanded certain qualifications of instructors before they could teach, even in a private school. And frequently these qualifications could be obtained only in an institution of the state. This meant that in many cases the clergy and religious orders were ruled out of education. Then the University required all candidates for the baccalaureate to attend certain classes in the schools which it controlled; and it alone possessed the right to confer degrees. At the close of the Restoration the liberal Catholics had adopted the watchword of "liberty of instruction", and throughout the Monarchy of July they were endeavoring to attain the ideal for which it stood. The law of 1833, it is true, had given them satisfaction as far as primary instruction was concerned; but the fear of the Jesuits and of a "clerical domination" had prevented a *bourgeoisie*, tainted with eighteenth-century rationalism, from conceding this liberty in secondary instruction. But the Republic meant liberty, and it led the Catholics to expect liberty of instruction.

The preparation of the Falloux Law was the achievement of this liberty.

Amongst the members of the provisional government brought to power by the fall of Louis-Philippe was Hippolyte Carnot to whom was given the portfolio of Public Instruction and Worship. The son of a regicide of 1793, a republican by conviction as well as by inheritance, and a disciple of the school of Saint-Simon,¹ Carnot sought to make education serve the cause of the Republic.² While Ledru-Rollin and his following endeavored to create republicans by means of "intimidation", Carnot, who belonged to the moderate party, believed that end could best be attained by means of education.³ Accordingly he invited the curé and the school-master to exercise their political rights and to instruct the people how they should use their newly-won privileges.⁴ "Beside your duties towards the children", he wrote to the school-masters, "events impose on you an urgent duty, that of preparing adults for the political life which is open to them: it behooves you to make them understand the true meaning of the new Republic."⁵ Moreover Carnot was instrumental in the production of republican manuals, the purpose of which was to explain the nature of the new form of government and to clarify citizens on their duties and their rights. Some of these manuals were conservative and sought to reassure the peasants against the social consequences of the revolution; some were religious and appealed

¹ Weill G., *L'École saint-simonienne* (Paris, 1896), p. 218 et seq.; *Histoire du parti républicain en France* (Paris, 1900), pp. 10, 19.

² Quentin-Bauchart, *op. cit.*, p. 106 and note.

³ Carnot, H., *Le Ministère de l'instruction publique et des cultes* 24 février à juillet, 1848 (Paris, 1848), pp. 28-30.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁵ *Ibid.*

to the Pope to bless the Republic; while others proclaimed the social gospel.¹

But Carnot's educational program was more comprehensive than merely to prepare the citizens of the Republic for an election. He beheld in education at once a duty of the state towards its citizens and of its citizens towards the state.¹ While rejecting the "dangerous and erroneous" ideas of the socialists which made "man a slave of the state", he nevertheless desired to put education in the hands of the state. "At the risk of being called socialists", he said, ". . . we desire that the state should act as the father of a family towards all its children; that it should give them education and assistance; and we urge our fellow citizens not to spare any sacrifice to attain this end."³ "Let us form new citizens for new institutions" was the appeal which he issued to the Council of the University.⁴ To this end Carnot devoted himself to the preparation of an educational law that should embody his ideas. Three great principles guided him in working out his proposal. Education, "in order to efface every distinction in the schools between the child of the rich and the child of the poor", should be gratuitous. Then education should be obligatory. Where universal suffrage prevailed instruction became a civic duty. "The freedom of instruction is not the freedom of ignorance," he declared. And finally Carnot believed in the liberty of all to teach. Education should indeed be given and supported by the state; but this should not preclude the right of either individuals or societies to open schools. Thus even the Jesuits would be al-

¹ Dreyfus, F., *L'école en 1848* (Paris, 1908), p. 11.

² Carnot, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

lowed to teach.¹ The aim of Carnot was to create a national education which should promote national unity. "If my anxiety", he said, "with regard to the clergy was to destroy amongst them the spirit of corporation, it was the same with regard to the University, which also formed a little church. By attaching both bodies more closely to the national unity I hoped to make their old rivalries cease."²

Accordingly, on the 30th of June Carnot presented his project before the Constituent Assembly. Since the free will of the citizens should henceforth direct the destinies of the country, the safety and the happiness of France would in future depend upon the proper cultivation of that will. The purpose of primary instruction was therefore larger than merely to give children some notions of reading, of writing and of grammar: it should aim to make them worthy by developing at once the man and the citizen of the great name of citizen that awaited them. While calculated to impart as much knowledge as possible, instruction should also tend towards moral development, and more especially towards the cultivation of the idea of fraternity. Education thus became religious as well as intellectual.³ A "general supervision" by the state, which in the case of ecclesiastical schools should be performed by the most republican of the clergy, was the only restriction placed upon liberty of instruction.⁴ The Assembly then appointed a committee of fifteen members to deal with the project.⁵

But while Carnot's proposal for primary instruction was being intrusted to a parliamentary committee, Carnot him-

¹ Carnot, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-12.

² *Ibid.*, p. 45.

³ *Moniteur*, July 1, 1848.

⁴ Carnot, *op. cit.*, pp. 44-45.

⁵ Michel, H., *La Loi Falloux* (Paris, 1906), pp. 51-52.

self was attacked in the Assembly and obliged to resign.¹ After the June days terror had seized upon the conservative members of the Constituent who beheld everywhere the red specter of socialism.² In the session of the 5th of July Carnot was accused of being an accomplice to the propagation of socialistic ideas through the republican manuals which he had authorized. The manual that was most severely attacked was by Charles Renouvier, a philosopher, and was entitled *Manuel Républicain de l'Homme et du Citoyen*. It was accused of attacking the right of private property. "Does there . . . exist any means of preventing the rich from being idle and the poor from being devoured by the rich," was the passage that awakened criticism. Carnot, who had not read this manual before he had authorized its distribution, defended himself and the book against charges which were unjust, but at the same time he felt obliged to resign his portfolio.³

Indeed after the June Days it was the fear of socialism that largely dictated the form that the educational law was to take. Maxime du Camp relates that Victor Cousin meeting Charles de Remusat on the Quai Voltaire after the Revolution of the 24th of February, the former, "that eclectic philosopher whom no event should have disturbed, raised his hands to heaven and exclaimed: 'Let us run and throw ourselves at the feet of the bishops; they alone are

¹ He had been reappointed minister by General Cavaignac when the latter assumed power after the June days.

² Dreyfus, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

³ *Moniteur*, July 6, 1848: "It is . . . owing to ignorance or wilful confusion that they have discovered, in some publications authorized by my ministry, points of resemblance with the doctrines which are in question. In all these publications, on the contrary, and my convictions would not have permitted that it should be otherwise, the right of individual property and the sanctity of the family have been proclaimed without ambiguity." Carnot, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

able to save us to-day.' ”¹ The incident is illustrative of the attitude of the bourgeoisie whom the social revolution filled with terror. This fear was to make the liberty of instruction, which the Catholics desired, at once more easy and more difficult of attainment. It made the bourgeoisie more ready to give the Church a prominent part in education, but it made them unwilling to forego all supervision on the part of the state.

To-day [wrote Thiers] when every social idea is perverted, and when some desire to give us in each village a teacher who will be a phalansterian, I regard the curé as an indispensable rectifier of the ideas of the people. He will at least teach them in the name of Christ that pain is a necessity in every estate, that it arises from the nature of life, and that when the poor have the fever, it is not the rich who have sent it to them. . . . As to the liberty of instruction, I am changed . . . not by a revolution in my convictions, but by a revolution in the social state. When the University represented the fine and prudent French bourgeoisie; when it instructed our children after the methods of Rollin; when it gave the preference to wholesome and ancient classical studies over the physical and altogether material studies of the exponents of professional education, oh! then I desired to sacrifice to it the liberties of instruction. To-day I am no longer of this opinion, and why? Because nothing is as it was then. The University, falling into the hands of the phalansterians, pretends to teach our children a little mathematics, a little physics, a little natural science and much demagoguery. I behold safety only in the liberty of instruction. I do not desire that it should be absolute and without any guarantee for the public authority; for if there were an instruction according to Carnot, and more than that, an instruction according to Blanqui, I should desire at least to prevent the latter. But in any case, I repeat that the instruction of the clergy, which

¹ *Souvenirs* (Paris, 1876), pp. 112-113.

for many reasons I did not like, now seems to me better than that which is prepared for us I direct my hatred and the strength of my resistance to-day only against the enemy. That enemy is demagogism. . . .¹

The Catholic papers did not fail to insinuate that this plight in which the bourgeoisie found themselves was, in a measure, due to their repeated refusal² to give the Church the educational rights that she demanded. If they take the present situation into consideration, said the *Ère Nouvelle*, they will perceive that their interest dictates this "act of justice".

If the moral order is not consolidated, society is rushing towards a fearful cataclysm. Who does not feel it? Who does not say it? Do you not behold audacious and perverse doctrines sapping in every mind the bases of the social order? Do you not know that there are some thousands of arms ready to apply these subversive doctrines? Never have graver questions been raised in the world! Never has the moral order been more severely shaken! Where is the remedy? You answer, in the salons, in the political assemblies, even at the tribune: it is only in the resurrection of the religious spirit, in the awakening of the Christian consciousness. Ah,

¹ *Ère nouvelle*, June 23, 1848. Letter of May 2, 1848. Cf. *Univers*, June 5, 1848: "With regard to the Clergy," said Thiers, "I believe the situation is changed, and our attitude is also necessarily changed. Under the overthrown régime I feared certain influences of the clergy; to-day I regard religion and its ministers as the auxiliaries, the saviors, perhaps, of the social order, which is threatened. I am resolved to defend the Catholic institutions with the greatest energy, notably, the budget of the clergy. Furthermore, I regard liberty of instruction as useful, even necessary in the face of a system of obligatory demagogic education. It would, therefore, be folly for all the defenders of the social order . . . to be disunited in the face of anarchy. The curé of the country will be our only buttress against the communist and demagogic schoolmaster whom it is proposed to send us in every village. I do not say this from complaisance but from conviction."

² Cf. *supra*, introduction.

Well! Be consistent with yourselves! If you wish the awakening of the religious consciousness, put religion in a position where it will be able to develop its action fully, and to recover its legitimate influence.¹

After discussing Proudhon and his doctrines the *Univers* concluded: "Perhaps now the committee on primary instruction will understand that it will be of advantage to society to teach the catechism a little more and a little better in the schools of the people." ²

The question of liberty of instruction was debated in the Constituent Assembly in September during the discussion on the constitution, and Montalembert supported it in the interests of the Church. The committee on the constitution had refused to recognize this liberty as a natural right like that of association, of petition and of the press; but had put it in the category of rights conferred by the state.³ Accordingly the committee drafted a special article [art. IX] which declared: "Instruction is free; the liberty of instruction is exercised under the guarantee of the laws and the surveillance of the state. This surveillance is extended to every establishment of education and instruction without exception." Montalembert proposed that article IX should be dropped out of the constitution and that liberty of instruction should be inserted in article VIII amongst the natural rights of man under the Republic.⁴

The exercise of these rights [said Montalembert] has for a limit only the rights and the liberty of another or the public

¹ *Ère nouvelle*, July 3, 1848.

² *Univers*, August 1, 1848.

³ Michel, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

⁴ Article would then read: "Citizens have the right to associate, to assemble peaceably and without arms, to petition, to teach and to manifest their thoughts by way of the press or otherwise." Michel, *op. cit.*, p. 62; *Moniteur*, September 19, 1848.

security. . . . We no longer wish the words: "under the guarantee of the laws", which article IX contains, because it is not, unfortunately, a question of laws protective of liberty, but of preventative and restrictive laws, as all those have been which were presented on this subject during the regime of July.¹

I maintain [asserted Montalembert] that society is ill that the society of which we form a part, the society which is our mother, is threatened by an *ensemble* of doctrines which are very ancient, the genealogy of which I have no need to give, but which have at their disposal to-day not new ideas, but new forces, and forces as redoubtable as new, forces which we had believed satisfied by the solution given to the social difficulties in 1789, but which are not satisfied, which each day become the more inflamed, which each day arm thousands against society which inflame thousands of hearts and arm perhaps millions of hands against society. There is the danger.

What then is the remedy? asked Montalembert.

"I declare frankly", he replied, "I know no other than the old Christian spirit which, up to the present, has unified French society and European society." He declared that neither philosophy nor legislation would avail. There was only one remedy, the instruction of the Church given to the people by means of liberty.² What the people needed was respect, respect for property, respect for the powers that be, which the Church would teach them. ". . . I," he affirmed, "maintain that the Catholic doctrine, which we wish to diffuse in the French people by means of the liberty of instruction, inspires and creates this respect, in placing the rights of authority beside the rights of God himself."³ A victory of brute force over socialism, he declared, would

¹ *Moniteur*, September 19, 1848.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, September 21, 1848.

be "sterile, monstrous, detestable" if something were not done to heal the moral malady of society. In short empower the Church to teach as freely as she wished, and society would be saved.

Jules Simon declared that he would immediately support Montalembert if, like the Catholic orator, he feared an "anarchy of intellects"; and if the state should so far forget or dishonor itself as to neglect its duty in the "formation of the citizen", he would wish that "that grand creed which has already saved the world so many times" should save it still. But, he gave the Assembly to understand, he had not lost all faith in the state or in philosophy. "I believe then", he affirmed, "that the right to teach ought not to be inscribed in the draft of the constitution, and I believe that the liberty of instruction ought to be inscribed there with its indispensable corrective: the supreme guarantee and the surveillance of the state." "We find ourselves once more between these two alternatives, liberty regulated and liberty unlimited. Well! Our choice is made: we are for the liberty regulated." Nevertheless, he declared that it was not his wish to continue the warfare with the Church.

It is with a feeling of keen regret that I have heard recommence here what has been called the quarrel between the University and the Clergy. Quarrel! Who can think to-day of having a quarrel with anything but the common enemy, the enemy of society? Upon my honor and before God I know no other than this enemy—I wish no other—and whosoever will march with me against this enemy, instead of wronging him, I will hold out to him a loyal and fraternal hand.¹

Then Falloux came forward to support Jules Simon and with him the bourgeoisie. "We have to concern ourselves with only one principle", he said. "This principle, no one

¹ *Moniteur*, September 21, 1848.

contests it: education is free; we have to place beside this principle only one restriction which no one any longer opposes: the surveillance of the state."¹ Montalembert then withdrew his amendment. "In the face of multifarious doctrines", said Dufaure, "the state cannot be indifferent." Nevertheless two of the ecclesiastics in the assembly, the bishops of Langres and Orleans, fearing lest it would be oppressive of the liberties of the Church, both opposed the supervision of the state. But they were in the minority and article IX of the constitution was voted as it stood.

The fear of socialism had thus impelled the bourgeoisie to give way to the Catholics and concede them the liberty to give instruction; but the same fear had prevented them from granting it as completely as the *Parti Catholique* had desired. Furthermore the clerical peril still caused many alarms. ". . . . The fear of clerical domination", said Montalembert, "prevails over the mind of these bourgeoisie to the same degree as the fear of the Republic. . . . There is fear of the evil and dread of the remedy. . . ." ² The right to supervise all instruction was, therefore, retained by the state and inscribed in its constitution.

After the adoption of the Constitution the educational question that arose was: Did the project of Carnot, which was still before a committee of the Assembly, embody the promises and assure the guarantees of the Constitution? ³

¹ *Moniteur*, Sept. 21, 1848. ". . . the supplé M. de Falloux," said Eugène Veuillot, "addressed the Assembly to overshadow the truths which the head of the *Parti Catholique* had exposed." *Op. cit.*, ii, p. 273. The comment of an uncompromising member of the *Parti Catholique*.

² Lecanuet, *op. cit.*, ii, pp. 412-413.

³ Cf. Michel, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-58. The revision which the committee made in Carnot's project illustrates the reaction against socialism. "The project of Carnot represents the democratic and laic effort in the Constituent in the matter of popular education. The minutes of the committee represent the offensive reaction of the idea of social defense sheltered behind constituted religion." Michel, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

The Catholics said, No! To many it seemed to savour too much of socialism to be acceptable.¹ The Abbé Cahour described it as "the tomb of liberty of instruction", "the most audacious attack which, since 1793, legislation has dealt against individual, domestic, civil and religious liberty," in short, nothing but communism "applied to public instruction and thus invading the whole of society."²

The project of M. Carnot is only the counterpart of that of M. Louis Blanc on labor. While the latter claims to organize society in the material order, the former aspires to organize it after an analogous plan in the intellectual and moral order. The one is engrossed with enslaving the body, the other, the mind. These are the two principal forces by the means of which communistic socialism has proposed to demoralize the people, to overturn society and the world.

Carnot, in order that no citizen might lack the measure of intellectual culture necessary to the exercise of his political rights, had proposed to make education obligatory. "That the people have need of intellectual culture we do not deny," said Abbé Cahour; "but that is no longer the ques-

¹ Carnot's idea that the clergy in the course of their training should undergo a national education may also have made the Catholics alarmed. "The Catholic clergy," said Carnot, "in my estimation are only too disposed, by reason of the education that they receive and the position that they have hitherto occupied, to hold themselves apart from the great national movement. To combat this sad tendency it is desirable that the clergy should more and more be recruited from the establishments of public instruction, and should be separated from their young contemporaries only to receive in the *grand séminaire* the special instruction indispensable for the exercise of the sacred ministry. One would thus see the clergy abandon an *esprit de corporation* quite opposed to the republican spirit, adopt national habits and retain with a foreign state only that spiritual bond which attaches them to the supreme head of the Church." *Op. cit.*, p. 45. But this conception of the function of the clergy was quite opposed to the movement of the Church.

² Cahour, Abbé Abel, *Attentat à la liberté des familles, des communes et des cultes au projet de loi de M. Carnot sur l'instruction* (Nantes, 1848), p. 5.

tion. It is a question of knowing who ought to give this education. M. Carnot and his political coreligionists claim that it is the state, while we believe that it is the family."¹ By placing education in the hands of the state it was feared that the influence of the family, and hence of the Church, would be undermined.

The project on primary instruction [said the same writer] has the same origin as the law on divorce, the progressive tax, and that crowd of other social-economical projects which have appeared to us like phantoms at the moment of revolutionary tempest, and have thrown terror amongst us. But more persistent than the others, it has not disappeared like them. It has remained until the present time hovering over our heads to the terror of all good citizens. Its withdrawal alone can calm all alarm.²

The withdrawal of the project of Carnot was therefore one of the conditions that the *Parti Catholique* laid before General Cavaignac if he desired their support in his candidacy for the Presidency.³ But this he refused to do, saying that it had already cost him pain enough to sacrifice his friend Carnot to the demands of the right.⁴ This refusal was one of the ostensible reasons the members of the *Parti Catholique* gave for withdrawing their support from the republican leader.⁵ Moreover Louis Napoleon had vaguely promised to support liberty of instruction; and this promise had doubtless gained him many votes for his candi-

¹ Cahour, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 30-31.

³ Cf. *supra*, chap. iv, p. 166. "Our friends," said the *Univers*, "have asked of M. Cavaignac, as condition of our support, the withdrawal of that disastrous bill of M. Carnot on primary instruction. M. Cavaignac has refused." *Univers*, December 2, 1848. Cf. *ibid.*, December 7, 1848.

⁴ Lecanuet, *op. cit.*, ii, p. 416.

⁵ Cf. *supra*, chap. iv; Michel, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

dacy. The fact that he had offered the portfolio of worship and public instruction to Falloux was taken as a further pledge of his good will. And when he was actually elected the Catholics, seeing in Falloux's appointment the fulfilment of their desires concerning education, compelled him to accept the proffered post. Falloux himself accepted this interpretation of his mission, and lost no time in performing it. Accordingly on the 4th of January, 1849, he published in the *Moniteur* two reports to the President, which announced the withdrawal of the project of Carnot, the intention to prepare a new bill and his determination to carry out the promise contained in article IX of the Constitution guaranteeing liberty of instruction.

One of my predecessors, M. Carnot, laid before the National Assembly the thirtieth of last June a new plan for primary institutions; but the bill has raised the gravest objections. It is at once too vast and too restricted. From the financial point of view it greatly exceeds the present resources of the treasury; from the point of view of social principles, it arbitrarily substitutes the state for the father of the family. . . .¹

The same day Falloux appeared at the tribune to announce the withdrawal of the project of Carnot and the appointment of a new committee to consider the educational question.² The announcement at once raised a storm of protest from the Assembly: "It is a defiance! It is an outrage against our dignity! It is an attack on our sovereignty!" were cries that were heard on every hand.³ The Con-

¹ *Moniteur*, January 4, 1849.

² Michel, *op. cit.*, pp. 33 *et seq.*

³ Barrot, *op. cit.*, iii, p. 64. "A bill on public instruction had been presented by M. Carnot; the work naturally revealed the socialistic and demagogic prejudices which dominated the author. The parliamentary committee, over which M. Barthélemy St.-Hilaire presided, had corrected and almost entirely re-made this project. But M. de Falloux did not think that he could appropriate the work of the committee any more than that of M. Carnot." *Ibid.*

stituent Assembly perceived in this withdrawal of its bill an attempt to override its will, of which it was becoming the more jealous as its tenure of power was drawing to a close. Odilon Barrot immediately came to the aid of the minister of instruction and informed the Assembly that the ministry were not obliged to defend a law of which they did not approve; that they had a right to maintain or withdraw it; and that if they were asked why they did not adopt the project in question, they would reply that it was a matter of conviction and of conscience.¹

So sensitive indeed was the Assembly over its waning power that it decided to nominate a committee of its own to prepare a bill on education. This attitude of the Assembly and the fact that its lease of life was almost run aroused the question: what would be the temper of the new assembly? The educational problem therefore was one reason that prevented the Catholics from being indifferent in the conduct of the elections to the Legislative Assembly which were set for the 13th of May. Montalembert, in sending instructions to the Catholic committees throughout the country, urged them ruthlessly to proscribe all candidates who refused to support liberty of instruction, just as he proscribed those who were suspected of sympathy with socialism.²

If there can still be found [wrote Montalembert] any men within the ranks of the moderate or conservative party, who persist, in the face of the calamities of our time, in holding the truth captive and corrupting the sources of that public instruction which the constitution has enfranchised from all monopoly . . . , if there still exist hypocrites and madmen of this breed, ah! certainly we shall never ask you to support

¹ Barrot, *op. cit.*, iii, p. 65.

² Cf. *supra*, chapter iii.

their candidature, and your hand should wither up rather than inscribe their name on your ballot. . . .¹

Shortly after the 4th of January, 1849, and the withdrawal of the project of Carnot Falloux nominated two extra-parliamentary committees to consider primary and secondary education respectively, which, after their first sessions, united and elected Thiers as president.² This committee was composed of both laymen and ecclesiastics; but Falloux was careful to exclude from it the intransigents of the University as well as those of the *Parti Catholique*.³ The dominant spirits were Thiers and Cousin, the Abbé Dupanloup and Montalembert.⁴ It was within this committee that the Falloux Law was prepared. Taking the constitution as a starting point, the intention of Falloux was to give the Church a greater place in education without destroying the University.⁵

Thiers at the outset made it plain that he saw safety for society only in so far as primary instruction was placed in the hands of the ministers of religion to the exclusion of lay instructors.¹

If the law of M. Carnot has so greatly frightened me [he declared] it is not because it has diminished the qualifications for admission to the rank of instructor, or because it has excluded the clergy from surveillance; I have perceived something in it much more deplorable still, namely, the in-

¹ Lecanuet, *op. cit.*, iii, pp. 430-431.

² Lacombe, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-12.

³ Michel, *op. cit.*, pp. 96 et seq.

⁴ Lacombe, *op. cit.*, p. 31. Falloux attended only very occasionally. Melun, *op. cit.*, ii, p. 62.

⁵ Cf. Weill, Georges, *Histoire de l'enseignement secondaire en France (1802-1920)*, (Paris, 1921), p. 118.

⁶ Melun, *op. cit.*, ii, pp. 62-63.

troductioin into the communes of thirty-seven thousand socialists and communists, veritable anti-curés.¹

He cited the fact that it was amongst the most intelligent and best educated of the working classes that socialism had made most headway, and urged that as a reason for watching over the "social doctrines" that were taught to the masses. "To read, to write, to count, that is what it is needful to teach; all the rest is superfluous."² Indeed so far did Thiers go in his depreciation of popular education and in his ridicule of the attempt "to make a savant out of a workman", that one of his colleagues laughingly exclaimed: "According to you, M. President, it would be necessary to have ten thousand livres income to possess the right to learn to read."³ Society was in great peril, he affirmed; and he thought the "most efficacious remedy" would be to confide primary instruction to the clergy.

But other members of the committee did not support Thiers in his readiness to give primary education entirely to the Church.

I desire . . . sincere accord between religion and the state [said Cousin]. . . . But I add that I do not desire that the curés or the members of the religious congregations be exclusively charged with primary instruction. I only ask that the curé may have in the commune, over the public as over the private instructor, an influence more direct and more personal than under the existing law.⁴

He did not desire to create a new monopoly in place of the old one, or "to give the University to the clergy; but to

¹ Lacombe, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

² *Ibid.*, p. 36.

³ Melun, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

⁴ Lacombe, *op. cit.*, pp. 74-75.

put the clergy in the University. The clergy not only have need of liberty, but also of protection and of surveillance.”¹

Nor did Montalembert, stout champion as he was of the rights of the Church, want to erect a monopoly of the clergy in place of that of the University.

I share entirely the opinion of M. Thiers on the extent of the evil [he declared] and on the remedies for it. Nevertheless there is one point on which I cannot agree with him, that is on giving the exclusive influence to the clergy. For I do not wish in any way to forswear the principle of liberty of instruction.²

It was therefore a question of regulating liberty rather than of establishing a new monopoly.

Let us retain education by lay instructors [urged Cousin]. Most certainly no one has been at all times and everywhere the avowed partizan of the participation of the religious congregations in primary instruction more than I. But to charge those congregations alone with it, without the competition of lay education, would be to court their ruin by giving them in the eyes of the populace the odium of a monopoly. . . .³

Although there was no longer to be a monopoly of education, it was necessary “to fortify the position of morality”, and to make primary instruction “a strong barrier capable of arresting the invasion of injurious doctrines or the influence of a demagogic power.” Liberty should be so protected as to prevent “a Raspail from maintaining a school.”⁴ This was to be done by requiring a *brevet de capacité* of all who sought a license to teach or open a school, and by subjecting all to a strict supervision in which

¹ Lacombe, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

² *Ibid.*, p. 94.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 76, 90.

the clergy should play an important role. "Let the curé have an eye upon every phase of instruction", said Cousin, "as well as expound the catechism; for in teaching children to read one is able to impart mischievous doctrines."¹ If, he declared, there is no real or beneficial primary instruction unless it is based on religion, and if, on the other hand, there is no religion without the clergy, let us not imprison both religion and the clergy within the walls of a temple, but let us seek their intervention in the world outside, and give them without any scruples a prominent part in primary education.²

But should the *brevet de capacité* be required of members of the congregations or of the clergy before allowing them to teach? Cousin was in favor of exacting it from them as well as from lay instructors.³ In this he was opposed by both Thiers and Dupanloup. The former asked that all members of religious congregations should be exempted from examination and the *brevet*⁴ while the latter urged that for the priest his letters of priesthood should suffice.

The supervision of primary instruction, it was proposed, should be intrusted to the curé of each diocese assisted by the local mayor. But in order to assure adequate authority for the curé in his duties of inspection, an academic council should be erected in each department, a third of the members of which should be taken from the secular administration, a third from the religious element and a third from the University and judicial body.⁵ Thus it was proposed to decentralize the University with its twenty-seven academies, each of which was presided over by a rector, and substitute for

¹ Lacombe, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, p. 102; cf. Michel, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 103; Michel, *op. cit.*, pp. 125 *et seq.*

⁵ Lacombe, *op. cit.*, pp. 110-111.

them eighty-six academic councils, one in each department, in each of which the bishop would have a seat and exert an influence.

It was over the creation of this academic council of the department that the warmest debate in the discussion of primary education took place. The project had been worked out in a sub-committee, and when it was laid before the full committee Cousin declared it the most counter-revolutionary proposal that had yet been made.¹ The Abbé Dupanloup in reply explained the motives that had actuated them in asking for such a change in the educational system. They were "alarmed" at the "extreme peril" which confronted society; for, he declared, society would never be able to resist the "subversive action" of forty thousand instructors in whose ranks socialism "already counted too many adepts." They did not propose to give the school to the curé, however desirable that might be: they merely wished to assure him, along with the mayor of the commune, the moral and religious supervision of primary education. But the question was, how to make the authority of the curé real and effective. Their solution was the creation of the academic council of the department.²

It is in vain [said Dupanloup] that we shall desire to give the curé an influence over the school of his parish; he will remain powerless without the establishment of the departmental committee. There indeed will be his bishop, his hierarchical superior; there also the prefect with whom the curé will always have better relations than with the Voltairians of the arrondissement. . . .³

Moreover, Dupanloup argued:

¹ Lacombe, *op. cit.*, p. III.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 112-113.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

In the chief town of the department the magistracy and the clergy are powerful. It is also in the chief town of the department that we are able to gather the landowners menaced by the influence of a too great number of primary instructors. Therefore it is in the department that it will be most suitable to establish this council designed to struggle against the dangers, unhappily so serious, which result for society from the present condition of primary instruction.¹

The institution of the academic council of the department was thought to offer greater influence to the clergy than the existing system: that was the chief reason for its creation.²

Thiers, seeing in the council of the department a means of consolidating the influence of the bourgeoisie, was immediately in accord with Abbé Dupanloup. Cousin, however, fearing the destruction of the University, was not so easily won. It was only when he was assured that this council would be subordinated to a grand national council that he acquiesced.³

But if Thiers was ready to place primary education in the hands of the clergy, he was by no means willing to give them secondary education, which became the ground of contention in the committee. He declared that if, in the matter of primary instruction, he was disposed "to accord an absolute and exclusive influence to the clergy, because primary instruction addressed itself to the masses, because the masses were in need of truth imposed upon them, because faith ought to be their only philosophy", his opinion was quite different regarding secondary education, which was intended for the middle classes, who "revolted against imposed doctrines", and who considered "free philosophical discussion" as a right.⁴ He wished the state to con-

¹ Lacombe, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

² Cf. Michel, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

³ Lacombe, *op. cit.*, pp. 131-133.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 195-196.

trol secondary education because he believed that the state possessed the right "to fashion youth according to its model."¹ Ecclesiastics, it is true, should have the right to teach, but under the conditions and supervision of the state.

Cousin likewise wished the state supreme in secondary education. The "supreme authority" of the state should have as its mission "to curb the abuses" of liberty.² For this purpose he desired the control placed in the hands of a "grand council of instruction".³ "I love this great name of University", he affirmed, "and I shall sustain this powerful institution while introducing into its new organization the modifications the present state of minds and morals demands."⁴

The Abbé Dupanloup replied that he did not reject "all control of the state."⁵ He declared that, for the prevention and repression of evil, he wished this authority "large, absolute, universal."⁶ Nothing could be better than that the state should intervene to repress the abuses that disorder created. That indeed was its mission. But he warned the committee to be on their guard against exaggerating the duty of the state, and thus create evils greater than those against which they desired to fortify society. Let the state beware lest it encroach upon the duties and rights of the family and of the Church. Thiers had declared that the state possessed the right to fashion youth after its image; but for his part, he maintained that society possessed the right to defend itself against a state or authority in the

¹ Lacombe, *op. cit.*, p. 197.

² *Ibid.*, p. 185.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 187.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 206.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 210.

hands of a perverted and corrupting administration. And he reminded his hearers that "the state might call itself Proudhon."¹ To fashion the child according to the model of the state was to wound at once his dignity and his liberty. What the Church demanded was liberty of instruction. Undoubtedly he would fear this liberty if it should produce "the schools of a Raspail or of a Proudhon"; but with the protection of the state such as he was ready to concede, he did not think that liberty would have "for a result the promotion of anti-social doctrines."²

Dupanloup also repudiated the distinction that Thiers had drawn between the education of the people and that of the upper classes. The idea that religion was good for the poor but superfluous for the rich he branded as "disastrous and deplorable."³ The catastrophes of 1793 and 1848 were the result of such a way of thinking. "Faith! Faith for all! that is what it is necessary to recognize as indispensable", he exclaimed. Nor would he admit that "faith" should be "imposed" on anyone.

Faith which is essential for all, ought to be the same for all, that is to say, an act of free will, without ever being imposed on anyone, not even on the child of seven years. It is a gift of God, to which virtue alone is able to attain and which no human force can impose.

The bourgeoisie needed the lessons of faith, perhaps more than the countryman. What the Church asked, therefore, was the liberty to instruct all in its faith.

Dupanloup made it plain that he did not desire the destruction of the University and that he was quite ready to enter into a "transaction." Notwithstanding, there were

¹ Lacombe, *op. cit.*, pp. 212-214.

² *Ibid.*, p. 206.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 217.

some concessions which the University must make to the Church, else the war would continue between the Church and the state.¹ These conditions of peace were: that the state should forego the control of the *petits séminaires*; that it should abolish the excessive qualifications that were imposed on the school-master; that it should suppress the requirement of a certificate of attendance at a state institution for the baccalaureate; and finally that it should no longer exclude from educational rights the members of congregations duly authorized by the Church.²

The first three concessions raised little opposition and were easily accorded.³ But the fourth was not to be made without a struggle. Underlying the question of the recognition of the educational rights of the congregations indiscriminately was the question of the Jesuits; and the Jesuits still aroused many susceptibilities. One solution of the difficulty that was suggested, was to pass over the Jesuits without mention.⁴ But such a proposal appeared inadmissible, for the laws against them were still unrepealed.⁵ Thiers was the first to oppose their admission to educational rights. If all the French clergy were agreed on the utility of the Jesuits, he said, he would willingly consent to the sacrifice asked; but a "notable part" of the clergy themselves were dubious as to the "good to be done by the Jesuits." He did not fear ultramontanism as formerly, he declared; but he was afraid that "the grand maxims" of the Gallican Church would be menaced by the members of the Society of Jesus. The liberty of the French Church would be threatened by their admission to the right to

¹ Lacombe, *op. cit.*, p. 220.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 220; cf. Michel, *op. cit.*, p. 148.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 228-238; Michel, *op. cit.*, p. 148 *et seq.*

⁴ Lacombe, *op. cit.*, p. 280.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 254, 279.

teach.¹ Nevertheless he signified that if they could make a law which would exclude the clubs, while permitting the Jesuits, he would gladly agree.²

Cousin supported Thiers in his opposition to the Jesuits.

In your own interest [he said to the Church] and when the public sentiment is against this institution, do not ask for the reestablishment of the Jesuits, whose aptitude to teach has, perhaps from the first, been too greatly exalted, and who have been reproached with being imbued, not with ultramontanism, which signifies nothing, but with certain ideas that are incompatible with our present political and social customs. . . . If the state deems that the existence of the Society of Jesus does not present any objection, let it recognize it and then it will perform its work freely; but no middle course, no silence which will be nothing else than weakness and pusillanimity.³

Then Dupanloup in a final speech warmly championed the cause of the Jesuits.

Assuredly [he conceded] the Church cannot regard the Jesuits as absolute perfection; but [he maintained] it considers them perfectly innocent of all the accusations brought against them. This is its profound conviction; it has no other, nor can have; and as the Church is justice, it cannot like Pilate condemn the just and then believe itself justified by washing its hands. . . .

Moreover individual Jesuits, he claimed, had always been worthy of respect; and from Voltaire, who wrote concerning them to the bishop of Soissons, the only member of the episcopate who had voted against them, all recognized that their "morals were pure and above reproach."⁴

¹ Lacombe, *op. cit.*, pp. 238-240.

² *Ibid.*, p. 282.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 254.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 291.

No one attempted to reply [said Melun]. M. Thiers was satisfied with saying: "Let it be so, I no longer oppose the article: only I request that when it shall be discussed before the Assembly, you will allow me to hide under a table. For how can I ask to-day for the recognition of the right of the Jesuits to teach on our country, after having only a few years ago, asked and obtained their exclusion from France?"¹

"Cousin! Cousin!" he exclaimed afterwards, "have you comprehended the lesson that we have received when he [Dupanloup] spoke of the Jesuits? The Abbé is right. Yes, we have fought against justice, against virtue, and we owe them [the Jesuits] amends."²

But what concessions was the Church willing to make to the University? Cousin, following the example of Dupanloup, laid down the points that the Church must concede, without which, he declared, there could be no accord. The national system of public instruction, comprising both public and private schools, must be maintained. The administration of public instruction should be organized in a body called the University which would inspire and spread the *esprit de corps*. Uniformity of supervision should be obtained by means of the council of the University and academic councils with their inspectors.³ Degrees should be conferred by the faculties of the state. Dupanloup accepted these conditions with few reservations. Omit the name University, he said, and he would accept that institution which had been called "a great national system of public instruction."⁴ He believed that it was necessary, in order that the man might occupy a useful place amongst

¹ Melun, *op. cit.*, ii, p. 67.

² Lacombe, *op. cit.*, pp. 298-299.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 255.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 293.

his fellow citizens, that the child should be reared in conformity with the *esprit* of his country. As to the right of the state to create and maintain public schools, that he had never contested.¹ But the national system of education should leave room for the untrammelled instruction of the Church. Absolute centralization in the matter of education displeased him, he said.² He styled the imperial University, the creation of a "mathematical and military genius", "a great work without equal"; but at the same time he stigmatized it as "false." Nevertheless he "very willingly" accepted the new organization which had been proposed, consisting of a "great central council of public instruction and academic councils."³

Thus ended the general discussion. The project was then referred to a sub-committee to draft a bill for presentation before the Legislative Assembly. On the 18th of June, amidst the stir created by the insurrection of the 13th, Falloux introduced his bill on education into the Assembly, where it was "very well received" by the majority.⁴ The Assembly immediately appointed a committee to consider the project, by whom it was almost rejected.⁵ From the parliamentary committee it was sent to the Council of State, so that it did not come up for discussion in the Assembly until the 14th of January, 1850.

The bill that Falloux laid before the Legislative Assembly was divided into three sections, one dealing with the authorities who controlled education, another regulating primary, and a third, secondary instruction.

¹ Lacombe, *op. cit.*, p. 293.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 296-297.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 297.

⁴ Falloux, *Memoirs*, i, pp. 402-403.

⁵ Cf. Seignobos *et al.*, *La Lutte scolaire en France au dix-neuvième siècle* (Paris, 1912), p. 174.

At the head of the educational system there was to be a Superior Council of Public Instruction, consisting of twenty-four members, the president of which should be the Minister of Public Instruction. Eight of its members were to be chosen from the council of the University, and should constitute a "permanent section". The ecclesiastical element was to be made up of four bishops or archbishops elected by their colleagues, a minister from each of the recognized Protestant bodies, the Reformed and the Lutheran Churches, and a representative of the Jewish Synagogue. But this body was largely a consultative one. It might be called upon to give its opinion on bills and decrees, which the minister might submit to it; and it was necessarily consulted regarding examination regulations, programs of studies, supervision of free schools, the establishment of Lycées and Colleges, and the books to be authorized in public schools or to be forbidden in free schools. Finally it gave judgment on questions submitted by the Academic Councils.¹

Subordinate to the Superior Council were the eighty-six Academies, one for each department. Each Academy was to be administered by a rector, who was to be assisted by one or more inspectors and by an Academic Council. Amongst the members of this council were the bishop and another cleric of his nomination, a representative from each of the other recognized religious bodies, the prefect and representatives of the legal body. Like the Superior Council the Academic Council was a consultative one. Its opinion was to be asked on the following matters: the condition of schools in the department, reforms to be introduced, discipline and administration of public establishments, the budget of Lycées, Colleges, etc., and support of primary schools. Its duty was also to investigate all

¹ Articles 1-6.

cases of discipline which might be laid before it by the minister or rector. But the Academic Council possessed an administrative function as well as a consultative one, and in this lay its power. It was to pass judgment on matters of dispute relative to the obtaining of diplomas, on the opening of free schools, on the rights of individual instructors, and on the exercise of the right to teach. Moreover, all disciplinary procedures were under the control of this council. Each year it was to present a report to the Superior Council.¹

Provision was made for two kinds of schools: those "founded or maintained by the communes, the departments of the state"; and those "founded or maintained by individuals or by associations," which bore the name of "free schools". Both free and public schools were to be inspected by various officials: By "general and superior inspectors" chosen from amongst the former general inspectors, or from the teaching body who possessed the degree of licentiate, or had had ten years experience; by academic inspectors, likewise chosen from the teaching body; by inspectors of primary instruction selected from the general inspectors; and finally by cantonal delegates, the mayor, the curé, the pastor or the rabbi. Besides, there was to be a special inspector for primary instruction in each arrondissement. In the case of free schools inspection was to ensure "morality, hygiene and sanitation", and to make sure that nothing was taught "contrary to the constitution, to morality and to the laws."²

Any Frenchman who had attained the age of twenty-one was permitted to teach in a primary school, provided he possessed the *brevet de capacité*. Each year the Academic Council should nominate an examining committee, com-

¹ Articles 7-16.

² Articles 17-22.

posed of four members, to examine candidates for this teacher's certificate.¹ The requirement of the *brevet de capacité* might be waived, however, provided the applicant possessed a university matriculation, the unrevoked title of a minister of a recognized denomination, or a certificate showing that he had taught three years in a free or public school. To open a school it sufficed for a teacher to declare his intention before the mayor of the commune, designating the locality in which he proposed to open his school, and stating the profession which he had practised during the preceding ten years. This declaration was also to be sent to the rector of the Academy. Should the latter not raise any objection within a month after the making of such declaration, the school might be opened without further formality.² Penalties were provided for the infraction of these regulations. Moreover, a teacher might be suspended temporarily or permanently for misconduct or immorality.³

Every commune, unless all the children within its bounds were able to receive instruction in the free schools, was obliged to maintain one or more primary establishments.⁴ Instructors were to be appointed by the municipal council of the commune, and chosen from lists of approved teachers submitted by the Academic Council. In the case of members of religious congregations, they were to be appointed by their superiors. A salary of 600 francs, payable by the commune, was guaranteed to instructors, who were forbidden to engage in any commercial or industrial enterprise.⁵ Each canton was to possess one or more persons appointed

¹ Article 46.

² Article 28.

³ Articles 29-30.

⁴ Article 36.

⁵ Articles 32 and 38.

for a period of three years to supervise the instruction within its bounds. They were to report to the council respecting the state and needs of the schools within their jurisdiction. Besides these inspectors provision was made for the supervision of local schools by the mayor and curé. The ministers of the various cults were "especially charged" with the religious instruction of the children of their creed; and the door of the school was always to be open to them.¹ "Education", it was maintained, "had been too isolated from religion."²

In secondary education any Frenchman aged twenty-five years was permitted to open a school by making, to the rector of the Academy, declarations similar to those prescribed for primary instruction, and by placing in his hands the following documents: a certificate showing that the applicant had had five years experience as a teacher or inspector in secondary education, whether public or free; either a matriculation diploma or a *brevet de capacité*; and a plan of the situation of the proposed school and an indication of the purpose in opening it. During one month following this formality, the rector, the prefect or the public prosecutor might oppose, in the interest of public morality or the health of the pupils, the opening of the said school. After the lapse of that period, provided there was no opposition, the school might be opened immediately. In case of opposition an appeal might be made to the Superior Council. On the advice of the Academic Council, the minister might waive the requirement of the certificate of experience.³ Infraction of these regulations was likewise punishable by fine or imprisonment.

¹ Article 44.

² Exposé des motifs, Michel, *op. cit.*, p. 478.

³ Articles 60-67.

Each year the Minister of Public Instruction, at the request of the Academic Council, was to appoint an examining board, consisting of seven members presided over by the rector, for the purpose of examining candidates for the *brevet de capacité* of secondary instruction. A minister of the cult professed by the candidate might be called in to vote with the examiners, provided he was not already a member of the board. No certificate of studies pursued in a public school should be required of a candidate either for the *brevet* or for matriculation.¹

Secondary ecclesiastical schools existing at the time of promulgation of the Falloux Law were to be maintained, on the sole condition of submitting to the supervision of the state. New ones might not be established without the authorization of the government.² No mention was made of the ordinance of 1828 which restricted the number of pupils in ecclesiastical schools to 20,000. But it was explicitly stated that "the provisions of all laws, decrees or ordinances" contrary to the new law were abrogated.³ Moreover, ministers of the recognized cults might give private instruction to young men who were preparing for the ecclesiastical schools, provided the number in each case did not exceed four, and a declaration was made beforehand to the rector of the Academy.

The Lycées and Colleges of the state were maintained as before.

The Falloux Law thus destroyed the monopoly in education. It decentralized the University, and deprived the central council of much of its authority. The clause [art. 17] which permitted "individuals or associations" to found and maintain schools was an invitation for the religious

¹ Articles 62-63.

² Article 70.

³ Article 82.

congregations to enter freely into education. In spite of the protests of Thiers and Cousin, the law made no mention of the Jesuits, who were therefore to possess the same rights as the other congregations. The *petits séminaires* were enabled to participate in education with a minimum of interference on the part of the state, a supervision which was purely administrative.¹ Furthermore, the position that was given to the curé in primary instruction and to the bishop in the Academic Council assured the Catholics a preponderant rôle in education.

By reason of the conditions in the midst of which it was prepared, the educational bill of Falloux was essentially a compromise; and like most compromises it pleased the extremes of neither party. No sooner were the general outlines of the project known than the intransigents of the *Parti Catholique*, led by Louis Veuillot and the *Univers*, denounced it as a capitulation to the University. On the other hand the radicals and the partizans of the University, the disciples of eighteenth-century philosophy, saw in the measure the destruction of education by the state, the domination of the Church in instruction, and the surrender of education to the priests.

"What have we always and unanimously asked?" queried Louis Veuillot; and he answered: "Liberty. What does the bill offer us? A feeble part of the monopoly. The bill organizes and justifies the monopoly; it does not establish liberty."² He accused Falloux and Dupanloup of being men of "accommodation" and "transaction"; and Montalembert with being wheedled by them and by Thiers, thus compromising the aims of the *Parti Catholique*, which sought an education by the Church that should be absolutely free of all connection with the state.

¹ Cf. Debidour, *op. cit.*, p. 509.

² Michel, *op. cit.*, p. 206.

The great evil of the Falloux law [he declared] is that it is a lack of faith. It proclaims that we ourselves no longer believe in that which we have so long demanded. But as I, for my part still believe in it, as I believe that safety is in the liberty of the Church and is only there, I adhere to our old doctrines, and I do not enter into an agreement which outrages them.

He deplored that the *Parti Catholique* on the "religious question" should fall into the arms of the University, and urged that, in order to save itself, it should promptly split.¹

The Marquis de Régnon branded the law as a deplorable scheme which sought to sanction, by the cooperation of the bishops, the supremacy of the "University over the Catholic Church and over all religious families." It was the exalting of the state above the faith and conscience of a people; it was the despotism of the state dominating religion, morals, laws, customs, education and beliefs; in short it was "legal communism." But not only did it "subordinate everything to the atheistic state", it called the bishops, who would only be a minority, into its midst in order to sanction the work of the University. "Never", he declared, "have faith and the rights of the people been attacked with more skill and with more hypocrisy. Never have they been exposed to more certain ruin."² The archbishops and bishops of France became but the instruments of the state to apply the irreligious monopoly of the state.³ "Indeed", he declared, "the bill contains the complete op-

¹ Leroy-Beaulieu, A., *Les Catholiques libéraux* (Paris, 1885), p. 289 *et seq.* Letter of Louis Veuillot to the bishop of Annecy, August 2, 1849; cf. Lecanuet, *op. cit.*, ii, p. 467.

² Régnon, H. de, *Adresse à l'épiscopat français au sujet du projet de loi de M. de Falloux* (Nantes, July 13, 1849).

³ Régnon, *Appel à S. S. le Pape Pie ix au sujet du projet de loi sur la liberté d'enseignement présenté le 18 juin 1849 à l'assemblée législative par M. de Falloux* (Nantes, October 15, 1849), p. 14.

pression of the Catholics, in taking away from them, in a surreptitious manner, all the guarantees that the Constitution of 1848 had given them.”¹

The bishop of Chartres declared the law a violation of article IX of the Constitution of 1848. He feared that it would authorize the establishment of schools of socialism and communism, which would inflame the towns and the departments.² And he rejected the idea of a compromise, perceiving in the project the domination of the University at the expense of the Church.³

But if the partizans of the *Parti Catholique* feared that the bishops would become slaves of the University by sitting in the councils of public instruction, the partizans of the University feared no less that the ecclesiastics would dominate and “impress on the instruction of the University a Catholic direction.”⁴ “The bill of M. de Falloux on public instruction”, said an anonymous letter to the President, “. . . is the ruin of the education of the state.”⁵ The author appealed to the “heir of the Napoleonic traditions” and asked him if he would allow injury to the University, that great institution of his uncle, who in spite of his regard for the clergy had made them feel the strong hand that governed.⁶ “By the destruction of the University and the ruin of the schools of the state,” “by the complete

¹ Régnon, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

² Chartres, Evêque de, *Courtes observations sur le nouveau projet de loi concernant l'instruction publique* (Chartres, 1849), p. 7.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

⁴ Metz-Noblat, M. A. de, *Des rapports de l'église et de l'état* (Paris, 1849), p. 16.

⁵ *Lettre d'un bourgeois de Paris au président de la république touchant le projet de loi de M. de Falloux sur l'instruction publique* (Paris, 1849), p. 1.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

abandonment of public instruction into the hands of the clergy", "the bill of M. de Falloux, by a road indirect in appearance but none the less sure, advances the counter-revolution."¹ But not only did it annihilate lay education, it left the field open to the invasion of the religious congregations. "Already . . . the congregations flock before the council of state and the council of the University, requesting, by an ingenious subterfuge, to be authorized, no longer as congregations, but as establishments of public utility."²

The opposition to the bill continued after it had been introduced into the Assembly on the 14th of January, 1850. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire, in a speech that lasted through two sessions, combated the proposed law on the ground that it weakened the surveillance of the state as promised by the constitution. In view of the subversive doctrines of socialism that were abroad, he feared that the measure did not afford sufficient safeguards. "You assist these fatal doctrines", he declared.³ His objections were four-fold: it destroyed the University; it weakened the influence of the state; it "confiscated" primary instruction for the benefit of the congregations and of the clergy; and it gave the Jesuits a place in secondary education.⁴

Victor Hugo came forward as the champion of the liberty of instruction as well as of the surveillance of the state, which he wished purely and exclusively laic. Far from being opposed to religious instruction, he declared that he "ardently wished" it, but it was the religious instruction of the Church and not that of a party. Consequently he

¹ *Lettre d'un bourgeois de Paris*, p. 7.

² *Ibid.*, p. 13.

³ *Moniteur*, January 15, 1850.

⁴ *Ibid.*, January 16.

would admit neither bishops nor their delegates into the Superior Council or the Academic Councils. He perceived in the proposed law an instrument to be seized by the "clerical party"; and he thereupon drew a picture of obscurantism blighting the intellectual life of France as in Italy and Spain.¹

Monseigneur Parisis, the bishop of Langres, after tracing the history of education in France since the eighteenth century, stigmatized the University as "only the accomplishment of the ideas of Talleyrand, Condorcet, Danton and Robespierre. . . ." To that fact he attributed the failure of the education of the University, which was responsible for all the unsound theories of the age. Religion therefore had no need of the University, which was incapable of founding anything stable in France; rather it was the University that had need of religion. For religion required nothing but liberty to accomplish her work. The proposed law was consequently not what the Church would have made. Would he therefore reject it? "If the project is presented to us as a favor, I reject it", he replied; "if it is proposed to us as an opportunity of showing our devotion, I accept it."² The episcopate was too hostile to the bill to allow him to endorse it in more unqualified terms.

But if the representative of the episcopate in the Legislative Assembly hesitated to accept the proposed law, it was otherwise with the famed leader of the *Parti Catholique*, the Comte de Montalembert. Since he had first entered the Assembly chamber, he declared, he had supported every proposal that had been made to stem the invasion of socialism. But he considered all other remedies futile without giving "religious training" to the country. This could only be accomplished by restoring the influence of religion to educa-

¹ *Moniteur*, January 16, 1850.

² *Ibid.*

tion by means of liberty. "That", he affirmed, "we have attempted to do in our law." Like the bishop of Langres he attributed the evil ultimately to the deistic influence of the eighteenth century which had created a society "disdainful of all spiritual succour."

Men thought they were destroying religious faith, and without wishing it, they have destroyed social faith. . . . Do you know what has been the result of this? . . . without desiring it the people have been given socialism for religion; because it is necessary for the people to have religion, which you all acknowledge. When the old religion has been taken away from them . . . , faith in the God-become-man of the Gospel . . . there has been substituted faith in the man-made-God of socialism.

Socialism he defined as "Man believing himself God in the sense that he believes himself capable of destroying evil and suffering." The great need of the time he declared to be respect, "respect for law, respect for order, respect for authority, respect for society and respect for property." That is what the Church teaches, he affirmed.

The project of Falloux, he contended, afforded liberty as the constitution called for it. "We have been denounced", he said, "we the oldest advocates of liberty of instruction have been denounced as having betrayed the cause of liberty of instruction and the interest of religion. . . ." "We have been reproached from the first with not having given absolute liberty." That indeed he had asked for in the Constituent Assembly, liberty, complete and unlimited. But it had been denied them, and nobody then complained. The constitution had placed certain conditions and restrictions on liberty. These conditions they had respected, since they could not go against the Constitution. Furthermore, he complained, we have been reproached with having compromised with the education of the state.

We have been upbraided with having made an alliance in which we should be dupes and victims; we have been upbraided with having concluded, a fact of which we are proud, an honorable peace instead of perpetuating the strife, and, after having guaranteed liberty for ourselves and for others, with having accepted for religion a real part in instruction. In a word, we have been reproached with having substituted alliance for conflict.¹

But in face of the menace of socialism he declared that the need of the country was peace, not war. For that reason they had taken advantage of the conciliatory disposition of their former adversaries² and entered into a law of trans-action.

Thiers defended the law against the charge of having surrendered education to the Church, as Montalembert had vindicated it against the imputation of having compromised with the University. After the difficult and painful rôle which he had played in France for two years, he declared that he was disdainful of the charge of apostasy which had been brought against him. On one point, however, he acknowledged that perhaps he had changed.

In the face of the enormous perils that have menaced, and continue to menace, society [he said] I have desired to reunite its various defenders, to cause the quarrels to cease between the partizans of the state and those of the Church, because both, if they understand their interests and their duties, ought to-day to be champions of society.

He avowed that he had never been in favor of liberty of instruction; rather he had feared it. But the circumstances had changed. "I ask very frankly, Do you know what the partizans of the Church and those of the state mean to me?

¹ *Moniteur*, January 18, 1850. Session of January 17.

² The allusion is to men like Thiers.

They are the champions of society, of the society which I believe is in peril; and I have held out my hand to them."

The Church, he declared, might well have objected against the constitution and said: "I do not wish to be inspected." But on the contrary the clergy said:

I will be inspected like all the other establishments; and that day the contract had been signed: peace was made. Yes! that is the great concession, if concession there is. Yes! the *petits séminaires* will be a university. They will likewise be able to instruct in all subjects. I defy you to show me in the law any other real concession than that. As to the presence of the clergy . . . whether in the Superior Council of the University or in the Academic Councils, Monseigneur, the bishop of Langres was right in saying it is not a favor, it is a trust.

They had conferred no favor on the Church in granting liberty of instruction, he declared, for that was a right which the Constitution had accorded them. The only danger that he could foresee [and this ultimately proved to be a very real one] was that the *petits séminaires* would be enabled to establish themselves in rivalry with the institutions of the state. The University, in spite of what his opponents said, had been maintained. In the Superior Council eight members out of the twenty-four belonged to the University, whereas the Church was represented by only four bishops. Surely therefore the framers of the law could not be accused of having been partial to the Church. The charge had been brought against the law that it would permit the Jesuits to return. "Well", he retorted, "I ask you in the name of your principles, how you are going to prevent the Jesuits from entering into education?"¹ "It has sometimes been

¹ The discussion was not unrelieved by touches of humor. While

said: The University represents philosophy, the Church religion. Well, for my part, I make known to you the whole secret of my sentiments: I believe, I hope, that religion and philosophy can be made to live together."¹

While the law was being debated within the Assembly the opposition to it continued in the Catholic press.

When M. Thiers speaks of making religion and philosophy live together [said the *Univers*] everybody knows very well what philosophy is meant. It is the anti-Christian philosophy to which they wish to compel religion to sell itself and to surrender the souls of Catholic youth. . . . If the party of order cling to philosophy, it must leave the Church; if it wishes the protection of the Church, it must renounce its philosophy.²

Is the omnipotence of the state the source of all the political and social disorders against which France struggles at this moment, or is it not? . . . They speak of peace, of a treaty of peace; they forget only one thing, namely, that a treaty of peace is absolutely impossible between two principles which are diametrically opposed to each other. Enemies of this sort can, indeed, if interest dictates, suspend hostilities, agree upon an armistice; but make peace, never!³

As Catholics [said the *Hermine* of Nantes] we reject this bill because we believe that it is subversive of the doctrines of our Church and injurious to the religious sentiment of the vast majority of Frenchmen. . . . No citizen, no Catholic,

Thiers was defending the law a member of the left interrupted: *Passez aux Jésuites.*

Thiers: *Je vais passer aux Jésuites.*

Voice at left: *C'est fait: vous y êtes passé aux Jésuites.*

Thiers: *Oui, c'est convenu. Je suis un Jésuite; d'accord.*

Montalembert: *Je ne suis donc plus le seul dans l'Assemblée. Moniteur*, February 24, 1850.

¹ *Moniteur*, January 19, 1850.

² *Univers*, January 30, 1850.

³ *Ibid.*, February 6, 1850.

can consent to or aid in this pretended pacification between the Church and the University, between truth and error, between good and evil, between order and anarchy. The moral impossibility of the proposed law is of the same nature as that which, in 1791, resulted from the Civil Constitution of the Clergy. The lay authorities intend, to-day as then, to violate the conscience of Catholics by constraining them to do what they ought not to do, and by themselves organizing moral and religious instruction.¹

It is all over! [said the *Esperance, courrier de Nancy*]. The division of the *Parti Catholique* has been proclaimed at the tribune by its former chief. M. de Montalembert complains in bitter terms of the opposition which he has met in what he calls his treaty of reconciliation with the party of the University. . . . It is then true, we no longer fight under the same flag, devoted soldiers of an intrepid leader. . . . We are an army disbanded, dispersed, and our division is the laughing-stock of the whole world. Our adversaries are able to laugh and make merry over the disaster to our cause. . . .²

Indeed the *Correspondant* affirmed that "a single one of the religious journals, the *Ami de la Religion*" had shown itself "fully satisfied with the bill."³ But even the satisfaction of the *Ami de la Religion* was not without its qualifications. "Does the bill satisfy us completely?" it asked. "Have we ever said so? If it had been thus, would the law be called a compromise?"⁴

Notwithstanding the hostility to the project of Falloux and his colleagues, the bill, after the third reading in the Assembly passed by 399 votes against 237 on the 15th of March, 1850.⁵ That the opposition on the part of the

¹ Cited from *Univers* of February 7, 1850.

² *Ibid.*, January 30, 1850.

³ *Correspondant*, January 25, 1850.

⁴ *Ami de la religion*, March 7, 1850.

⁵ Michel, *op. cit.*, p. 441.

episcopate was strong is revealed by the fact that the bishop of Langres abstained from voting. Nor did the opposition cease after the law had passed.

We wished to have it defeated [said the *Univers*] for we believe it bad. We have not even been able to improve it. It comes from the ballot full of all sorts of obscurities, of disadvantages, of every danger that we have pointed out. It puts the Church in a difficult and dangerous situation; it consolidates the University; it retards, for a very long time, perhaps, the day of liberty, the dawn of which we had at one time hoped to welcome.¹

They have not given us an atom of liberty [said the *National*, of the framers of the law]. Instead of obeying the constitution, which decreed liberty of instruction, M. Thiers and M. de Montalembert have done only one thing: they have taken the direction of education away from the state to give it . . . to the congregations.²

To maintain the poor and the laboring classes in ignorance, [declared the *Démocratie Pacifique*] such is the avowed purpose of the law; to put their instruction within the hands of the clergy.³

. . . the new law [said the Abbé Bautain] restricts the liberty of the Church. The Constitution of 1848 has cast one more bond of servitude; for before, the *petits séminaires* and especially the *grands* were outside the inspection of the University and dependent only upon the bishops. . . The new law submits all the ecclesiastical schools, without any exception, to the surveillance of the state exercised by the University; and nothing compensates for the added subjection. The idea of the majority who made the law has been quite simply to impede the spiritual power a little more. . .⁴

¹ *Univers*, March 17, 1850.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Moniteur catholique*, June 11, 1850.

So strong indeed was the opposition to the new law amongst the Catholics that Pius IX had to intervene in its favor. The Church, he declared, should, in the interest of Christian society, endure some sacrifice consistent with its existence and its duties.¹ Nevertheless, it was not until the congregational schools, the establishment of which the law permitted, met with success that the voice of Catholic opposition was silenced.² After ten years' experience of the law the Abbé Lacordaire could say, "The law on the liberty of instruction has been the edict of Nantes of the nineteenth century."³

The effect of the Falloux Law was quite different from what its adversaries had prophesied. It brought neither the destruction of the University nor the domination of the Church in education. Lay education continued as before. But France was soon covered with ecclesiastical schools in competition with those of the University.⁴ The Falloux Law thus broke the unity of French education which the University had attempted to establish. By splitting the French youth into two sections, each with a different orientation, the fruition of the instruction of the state and that of the Church, it continued the division that had been introduced into French life by the philosophy and the Revolution of the eighteenth century. For this reason it has been called "one of the decisive events of the nineteenth century."⁵

¹ Mourret, *L'Église contemporaine*, pt. i, p. 383; cf. Lecanuet, *op. cit.*, ii, p. 494.

² Melun, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-78.

³ Foisset, *op. cit.*, ii, p. 198; cf. Melun, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

⁴ Seignobos *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 181-182; Lavissee, *op. cit.*, pp. 149-150.

⁵ *Ibid.*

CHAPTER VIII

THE CATHOLICS AND THE COUP D'ÉTAT

LOUIS NAPOLEON once elected President of the Republic had no intention of surrendering the reins of the power at the end of four years as the Constitution required.¹ Thiers, on whom he relied for counsel, advised him "to imitate with some embellishments American simplicity."² But such a conception of his office was far from the thoughts of the new President. Almost immediately "he assumed the uniform, surrounded himself with aides-de-camps, and became the Prince President and Monsignor."³ In the addresses that from time to time he was called upon to make in various parts of the country, he spoke less as a president of a Republic than as the heir of Napoleon and of the Empire, more as a divine-right monarch than as the simple elect of the people. Speaking at Amiens on the 19th of July, 1849, he stated that he attributed the "flattering and enthusiastic" reception which he had received much more to his name than to himself. "This name", he continued, "as France was aware in giving me her suffrage, represented not only conquest and war, but also order and peace."

¹ Montalembert to Senior, Senior, *Conversations with Thiers*, i, p. 364.

² *Ibid.*, p. 43.

³ Cf. Senior, *Correspondence and Conversations of A. de Tocqueville with N. W. Senior*, i, p. 208. De Tocqueville: "He (Louis Napoleon) is essentially prince; the rôle of Washington would have had no charm for him. He has believed for twenty years that it is his destiny to be the permanent ruler of France, and his rashness is equal to his confidence."

A whole system triumphed on the 10th of December [he affirmed in his message to the legislative assembly of the 31st of October, 1849]. For the name of Napoleon is in itself an entire program. It denotes: at home, order, authority, religion, well-being of the people; abroad, national dignity. It is this policy, inaugurated by my election, which, with the support of the Assembly and that of the people, I wish to make triumphant.¹

Considering himself therefore as the heir of the Empire and as the rightful ruler of France, he posed as the savior of the country from the perils of socialism. "What is it that to-day prevents our prosperity from developing and bearing its fruits?" asked the Prince President. "It is because the characteristic of our age is to allow ourselves to be seduced by chimeras instead of attaching ourselves to reality." ²

This system of agitation [said he referring to socialism] maintains in the country unrest and distrust which create poverty. It is necessary that it cease. It is time for the good to be reassured and the wicked to tremble. The Republic has no more implacable enemies than those men who, perpetuating disorder, compel us to change France into a vast camp, our projects of amelioration and of progress into preparations for defense and strife.³

Accordingly he represented himself as the stabilizer of society; and, in order to capture the Republicans, he added the word Republic. As the first Napoleon conserved the benefits of the First Republic, so he was to secure those of the Second.

¹ *Oeuvres*, iii, Oct. 31, 1849.

² *Ibid.*, *Voyage de Rouen*, Aug. 11, 1849.

³ *Ibid.*, *Proclamation au peuple français*, June 13, 1849.

. . . . after '89, it was not for the ideas of Baboeuf or of some other such sectarian that society was overturned, but for the abolition of privileges, for equality before the law, for the admission of all to official positions. Ah well! still to-day it is not for the application of impracticable theories or of imaginary advantages that the revolution has been accomplished, but to have a government which, the result of the will of all, may be more sensitive to the needs of the people, which may be able to direct, without dynastic preoccupations, the destinies of the country.¹

Such he regarded as the "mission attached to the great name" which he bore.² "France will not perish in my hands", he was assuring the country.³

But besides seeking to curry favor by posing as the champion of society and of the Republic against socialism, Louis Napoleon sought to gain the support of the army. He realized that his ambitions could never be attained without the cooperation of the military power. Accordingly he paid court to the military instincts of the country and of France.

Here the military spirit exists still in all its strength [he declared at Saumur] and, God be praised, it is not nearly extinguished. Do not forget that this military spirit is, in times of crisis, the safeguard of the country. During the First Revolution, the Emperor said that, while all parties were dishonoring and slaying each other by their excess, the national honor took refuge in our armies. Let us then lend all our efforts to keep intact and to develop this military spirit; for, be assured, if the products of the arts and of the sciences merit our admiration, there is something that merits it more: it is the religion of duty, it is devotion to the flag.⁴

¹ *Oeuvres*, iii, p. 80.

² *Ibid.*, April 10, To Prince Napoleon Jerome.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 210, June 1, 1851, at Dijon.

⁴ *Ibid.*, *Voyage de Nantes à Saumur*, July 31, 1849.

Moreover by means of reviews, eulogies of the military feats of the grand days of the Empire, distributions to soldiers, the Prince President sought to rally the rank and file of the army to his cause. Officers who proved intractable to seduction were replaced wherever possible.¹

The support that Louis Napoleon received from the country at large and from the army was doubtless the chief factor in enabling him to overturn the Republic. But one other force of no inconsiderable importance had to be reckoned with; and that was the Church. What would its attitude be to the overthrow of republican institutions? We have seen its strength after the proclamation of the Republic and in the struggle against the radicals. We have beheld the anxiety of Louis Napoleon to capture its support in his candidacy for the Presidency, and afterwards for his rule. We have no need, therefore, to be surprised that he should seek its sanction for the destruction of the Republic. If the ecclesiastical leaders could be made to behold in him a means of accomplishing their aims, the establishment of what they regarded as the ultimate bases of society, religion, the family and property, would that not greatly aid him in rising to supreme power? Such an arch-plotter as he could not fail to perceive the advantage that would thus accrue to him. He desired the Catholics, who had already become alarmed at the progress of socialism,² to see in him the sole savior of the country from the menace that threatened it.³

¹ Seignobos, *La Revolution de 1848* (Paris, 1921), pp. 190 *et seq.*; de la Gorce, *op. cit.*, ii, pp. 360 *et seq.*, 365 *et seq.*

² "Human wisdom," said the Archbishop of Paris, "is at an end; the whole of society reels like a drunken man on the edge of the abyss; the old social order is collapsing." Barrot, *op. cit.*, iv. p. 207.

³ Mourret, Fernand, *L'Église contemporaine* (1823-1878), (Paris, 1922), p. 384.

Accordingly, we find Louis Napoleon in his various speeches throughout the country flattering the Church, and the clergy in turn recognizing in him the bulwark of society. "Let us establish the religious principle", declared he, "without abandoning any of the gains of the revolution, and we shall save the country in spite of the parties, the ambitions and even the imperfections which our institutions may contain."¹ At Troyes, whither he had gone at the end of April, 1849, to distribute flags to the National Guard, the bishop, Monseigneur Coeur, "addressed and flattered him as though he already had the crown on his head."²

These flags which you are about to receive [said the bishop to the National Guard] have been blessed in the presence of the elect of the nation, the nephew of the Emperor whose name is for France the symbol of order, of victory and of public prosperity, in the presence of the elect of the nation, who in a few months has won the esteem of the whole of Europe and who has justified the votes and the hopes of France by the wisdom of his government. . . . If the country should one day be threatened, recollect, and it will make you invincible, that the hopes and votes of France have been held by the nephew of the Emperor; for there is in the blood of heroes a secret and mysterious virtue that communicates itself to all that it touches.

The President then profusely thanked the bishop for his flattery.³ In the beginning of June 1850, Louis Napoleon opened the railway from Creil to Saint-Quentin. At the latter place his first act was to attend the Cathedral to hear Mass. The bishop of Soissons, who received him, welcomed him with an address :

¹ *Oeuvres*, iii. Message to the legislative assembly, Oct. 31, 1849.

² Barrot, *op. cit.*, iii, p. 248.

³ Thirria, H., *Napoléon iii avant l'empire*, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1895), ii, p. 69.

This act of faith honors you [he declared] In wishing to hallow this occasion by homage rendered to God, you have once more shown how much you are always pleased to seek the help of heaven in all that which can contribute to the honor and to the happiness of France. "Monseigneur" [replied the Prince] "with you I realize more and more that the power of religion is indispensable for establishing the welfare of the country. I am delighted that you have no objection to blessing my efforts, and I beseech you to supplicate heaven for their success."¹

At Rheims the Archbishop complimented him and thanked him for the service which he had rendered order and religion. Louis Napoleon replied by saying that he could be counted on to honor religion, and to defend the equally sacred cause of society, of civilization and of order.² On the 3rd of September the President set out for a naval review at Cherbourg. At Evreux, en route, the bishop, Monseigneur Olivier, informed him that "France, in offering him its acknowledgment, merely performed an act of gratitude.

Religion and the family [he replied] are, with authority and order, the bases of all durable society. The constant aim of my efforts is to consolidate these essential elements of the welfare and of the prosperity of the country. I am pleased with the cooperation of all the eminent men of the country and with yours in particular. I thank you for the assurance which you give me in the name of your clergy, whose good will I appreciate.³

At Caen the bishop of Bayeux said: "If heaven grant our desires, Monsignor, religion and France will forever bless your government. . . ."⁴ In the Cathedral at Coutances

¹ Thirria, *op. cit.*, ii, pp. 224-225.

² *Ibid.*, p. 300.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 305.

⁴ *Oeuvres*, iii, p. 152; Thirria, *op. cit.*, ii, p. 306.

the bishop congratulated France and religion on the advent of Louis Napoleon, and announced that it was the wish of the clergy that he should retain his power.¹ On the 25th of October, 1850, Louis Napoleon presided, in the Chapel of Saint-Cloud, at the ceremony of conferring the Cardinal's hat on the Apostolic Nuncio, and on the Archbishops of Toulouse, Rheims and Besançon. In addressing the clergy he requested them not to forget him in their prayers. To the Ablegate he said:

. . . . I have seen with an extreme satisfaction his Holiness allot three Cardinal's hats to France. It is a new proof of the especial esteem of the Sovereign Pontiff for the French clergy, this clergy always so marked by its merit, its virtues and its devotion to the great principles on which the Catholic religion rests. I esteem it an honor to preside at a ceremony where the spiritual power shows itself in perfect accord with the temporal. . . . I beseech your excellency to place at the feet of the Head of the Church the sincere acknowledgment of my veneration.²

On the 6th of July, 1851, he visited Beauvais to unveil a statue of Jeanne Hachette. His first act there was to visit the Cathedral where he was greeted by the bishop, Monseigneur Gignoux.

On entering this city so honored by your presence [said the bishop] your first step is for God whom you come to worship in his temple, your first word one of prayer, your first act one of homage paid to the ancient and holy law of the Sabbath. May you be blessed because of this noble example. Whatever the future may be, the Church shall repeat with pleasure that under your government the august

¹ Thirria, *op. cit.*, ii, p. 308.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 349-350.

head of Catholicism has been restored to the capital of the Christian world, and education has been freed from the restrictions that prevented the development so necessary for religious principles. . . .¹

Thus did Louis Napoleon prepare for the support of the Catholics when the time should come for him to overthrow the Republic. As a consequence, and because of the fear that, in the event of a new presidential election, socialism would again embroil the country, the Catholics stood, in the main, for some revision of the Constitution which would leave the power in his hands. It is true that Louis Veuillot and the *Univers* at first inclined towards the legitimist cause, in the hope that the time had come for a new restoration;² but on being assured by one Romieu, a familiar of the President, that the Prince favored the repeal of the Falloux Law and the destruction of the last vestiges of the monopoly held by the University, the editor of the *Univers* decided to support him in achieving his ambition.³ Accordingly, that paper declared that Louis Napoleon was, "by force of circumstances", the man who seemed the "most capable of presiding over the reconstruction of the country", that he was the chosen head, "the generalissimo of the great army of order", and that without him this army would soon break up into factions.⁴ Montalembert, likewise seeing in Louis Napoleon the sole means of safety, favored the revision of the Constitution, although he did not take part in the debate on that question in the Assembly.⁵ Lacking, however, the three-fourth majority vote required by the Constitution, the project for revision was defeated.

¹ Thirria, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 489.

² Lecanuet, *Montalembert*, iii, p. 8.

³ Veuillot, *Louis Veuillot*, ii, pp. 453-454.

⁴ Thirria, *op. cit.*, ii, p. 517; *Univers* of July 24, 1851.

⁵ Lecanuet, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

After the defeat of the proposed revision, Louis Napoleon suggested the abrogation of the Law of the 31st of May, which had restricted universal suffrage. In September, 1851, he advocated the dissolution of the Assembly, the withdrawal of the Law of the 31st of May, and an immediate appeal to the people. His ministers, however opposed and resigned. Montalembert wrote Napoleon a letter urging him to adopt a more conciliatory tone.

Right or wrong [he declared] the law of the 31st of May is regarded as the flag of the Party of Order; it has been opposed only by a few legitimists who are blind admirers of universal suffrage, and by the unanimous vote of the revolutionary party. It is with the latter that you will henceforth range yourself. You believe that the law of the 31st of May has greatly diminished the number of electors disposed to vote for you. That, in my estimation, is an error. Two-thirds of those whom this law has affected do not bother to vote, and remain at home. The other third will always vote for the "red" candidate, and it is repugnant to me to think that you would ever be that.¹

Louis Napoleon replied that he "never changed" his principles.² Accordingly, in the first session of the Assembly after the summer recess, the 4th of November, the President placed before it a request for the repeal of the law in question. The Assembly appointed a committee to consider the proposal. The committee, however, rejected it, and delegated Montalembert to conciliate the President by offering him a compromise. But this Napoleon refused to accept. "Remember Charles X", cautioned Montalembert. "I am not a Bourbon, but a Bonaparte", was the retort. The Assembly likewise rejected the proposal by a majority of 3.³

¹ Lecanuet, *op. cit.*, iii, p. 26.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

Louis Napoleon had thus thrown the onus of the law of the 31st of May upon the Assembly, and posed as the champion of popular rights. It was a clever stroke intended to win him popularity.

The *Coup d'État* was now inevitable; and the date for its execution was set for the morning of the 2nd of December, 1851, the anniversary of the battle of Austerlitz. Although expected by everyone, the details and the time of execution were imparted to five confidants only.¹ Was the attitude of the Catholics to be as favorable towards this event as it had been towards the revision of the Constitution? Louis Napoleon must have been as morally certain of it as he was of the support of the army and of the country at large. On the 2nd of December the Assembly was suppressed, and Louis Napoleon, in a proclamation which announced the restoration of universal suffrage, called for a plebiscite on the basis of a Constitution of his own manufacture, the main points of which were emblazoned in placards posted up all over Paris.

The attitude of the vast majority of the Catholics was expressed by Louis Veillot in the *Univers* some days preceding the *Coup d'État*. "Those who believe", he stated, "that M. Bonaparte can be replaced by a legitimist or by a quasi-legitimist king . . . are endowed with a confidence to which everything gives the lie, a confidence which we do not possess. After Bonaparte President, there is no possible mean between Bonaparte Emperor and the social Republic."² In order to avert the latter disaster, Catholic leaders were willing to permit "Caesarism", which was merely a lesser evil, to obtain its sway.

After the *Coup d'État* this attitude was even more strongly expressed.

It was seventy leagues from Paris [wrote Louis Veillot]

¹ Fisher, H. A. L., *Bonapartism* (Oxford, 1914), p. 139.

² *Univers*, November 25, 1851.

that we received the news of the events of the 2nd of December. It has been accepted as a necessity long since foreseen. . . . There is no opportunity for choice, recrimination or deliberation. It is necessary to sustain the government, for its cause is that of social order. It is necessary to sustain the government now while the struggle is on, in order to gain the right to counsel it later. Still more to-day than before the 2nd of December we say to the men of order: the President of the Republic is your general; do not separate yourself from him, do not desert him. If you do not triumph with him, you will be vanquished with him, and irreparably vanquished. Rally to-day; to-morrow will be too late either for your safety or for your honor.¹

And in order that the Catholics might the more readily lend him their support, Louis Napoleon decreed that the Church of St. Genevieve [the Pantheon] should be restored to Catholic worship.²

After the *Coup d'État* the question that confronted France was the plebiscite which Louis Napoleon had called for the 20th of December. What attitude were the Catholics to take towards this appeal to the country? We shall let the leaders speak for themselves.

The twentieth or the twenty-first of the month [wrote the bishop of Chartres] the French people will decide whether Louis Bonaparte shall be for ten years the President of our country. The "Yes or "No" written by all the citizens on their ballots will decide this question, the consequences of which are infinite. Impelled by your own views, and still more by the love of country, of which Jesus Christ has given us the example, you will sign "Yes", I do not doubt. Providence gives us at this moment only this means of safety. It is evident that if Bonaparte were rejected, France would

¹ *Univers*, December 5, 1851.

² *Ibid.*, December 8, 1851.

find no one to take his place. The people, deceived by intrigues and by false suggestions, might make a detestable choice, which would plunge our country into new and incomparable misfortunes.¹

“There is no middle course possible to-day”, declared the bishop of Mans, “between the power asked of France by Prince Louis Napoleon Bonaparte and anarchy pushed to the very last degree of cruelty and of folly. In the face of this imperious position, no one, therefore, can be permitted to abstain.”² “The bishop of Mans understands perfectly well”, commented the *Constitutionnel* on his mandate, “that the question is still a social rather than a political one.”³ A circular was sent to the clergy of the diocese of Saint-Brieuc, which, purporting to come from the bishop, urged them to abstain from voting for Louis Napoleon. The bishop at once denied its authenticity, and informed his clergy that they would do well to read the letter of the bishop of Chartres.⁴

I find in the papers to-day [said the bishop of Chalons] the letter of Monseigneur the bishop of Chartres, who counsels his clergy to vote in favor of our President, the prince Louis Napoleon. He has in that only expressed the thought of all good men, of all the bishops. . . . From the outset my opinion was known throughout the diocese, and that fact has made me abstain from publishing it abroad, and from saying plainly what has been so well understood, that from thence [i. e. the vote for Napoleon] hangs the safety of France, our dear country.⁵

¹ *Univers*, December 15, 1851.

² *Ibid.*, December 17, 1851.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, December 14, 20.

Montalembert wrote two letters to the *Univers* in which he made the support of Louis Napoleon the sole means of safety, and urged the Catholics to champion this destroyer of the Republican Constitution.

Observe [he began] that I preach neither absolute confidence nor unlimited devotion; I give myself unreservedly to no one. I do not make an idol out of armed force any more than I do out of the reason of the people. I confine myself to searching for the good within the domain of the possible, and to choosing amid the tribulations by means of which God tries us, the rôle that is least unworthy of the dignity of the Christian and of the good sense of the citizen. If Louis Napoleon were unknown, I should indeed hesitate to confer so much power and responsibility upon him. But, without entering here into an appreciation of his policy during the past three years, I recall the great religious achievements that have marked his government. Accord between the two powers has continued; liberty of instruction has been guaranteed; the Pope has been restored by French arms; the Church has been put in possession of her councils, her synods, the fulness of her dignity; and she has beheld the number of her colleges, of her convents, of her works of salvation and of charity gradually increase. I seek in vain apart from him a system, a force, that shall be able to guarantee us comparable benefits. I behold only the yawning gulf of irresistible socialism. My choice is made. I am for authority against revolt, for conservation against destruction, for society against socialism, for the possible liberty of the good against the certain liberty of evil. And in the great struggle between the two forces that divide the world, I believe, in acting thus, to be still, to-day as always, for Catholicism against the Revolution.¹

I begin by stating [said Montalembert in his second letter] that the deed of the 2nd of December has routed all the re-

¹ *Univers*, December 10, 1851.

volutionaries, all the socialists, all the bandits of France and of Europe. That is, in my opinion, a more than sufficient reason why all honest men should rejoice, and why all the most antagonistic amongst them should be resigned. . . . To vote against Louis Napoleon is to side with the socialistic revolution, the sole possible heir, at the present time, of the existing government. It is to invoke the dictatorship of the "reds" to take the place of the dictatorship of a prince, who, for three years, has rendered incomparable service to the cause of order and of Catholicism.

To abstain from voting, he said, was to deny all their antecedents, to fail in their duty, and to abdicate the mission of honest men when that mission was most needful and most capable of doing good. Moreover the instinct of the masses was for Louis Napoleon. He would be, in 1852 as in 1848, the elect of the nation.

That being so [declared Montalembert] I aver that there is nothing more imprudent, I will say nothing more insane, in a country like ours, than for religious men and the friends of order to place themselves athwart or aside from the popular will, when that will contains nothing contrary to the law of God or to the fundamental constitution of society.

For those who were Catholics before all else, who had always professed that religion and society could accommodate themselves to all forms of government which reason and the Catholic faith did not preclude, he could find no motive or excuse that would justify their "voluntary annihilation."

There remains therefore [said Montalembert] the third course: the affirmative vote. But to vote for Louis Napoleon does not entail approval of all he has done; it is to choose between him and the total ruin of France. That does not imply that his government is the kind that we prefer above all others:

it simply means that we prefer a prince who has given proof of his resolution and ability to those who have shown up their character by murder and pillage. We shall not thus confuse the Catholic cause with that of a party or of a family; but we shall arm the temporal power, the only possible power to-day, with the force necessary to subdue the army of crime, to defend our churches, our hearths, our wives, against those whose lust respects nothing. . . .¹

These letters of Montalembert met with instant approval, the most noteworthy of which was that of Abbé Gerbet, vicar-general of Amiens, who was himself in sympathy with the Social-Catholic Movement.

I have just read with a great satisfaction the wise and patriotic counsels that are contained in your letter to the *Univers* [he wrote].² At such a critical moment this letter, which cannot fail to make a profound impression on the Catholics who have been accustomed for a long time to see you march at their head, is a new and signal service which you have just rendered religion and society. I needs must congratulate you for it, and congratulate myself for being entirely in accord with you in the manner of appreciating the present situation, and of understanding the duties which it imposes. . . . the defeat of socialism is a conspicuous service rendered to the whole of Catholicism. The *Coups d'État* of God hide themselves beneath the *Coups d'État* of men.

Cardinal Bonald, Archbishop of Lyons, likewise heartily approved the attitude of the *Univers* and of Montalembert. On the 19th of December he wrote to Louis Veuillot:

Amid the difficult circumstances in which we are situated, Monsieur, you have understood your duty and you have done it. You have, from the first moment, followed the line that

¹ *Univers*, December 14, 1851.

² *Ibid.*, December 18, 1851. The letter is addressed to Montalembert.

religion, sane politics and good sense indicate. Moreover your first words after the event [i. e. the *Coup d'État*] have been received with a marked satisfaction. They have encouraged some, they have shown others the only direction to take. . . . I hope . . . that the great majority of electors will vote well, and that they will not desire to surrender France to the most hideous barbarism, because it is the product of impiety. Our country districts, which are very peaceable, will not vote for anarchy. They have learned with joy the news of the events of Paris.¹

Yes, Monsieur [wrote the bishop of Poitiers to the editor of the *Univers*] you are right: we are between the sword and the knife; it is the inevitable dilemma of the moment. But the sword only makes the wicked tremble while the knife is sharpened against all good men. When God places honest men in face of such an alternative the matter of conscience becomes much more easy for them to resolve. . . . My clergy know that I regard every negative vote as a premium given directly to the party that wishes to burn the churches and to assassinate the priests.²

"Heaven", said Pius IX of the *Coup d'État*, "has just paid the debt of the Church towards France."³

The plebiscite which ended on the 21st of December, by a vote of 7,145,393 against 592,506,⁴ supported the *Coup d'État* and prolonged Louis Napoleon's term of office for ten years. In order to associate the Catholics with his triumph he issued a request to all the bishops to celebrate it by a *Te Deum* in every Cathedral Church.⁵ At the reception of the *Corps diplomatique* and of the clergy of Paris, the Archbishop expressed the congratulations and the alleg-

¹ Veuillot, *Louis Veuillot*, ii, pp. 472-473.

² *Ibid.*, p. 474.

³ *Univers*, January 7, 1852.

⁴ These figures are from Seignobos, *op. cit.*, p. 215.

⁵ *Univers*, January 1, 1852.

iance of his clergy. "We shall pray God fervently", he affirmed, "for the success of the high mission that has been confided to you, for the peace and prosperity of the Republic, for the harmony and concord of all citizens." Louis Napoleon in turn thanked the Archbishop for his desire "to put under divine protection" the acts which were inspired by the sentiment which these words had suggested: 'Let the good be reassured and the wicked tremble.'"¹ The senior member of the Clergy of Paris, the venerable curé of St. Nicolas, on congratulating the President said: "I am happy, Monsignor, to say to you with the prophet: 'The work of the Lord shall prevail in spite of all things.'"² "A double duty is imposed on us", said the bishop of Quimper when the result of the plebiscite had been ascertained: "To thank God for the return of peace; to request, for the man into whose hands France has just entrusted her destinies, the spirit of insight, of wisdom and of strength, that he may respond to the marvelous proof of the national confidence."³ "God has blessed", said the bishop of Olger," the prince who has saved Rome and the great nation which has cooperated with such a religious enthusiasm, to the reestablishment of the Vicar of Jesus Christ in his temporal power."⁴

Not only, however, did many of the leaders in the Church heartily support the *Coup d'État*, but some even went so far as to reject representative government.

The ballot of the 20th of December is now known, and its meaning is no more doubtful than the result [declared Louis Veuillot]. As on the 10th of December, 1848, the people con-

¹ *Univers*, January 2, 3, 1852.

² *Ibid.*

³ January 1, 1852; *Univers*, January 9, 1852.

⁴ *Univers*, January 15.

sulted declare that they wish to be governed. That is the cry that goes forth from the bowels of the nation. . . . In the two great acclamations of December, 1848, and December, 1851, we perceive, as it were, a résumé of our entire history. France is anarchical only by occasion, by error, by subterfuge. It is a country of authority and of unity. It is strong, proud and free only under a chief in whom it feels itself live, and who personifies it in the midst of the affairs and of the interests of the world. Its good sense informs it that several hands are not necessary to hold the sword, nor several heads to bear its doctrine. All that divides it against itself is hateful to it, repugnant to its nature, contrary to its mission. It will reject Parliamentarism as it has rejected Protestantism, or perish in struggling to vomit it forth.¹

The climax of this reactionary doctrine was reached by the Abbé Jules Morel in an article entitled *Du Libre Examen* which he contributed to the *Univers*.² "Why is it", he asked, "that deliberating assemblies, which make and exalt other nations, destroy ours in so short a time?" And he answered: because France is a "country of free thought." Frenchmen push their ideas to the extreme, and make of an Assembly "a school of anarchy, an arena of gladiators and a tower of Babel." The parliamentary form of government was therefore unsuited to the genius of the French.

But not all accepted the *Coup d'État* with the enthusiasm of the *Univers* and of Montalembert and their following. The *Ami de la Religion* endeavored to be neutral, and accepted the political event with little comment. "In civil discord", it declared, "the Church is neither amongst the conquerors nor the conquered: it prays for all, it intercedes for peace and, at need, as the illustrious Archbishop of Paris, it throws itself between the combatants and spills

¹ *Univers*, December 26, 27, 1851.

² February 8, 1852.

even its last drop of blood in order to allay fratricidal strife.”¹ A like attitude was adopted by the *Correspondant*. Religion ought not to compromise itself in the “troubles of politics”. “On the contrary, the more religion shall remain distinct from the vicissitudes of affairs, the more it will be not only respected, but influential.” “Ah, that at last in the universal tribulation the Catholics should not have to reproach themselves with having opened the way for a more intimate union of its forces with those of the state.”² Some of the bishops likewise cautioned reserve. Dupanloup, then bishop of Orleans, advised Montalembert, who had consulted him, not to approve the *Coup d’État* “with éclat”.³ He desired to remove himself far from all political strife and give himself solely to the “work of God”. When, after the plebiscite of the 20th of December, the President issued a request to the bishops for their prayers on his behalf, Dupanloup simply transmitted this to his clergy as an official communication without comment or instruction.⁴ The bishop of Gap advised his clergy that their mission was one “of prayer, of conciliation and of peace.” “Men of God” they were not to mingle in the “tumults of the public square.” They were to remember that “the priest was a man of no party”, “that he owed his ministry to men of every opinion, that the first obligation that was imposed on him in those difficult times was to conduct himself with that wisdom and moderation truly pastoral which . . . would gain for him the respect and the confidence of all.”⁵

¹ *Ami de la religion*, January 3, 1852.

² *Correspondant*, March 25, 1852.

³ Lagrange, *Dupanloup*, ii, p. 207.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ami de la religion*, December 27, 1851.

Nor did the Social Catholic Party approve the *Coup d'État*. Amand de Melun, arrested and imprisoned with other members of the legislature on the morning of the *Coup d'État*, retired to private life.¹ Arnaud [de l'Ariège] went into exile with other republicans because of his opinions.² Ozanam, because of ill-health, had already ceased to participate in public affairs. The Abbé Lacordaire saw in the overthrow of the Constitution "a great public calamity."³ The Abbé Maret "submitted without approving" the *Coup d'État*.⁴ He went into retirement until after the plebiscite, and then gave himself up to his philosophical studies.

The situation of the Catholics who could not support Louis Napoleon was a difficult one. They feared to voice their disapproval, knowing well that a hostile government could greatly hamper the work of the Church. They therefore maintained a discreet silence, refraining from participation in politics, or accepting the new regime as a *fait accompli*.

Nevertheless, because of the enthusiastic support of those who approved the government, and the silent submission of those who were hostile, the Church appeared as a bulwark of the new order. "Almost all", said Eugène Veuillot of the bishops, "ratified in practice this dictum of Monseigneur Menjand, bishop of Nancy: 'The President has departed from legality in order to enter into the right.'"⁵ We may therefore accept the testimony of de Melun:

¹ *Mémoires*, ii, p. 104.

² Bazin, *op. cit.*, i, p. 390.

³ Foisset, *Vie de Lacordaire*, ii, p. 230.

⁴ Bazin, *op. cit.*, p. 287.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, ii, p. 475.

The vast majority of the episcopate, deceived by the promises of the Empire, as M. de Montalembert had been, won over by the counsels of the *Univerts* and by the very legitimate desire to obtain the support and the assistance of the government, gave to the new order of things a very prompt adhesion. The clergy in fact had been alarmed by the menaces and by the doctrines of those whom they called the "reds", and against which the dictatorship of Napoleon would assure an energetic repression.¹

Moreover the attitude of the President towards liberty of instruction and the temporal power of the Pope led them to believe that his rule would best safeguard the interests of the Church. The Church was thus made one of the instruments that enabled Louis Napoleon to found the Second Empire.

¹ *Mémoires*, ii, p. 104; cf. Mourret, *op. cit.*, p. 385; Louis Napoleon was "the great man who had restored Pius IX to his see."

CONCLUSION

VARIOUS factors had tended to rally the Catholics to the support of Louis Napoleon and of the Empire. The doctrines of socialism had created widespread alarm. Socialistic propaganda and agitation combined with an unwieldy constitution had brought the Republic into disrepute. On the other hand Louis Napoleon had assiduously courted the favor of the Catholics. He had lost no opportunity of insinuating that his rule would be beneficial to the best interests of the Church. The Roman Expedition, in spite of his letter to Edgar Ney, had resulted in an increase of popularity for him. His attitude towards liberty of instruction, notwithstanding the hostility which the Falloux Law had aroused amongst the ultra-Catholics, had gained him adherents. Moreover, during the first years of the Empire, conciliatory measures were enacted which were calculated to strengthen this Catholic support. They were offered a greater control of education than the Falloux Law had assured them;¹ their budget of worship was increased; the multiplication of religious orders was encouraged; and the affairs of the Church in general were prospered.²

But the enthusiasm with which the most influential part, if not the majority, of the Catholics had hailed the *Coup d'État* and the proclamation of the Empire exceeded the bounds of all propriety. Led by Louis Veillot and the *Univers*, they applauded the suppression of liberty, rejected

¹ Weill, G., *Histoire de l'enseignement secondaire*, p. 129.

² Lavissee, *Histoire de France Contemporaine*, vol. vi, p. 391.

parliamentary government,¹ declared Catholicism inconsistent with the Revolution and its principles, and exalted the Empire as the highest expression of Roman civilization.²

Some, however, did not share this attitude of the *Univers* and of its following towards the Empire, and it soon aroused a reaction towards liberalism on the part of others. Lacordaire was, and remained, hostile towards the Empire. He did not believe that despotism had ever saved anything.³ After the *Coup d'État*, Dupanloup, bishop of Orleans adopted an attitude of reserve towards the new power. The day after the proclamation of the Empire, the 3rd of December, 1852, he issued a mandate entitled *La Liberté de l'Église*, by which he sought to prevent his clergy from acclaiming "Caesarism". He reminded them that Napoleon I had begun by desiring to exalt the Church and had ended by persecuting it.⁴ He did not wish to foment opposition to the Empire, but he sought to encourage the Catholics "to flatter no party, to abuse no misfortune." Montalembert applauded this stand, and wrote Dupanloup that, in his estimation, it placed him "at the head of the French episcopate." Indeed the repressive measures of the Empire and the intransigence of Louis Veuillot had aroused the disgust of the former leader of the *Parti-Catholique*, and in September, 1852, he expressed his views in a brochure entitled, *Les Intérêts Catholiques au XIXe Siècle*. It was a plea for liberty; not liberty without restrictions, but liberty regulated, liberty kept within bounds. In the existing state of Europe he declared that representative government was "the only possible form of political liberty".⁵ The repre-

¹ Lecanuet, *Montalembert*, iii, p. 89.

² Foisset, *Lacordaire*, ii, p. 254.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 262.

⁴ Lagrange, *Dupanloup*, ii, p. 211.

⁵ Lecanuet, *op. cit.*, iii, pp. 69 *et seq.*

sentative regime, he believed, was also more advantageous for the Church. Nothing could be more disastrous for her than a despotism that seemed to be exercised with the support of religion. He reminded the Catholics of the unpopularity which they had brought on themselves in 1830 by their alliance with the old monarchy, the popularity which their independent attitude toward Louis-Philippe and his government had created, and he protested against "the sacrifice of liberty to force under the plea of religion".¹ "The cause of despotism is a lost cause", he declared. "Woe betide those who wish to chain the immortal interests of religion to this broken idol."² Between the two extremes, a systematic opposition and an undignified submission, he urged the Catholics to maintain a position of reserve and independence.

The excess of the *Univers* and of the ultra-Catholic party which it represented aroused alarm amongst those who perceived the contempt that it was bringing upon the Church. Monseigneur Guibert, bishop of Viviers, publicly advised his clergy not to read the intransigent journal. He acknowledged the talent and the zeal of the party that cooperated in its production, but declared that they were bringing trouble upon the Church which they sought to serve. They manifested a desire to humiliate their adversaries rather than to bring them to the way of truth.³ Monseigneur Sibour, the Archbishop of Paris, in congratulating Montalembert on the position which he had adopted by "stigmatizing" the ultra-Catholic party, condemned those who, "each morning, heaped anathema upon liberty", "deified absolutism", "made it the very ideal of government", and "refused all right in politics to the people." "The

¹ Lecanuet, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

² *Ibid.*, p. 74.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 102-103.

fanaticism of the *Univers*", said another bishop, "has done more harm to religion than that of Voltaire".¹ Some of the most eminent Catholic laymen also resented the attitude of the *Univers*. Melun, Corcelle, Falloux, Foisset, Beugnot, Riancey and others perceived that it was paralysing the *rapprochement* of religion and society that had been in progress for nearly half a century, that it was making the Church unpopular, and that it was preparing a reaction. "I never read the *Univers*", said M. Lefevre-Pontalis to a friend, "because I desire to remain a Christian". "And I", was the reply, "read the *Univers* every day because I do not wish to become a Christian."²

Amongst the first to perceive peril for the Church in an alliance with the Empire was the Abbé Maret, one of the former editors of the *Ère Nouvelle*. A few weeks before the proclamation of the Empire, October 25th, 1852, he advised the Archbishop of Paris to assume an independent attitude towards the new government.

The Empire [he declared] means absolute power with all its deplorable consequences. If the clergy, through its representatives, the French cardinals and the Archbishop of Paris, concur with the resurrection and the foundation of absolute power, what will be the result? First of all, the lie will plainly be given to the maxims of liberty and of progress professed for more than twenty years by the majority of the clergy and of the Catholics. These maxims and this attitude have contributed not a little to the progress of religion . . . and ushered in an era of reconciliation of faith with science, of religion with liberty, of Catholicism with legitimate progress. . . . But a new alliance of the Church with an absolute and despotic power means the rupture of this so necessary reconciliation. This rupture will occur amid the

¹ Lecanuet, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

² *Ibid.*, p. 102.

most unfortunate circumstances. Pius IX has abandoned his first policy and his glorious work of universal regeneration by means of concord between religion and liberty. All the blind and selfish partizans of the past within the Church have obtained a hearing and influence. Beside them a school has been formed which dogmatizes while they act, and through its papers and books proclaims every day the absolute incompatibility of Catholicism with modern society as a whole. The theocratic system of the Middle Ages is for them the ideal and the perfect expression of Catholicism. All that which the people love and invoke under the name of progress of reason, of philosophy, of the sciences, of society, in a word, all that which one calls the legitimate conquests of the French Revolution appears injurious and worthy of condemnation. They perceive there only the agency of the genius of evil.

The unenlightened and undiscerning conduct of a numerous part of the clergy, which tends to confirm the so-called incompatibility of the Church with modern society, will make a multitude of persons, friends of science and of liberty, renounce forever the Christian and Catholic faith. A defection such as the world perhaps has never known, a new apostasy of nations, is silently being prepared and marking the way for practical atheism and for socialistic materialism. The atheistic socialists know very well that there is an incompatibility between modern society and Catholicism such as a certain school present it.

Such is the situation, which is full of peril for the Church and for society. What weight will the vote of the clergy in favor of the reestablishment of absolute power have in weighing the destinies of the world? One does not fear to say: it will be baneful, it will be disastrous . . . because it will prove that the Catholics have not been sincere in their professions in favor of liberty . . . because it will render reconciliation impossible, because it will yield the day to the omnipresent detractors of the Church. . . . If the clergy fall into the most clever trap that has ever been laid for them,

faith may be lost in this old Europe of ours. Great evil has already been done. It will then be consummated.¹

For some years after the establishment of the Empire the Abbé Maret watched the conduct of the ultra-Catholic party in silence;² but on the 4th of December, 1857, he addressed to the Minister of Worship a memorial on the state of religion in France.³ Its purpose was to point out "the moral, social and political dangers" into which the ultra-Catholic party were leading France and the Church. He denounced them as seeking to inaugurate a theocracy such as had "never been completely realized even in the Middle Ages", which was their "ideal politic". Regarding this "theocracy" or a "state religion" as the ideal condition of the relation of the Church with society, they rejected the gains of the French Revolution "as a sort of apostasy of nations". Even the history of the Restoration had not been a "salutary admonition" to them. Consequently the efforts of the ultra-Catholic party were serving only to compromise the cause which it sought to sustain and to injure the Church which it believed it was serving.⁴

The ultra-Catholic party, it is true, constituted the majority "neither in the episcopate, nor amongst the enlightened priests. "There was even a majority against it, but this majority was "without unity and organization."

Because of this want of *entente* and concert [said the Abbé Maret] the members of this majority are timid and hesitating in face of a turbulent and audacious minority. They do not dare come forward or express their views, and they are in dread of attracting the hostility of a party which they fear.

¹ Bazin, *Vie de Mgr. Maret*, ii, pp. 392 *et seq.*

² *Ibid.*, p. 24.

³ This memorial is given in Bazin, *op. cit.*, ii, pp. 25 *et seq.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

Thus this party, which never retreats, has opposed to it only isolated individuals.¹

But its strength, he declared, was at Rome rather than in France.

The effect of the propaganda of the ultra-Catholics was as deplorable as the most clear-sighted of their opponents within the Church prophesied. Those who were inclined to be hostile to the Church fitted all Catholics indiscriminately into the ultra-Catholic mould. To the radicals the Roman Catholic Church appeared the great enemy of liberty.² The alliance between Catholicism and democracy of which many had dreamed in 1848 seemed to the philosophical republicans of 1852 to be a delusion.³ The support given by many of the clergy to the *Coup d'État* seemed to them to demonstrate the necessity of a union between the throne and the altar, and the impossibility of overturning the one without destroying the other. Some indeed, such as Arnaud [de l'Ariège], clung to their old creed, and looked for a Catholicism that should be reformed, liberal and separated from theocracy.⁴ Others, such as Jules Favre, adopted a deism after the eighteenth-century fashion. Some, such as Jules Simon, did not directly attack Catholicism.⁵ Others, such as Vacherot and Edgar Quinet, denounced it as the ally of despotism.⁶ Already were heard mutterings that presaged the battle-cry of the Third Republic: "Clericalism! There is the enemy."⁷

¹ Bazin, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

² Weill, *Le Parti républicain*, p. 430.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 431.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 446.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 447, 449.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 430; cf. Hanotaux, G., *Contemporary France* (London, 1903), 4 vols., vol. i, p. 504.

But if the support which Catholics gave Louis Napoleon compromised the interests of the Church, the desire to retain that support created difficulties for the Emperor.

The attitude of Louis Napoleon towards the Papacy, it has been pointed out, was assumed for the purpose of winning him the support of the Catholics. The Roman Expedition was, in this respect, a success. It helped to rally many Catholics to the Empire. Even as late as 1858 Louis Napoleon was the Saint Louis of the nineteenth century who had restored the Papacy.¹ But the outcome of the Roman Expedition had, in one sense, been a defeat for the President of the Republic. His letter to Edgar Ney was disregarded. It was a humiliation which he could not endure in silence, and he avenged himself by dismissing the Barrot ministry. Indeed his whole Italian policy was characterized by a desire to ride two horses at once, to satisfy the aspirations of the Italian nationalists, and to hold the support of the French Catholics by sustaining the temporal power of the Papacy. It was a policy which no one, perhaps, could have carried to a successful termination, and certainly not a Louis Napoleon.

During the first few years of the Empire Louis Napoleon took no active steps to satisfy the Italians, and the republicans reproached him with not having fulfilled his oath towards Italy. But in 1858 an incident occurred which was to stimulate him to action. On the 14th of January, 1858, Felice Orsini, an Italian who, in 1849, had been an agent of Mazzini, made an attempt on the Emperor's life. The first effect was one of anger at the Italians; and the government demanded that Piedmont curb the radicals who had taken refuge in Turin. But before his execution, Orsini obtained permission to have his counsel, Jules Favre, read a letter in court which concluded with an appeal to the Em-

¹ Lecanuet, *op. cit.*, iii, p. 197.

peror to render Italy its freedom.¹ This incident became the starting-point of an Italian policy which was in keeping with the Emperor's nationalistic ideas. In July, 1858, he entered into the pact of Plombières, by which he pledged Cavour his support in a war against Austria. In the early part of 1859 there appeared a brochure entitled *Napoléon III et l'Italie* by La Guéronnière, which if not actually dictated by Louis Napoleon, contained his ideas, and was intended to prepare public opinion for action. It emphasized the necessity of giving satisfaction to the aspirations of the Italian nationalists as over against the treaties of 1815, and declared: "The confederation of the Italian states signifies a pacified Italy, a Papacy consolidated and elevated to the height of its mission, and a Europe freed from a real peril which can disturb it profoundly." The general interest therefore should lead to the expulsion of Austria from Lombardy.² In May, 1859, hostilities commenced which ended in the cession of Lombardy to Piedmont.

The Emperor's policy throughout, however, was a two-fold one. The solidarity of the support which the Catholics gave his rule made him shrink from alienating them.³ For this reason he still clung to Gioberti's idea of an Italy federated under the presidency of the Pope.⁴ A confederation of Italian states, into which the Pope should enter as a temporal ruler, and over which he should preside, was the only solution, he believed, that would satisfy the demands both of the Catholics and of the Italian nationalists.⁵ The fear of losing the Catholic support to his rule was also

¹ Mourret, *L'Eglise contemporaine*, part i, p. 452.

² *Napoléon iii et l'Italie* (Paris, 1859), pp. 60-61.

³ Mourret, *op. cit.*, p. 456.

⁴ *Cf. supra*, p. 212.

⁵ La Guéronnière, *op. cit.*, pp. 46 et seq.

doubtless one of the reasons that prompted him to negotiate the premature peace of Villafranca [July, 1859], which left Austria still in control of Venice and so greatly disappointed Cavour.¹

But however much Napoleon might desire to safeguard the temporal power, the struggle against Austria inevitably kindled a flame which he was unable to keep within bounds. The idea of confederation was no longer popular in Italy. The duchies of Parma, Modena and Tuscany having driven out their rulers, refused to receive them back, and clamored for annexation to Piedmont. Romagna almost immediately broke away from the Papacy. Umbria and the Marches soon followed, likewise joining in the cry for union with Piedmont. By the end of 1860 all that was left of the States of the Church was a narrow strip of territory including Rome and stretching between the former Tuscan and Neapolitan borders.

The Emperor now tried to adjust his policy to a situation in Italy which he had not foreseen. In December, 1859, there appeared another brochure by La Guéronnière entitled *Le Pape et le Congrès*, which again gave expression to the Emperor's position. It affirmed that the temporal power of the Papacy was necessary to safeguard the interests of the Church,² but maintained that the extent of its territory need not be very great. "We believe that it is even essential that it be restricted. The smaller the state, the greater will be the sovereign."³ The revolt of Romagna from the Papacy was a *fait accompli*.⁴ But that did not mean a diminution of the temporal power of the Pope. "The authority of the head of the Church does not lie in

¹ King, Bolton, *History of Italian Unity*, vol. ii, pp. 78 et seq.

² *Le Pape et le congrès*, pp. 8-9.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 10-11.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

the extent of a territory which he can preserve only with the arms of a foreign power. . . ."¹ "The Pope enthroned at Rome and presiding at the Vatican is what impresses the world."² The city of Rome, therefore, would suffice.³ France, it is true, had restored the Pope in 1849; but the circumstances that had made this action necessary had created a misfortune for the Church. France could not again undertake such an expedition, which would be a blow at the moral power of Catholicism.⁴ The brochure, *Le Pape et le Congrès*, accordingly proposed a congress of the powers for the purpose of guaranteeing the Pope the possession of the city of Rome.⁵

In order to excute the ideas that had been thus expressed, Napoleon III, on the 31st of December, wrote a letter to the Pope, saying, that while he recognized the "incontestable rights" of the Holy See over the revolted territory, he thought that the attitude "most consistent with the real interests of the Holy See would be to sacrifice the revolted provinces . . . and to ask the powers to guarantee him the remainder."⁶ But this Pius IX refused to do. On the 8th of January, 1860, he replied to the letter of the Emperor that his oath did not permit him to alienate any portion of the patrimony of his predecessors. "The Pope will never compromise", declared Antonelli.⁷ In 1861 there appeared another brochure by La Guéronnière, *La France, Rome et l'Italie*, which threw the blame for the situation in which the Papacy was placed upon the papal court.⁸

¹ *Le Pape et le congrès*, pp. 23-24.

² *Ibid.*, p. 25.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 28-29.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

⁶ Seignobos, Ch., *Le Déclin de l'empire* (Paris, 1921), p. 14.

⁷ Guéronnière, *La France, Rome et l'Italie* (Paris, 1861), p. 44.

⁸ *Ibid.*, *passim*.

What was the attitude of the Catholics towards the Emperor's Italian policy? A few liberals, such as the Abbé Maret, applauded, believing that it would enable Pius IX to throw off the influence of the "retrograde party" which had dominated the Papacy since 1849, and to return to his original liberal policy. Maret believed that the Emperor's policy was consistent with "the trend of the Catholic policy of France"; that it would continue "the great work of reconciliation of the Church with modern society"; and that it would give satisfaction to "the needs and legitimate desires" of the subjects of the Papacy.¹ But from the very first rumors of war in Italy the majority of Catholics, fearing the effect that such a war would have on the Papacy, had been opposed to it. Events justified their worst fears, and by voice and by pen they attacked the Emperor's policy. Monseigneur Dupanloup, bishop of Orleans, replied to the brochures of La Guéronnière, deploring the policy of the government, and calling upon it to forbid Piedmont to touch the pontifical sovereignty.² Montalembert wrote a brochure, *Pie IX et la France en 1849 et en 1859*, in which he championed the temporal power. And Monseigneur Pie, bishop of Poitiers, published a mandate in which the Emperor was alluded to as Pilate. "Wash thy hands, O Pilate! Posterity will reject thy justification." On the 19th of January, 1860, the Pope issued an encyclical, thanking the French bishops for their perseverance in championing the rights of the Holy See, and urging them to arouse the enthusiasm of the faithful for "the maintenance of the temporal power and of the patrimony of the Holy See, the conservation of which was a matter of interest to all Catholics."³ The *Univers* published this en-

¹ Bazin, *op. cit.*, ii, p. 66.

² *Lettre à M. le vicomte de la Guéronnière* (Paris, 1861), p. 29.

³ Seignobos, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

cyclical; but it was an illegal act of opposition to the government, and Napoleon retaliated by suppressing that paper. The outcome was that the clerical support of the Empire was broken, and the Catholics were henceforth ranged with the opposition.

From 1860 the problem that confronted Napoleon III in his Italian policy was: How could he withdraw the French forces from Rome, and at the same time safeguard the interests of the Papacy and satisfy the demands of the new Kingdom of Italy? ¹ In 1864 he entered into a convention with the Italian government by which it was agreed that the French troops should be withdrawn within two years, and that the Italians should protect the existing dominions of the Holy See. The Pope might organize an army on condition that it should not be used against Italy, and the French troops were to be withdrawn as this army was organized. But this convention pleased neither the Italians, who wanted Rome for the capital of the new Kingdom of Italy, nor the French Catholics who feared for the safety of the temporal power.

At the close of 1866, according to the agreement, the French troops had actually been withdrawn from Rome. In 1867, however, Garibaldi invaded the pontifical territory, and Napoleon once more despatched French troops to occupy Rome. Henceforth the Emperor had no confidence in Italy, and Italy hoped for nothing from Napoleon.² Accordingly after 1867 Napoleon and his ministers chose the easier path of leaving the Roman question unsolved. Neither the French Catholics nor the Italian nationalists were pleased. The Emperor had alienated the sympathy of Italy as well as lost the support of the Catholics at home.

¹ Bourgeois et Clermont, *op. cit.*, pp. 200-217.

² *Ibid.*, p. 217.

The consequence was that July, 1870, found him without an ally, and facing a war with Prussia for which France was ill-prepared.

An Italian policy that was intended to win him popularity amongst the Catholics at home and the support of Italy abroad, was thus one of the causes of the downfall of the rule of Napoleon III. The foundation on which he had built his power proved to be unsound. Two props of the Empire turned out to be instruments of its destruction.

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CHAPTER VII

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
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